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**Summary and Conclusions**
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At a conference on Indonesia's democratisation in Jakarta in January 2002,[2] concerned scholars and reflective activists reached five conclusions. First, the elitist introduction of basic rights and institutions to favour democracy seemed insufficient. This was because these instruments rarely made sense even to the most optimistic campaigners. Second, the democracy movement also seemed to have reached a dead end with its prime strategy of working outside organised politics, within civil society. The movement continued to reflect Soeharto's 'floating mass' politics by being fragmented, poorly organised and somewhat detached from ordinary people. Third, given these conditions, there was an urgent need for a *revitalised* agenda for meaningful Human Rights based democratisation. Fourth, that such an agenda should not be crafted by experts from the top down if it was to be effective and legitimate, but called for detailed knowledge about the specific problems and options on the ground and in the country at large. Fifth, that the best way to obtain such knowledge would be to 'rely on the experience and expertise of reflective democracy activists who were engaged in several of the most vital issues.'[3]

This book concludes the efforts made since the January 2002 conference to provide some of the knowledge required concerning the problems and options in the country at large by way of a national survey. This chapter will first summarise the approach and the salient results from the survey, then discuss the implications for the predominant arguments about democratisation, and finally it will initiate the discussion on what should be done.

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[1] I am particularly thankful for valuable comments and inputs from members of the Demos team and colleagues within the Contextual Politics Network, CPD. The faults and mistakes that remain are mine.

[2] For the details, see Chapter 1, sub-section 'Tasks and mandate'.

[3] See the introduction to the previous book summarising this research and conference, Prasetyo, Priyono, Törnquist (2003), primarily page 43.

**What has been done (and why)**

To conduct the survey, an alternative framework for bottom-up assessments of the problems and options of meaningful human rights based democracy had to be developed. This is because the most available analytical schemes are donor-driven, lack firm theoretical basis, focus on specific aspects of democracy or extremely general indicators, are limited to static measurements and rarely capture processes of democratisation. They also call for 'data banks' that do not exist, or interviews with top-level experts who have poor knowledge of conditions on the ground, or opinion surveys with a dubious selection of respondents and insufficiently contextualised questions.

The alternative framework combines theoretically derived questions coupled with mass data. This is important in order to be able to both describe the situation and test major explanations about the problems and options. The framework also combines analysis of, on the one hand, institutions and power relations and on the other, actors with practices and strategies. This is to allow for both descriptive mapping of the state of democracy and analysis of democratisation. The framework consists of a definition of meaningful human rights based democracy, a list of favourable outcomes that a number of contextual instruments in terms of rights and institutions must promote in order for such a democracy to emerge and be meaningful, and a set of principles for assessing the performance as well as the scope of these instruments. To this are added various indices to estimate the will and the capacity of the actors to promote and use the instruments, and indicators of how the actors relate to the structural conditions.

The alternative sources of information consist of carefully selected, experienced and reflective democracy activists within different fields of activity around the country. First, because they should know best what problems they face and what options are available. Second, because they should be able to answer the rather difficult and abstract questions that are unavoidable since we could not design and combine different sets of contextualised questions for different regions. This called for a survey with systematically and transparently identified local experts within the democracy movement. This is thus a so-called expert-survey rather than a 'regular' survey with a statistically selected number of respondents among the activists in general.

A research proposal was drafter in cooperation between *Demos* and the University of Oslo. The funds – coupled with full respect for the academic integrity of the team, were provided by public Norwegian and Swedish donors as well as the Ford Foundation and others. Legitimacy and logistical support have been provided by key-sections of the democracy movement on the basis of mutual trust. Experienced and reflective informants within fourteen empirically and theoretically selected areas of strategic pro-democratic activity have been identified in cooperation with *Demos'* local representatives in each province. Help and guidance in filling in the questionnaire was provided by more than one hundred trained local assistants. The interviews were carried out in two rounds to allow for improvements in the framework and methodology. Additional semi-structured interviews have since been carried out by the research team. Early results have been popularised in a series of supplements in *Tempo,* Indonesia's major news weekly. The results have also been discussed at eighteen national and regional assessment councils (as well as meetings with scholars and organisations) to control the quality, provide additional information and begin the process of following up on the conclusions. Thematic studies, additional research-based information and forums for cooperation are being made available to the pro-democracy activists who may wish to follow up the results of the survey. A full re-survey to trace changes over time is scheduled to commence by late 2007. Those research areas that call for close cooperation with the democracy movement will remain with *Demos.*. Additional studies and education initiatives will be conducted in cooperation with partners within academia, coordinated by a democracy consortium at the Gadjah Mada University.


