Stalemated Populism

and the Case for Citizenship-Driven Social Democracy

Olle Törnquist and Luky Djani

with Surya Tjandra and Osmar Tanjung

The Challenge

The two most outstanding processes of radical transformation in independent Indonesia are the advances in the 1950s and early 1960s of the largest popular movement in the world, led and patronised by reformist communists and President Sukarno; and in the 1990s the democracy movement against Suharto's dictatorship, spearheaded by students and intellectuals. However, the same struggles are respectively marked by the human and political catastrophe in the mid-1960s, and the inability of the pro-democrats to make a difference after 1998 despite economic and political liberalisation. Previous studies of the first period point to the problems of fighting imperialism and private capitalism while at the same time neglecting democratisation as a means to contain authoritarian rule and the political accumulation of economic resources. Analyses of the second period emphasise the challenges of combining issue-oriented struggles for civil society and human rights with efforts to unite labour, farmers, and precarious middle classes, whose interests tend to be divisive in the context of uneven economic growth and elitist democratisation.[1]

[1] For examples of studies examining the first period, see Törnquist (1984a); for the second period, see Aspinall (2005), Djani (2013), Hadiz (1997), van Klinken (2009), Lane (2008), Piryono and Hamid (2014), Tjandra (2016), Törnquist (1984b), (1997), (2000), (2009) and with Budiman (2001), with Prasetyo et al. (2003 and 2011), and Samadhi (2015).

As in most parts of the Global South, the basic question in Indonesia is, therefore, whether and how people who want more inclusive, equal, and sustainable development can better use and improve fledgling democratic institutions, despite unfavourable conditions. It is true that the conditions in countries like Indonesia differ from those in the 20th century Global North. In many parts of the North, at least, comprehensive industrialisation, the rule of law, and democratisation enabled the rise of broad class-based social democratic-oriented movements and regimes. Hence, it has been that in the South, where this is not at hand, social democratic development (broadly defined as democratic politics towards the combination of social equity and economic growth) is not a viable proposition (e.g. Therborn 2012, 2014). However, recent studies of the problems and options of reinventing social democracy (Törnquist and Harriss 2016), as well as our own study of efforts in Indonesia (2016) by new populist leaders and related movements since the early 2000s, suggest otherwise. They indicate (i) that the very uneven growth and shallow democracy in the South may foster a new generation of counter movements; and (ii) that these movements may be based less on specific class interests and solidarities than on citizens' demands for equal civil, political, and social rights.

If so, this would be an upside-down scenario in comparison with the paradigmatic case of social democracy. The Scandinavian history of remarkably broad labour movements to counter the world economic crises of the early 1930s with pre-Keynesian public works and investments, and then social growth pacts between well-organised representatives of capital and labour, generated capacity and interest (even among employers) in welfare reforms that also fostered economic development. The possible scenario in countries in the Global South with uneven development, rather, is that struggles for rights, welfare, and impartial implementation pave the way for more unified and stronger organisations, as well as social growth pacts.

Openings

Would this really be feasible? The basic problem for alternative actors remains that of building broad alliances and sustaining them. In the early 2000s, however, there were two structural openings, including in Indonesia. The first opening was the rise of what, in comparative studies, has been labelled post-clientelism. This applies especially to urban areas. Indonesian post-dictatorial politics was not just about freedoms and national elections, but also the radical devolution of decisions and funds to districts and towns. Mayors and governors had to negotiate with parties, local parliaments, and extra-parliamentary actors to get things done. Subsequent direct elections made broad popular support increasingly important. These elections did not generate more policy-oriented politics and better representation. Rather, in addition to negotiations between party bosses and their clients, there was a need to reach out more broadly, to engage popular figures and groups, to conduct popularity surveys, and to engage professional campaign workers and activists (Buehler 2007, Pratikno 2009, Qodary 2009). On top of traditional clientelism, with tight and expensive relations between politicians and their dependents, there was a need for wider horse trading, universal programmes, and extensive populism. We delineate populism, generally, in terms of anti-elitism and supposedly direct relations between acclaimed leaders and a notoriously unspecified 'people'. In this context, therefore, it was also possible at times for progressive civil society associations, as well as sectoral labour and urban poor organisations, to enter into favourable deals with populist oriented leaders.

The second opening grew out of the Asian economic crisis in the late 1990s. On one side of the playing field, many dominant actors, who had expanded their interest in extra-economic control of natural resources to opportunities in the rapidly growing industrial and urban areas, faced political and economic uncertainties. On the other side, workers, and wide sections of the middle classes were hard hit, and increasing numbers of dislocated and unemployed labourers had to squat in open places and riversides and turn to petty trading in the streets. In

addition, wide sections of the population were affected by the neo-liberal version of uneven growth in the form of more flexible employment conditions and the outsourcing of some production and services to units with lower wages and less regulations. Unions' bargaining power was reduced and increasingly many workers and middle classes suffered from precarious employment conditions. These hardships brought together many sections of people in demands for public welfare measures. Insightful union leaders even began to contemplate alliances with outsourced and informal sector labourers to sustain their bargaining power and affect politics. In the process, it also became necessary for politicians with a popular following and an interest in attracting investors, in terms of loyal and cheap labour, to consider public welfare measures.

Prime questions and design

The one million-dollar question, then, is to what extent and in what way these structural openings really transfer into effective counter movements that might foster social democratic development. To find out, we have studied the two most outstanding processes over time: (i) the development of informal social contracts between new populist leaders, urban poor, and civil society activists, best illustrated by what happened in the royal country town of Solo, Central Java; and, (ii) the remarkably broad and briefly successful KAJS alliance (Komite Aksi Jaminan Sosial or Action Committee of Social Insurance) uniting unions and civil society activists with progressive politicians in promoting social policies and legislation on health protection. The Solo model of a social contract, with Joko 'Jokowi' Widodo in the forefront, gave rise to new leadership in Jakarta and the presidential palace, but also faced many stumbling blocks. The KAJS campaign, meanwhile, was followed by additional attempts at broad alliances based on movements from below, though most of these were run aground.

In the following sections, we analyse the character and dilemmas of the new politics in these two cases over time, i.e. from around 2004 until late 2016. In view of relevant international experiences, we focus on what characterised the social contracts and alliances, what problems occurred, and what lessons may be learnt.

We shall first introduce the actors and course of events in the two cases. We will then focus on the general conclusions from a more extensive research report (Djani and Törnquist et al. 2016). We round up with a summary of the problems and options for activists in favour of social democratic development. We rely primarily on relevant previous experiences as well as studies of our own and by colleagues. We also use conversations, focus group discussions, and workshops with actors, supplemented by participatory observation.[2]

The Solo-Jokowi model

The first case is about the possibility for civil society activists and popular groups to rally behind populist leaders in need of legitimacy and votes in direct local and presidential elections, and to use thus-acquired elite-dominated resources and contacts with wider sections of the population to foster more progressive politics and policies. The foremost case was in the Central Javan city of Solo (Surakarta).[3] This refers to the unofficial social contract on urban development between leading politicians in the PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia –

[2] Lead authors Luky Djani (as part of his recent PhD dissertation and follow-up studies) and Olle Törnquist (since the early 1980s) have done related research, including in cooperation with activists. Among the supportive authors, Osmar Tanjung is the former director of the NGO forum in Medan, now secretary general of *Seknas Jokowi* and independent public commissioner in one of Indonesia's state owned plantation companies (PTPN-IV). Surya Tjandra, meanwhile, was a leading activist in the KAJS and conducted research for his PhD dissertation on unions' struggle in favour of social security reforms.

[3] Cf. Pratikno and Lay 2013. Thanks also to several informants during authors field visits to Solo, in particular Akbar of KOMPIP (a local NGO that has been active in promoting citizens' participation agenda); April 2015. Also consulted are Törnquist's conversations with activists in Solo in the late-1980, 1990s, and especially in late 2006, early 2007, and late 2013.

Perjuangan or Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle) and activists in CSOs and sectoral popular organisations.

Solo has a long history, during and after colonial rule, of popular struggles that often resulted in advances tempered by chaotic and destructive events. In the 1950s and early 1960s, it was a stronghold of the PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia or Indonesian Communist Party), thereafter suffering badly from the repression. Many years later, towards the end of Suharto's regime, it was again a centre of activism, this time in the context of a campaign against his Golkar party (Budiman and Törnquist 2001). In the years to follow, it was hard-hit by the Asian economic crisis. As a result, many people had problems making ends meet, often having to squat in open places and riversides and turn to petty trading in the streets. A few years after the fall of Suharto, however, times began to change.

First, substantial funds were devolved to the regencies and towns, including Solo, in the context of decentralisation.[4] Second, even though the PDI-P won Solo's first local parliamentary elections in 2000, the prospective mayor, Slamet Suryanto, did not get sufficient support from the party. As such, he added agreements with local oligarchs and other powerful actors, strategic sections of the bureaucracy, as well as civil society organisations and sectoral interest groups. In 2005, Jokowi and his deputy F.X. Hadi 'Rudy' Rudyatmo were elected in the new country-wide direct elections of political executives. However, they too did not get a clear majority of votes in the first term. As a result, they even opted for wider extra-parliamentary support from civil and sectoral groups, but within an increasingly populist framework. The cooperation with the grass roots was, on the one hand, territorial in the

[4] Indonesia's radical agenda of decentralisation began to be implemented in 2001. Local governments received substantial portion of their budget from the central government. In the early stage of decentralisation, on average, 90% the local governments' budget came from external sources. This substantial external funding strengthened the local governments and especially the associated elites.

context of Indonesia's so-called *musrenbang* (*musyawarah perencanaan pembangunan* or participatory development planning). *Musrenbang* was sponsored and celebrated by foreign donors as part of the hype around decentralisation, direct democracy, and the experiments in Porto Alegre (the political emergence and design of which was conveniently neglected).[5] On the other hand, however, the cooperation was also with sectoral popular interest groups among poor people, from hawkers to sex workers. In terms of capacity and impact, the sectoral organisations were most crucial. They were facilitated by both civil society groups (with external financial support) and special task forces (*satgas*), organised under the PDI-P. Basic problems included that, despite Solo's long history of popular struggles, modern and progressive ideologies had been repressed. As such, organisations picked their options among the facilitators, depending on what they found to be immediately most favourable. Moreover, the consultations with the mayor and his administration were informal and often with one actor at the time. Nevertheless, new linkages between government and society were established—and they fostered political capacity among sectoral groups. Most famously, the linkages were utilised to negotiate urban development in Solo in ways that could be accepted by politicians, administrators, businesses, as well as the urban poor. This proved successful, and Jokowi in particular gained national and international reputation as a good popular leader and administrator. Hence, we need to discuss in the remaining sections of the essay what these advances really rested on.

In the next elections (2010), Jokowi and Rudy got more than 90% of the votes. This made Jokowi an attractive figure for the political elites in Jakarta, who were searching for an electable candidate in the 2012 gubernatorial elections. Jokowi ran together with Basuki Tjahaja 'Ahok' Purnama, a Christian mining engineer of ethnic Chinese background from the

[5] For a recent summary, see Antlov 2013.

Bangka Islands outside Sumatra. Essentially, they tried to scale up the lessons from Solo and to add Ahok's managerial skills. However, in spite of several advances, primarily within welfare policies, governance, and infrastructural development, there were also problems scaling up the Solo model. These difficulties were primarily in terms of fostering and building effective cooperation with civil society and popular organisations. The prime question, then, is why this was more difficult in Jakarta.

In face of the national elections in 2014, moreover, Jokowi was also attracted to run as presidential candidate, drawing again on the good reputation from Solo as well as the positive trends in Jakarta. However, he was only able to win with a tiny margin against a former general and son-in-law of Suharto, the immensely wealthy businessman Prabowo Subianto. Once in office, Jokowi was unable to make full use of the anti-corruption movement to counter crooked politics and to facilitate cooperation with CSOs and popular organisations to foster his own reforms. Priority was given instead to transactional politics, primarily within the elite. By the end of 2016, it was his political opponents who had managed to mobilise mass support. This they so by utilising religious identity politics and drawing on discontent among the urban poor. In the largest demonstrations since the overthrow of Suharto, Ahok was dubiously accused of blasphemy and correctly of neglecting the plight of the poor. The question for our essay is thus: what were the major problems involved in the failure of scaling up the Solo model?

The KAJS labour alliance, and the attempts to follow up

The second case refers to the successful efforts in Greater Jakarta in 2010–2012 by a number of leading unions, interest organisations, and civil society groups, as well as progressive

parliamentarians to form a broad alliance (coordinated by the previously mentioned action group KAJS) in support of legislation for and the implementation of a national insurance system, especially universal health insurance (Law No. 11/2011 on Badan Penyelenggara Jaminan Sosial [Social Security Executing Agency, the BPJS]).[6] The bill had been introduced in 2004 under then-President Megawati, but had been neglected under subsequent President Yudhoyono, and by late 2009 was about to be scrapped. Some legislators managed to draft a proposal, and broad extra-parliamentary mobilisation made their proposal real. This indicated that there was, indeed, a possibility to build alliances among scattered unions and informal labour as well as sections of the middle classes. There were now efforts towards national mobilisation for better labour conditions and attempts to launch labour candidates in the parliamentary elections.

It proved difficult, however, to follow up the struggle for additional welfare and labour reforms and to sustain broad unity. The initially fruitful cooperation with the then-governors of Jakarta, Jokowi and Ahok, came to nothing. In face of the presidential elections, the leaders of the best organised and militant trade unions—those of metal workers, which had been crucial in the KAJS alliance—even opted for supporting Prabowo. By late 2016, the same leaders backed up the religious identity politics in Jakarta against Ahok and Jokowi. The major additional question for our essay is, thus, why the initial success was followed by disaster?

To summarise the issues at stake: What were the pillars of the Solo model? Why was it so difficult to scale up to Jakarta and to serve as a basis for national governance? What were the basics of the KAJS alliance, and why was it so problematic to sustain? Is there a way ahead?

[6] For details of the KAJS movement, see Tjandra (2016: 138–146) and Cole (2012).

In the following sections, we shall suggest that the answers boil down to three factors: (i) the relative strength of civil and sectoral groups to enforce social contracts and reforms; (ii) these groups' political capacity to make use of new opportunities; (iii) the devastating practice of transactional politics, which now spread from that of horse trading between the elites to negotiations between populist politicians and leaders of CSOs and interest groups. These factors are certainly interrelated, but nevertheless possible to hold them apart for analytical purposes. The conclusion is that the possibility to further develop popular democratic politics in the context of populism presupposes citizen rights-based efforts to promote the democratic representation of crucial issues and interests.

(1) The importance of strong civil and sectoral groups

Our first argument is that the above-mentioned attempts at transformative populist alliances presupposed that the civil and sectoral groups had become strong enough to enforce social contracts and transformative policies. While this was the case in Solo, it was not in Jakarta. This, in turn, was certainly due to contextual factors (which we shall return to), but the first basic point is simply that civil and sectoral groups must be strong enough to demand and negotiate political deals. Let us look at the details. Our conclusion is based on several indicators.

When Jokowi and Rudy were elected in Solo in 2005, their main focus included making the city more liveable for the middle classes, fostering good governance and investments, and to even turning the city into a tourist destination by bringing back 'the spirit of Java'. One prerequisite for this was removing squatters along the riverbanks and hawkers in public places. Jokowi, in particular, had projected himself as a non-elitist mouthpiece of ordinary people's

ideas and ambitions, and as being in favour of direct links with popular and civic partners in society rather than party bosses and their clientelist networks. However, the urban poor refused mayoral instructions to pull out. Their civil and sectoral organisations had become stronger during the cooperation with the previous mayor and while backing Jokowi. So, given that repressive solutions were politically unviable, Jokowi and Rudy had to negotiate decent solutions.[7] It was these successful negotiations towards urban development in favour of businesses and middle classes, by moderating the effects for the poor and less well-off, that became known as the Solo model. As a result, Jokowi gained the reputation of a good leader, his team won 90% of the votes in the next elections, and he moved on to become governor of Jakarta and president of the country. By then, however, it was conveniently forgotten that the successful deal in Solo rested with the fact that the popular groups had become stronger since the early 2000, and could thus insist on meaningful negotiations that resulted in win-win deals.

Weaker civil and sectoral partners in Jakarta

Similar logic applied to the national parliament's approval in 2010 of the long neglected draft law on universal health. The positive decision was very much thanks to strong outside pressure from the KAJS alliance, to which we shall return shortly. The attempt to scale up the Solo model ran into trouble because the political capacity of the sectoral groups and citizen organisations was insufficient in Jakarta, and because Jokowi and his team did little to foster their capacity.