**Principal Results**

The main results and conclusions may be summarised under six headings:

(1) vital freedoms exist, but the operational tools of democracy exhibit a huge deficit;
(2) there are elections but little representation of basic popular views and interests;
(3) the dominant elite do not primarily avoid but monopolise the instruments that are supposed to promote democracy, thus establishing an oligarchic democracy;
(4) the pro-democratic groups remain the major agents of change but are politically marginalised and socially 'floating' without a firm organised base;

(5) people's identification in public matters with the officially delineated citizens in the country as a whole, the provinces or districts is weak, and there are centrifugal tendencies, but a nationally unifying democratic system is evolving that allows for improvements from below;

(6) the democracy groups remain scattered and fragmented, but they share many potentially unifying perspectives on the problems and options of democracy.

**Freedoms, but with Democratic Deficit;**

The character of Indonesia's fledgling democracy is dual. On the positive side, most civil and political freedoms as well as the vibrancy of civil society are assessed favourably. The exceptions are found in areas of political unrest such as Aceh (when the survey was conducted) and more universally with regard to institutions that shall guarantee 'freedom from physical violence and the fear of it'. Even our critical informants say that it makes sense to defend, use and further develop many of the institutions that are not doing well – those that are meant to favour social and economic rights, the rule of law, good governance, representation and government. The partial exceptions are found once again in the conflict areas where rights and institutions are yet to be built. The new peace accord in Aceh has provided some space for this.

Of great concern however, two thirds of the rights and institutions are deemed poor or defunct. These rights and institutions include those that are supposed to promote 'basic social and economic rights' and 'freedom from physical violence and the fear of it'. But worse still, most of the core working tools of democracy are also included – instruments to promote citizenship, justice, the rule of law, representation, responsive and accountable government and administration, consultation and direct participation. Herein lies the grave and serious deficit of democracy.

There have been few signs of improvement since 1999. Moreover, many informants suggest that one-sixth of the instruments have deteriorated. These include the instruments that should prevent money politics, corruption, and 'paramilitary groups, hoodlums and organised crime', as well as promote subordination of the executives to the rule of law. This stagnation and the very poor rights and institutions that should

favour democratic representation point to an emerging crisis – because if representation does not work, how can democracy be improved in a democratic way?

Indonesia is not alone. Similar tendencies are in evidence in most new democracies. This has generated a widespread critical debate on the viability of the dominant, so-called transition paradigm; a paradigm that is based on pacts within the elite and top-down crafting of supposedly pro-democratic rights and institutions.[4]

**Elections but Little Representation**

As indicated above, the worst problem is defunct representation. Aside from elections and the freedom to form parties, all institutions aimed at promoting political representation through parties, associations or individuals are among those with the poorest performance and scope. The free and fair elections have mainly comprised of unrepresentative and unresponsive parties and politicians. The parties are dominated by money politics and powerful vested interests; they often abuse religious and ethnic sentiments; they are bad at forming and running government; they do not reflect critical issues and interests of the people; they are not democratically controlled by their members; and their relation to their constituencies is very poor. People's contact with political representatives and public officials - as well as opportunities for consultation and direct participation are similarly bad. Interest based representation through, for instance, trade unions is also weak.

In this regard Indonesia is, once again, part of a major international trend. More and more concern is being expressed among international promoters of democracy about dysfunctional political parties and party systems.[5] In Indonesia, efforts that have caught some attention relate primarily to education that favours reforming and strengthening existing parties by a new independent Indonesian institute called *Sekolah Demokrasi*, guided by leading intellectuals and sponsored by the Dutch Institute for Multiparty Democracy (IMD). The survey of grounded pro-democratic experts very clearly indicates, however, that whatever the efforts at improving defunct rights and institutions, they must at first hand be guided and propelled by broad-based representation of basic issues and interests which is currently beyond the scope and

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[4] For references, see footnote 6 in Chapter 1.
[5] See e.g. Törnquist (2005).

ability of most of existing political parties.

## Oligarchic Democracy

The stagnation of democratisation is due to the monopolisation of power by the dominant elite, thus creating an oligarchic democracy. The groups and popular aspirations that brought democracy back to Indonesia have been marginalised. This confirms the international trend referred to above, namely that the main problem of the new democracies is the persistence of elite hegemony.

The oligarchic democracy in Indonesia is not however identical to the variants often found in Latin America for example, where the established elite primarily bypass or veto the new polity by making the 'real' decisions in company boardrooms or military headquarters. Of course, these are common practices in Indonesia as well, but even very critical informants 'admit' that the dominant actors usually adhere to the instruments that are supposed to promote democracy.

It is also the case however that few dominant actors actually promote democracy - but according to our local expert-informants, more than 30 percent at least use the instruments that should advance democracy and only 15 percent simply abuse them. In addition, the informants say that more than 60 percent of dominant actors' strategies within the political system relate to legislatures – where gaining a position is one of their major ways of legitimising and authorising their powers, while less than 10 percent of the dominant actors adopt strategies aimed at bypassing the system.

In this sense, democracy has clearly become 'the main game in town' – but at the same time the established elite monopolise, manipulate and abuse the rules of that game. Pro-democrats and ordinary people are largely marginalised and most of the supposedly democratic rights and institutions are usually either defunct or deficient.

To make things worse, it is clear from the survey that Indonesian democracy will not be de-monopolised by relying on either the discipline of the market or enlightened state directives. Neither of these actually exist - other than in theory. In Indonesia,

state and market are intertwined by mutually vested interests. Yet Indonesia is not unique in this matter – it is a typical pattern in the South as well as the former Eastern Block where state and other non-economic sources of power remain crucial in both primitive and advanced accumulation of capital. In Indonesia, the informants say that 40 percent of the most powerful actors operate within or are related to the public executive; 16 percent are police, military, militias and hoodlums; 17 percent are related to parliament (local and national) and political parties; and only twelve percent are directly related to business or NGOs founded by dominant actors. The sources of power and elite strongholds are mainly located in a combination of private business and the state, including through close networks and 'good connections' between the two. Not unlike indirect colonial rule, powerful businessmen use local state politics to obtain privileges, and many bureaucrats and politicians sustain this process in order to enhance their positions and, in turn, develop their own businesses.

**Marginalised and Floating Agents of Change**

The survey confirms previous results obtained from case studies, that although pro-democrats remain crucial within civil society, they continue to resemble Soeharto's 'floating mass' policy – that is, they are 'floating democrats' lacking a firm social base and are confined to the margins of politics.

There are six major characteristics of the 'floating democrats': (1) they are marginal within the state, business and in the workplace; (2) women's perspectives are rarely included; (3) priority is given to direct democracy in civil society – in contrast to combinations with constitutional and representative pathways; (4) single and specific issues and general ideas dominate at the expense of comprehensive issues, interests and governance agendas; (5) populist, clientelistic and other traditional top-down shortcuts to mobilise support are often resorted to; (6) interventions in the public discourse are the main way of gaining legitimacy and authority while very few seek out the mandate of the people -  including election and appointment to official positions. Much of the Indonesian pro-democracy thinking and action thus concurs with the ideas of such different actors as the World Bank and radical social movements – that democracy is best promoted by autonomous and polycentric agents

within civil society, against the state and party politics.[6]


The Indonesian characteristics are not unique, but part of an international trend evident amongst middle class and social movement oriented activism. However, the Indonesian situation is particularly serious as it does not co-exist and interrelate with the more traditional form of mass organising and ideology oriented movements that have survived and in some cases try to change and reinvigorate themselves in many other settings. In Indonesia, such forms were eliminated with the massacres in 1965-1966. Any attempt at mass based alternatives were prevented under more than thirty years of strong authoritarianism, and little has happened since then.

**Nationally Unifying Democracy**

A prerequisite for democracy is correspondence between the officially delineated *demos* and how people identify themselves in public matters – something which the results of our survey suggest have yet to be secured in Indonesia. Only 47 percent of the informants say that people tend to identify themselves as Indonesians - or as members of a province or regency in the first or second instance, while 49 percent say that they tend to identify themselves as belonging to a local or religious or ethnic community.


That said, there are few major differences between almost all of our indices of democracy in the various Indonesian regions, aside from the disturbed provinces of Aceh and Papua. A rather coherent political system thus seems to emerge in terms of similar problems and options that pave the way for united and democratic politics from below.