Let us turn to the details. The main challenge to scaling up the Solo model to Jakarta was not that several civil society activists initially supported the independent middle-class oriented

[7] In interviews with street vendor-cum-activists, we were told about their willingness to confront the Solo administration's instruction to move from public space just before the Indonesian Independence Day ceremony in August 2006. Some of the informants said that they would defend their 'right' to exist in the public park because it was their only place to sell goods. Other informants (journalists, university lecturers) also confirm this story.

economist Faisal Basri rather than Jokowi. There were volunteer groups in support of Basri (Jakarta Kita) on the hamlet (RW) and neighbourhood (RT) level; and there was a social democratic oriented platform to attract non-oligarchic business, middle classes, and workers. Nevertheless, there were few popular welfare reform proposals, and unions and many radicals did not come along. So, when Jokowi and his partner candidate 'Ahok' began to campaign with more resources and a more effective message based on good track records of promoting social welfare issues such as education, health, and social protection of the poor, they gained the upper hand and many shifted their support from Basri to Jokowi.[8] Moreover, Jokowi was particularly successful in 'selling' his populist programmes, especially in the media. Journalists covered his frequent visits to troubled neighbourhoods, where he wore chequered common man's shirts, used simple means of transportation, and rarely made speeches, instead humbly listening to stories of local people's problems (which his team had prepared him for).

The more serious problem of scaling up the Solo model was that the negotiation and cooperation with civil society organisations and urban poor could not be duplicated in Jakarta. Many civil society groups focussed on general advocacy and on lobbying the national government and parliament, thus keeping 'local' elections at arms length. While civil organisations and sectoral groups in Solo had gained some clout in the context of historical activism and the needs of certain political elites to get extra-parliamentary support, little of this applied to Jakarta. Jokowi's main advisor in this regard, Eko Sulistyo (former director of a local CSO in Solo[9]), was brought over to Jakarta, but had to apply quick fixes in unchartered waters, with the support of scattered civil society activists and community facilitators, and

[8] Interviews and conversations with Sukma Widyanti, former secretary general of Pergerakan Indonesia (Indonesia Movement, PI) of which Faisal Basri was the chairman (Djani, May 2016) and Wardah Hafid, former chairperson of UPC (Törnquist, continuously). See also Nugroho 2014.
[9] Konsorsium Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat untuk Monitoring dan Pemberdayaan Institusi Publik (Consortium of Non-Governmental Organisations for Monitoring and Empowering Public Institutions, Kompip)

local fixers gained ground too.[10] As such, even when support was provided for local people to get access to public services such as healthcare, our informants and early results from research by Retna Hanani (2015) suggest that this may have been in the form of patronage in exchange for political support rather than the facilitation of active citizenship in which people themselves would get to know their rights and how they could claim and extend them. As we shall soon see, there were also few attempts on part of Jokowi and his team to boost the strength of the CSOs and sectoral groups. The latter were also unsuccessful in fostering their own political capacity.

In fact, even Jokowi's appointment as presidential candidate was much less a matter of popular movement support than the ability of well-connected progressive leaders to convince Megawati and her PDI-P party of Jokowi's popularity and electability.[11] This was only partially compensated by intensified populist measures and media exposure through networking, social media, and voluntary campaign organisations such as Pro Jokowi (Projo). Another voluntary organisation, Seknas Jokowi, tried to bring together committed experts and leading activists in suggesting specific policies, but was mainly able to initiate alliances from above.

Lack of civic- and sectoral-based policies paves the way for elitism

In short, there was indeed a movement behind Jokowi as a non-corrupt and fairly simple businessman from outside the Jakarta elite who had proven capable of advancing and facilitating some change without being an oligarch or the son of either a general or famous politician. The Solo model of cooperation with popular groups and civil society organisations

[10] See Savirani and Saedi (2016). Personal communication with Ian Wilson (Djani).
[11] Personal communication with Cornelis Lay (Yogyakarta, February 2016).

was not yet feasible in Jakarta and many other places. Since the quick fixes were insufficient, and Jokowi and his team had not worked out a proactive concept to foster such organisations but resorted to reactive problem-solving, the basic policy orientation and commitments were severely constrained by his powerful political and economic sponsors within the elite.

The response from Jokowi and his team was to combine commitment to liberal economics (applauded by major Indonesian and international businessmen) with the recalling of populist-oriented Sukarnoism in terms of political sovereignty, economic self-sufficiency, and cultural dignity (known as *Trisakti*) as well as promises to foster public welfare programmes.[12] However, towards the end of the presidential campaign, there were not many attractive reform programmes to put up against the contending presidential candidate, a retired general turned businessman and former son-in-law of Suharto, Prabowo Subianto. Prabowo (and his brother) relied on huge funds and a massive smear campaign. As such, Jokowi would probably have lost[13] had quite different actors with new visions not entered the scene.

This was reminiscent of 1998, when the moral force of students filled the streets and the parliament ground, making several key ministers tender their resignations and thus tipping the balance against Suharto. This time, cultural activists mobilised huge numbers of people for a merry concert that ignited hopes for a better future in which everybody wanted to be part. In the end Jokowi won, with a thin margin. However, just as the civil society activists and students in 1998 disintegrated within a few months, and were marginalised by the moderate elite, the equally spontaneously organised volunteers behind Jokowi were immediately kept at bay as soon as the election was over.

[12] See the Nawacita document for more details. For a summary, see https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B1CjVjvMelBScGNRbnhnR1JRbEU/view?pref=2&pli=1 (accessed 19.06.2016)
[13] According to credible pollsters, the gap between Jokowi and Prabowo narrowed in the last week prior to voting . This situation brought in the question of why the 'Jokowi effect' was more limited than predicted (see Aspinall and Mietzner 2014).

It is true that political parties may lose control over the campaign process in direct elections, as the candidates' electoral machineries and supportive popular organisations, families, and networks as well as professional canvassers become more imperative. However, the playground is different once the votes have been cast (Buehler and Tan 2007). Immediately prior to the inauguration of Jokowi as president, key players established a '*Kantor Transisi'* (Transition Office) with the main party leaders that had backed Jokowi and his vice presidential candidate, Jusuf Kalla. This office became a formal channel not only to design the transfer of powers from the previous administration to Jokowi, but also to prepare the regaining of political control by reconciling and mediating interests, including in the nomination of potential figures as cabinet member.[14] In addition, vice president Jusuf Kalla resumed his major influence over economic policies from the previous presidential administration. One example of the outcome was that Jokowi's quick decision, in tandem, with business to reduce fuel subsidies to foster economic development and welfare, was not combined with the building-up of cooperation with representatives of labourers, farmers, and middle-class people.

In this context, Jokowi was caught between two camps: one that repeated Jokowi's promise that cabinet members should be professional and competent, and another that maintained that political parties who supported Jokowi's candidacy should have crucial positions in the cabinet. To strengthen his position, Jokowi shared the burden of screening potential members of the cabinet with the anti-corruption commission, KPK (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi or Corruption Eradication Commission). The party bosses were certainly frustrated, but turned to a hard struggle for clean proxy candidates with sometimes dubious qualifications, thus

[14] *Tempo* magazine, 15 September 2014 edition, 'Transisi Setengah Mati'

continuing to block progressive candidates. In addition, the anti-corruption agency's screening was undermined by concerted efforts on part of the police, the military, the judiciary, and their allies. In previous conflicts between KPK and police, over attempts by the KPK to investigate and prosecute high ranking police officials for involvement in graft, the KPK leaders had stood out as absolutely clean. In this conflict, however, the police managed to detect some minor offences on part of KPK's leading commissioners, Abraham Samad and Bambang Widjojanto. As such, they had to be suspended. To make things worse, attempts to mobilise public support for KPK did not include a cross-sectoral movement. As such, Jokowi could not stand tall. He had to search for compromises through a consultative group, which did not help much, and by appointing temporary commissioners, which made KPK a lame duck. Civil society groups and popular organisations did not manage to counter this through a broad alliance opposing the vested interests involved or promoting the progressive candidates suggested by Jokowi's team. The progressive candidates did not even present firm programmes so that the populace could be convinced that the struggle for efficient governance was crucial for their own efforts at a better life. The appointment of new commissioners was thus thoroughly undermined by disgraceful horse-trading; and this was followed by additional measures to weaken the KPK. The end result was that there was almost no representation in the new government of the groups that aspired to scale up the Solo project and promote alliances such as the KAJS.