**Links within the Democracy Movement**

There is less disagreement about the condition of rights and institutions and citizens' capacity to use them between informants from different regions than between experts from different issue areas. The Indonesian democracy movement is fragmented. It is not just that activists specialise in different issues areas and that there is little aggregation and organisational combination. Experts working within the fields of

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[6] See Harriss, Stokke, Törnquist (2004) for a critical review and further references.

human rights and gender, or among particularly marginalised sections of the population - such as urban poor, are more critical of the rights and institutions that are supposed to promote democracy than those working within the system - such as activists trying to reform political parties. In addition, middle class oriented groups tend to network, while those focusing on subordinate classes are more interested in broader and more solid organisations.

Yet, there *is* a *de facto* movement in terms of broad agreement concerning the six principal results – the main problems and options of democratisation that are emphasised in this report.

Thus, there is much to agree on, both in terms of critique and demands and in terms of necessary improvements that need to be made within the movement itself. In other words, it should be possible to form a united front on the basis of a minimum platform of those improvements that need to be fought for in order to build a democracy that is meaningful for ordinary people - and not just the dominant elite.

**Implications for the Arguments about Democratisation**

The questions in the survey were theoretically derived from the basic arguments concerning the problems and options of democratisation as were presented in the introductory chapter. This deductive formulation of the questions facilitated the collection of mass data. This was in order to both describe the situation and discuss the validity of various explanations for the state of affairs and how to go ahead. What are the conclusions?

**Why are the good freedoms not generating better tools?**

The first debate is on the state of democracy. One position is that democracy is well under way, so that we only need more of the same elitist crafting of institutions that has been tried since 1998 (in addition to political stability and liberal economic reforms). Another position is that conditions are deteriorating and that democracy will remain a façade – thus requiring a need for 'real structural change'. But as it stands, this discussion is too general to be fruitful. Empirical evidence from the survey is very clear: some aspects of the actually existing democracy are good and some are very

bad. We thus have to disaggregate democracy and turn to analyses of the different factors and trends involved.

The rights and institutions that are supposed to promote various types of freedoms (including elections and the freedom of civil society) are doing well. There are comparatively few Indonesian signs of the previous illiberal trends in Asian democracies.[7] There is an infrastructure of democracy in terms of basic rights and institutions that is remarkably widespread throughout the country, with the exception of disturbed areas. A good proportion of the informants say that most of these instruments are not in so poor a shape that it does not make sense to try to use and improve them. Better still, even the dominant elite seem largely to adhere to this infrastructure. In this regard, the picture is more positive than what use to be argued in high-profile metropolitan seminars, perhaps particularly by political economists. It would be cynical to say that this new political framework, these new real freedoms and this tendency to play the new game only constitute a façade.

However, the proponents of the thesis that democracy is well under way are also mistakenly optimistic, primarily on two accounts. First, they seem to ignore that aside from the freedoms, most of the rights and institutions that are supposed to promote democracy and the people's capacity to make use of them are very poor. Second, they have no explanation for why those freedoms that do perform relatively well (with the exception of the freedom from violence) have not produced improvements with regard to the other instruments of democracy. Freedom does not seem to be enough to generate basic socio-economic rights (including the related matter of business regulation) and the core working tools of democracy: equal citizenship, justice, rule of law, representation, responsive and accountable government and administration, consultation and direct participation. The informants around the country do not even indicate significant improvements since 1999.

In sum, the structuralists arguing that Indonesian democracy is only a façade and the elitist institution builders saying it is well under way are both only telling half truths. They fail to identify the pros and cons of democratisation by discussing democracy on an unspecified and general level. Thus, they are also unable to explain the basic

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[7] Cf. Bell et.al. (1995).

dualism that exists between comparatively well developed freedoms on the one hand, and poor tools of democracy coupled with the low capacity of citizens to improve and use the rights and institutions, on the other.

This is a general problem in new democracies. To proceed, one has to disaggregate the analysis of the different dimensions of democracy – as outlined in the analytical framework of this study – *and* focus on specific theories of how they are interrelated. Freedom is clearly not enough and neither is the crafting of institutions from top down; but pointing to structural constraints does not help in identifying which actors may be more capable of altering the structures by making use of and promoting the existing democratic space.

**Decentralisation makes sense with a strong state and representative democracy**

The second major dispute lies with the pros and cons of decentralisation. The first position is that decentralisation has undermined authoritarianism and generated space for the development of civil society and direct popular participation in public life. The second position is that the local space has in the main been captured by 'uncivil society'- powerful localised sections of the elite and their international partners.

The discourse on decentralisation suffers also from lack of specification of the various dimensions of democracy as well as from insufficient analysis of the relations between good freedoms and poor tools and popular capacity. Like democracy in general, the outcome of decentralisation is neither entirely positive nor entirely negative. Moreover, neither of these perspectives helps us understand the problems and options involved.

On the one hand, it is clear from the survey that decentralisation has created important local spaces for civic and political action. It is also obvious that real powers and decisive actors are now present on the ground where ordinary people have some means of joint action and not, as was previously the case, only in Jakarta. Thus, it should make sense to promote and use local democracy to fight for real change.

On the other hand, informants also indicate that decentralisation has not been an orderly devolution, but the combination of attempts at decentralisation by rule of law coupled with the disorderly break down of the centralistic Soeharto regime. The assessments of the informants clearly support case studies suggesting that various factions of the powerful elite as well as those marginalised under Soeharto have tried to benefit from the combination of new rules and disorder within the state apparatus as well as at local level where they had some power themselves, often in tandem with foreign companies and donors. Consequently, one may arrive at the worst form of corruption, that which is so disorganised and unpredictable that it does not even promote the kind of long term investment of resources that have been extracted and accumulated by force, which was possible during the height of the Suharto regime, but rather calls for short term investment and outright plunder.[8]

Internationally this is a familiar story. To promote democracy, decentralisation must be disciplined and structured within the administrative and political system as a whole (including democratically oriented parts of civil society), so that public affairs and resources are not also extensively deregulated and privatised. If the matters that people deem to be of public concern are extensively deregulated and privatised, decentralisation tends to make things worse. The Indonesian discourse might benefit from these types of analyses of the connections between the dual aspects of decentralisation[9] as well as pro-democratic experiences of trying to handle these problems, for example in Brazil the Philippines and India.[10]

The most interesting results from the survey in this regard concern the relative lack of regional differences. The problems and options of democracy seem to be remarkably similar around the country - except in Papua and Aceh. This is not to negate the serious discrepancies between the officially proclaimed *demos* ('people') and the experts' assessment of how people identify themselves in public matters. Identities related to the officially delineated 'people' in the country as a whole, the provinces or

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[8] C.f. Olson (2000)

[9] For a fascinating recent comparison involving Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand of the dynamics of local politics see Sidel (2004)

[10] Especially the Brazilian experiments with participatory budgeting (see e.g. the most recent Baiocchi,2005), the Indian experiment with people's planning from below (see e.g. Tharakan 2004 and Törnquist 2004) and the the Philippine attempt at local popular struggle for good governance (see e.g. Rocamora 2004).

districts are estimated to be less important than local, religious and ethnic identities. Neither is it to suggest that there are no disturbing centrifugal tendencies and no abuse of ethnic and religious sentiments. However, while all these problems exist, the regional similarities in the survey seem to indicate that there is a national infrastructure of rights and institutions that are meant to promote democracy as well as emerging popular capacities to promote and use them. Even if the socio-economic, cultural and other conditions vary from region to region, there is nonetheless a rather unified framework within which to operate and broad agreement on the problems and options involved.

At this stage it would thus be more dangerous to try enforce national unity by decree and coercion and to sustain the elitist democracy from top down than to open up the way for pro-democrats to improve and strengthen democracy form below. By 'strengthening democracy from below' we mean for example allowing local parties to run – at least in local elections, while also improving the laws on elections and parties in order to prevent the serious abuse of religious and ethnic loyalties.

In other words, the fledgling nature of democracy coupled with the similar problems faced and options available from region to region suggest that it is the further development of democracy rather than coercive nationalism that may be turned into the unifying framework in Indonesia - just as in India where a far from ideal, yet basically functioning democracy holds together a myriad of states, languages, parties and movements. Such a framework may also be an attractive proposition for people in Aceh and Papua who are tired of violence and repression. The advances in Aceh are already quite remarkable.