Anti-corruption movements can make a difference

Anti-corruption movements can do better. In India's capital New Delhi, activists transforming an anti-corruption movement into a party managed to win the local elections in 2013 and again in 2015 by a landslide. The immediate background was the India Against Corruption

(IAC) movement that evolved in the late 2000s. Major attention was given to grand scale abuse of public resources, but also to politically facilitated capital accumulation in which poor people were dispossessed of the land where they lived and earned their livelihoods. This attracted extensive media attention. The major demand was for an independent anti-corruption ombudsman, or Lokpal. When some concessions were given, and there were valid critiques against activists trying to impose decisions on the elected parliament, the movement began to lose steam. However, the response of several activists proved historical: in late 2012, they decided to continue the struggle by 'going politics', by transforming the movement into a party, AAP (Aam Aadmi Party, or the Common Man's Party), and participating in the local election in New Delhi. The main focus was simple: to curb corruption and put an end to dirty politics through participatory democracy. The claims for more democracy were also related to the growing concerns, among the young generation in particular, over gender rights and problems of rape.

Remarkably, the AAP activists managed to bypass vote banks based on party favours and ethnic and religious networks-cum-clientelism, by relating some of the most-immediate problems for many people in Delhi regarding the public provisioning of basic services, such as water and electricity, to corruption.[15] Also, the activists provided immediate voluntary assistance on how citizens could claim their rights, and engaged them in selecting AAP's candidates and in drawing up the main action programmes of the party. Corruption is certainly not the root of the problems in India, and APP does not even have a policy for problems of labour, such as jobs and employment conditions, as well as the many other issues that cannot be handled on the local level or by participation in neighbourhood and town hall meetings. However, APP's focused on the immediate basic needs of many people, poor as well as

[15] For the AAP experience, see in particular Harriss (2016), Ramani (2013); Shukla (2013), Palshikar (2013), Roy (2014) ; Naqvi (2015); Palshikar 2016; and the Hindu review of its performances 14.02.2016.

middle classes, and addressed them through democratic active citizenship and collective political action. It is true that a number of mistakes by the then AAP-led local government (which was short of an agenda for how to really implement many of its promises) were followed by presidential rule and total failure in the national elections in 2014. The latter indicates very clearly that AAP was a movement with deep roots in Delhi only. The persistent media hype about corruption was an insufficient as a basis for launching the party just about anywhere else. In Delhi, however, the party made an astonishing comeback in early 2015, winning 67 of 70 seats in local elections. It is true that, in a week or so, the movement-cum-party proved that even though it talked much of genuine democracy, it could not handle its own internal problems and instead stood out as a rather top-down driven populist party without a convincing capacity to govern. However, this is an important but purely political weakness that could have been avoided. Essentially, AAP has proven that it is possible to broaden and link anti-corruption issues to ordinary people's concerns and thus make a political difference. As of late, it has made some headway in improving the conditions for people in New Delhi.

In Indonesia, however, as we have seen, there was no concept and strategy to upgrade the civil and sectoral organisations in Jakarta and behind Jokowi as president. It is true that some attempts were made after the presidential elections to establish linkages between grassroots activists, presidential advisors, and a key ministry (that of village and rural development) that could foster participation from the ground. This, however, came to nothing when Jokowi appointed conservatives as his head of staff and the afore-mentioned ministry. In essence, a populist figure without an organised popular movement to back him up—and no policies to facilitate such a movement—was expected to combine more focus on welfare with market-

oriented economic growth in cooperation with big Indonesian business and international partners. This was not realistic, nor did it catch the imagination of many people.

Weak civil and popular based policies open up for right-wing populism

Later on, weak civic and popular partners (and the inability to foster them) translated into Jokowi having less capacity in Jakarta than in Solo to stand up against malevolent post-Jokowi policies to 'clean up the city' (including by evicting squatters) and thus foster rapid economic development and gain the support of the middle classes. Inhabitants who were not acknowledged as citizens of Jakarta had to leave, while those who were accepted and provided with public housing had to pay substantial rents or leave within six months.[16] Generally, until late 2016, Ahok seemed to gain sufficient ground for these harsher policies among the middle classes. However, politicians contending in the forthcoming gubernatorial elections, along with socio-religious Muslim organisations, supported the infamous FPI (Front Pembela Islam or Islamic Defenders Front) in its campaign against Ahok for allegedly having committed blasphemy when criticising how certain leaders had turned a verse in the Qur'an against him). Ahok's ill-advised statement, as well as his opponents' identity politics, not only put Indonesia's remarkable pluralism and multiculturalism at risk. Perhaps worse, it provided a locus around which contending politicians and Muslim groups could mobilise the urban poor that Ahok had neglected and even evicted (to show his middle class supporters that he could deliver speedily) (cf. Wilson 2016). Suddenly, Indonesia was far away from Jokowi's Solo model of negotiating social contracts, much more reminiscent of Modi's India and of the American and European right-wing populist politicians that had managed to gain substantial support from extremists and racists as well as long-neglected working people.

[16] Personal communication with Dono of UPC (Yogyakarta, February 2016).

(2) Problems of taking advantage of the new opportunities

The second challenge for progressive actors in the context of the new populist politics is to take advantage of new opportunities in order to combine territory-, issue-, and sector-based movements in broad collective action, develop transformative strategies, and scale up localised action.

Unresolved challenges in building citizenship and popular policies from below

One aspect of this is Indonesia's so-called participatory planning *musrembang*, which was sponsored and celebrated by foreign donors as part of the hype around decentralisation, direct democracy, and participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre.[17] However, the *musrembang* programme has tended to be elite-dominated, depoliticised, and rarely provide space for collective interest based groups. As such, it has not been a breeding ground for broad collective action. Moreover, the importance of the Labour Party (PT) in Brazil in designing and kicking off participatory budgeting had been conveniently set aside. In addition, though it is true (as in Indonesia) that much of the populist Brazilian policies and democratic deliberative processes developed in the framework of decentralisation and direct elections, it is obvious by now that Brazil's local alliances and policies have proven difficult to scale up and thus contain central-level corruption (Baiocchi et al. 2013) and address the increasing multitude of other issues that cannot be handled locally. The same applies to Indonesia.

[17] For a positive recent analysis, see Antlov (2013).

These dilemmas of fostering broad collective action and scaling up local efforts remain neglected in Indonesia's massive new programme for village-level development, which was enacted in 2014 with extensive political support and merry slogans like 'one billion rupiah to each village'. Everybody seems interested in 'doing a Thaksin' (Shinawatra), that is, altering politics by gaining new ground on the local level (Kitilangrap and Hewison 2012). Progressive groups certainly hope that it will be possible to build active citizenship and foster collective action from below. So far, however, public measures directed by the ministry of domestic affairs have mainly been about regulating administration and devolving money, and there is a remarkable shortage of anything like a plan and concept (Lewis 2015). In the Village Law, it was stated that each village (about 73,000 in total) would receive a substantial amount from national budget, roughly around 1 billion rupiah, to foster development and promote better service provisioning. Jokowi, especially, favours infrastructure development (Djani et al. 2016, Yustika 2016). If there are no substantial 'leakages', the Village Funds may certainly foster development and service provision in the less developed and resources-less villages. The funds might even open up an arena beyond the reach of parties and bosses on the central, provincial, and regency levels (Djani et al. 2016). But who will control the village leaders?

The new focus on rural development has often been characterised as a breakthrough to counter Suharto's coercive streamlining and 'floating mass politics' of virtually preventing political engagement on the local level. As already pointed out, one aim is to foster active citizenship 'from below'. However, there is little in the new regulations that would ensure extended rights and capacities to ordinary villagers to control the village elite. The heads of the villages typically get themselves elected by spending huge sums of money, after which they appoint their own staff. Meanwhile, the village councils, which are usually made up of the local elite, remain consultative (White 2016). Even the basic issue of how to reconcile

equal citizenship rights with the possibility of villages applying customary law, or *hukum adat* (for instance, by only granting customary rights to certain crucial policy areas like the rights to land and fishing waters) remains unanswered. Furthermore, there are strong opinions on the role of interest organisations such as farmers in search of land reform and ways of resisting land grabbing. Control of land and other resources has become increasingly unequal. There is little evidence that subordinated people and their organisations will be supported by the new village regulations. The villages are unlikely to be a neutral playing field where it is possible to foster democracy and promote equitable development (Harriss et al. 2004; Sambodho 2016; Ito 2016; White 2016). Experiences from several sites in Indonesia,[18] as well as from neighbouring countries such as the Philippines and Thailand, suggest that the villages are contested arenas where traditional and local social groups have been entrenched for decades and where external linkages and dependency relations are increasingly important. Direct participation is not a panacea. The combination of electoral and interest group representation is crucial but difficult, as proven by the challenges even in the celebrated cases of Brazil and the Indian state of Kerala (Törnquist et al. 2009a). Moreover, much of the Indonesian discourse seems to focus on the very local level, despite the fact that lessons from other cases of decentralisation point to the importance of State capacity to provide fair regulation and support and to facilitate negotiations between different levels of governance. Even the most radical cases of political and economic decentralisation, such as in the Indian state of Kerala, presupposed firm universal regulations and support through the state planning board under progressive leadership and a vibrant popular educational movement.[19] Similarly, as emphasised by scholars such as Joel Migdal (1994), the very linkages between State and society are vital. If they prove insufficient, as they did in Mao's China, the only way out may be the market.

[18] Workshop on 'New Law, New Villages? Changing Rural Indonesia', Leiden 19–20 May, 2016.
[19] The Kerala People's Science Movement

Dilemmas of combining sectoral interests

In Solo, however, it was not so much *musrembang* as sectoral action via popular interest groups among poor people, from hawkers to sex workers, that was crucial. This made an important difference. The interest groups, in turn, were facilitated by both civil society activists (with external financial support) and special strong-arm task forces (*satgas*) under the PDI-P. As previously indicated, the main problem was rather that, while Solo has a long history of popular struggles, modern and progressive ideologies have been repressed, so sectoral groups often picked their options among facilitators for immediate gains. We shall return to the problem of representation.

Sectoral and interest based organisations, including unions, were crucial in Greater Jakarta too, along with some urban poor- and issue-oriented anti-corruption groups. However, it was difficult to combine their efforts and transform divisive sectoral interests into broader citizen rights' policies and strategies. The possibilities, as well as problems, are best illustrated by the efforts in Greater Jakarta in 2010–2012 by leading unions, other interest organisations, civil society groups, and progressive parliamentarians to form a broad alliance in support of universal health insurance (Law No. 11/2011 on Badan Penyelenggara Jaminan Sosial [Social Security Executing Agency, the BPJS]).[20] The work was coordinated by the KAJS mentioned in the beginning of this chapter. The new healthcare system would be as universal as possible, apply to families with up to three children (even if both parents were not employed), and be valid in the country at large (thus benefitting migrant labourers too). Further, it would be based on a system with contributions from employees as well as employers, as well as voluntary inclusion and payments from the well-to-do self-employed, and with the State

[20] For a detailed discussion on the KAJS movement, see Tjandra (2016: 138–146) and Cole (2012).

covering the premiums for the poor. As such, this would also be an incentive for the state to foster good employment relations so that the companies would have to add their share.[21]

In face of the deadline for parliamentary approval in October 2009, the government had not submitted any operational proposals, so Parliament initiated a draft bill. Initially, trade unions responded to the idea of a universal health scheme by defending their previous special benefits for permanent formal sector workers. They were less interested in issues such as healthcare for all and the existing problematic pension scheme for civil servants (Tjandra, 2016: 151). After some time, however, several leaders and members understood that they would gain wider support by incorporating and linking up with broader sections of the working class and civil servants. The increasing informalisation of employment relations did not just affect workers, but also the unions' bargaining power. Calls were made for broader unity, as well as engagement in laws and regulations and in social security reforms. Moreover, the precarious middle-classes also became interested in public welfare reforms.

As such, dozens of national labour unions and CSOs, as well as farmers, fishermen, student organisations, and individuals formed KAJS to push for the implementation of social security reforms. KAJS was formally agreed upon in a meeting on 6–8 March 2010 between a number of unions and other organisations, facilitated in particular by FSPMI (Federasi Serikat Pekerja Metal Indonesia or Federation of Indonesian Metal Workers Union) and its flamboyant chairman Said Iqbal, the supportive Trade Union Rights Centre (TURC), and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.[22] This brought to mind the frequent examples of social movement trade unionism—i.e. that unions initiate broader alliances beyond the factory gates—that have been

[21] Formal and permanent employment relationships, rather than contractual and outsourcing ones, are preferable for the BPJS as it is easier it to collect the premiums. By now, close to 163 million of Indonesia's some 255 million people are enrolled (including all family members).

[22] The founding members of KAJS also included the Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Indonesia (Confederation of Indonesian Workers Unions, KSPI), the Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (All Indonesian Confederation of Trade Unions, KSPSI), and the Komite Buruh Untuk Aksi Reformasi (Workers Committee for Reform, Kobar).

so important in, for example, South Africa (Williams 2015). KAJS never really managed, however, to bring aboard informal labourers (such as domestic labour) on an equal footing. This brings to mind the problems of involving South Africa's informal labour and the Indian experiences where they have had to organise on their own (Agarwala 2013; Seekings and Nettrass 2015).

The need for transformative policies

However, in spite of the success in enforcing the initiation of a universal social security scheme, the campaign proved temporary. There was little in terms of a transformative strategy to make the reforms a first step that would open up for more advanced policies and to truly reach out to informal labour, and the reforms did not generate demands for the efficient, non-corrupt governance of the schemes. Separate anti-corruption campaigns monitored the obstacles and problems faced by people accessing service provisions, particularly in the health and education sectors, but these efforts related primarily to the urban middle classes. Efforts to engage union activists in a 'BPJS watch' were undermined by political divisions in the presidential elections. In view of international experiences, the much-needed long-term sequences of reforms may include unemployment and educational schemes. This would be to the benefit of both formal and informal labour (and middle classes), as well as those employers who are focussing not only on exploiting cheap labour, getting access to attractive land and concessions, and extracting natural resources, but competing and profiting through efficient and more advanced production. Links between welfare reforms and inclusive economic growth—which were the basis of social democratic development in northern Europe, especially Scandinavia—are particularly important to avoid bifurcation between handouts for the poor and neo-liberal uneven growth (Törnquist and Harriss 2016). Unfortunately, the latter even applied, partly, to the Brazilian Fome Zero programmes, including Bolsa Familia, and to de-informalisation of employment relations (Saa-Filho 2015

and Maurizio 2015). In South Africa, meanwhile, the ANC and the trade unions have not really fostered strategies to handle the basic problem of unemployment (Seekings and Nattrass 2015).

In temporary conclusion, the problem was not only that civil society associations and sectoral groups were relatively weaker in Jakarta and on the national level than in Solo, where they had been able to enforce negotiations and cooperation with Jokowi. This section has also pointed to a number of challenges faced by the associations and organisations themselves in strengthening their positions within the new space of post-clientelism and broad interest in welfare policies: the problems of scaling up localised actions, combining sectoral interests, and developing transformative long-term policies.

(3) Dilemmas of populist transactionalism

The third and possibly most strategic dilemma for progressive actors in the context of new populist politics is that their organisations and influence are part of a populist version of the transactional politics among elites as well as liberal democratic lobbyism.[23] This problem was obvious already in Solo: consultations between the mayor and civil society activists and sectoral popular groups were informal and often involved one actor at the time. The populist leaders preferred feudal-like informal and separate negotiations with CSOs and sectoral group partners. Nothing was fixed, and thus when Jokowi shifted to Jakarta much of the populist flavour in Solo and some of the practices faded away.

Populist transactionalism prevents the scaling up of the KAJS alliance

[23] The essence of populist politics, we may recall, is anti-elitism and supposedly direct relations between acclaimed leaders and a notoriously unspecified 'people'.

Similar problems of populist transactionalism constrained the scaling up of the KAJS alliance. Initially there were promising attempts. Despite the lack of a transformative strategy, the alliance had demonstrated the potential of the trade union movement. Several of the unions and leaders joined forces in two national strikes in 2012 and 2013 to push the government to develop a number of regulations that favoured not only permanently employed workers, including additional components to be considered in deciding the minimum wage and further restrictions on outsourcing. Moreover, the key KAJS member organisations FSPMI and KSPI (Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Indonesia or Confederation of Indonesian Trade Unions) remained active and followed up previous attempt to launch candidates in local elections in Batam by engaging more broadly in the 2014 parliamentary elections (Ford 2014). Some cadres were encouraged to run within different parties (as they could not participate through a labour party of their own) but with a joint campaign. One strategic aim was to demonstrate that workers (and unions) were fighting not only in their own interests, but also for society at large. Even though the main point in the campaign strategy was to focus on mobilising votes from the rank and file of labour ('*buruh pilih buruh*'), a crucial slogan was 'from factory to the public sphere' ('*dari pabrik ke publik*'). The unions and members believed that, by joining central and local parliaments, they would become more effectively involved in changing policies and regulations in favour of the workers and the entire population (Tjandra 2014). Concerned academicians, as well as labour and peasant organisations such as the TURC and Omah Tani, a peasant-based group in Batang, Central Java, assisted in training workers in the processes of voting, monitoring, and developing campaign strategies. The outcome was only two legislative seats in the important industrial regency of Bekasi, West Java. This, however, was the first time that a union had successfully obtained seats for its candidates in parliament through coordinated efforts between the union and its supporters (Tjandra 2016: 265-259).

At the same time, however, it proved difficult to further develop the initially good contacts between the unions in and around Jakarta and the Jokowi–Ahok team. The new governors had increased the minimum wage substantially, which also strengthened the bargaining power of the unions outside Jakarta proper. In addition, the deputy governor wanted to discuss how increased minimum wages could be combined with improvements in welfare and industrial policies, as well as a reduction of costs other than wages, including paybacks. Union leaders, however, did not come along, as there were no firm and concrete promises that they could show to their members. Jokowi and Ahok had simply not provided a format for trustworthy negotiations between unions, employers, and the government. For their part, the unions did not put forward a concept of their own. As such, the positions of the unions and politicians returned to zero, essentially meaning that trust and collective action suffered and that all took care of their immediate benefits and careers.

In face of the presidential elections, Said Iqbal, the KSPI's chairman, even decided to support Prabowo with little (if any) consultation with other union leaders. The alliance was launched in front of some eighty thousand members during the International Labour Day celebrations at Indonesia's largest football stadium, Bung Karno Stadium (Caraway and Ford 2014). There were reports that the FSPMI leaders undermined and even aggressively suppressed their members' concerns. Meanwhile, other groups of unions supported Jokowi, including KSPSI (Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia or the All-Indonesia Workers Union Confederation) and KSBSI (Konfederasi Serikat Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia or the Indonesian Confederation of Trade Unions for Prosperity). The competition was fierce and even brutal, causing polarisation that, according to some observers, put Indonesia's fledgling democracy in danger (Aspinall and Mietzner 2014). FSPMI was the most advanced trade union in Indonesia in terms of capacity to organise and mobilise members and allies, but at the time it had neither

been able to balance the needs for organisational efficiency and internal democracy nor counter the reluctance of Jokowi and Ahok to foster more comprehensive negotiations with a concept on its own. As such, despite having been a major pillar of KAJS and the associated ideas of sustaining broader transformative alliances, there was now a strong tendency for the union to focus merely on its core members' and its leaders' special interests. Even some friendly international unions reacted strongly.

After the election, efforts were made by the president and his staff to build more fruitful cooperation and move ahead by inviting representatives from various unions and labour groups (such as migrant care) to discuss various demands. However, instead of reaching a common agenda of vital issues that could be turned into policies, union leaders asked for public positions for their own benefits. Jokowi followed suit by appointing representatives from SBSI and SPSI, as well salaried commissioners in some State-owned enterprises related to housing development and postal services. Moreover, the government did not try again to discuss crucial matters with the unions, such as the regulation of minimum wages, but simply imposed new regulations in 2015 (Government Regulation No. 78/2015) with the support of the employers. It is also remarkable that unions were reluctant to engage in related constructive discussions, but rather launched another (not very successful) national strike.

In short, the KAJS movement pointed to openings for broader alliances. However, the stumbling block of developing more long-term transformative policies and strategies, as well as an organisational framework for comprehensive discussion between unions, employers, informal labour, and the government on issues wider than wages meant that this potential was lost in populist transactionalism.

Populist transactionalism constrains the Jokowi regime to elitism

The president and his team did poorly in other respects too, and Jokowi's rates of approval and popularity came down. Jokowi was constrained by the priorities of his vice president, Jusuf Kalla. Several members of the cabinet did not perform well, and were directed by their party leaders (including Megawati) and their own ambitions. Most seriously, instead of countering this by strengthening extra parliamentary actors that he could cooperate with and thus gain strength from (as in Solo), Jokowi and his team continued to negotiate informally and individually with various actors. This gave the upper hand to discretionary decisions on part of the rulers and undermined predictability and trust.

The president and his team have limited their efforts to reorganising and strengthening Jokowi's direction of the cabinet to the appointment of a few progressive aides (including outstanding labour rights, anti-corruption activist and crucial campaigner Teten Masduki as head of the Presidential Staff). They have primarily relied on leaders like business friend, Golkar leader, and former general Luhut B. Pandjaitan, as well as additional parties and powerful actors—including Suharto's former military commander, Wiranto—who have been indicted for crimes against humanity. In the process, the president has thus compromised on one of the basic promises during the election campaign that finally convinced activists to support him: to reconcile the historical crimes against humanity in the country, including the State sponsored massacres of 1965–1966. This has encouraged reactionary forces to undertake a counter-campaign that includes threats against human rights and cultural and academic freedoms, orchestrated by crucial sections within the army, police, and judiciary. The issue at stake is not 'only' about human rights and the welfare of the victims. In fact, the

ultimate condition for the broader alliances needed to foster more general progressive reforms is for people to regain their history, dignity, and equal citizen rights (Törnquist 2015).

The way ahead

The progressives behind Jokowi are thus back to square one: the need to foster and develop cooperation between politicians and partners in sectoral groups and civil society organisations. This is crucial in developing a social contract that may pave the way for inclusive economic development, as once proven possible in Solo and in the KAJS campaign.

For the time being, the position of Jokowi and his team seems to be that the Solo model cannot be scaled up beyond local communities. Cooperation with mainstream parties and power holders is more important than attempts at broader alliances such as KAJS. Progressive movements should subordinate their work to the president and his staff by providing input and support rather than building independent strong organisations. However, even a superficial historical comparison with more successful cases of politically facilitated development such as in North Europe and, partially, East Asia (into which several of Jokowi's aides are well read), proves this wrong. In short, there is a need for national-level partnership between the government and citizen and sectoral organisations. The lack of it was an Achilles heel even in the most impressive recent experiments in Brazil (Baiocchi et al. 2013); it was never resolved in China, which rather let lose the market (Shue 1994); and it was basic to the Scandinavian social democracies (Esping-Andersen 1985; Sandvik 2016; Svensson 2016). Partner organisations must thus be sufficiently strong and able to negotiate, and there is a need to broaden and scale up progressive agreements beyond the local level. This, in turn, calls for better citizen and sectoral representation.

The transactional populism in Indonesia, in the form of negotiations and horse trading with one partner at the time, where representatives are selected by the leader rather than by the stakeholders, is devastating, It needs to be replaced by a concept and campaign for an institutionalised framework that facilitates democratic representation in public governance within various sectors of the most important interests. This would enable negotiations and compromises towards social contracts for progressive policies within politically identified crucial sectors.

This is not to replace direct citizen participation as well as liberal-democratic elections, but to supplement them. Statist corporatist arrangements, as under Suharto, must be rejected—but the current practice of discretionary appointments by politicians is almost as destructive. Rather, there must be democratic forms and appointments from below, overseen (as in the case of elections) by an impartial commission.[24] This is much in line with the recent general recommendations on the basis of the PWD's democracy survey (Savirani et al. 2015), and much can be learnt from experiences in as different contexts as northern Europe and Brazil. The same applies to the principles of tripartite negotiations that Indonesia has agreed to as a member of the International Labour Organisation (ILO). These principles should also be expanded to vital policy areas other than labour and industrial relations and include vital partners such as organisations among informal labour and marginalised people.

The most important policy areas that call for supplementary democratic representation between major civil and interest groups, as well as between them and the government at various levels, are welfare reforms, capital-labour relations, and economic development—plus impartial implementation of related reforms and regulations. The fragmentation of interests

[24] The fostering of broader and more democratic interest organisations may be implemented by a similarly impartial commission directed by representatives of unions, employers' organisations, and civil society organisations.

under uneven neo-liberal development, which also tends to make civil society initiatives quite divisive, calls for broader equal citizen-based alliances than in the formative years of north European social democracy. Calls for individual human rights need to be based on clearly defined demos to facilitate democratic action and governance and to become less dependent on 'hypocritical interventionism', as Ben Anderson put it in his memoirs (2016: 194).

The Solo model pointed in this direction, but suffered from populist transactionalism. KAJS was an impressive start in fostering cooperation between politicians, unions, civil society groups, and organisations engaging with informal labour. However, the shortage of a transformative series of reforms and a framework for representation and negotiations with politicians and government made the major actors return to their own immediate priorities and to transactional populism.

Given the lack of sufficiently strong organisations, transactional practices are thus a collective action problem in the sense that nobody will stay away from them as long as they cannot trust that others will do so too. As long-time adviser of the PDI-P Cornelis Lay and the current minister of the state secretariat Pratikno concluded in their analysis of the Solo model (Pratikno and Lay 2013), the crucial factor for whether or not progressive actors could benefit from the widened room of manoeuvre was and still is that the drivers of change can institutionalise and democratise deliberative governance and effectively organise the beneficiaries. This cannot be demanded and implemented only from below. It also calls for political leadership and a forceful concept of structured representation of the various groups and interests to strengthen democratic organisations and increase trust in the representative linkages between state and society.

By now, Jokowi and his team (and supporters) are obviously preoccupied with their own problems. It remains to be seen if they realise that they need this kind of more solid popular backing and cannot advance on the basis of horse trading with party bosses and oligarchs. It is true that the president remains aware of the need to get support from outside in monitoring and improving the government.[25] Voluntary groups, in turn, are engaging task forces to monitor the implementation of the Nawa Cita election programme in cooperation with the presidential staff. Various CSOs are advancing policy proposals on land reform, protection of migrant workers, human rights, anti-corruption, and so on. However, the oft-discussed quick fixes to monitor the administration and increase its efficiency via technocratic managerialism and social media do not alter the power relations that hold back progressive governance. Also, it is not to be expected that specific issue-oriented civil society groups (that primarily have access to the President's staff but not to the ministries) can overcome the fundamental lack of broader strategic reforms within a number of policy areas. Said Iqbal of FSPMI/KSPI (with personal sympathies for the Muslim brotherhood-oriented Prosperous Justice Party, or PKS) and Andi Gani Nuwawea (from the more mainstream KSPSI, who is also a businessman and supporter of PDI-P and Jokowi) have tried to move ahead on their own by launching the mass organisations *Rumah Rakyat* (People's House) and *Organisasi Rakyat Indonesia* (Indonesian People's Organisation) respectively. Their idea is to bring together labouring people in the broad sense of the term, beyond those with formal employment, and to also build the basis for a labour party. However, some unions and activists are less convinced of these special attempts and ambitions and have tried other paths.[26]

Meanwhile, the top leaders of FSPMI and KSPI seem to have lost their patience. They soon began to support efforts by Ahok's contenders to employ religious identity politics, in the

[25] Personal communication with top ranking activists within *relawan* (pro-Jokowi volunteer) organisations, Jakarta.
[26] Personal communication with Abu Mufakkir of LIPS, a labour NGO.

media as well as in the streets, during the gubernatorial election campaign. According to media reports, Said Iqbal has even spoken in favour of the attempt of an obscure group of extra-parliamentary leaders[27] to mobilise demonstrations for the impeachment of the president and the return to the more authoritarian constitution of 1945.

In the shadow of these adventurous elite politics on behalf of 'the people' and 'the workers', senior FSPMI leader Obon Tabroni engaged in a much more innovative, inclusive, and constructive campaign as an independent candidate for the position as regent of Bekasi, which is the most vibrant industrial district outside Jakarta. Obon tried to form a broad following for what may be described as social democratic oriented policies. His volunteer group, including Jamkes-watch, a union initiative to assist poor people in getting health service, conducted door-to-door canvassing to gain people's support (shown by giving their ID) for Obon's nomination. Moreover, promises to foster better health services were just as important in mobilising supporters as campaigning on the factory level. Obviously, there were possibilities for Obon as an independent candidate to formulate broad-based and cross-class campaign programs. However, he had to attract loyal supporters of the mainstream parties, and he was short of a clear concept that might have attracted wider support for fostering more democratic governance based on citizen participation and interest representation, rather than employing Ahok's managerialism or Jokowi's transactional populism. Obon eventually became the third most popular candidate, receiving some 18% of the votes.

Given the obstacles, it is easy to be tempted by the breakthrough in New Delhi. That is, by the broadening and transformation of an anti-corruption campaign into a political movement that focus more on the mismanaged and crooked provisioning of basic social rights and services,

[27] This group includes a sister of Megawati, an old student activist, a supporter of the Suharto family, some retired generals, and a rock singer turned notorious activist.

and on trying to fight this with popular participation and direct democracy at the local level. However, as we have seen, this is clearly insufficient. To develop anything like the Indian AAP party is an unviable proposition in Indonesia, given its extremely exclusionary electoral rules and regulations in favour of elitist and moneyed democracy. Even if intellectual exercises in suggesting alternative electoral rules are stimulating themes for seminars, such concepts are probably impossible to implement, given that it is hard to envision broad popular engagement for technicalities, and that the final decisions would be taken by the same elite and related experts that benefit from the current rules and regulations. Progressive young middle-class liberals, inspired by Ahok and with interest in some social democratic ideas, might manage to mobilise sufficient financial support to set up chapters of their new Indonesian Solidarity Party (PS) so that it can run in elections. There is likewise potential to make efficient use of their bold leadership, skills within media, and contacts within polling institutes. However, the issue of popular base and transformative policies remain unresolved.

The realistic alternative in this respect is rather, as we have shown, to try and advance by way of popular pressure and activist engagement in struggles for equal citizen rights-based reforms, such as on universal social security and impartial and effective public services, employment generating policies and education, plus decent work conditions—along with a system of sectoral and issue oriented representation. Such social democratic reforms may be transformative by generating better conditions for further advances and realistic by strengthening progressive supporters of Jokowi. This may also create a sound basis for party-building.

References

Agarwala, R. (2013). *Informal labor, formal politics, and dignified discontent in India.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Anderson, B. (2016). *A life beyond boundaries.* London and New York: Verso.

Antlov, H., and A. Wetterberg. (2013) Citizen engagement, deliberative spaces and the consolidation of a post-authoritarian democracy: The case of local CSOs in Indonesia. In J. Öjendal and A. Dellnäs (eds.). *Imperative of good local governance: Challenges for the next decade of decentralization.* Tokyo: United Nations University Press.

Aspinall, E., and M. Mietzner. (2014) Indonesian politics in 2014: Democracy's close call. *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 50(3): 347–369.

Aspinall, E. (2005) *Opposing Suharto: Compromise, resistance, and regime change in Indonesia.* Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Baiocchi, G., E. Braathen, and A.C. Teixeira. (2013) Transformation institutionalized? Making sense of participatory democracy in the Lula Era. In K. Stokke and O. Törnquist (eds.), *Democratization in the global south: The importance of transformative politics.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Budiman, A., and O. Tornquist. (2001) *Aktor demokrasi: Catatan tentang gerakan perlawanan di Indonesia.* Jakarta: Institut Studi Arus Informasi (ISAI).

Buehler, M. (2007). Local elite reconfiguration in post-New Order Indonesia: An analysis of the 2005 elections of district government heads. *Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs,* 41(1): 119–147.

Buehler, M., and P. Tan. (2007). Party–candidate relationships in Indonesian local politics: A case study of the 2005 regional elections in Gowa, South Sulawesi Province. *Indonesia.* 84. 41–69.

Caraway, T.L., and M. Ford. (2014). Labour and politics under oligarchy. In M. Ford and T.B. Pepinsky (eds.). *Beyond oligarchy? Wealth, power, and contemporary Indonesian politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Cole, R.P. (2012). *Coalescing for change: Opportunities, resources, tactics and Indonesia's 2010–11 social security campaign*. Honours thesis: University of Sydney.

Djani, L. (2013). *Reform movements and local politics in Indonesia.* PhD thesis. Perth: Murdoch University.

Djani, L. et al. (2016). Review on the current village funds arrangement. Policy Paper submitted to the Coordinating Ministry of Human Development and Culture. Jakarta.

Djani, L., and O. Törnquist, with S. Tjandra and O. Tanjung. (2017). *Dilemmas of populist transactionalism: What are the prospects now for popular politics in Indonesia?* Jakarta: Institute for Strategic Studies.

Esping-Andersen, G. (1985). *Politics against market: The social democratic road to power*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Ford, M. (2014). Learning by doing: Trade unions and electoral politics in Batam, Indonesia, 2004s.ategi*South East Asia Research*. 22(3): 341–357.

Hadis, V. (1997). *Workers and the state in New Order Indonesia.* London and New York: Routledge.

Hanani, R.E. (2015). *Political networks and urban poor access to health care rights*. Presentation of draft paper to the panel on Clientelism, Citizenship and Democratization, EUROSEAS, Vienna. 11–14 August.

Harriss, J., K. Stokke, and O. Törnquist (eds.). (2004). *Politicising democracy: The new local politics of democratisation*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Harriss, J. (2016). What are the prospects for a social democratic alliance in India today? In O. Törnquist, and J. Harriss, with N. Chandhoke and F. Engelstad. *Reinventing social democratic development: Insights from Indian and Scandinavian comparisons.* New Delhi and Copenhagen: Oxford University Press and NIAS Press.

Ito, T. (2016) *Layers of power: Development, institutional reform, and subjectivity in village Indonesia.* Paper presented at the workshop on New Law, New Villages: Changing Rural Indonesia, Leiden. May 19–20.

Kitirianglap, K. and K. Hewison. (2009). Social movements and political opposition in contemporary Thailand. *The Pacific Review* 22(4). (pages?)

Klinken van, G. (1999). How a democratic deal might be struck. In A. Budiman, B. Hatley, and D. Kingsbury (eds.). *Reformasi.* Melbourne: Monash Asia Institute.

Lane, M. (2008) *Unfinished Nation. Indonesia before and After Suharto.* London: Verso

Lewis, B. (2015). Indonesian village decentralisation is all money no plan. *East Asia Forum* 27 June. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/06/27/indonesian-village-decentralisation-is-all-money-no-plan/ (accessed 21-07-2016)

Manor, J. (2013). Post-clientelist initiatives. In K. Stokke and O. Törnquist (eds.). *Democratisation in the global south: The importance of transformative politics*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Maurizio, R. (2015). Transitions to formality and declining inequality: Argentina and Brazil in the 2000s. *Development and Change* 46(5): 1040–1049.

Migdal, J.S., A. Kohli, and V. Shue (eds.). (1994) *State power and social forces: Domination and transformation in the third world*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Naqvi, S. (2015). *Capital conquest: How the AAP's incredible victory has redefined Indian politics.* Guragaon: Hachette.

Nugroho, B. (2014). *Indonesia memilih jokowi.* Jakarta: Gramedia Utama, Kompas Gramedia.

Palshikar, S. (2013). Of radical democracy and anti-partyism. *Economic and Political Weekly*. 48(10): 10–13.

Palshikar, S. (2016). India's Common Man. *New Left Review* 98, March–April.

Prasetyo, A.S, A.E. Priyono, and O. Törnquist, with T. Birks. (2003) *Indonesia's post-Suharto democracy movement.* Jakarta and Copenhagen: Demos & NIAS Press.

Pratikno. (2009). Political parties in pilkada: Some problems for democratic consolidation. In M. Erb and P. Sulistiyanto (eds.). Deepening democracy in Indonesia: Direct elections for local leaders (pilkada). Singapore: ISEAS.

Pratikno, and C. Lay. (2013). From populism to democratic polity: Problems and challenges in Surakarta, Indonesia. In K. Stokke and O. Törnquist (eds.). *Democratisation in the global south: The importance of transformative politics*, Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Priyono, A.E. and U. Hamid (eds.). (2014). *Merancang arah baru demokrasi: Indonesia pasca reformasi*, Jakarta: KPG.

Qodari, M. (2010). The professionalisation of politics: The growing role of polling organisations and political consultants. In E. Aspinall (ed.). *Problems of democratisation in Indonesia: Elections, institutions and society.* Singapore: ISEAS. 122–140.

Ramani, S. (2013) The Aam Aadmi Party's win in Delhi: Dissecting it through geographical information systems. *Economic and Political Weekly*. http://www.epw.in/web-exclusives/

Roy, S. (2014). Being the change: The Aam Aadmi Party and the politics of the extraordinary in Indian Democracy. *Economic and Political Weekly*. 49(15): 45–54.

Saad-Filho, A. (2015). Social policy for neoliberalism: The Bolsa Familia programme in Brazil. *Development and Change* 46(6): 1227–1252.

Samadhi, W.P. (2015). *Optimalizing political capacity of the pro-democracy actors through the forming of welfare political block.* MA thesis. Yogyakarta: Universitas Gadjah Mada.

Samadhi, W.P., and O. Törnquist. (2015). Bypassing the problems of democratisation. In A. Savirani and O. Törnquist (eds). *Reclaiming the state: Overcoming problems of democracy in post-Suharto Indonesia.* Yogyakarta: PolGov and PCD Press.

Sambodno, J.P. (2016). *Village level democratization in Indonesia: Towards popular participation or more benevolent elites?* Paper presented at the workshop on New Law, New Villages: Changing Rural Indonesia, Leiden. May 19–20.

Sandvik, H. (2016). From local citizenship to politics of universal welfare: Scandinavian Insights. In O. Törnquist and J. Harriss, with N. Chandhoke and F. Engelstad. *Reinventing social democratic development: Insights from Indian and Scandinavian comparisons.* New Delhi and Copenhagen: NIAS Press.

Savirani, A., and O. Törnquist (eds.). (2015). *Reclaiming the state: Overcoming problems of democracy in Post-Suharto Indonesia.* Yogyakarta: PolGov and PCD Press.

Savirani, A., and E. Saedi. (2016). *Plasticity of citizenship: Urban poor struggle of rights in Jakarta* . Draft paper. Yogyakarta: Universitas Gadjah Mada.

Seekings, J., and N. Nattrass. (2015). *Policy, politics and poverty in South Africa*. New York: Palgrave.

Shue, V. (1994) State power and social organization in China. In J.S. Migdal, A. Kohli, and V. Shue (eds.). *State power and social forces: Domination and transformation in the third world*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Shukla, S. (2013). Myopia, distortions and blind spots in the vision document of AAP. *Economic and Political Weekly*. 48(7): 16–18.

Svensson, T. (2016). Strengthening control or fostering trust? Indian politics and Scandinavian experiences. In O. Törnquist and J. Harriss, with N. Chandhoke and F. Engelstad. *Reinventing social democratic development: Insights from Indian and Scandinavian comparisons.* New Delhi and Copenhagen: NIAS Press.

Therborn, G. (2012). Class in the 21st Century. *New Left Review.* 78: 5–29.

Therborn, G. (2014) New Masses?. *New Left Review.* 85: 7–16.

Tjandra, S. (2016). *Labour law and development in Indonesia.* PhD dissertation. Meijers Research Institute and Graduate School of Leiden University.

Törnquist, O. (1984a). *Dilemmas of third world communism: The destruction of the PKI in Indonesia*. London: Zed Books.

Törnquist, O. (1984b). *Struggle for democracy – A new option in Indonesia?*. Uppsala: Uppsala University.

Törnquist, O. (1997). Civil society and divisive politicisation: Experiences from popular efforts at democratisation in Indonesia. In E. Özdaga and S. Persson (eds.). *Civil society, democracy and the Muslim world*. Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute and Curzon Press.

Törnquist, O. (2015). The politics of amnesia. *Economic and Political Weekly*. 50(40). 24–26.

Törnquist, O., N. Webster, and K. Stokke (eds.). (2009). *Rethinking popular representation.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Törnquist, O., and J. Harriss, with N. Chandhoke and F. Engelstad (eds.) (2016). *Reinventing social democratic development: Insights from Indian and Scandinavian comparisons.* New Delhi and Copenhagen: NIAS Press.

White, B. (2016) *Village Indonesia in long-term perspective: Competing visions and discourses in research and policy*. Keynote address, Day 2: Workshop on New Law, New Villages? Changing Rural Indonesia, Leiden. 19–20 May.

Williams, M. (2015). Transformative unionism and innovative campaigns challenging inequality. *Global Labour Journal.* 6(3). 253–266.

Yustika, E. (2016). Paper presented at the Village Funds Workshop, organised by Article 33, Jakarta. May.