Meanwhile however, much of the effort within the democracy movement itself to benefit from the new local space for civic action and self-management is also part of the problem. Democracy presupposes that the people who control public affairs are clearly defined and politically equal, both in terms of one person one vote and impartial implementation of political decisions. Similarly, public affairs need to be well demarcated and power and responsibility must be clearly interrelated. Unfortunately, many of the scattered and fragmented activities in civil society fail to

attain this – either in Indonesia or in many other cases of civil society based activism around the world.

Many pro-democrats focus on segmented self-management, direct democracy activities and attempts to bypass politics and democracy by establishing direct links between citizens and administrators; and there is much to this. But if the activists are not able to link their activities to universal citizen based and representative forms of constitutional democracy there will not only be problems (like in Porto Alegre, Brazil, and the Philippines) of scaling up from local to other levels – but politics, representation and the larger questions of power and democracy will be left uncontested and wide open for the established elite to dominate.[11]

**Market and state are not solutions – there is a need for a social pact**

The third debate is over how to counter corruption and revitalise the economy. Should one rely on neo-liberal measures, which (in theory) allow the market to discipline those who abuse politics and administration, or should one trust more disciplined politics, as during the rise and success of the developmental states in East Asia and Singapore?

According to the informants, neither way is possible. There is no pure market economy that can discipline the administrators and politicians, only a political economy. The actually existing political economy is dominated by business (national and international) in very close cooperation with administrators and politicians in poorly functioning political parties and organs of the state. In fact, more and more bureaucrats, business actors (in private and state sector) and to some extent retired officers[12] turned politicians – and vice versa, have staked their claim.[13] While further privatisation is thus likely to spur Russian-like oligarchs, stateism might generate Chinese-like state capitalists.

In other words, neither of the extreme positions is feasible. The debate is of little use

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[11] C.f. the discussion in Harriss, Stokke, and Törnquist (2004)
[12] From military services that have to finance some 75 percent of their costs through their own business ventures.
[13] C.f. Nordholt (2004),  Malley (2003: 111-115) and Mietzner (2003).

unless one also discusses less drastic options. The first point, then, is that all forms of 'politics against corruption' cannot be wrong. If there was an 'iron law' according to which there must be total political disengagement from the economy in order to fight corruption,[14] countries like France, Norway and Sweden would have been the most corrupt in the world. Here, successful promotion of 'good governance' has not at first hand been based on the market. It has been based on the combination of, on the one hand, the rule of law, professionalism and accountability within the administration itself, and, on the other hand, grounded political democracy that determines appropriate laws and enforces accountability of the judiciary as well as the impartiality of public administration of extensive welfare state benefits to the citizens.

History has not come to an end. It is true that there has been more civil society participation and some adaptation to the expanding markets over the years, but many of the models have survived the onslaught of neo-liberalism. One major reason is not just that labour and impoverished people benefit from welfare states and business regulations, but also that broad sections of the middle class similarly benefit. To put it bluntly: there is a need for more public resources, not less. Less public resources mean that all actors will look for special benefits by way of clientelism, special contacts and corruption. More resources that are public pave the way for broad action for broad policies and impartial administration.[15]

This kind of arrangement is even more relevant to the disciplining of public governance in cases like Russia or Indonesia where the pre-existing markets are further away from textbook ideals than Europe and where the 'iron law' is rather that further privatisation, deregulation and thus disempowerment of politics and public administration will generate more instead of less corruption.[16] The problem, therefore, is hardly for or against state regulation or even state ownership but how to propel good governance through the combination of horizontal accountability amongst the executive and vertical accountability to citizens and their representatives.

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[14] See for instance the argument by Indonesian Studies Professor Leslie Palmier in *Jakarta Post,* September 15, 2005.

[15] Cf. Khan 'Markets, states and democracy: Patron-client networks and the case for democracy in developing countries', in *Democratization,* (2005) and Rothstein, *Social Traps and the Problem of Trust,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (2005)

[16] On the theoretical level c.f. Khan and Sundaram (2000); for a fine contextual study, see. Harriss-White (2002)

At this point one may of course argue that the attractive combination of strong state professionalism and strong democracy is a non-viable proposition in Indonesia since historically the two did not emerge together. Historically, the most attractive model is the product of the separation between politics and economy. Thus, it is this separation that should be given priority to in Indonesia.

There is much to this historical argument – but given the results from the survey the conclusion is not valid. It is true that in much of Western Europe, it was dynamic sections of the emerging bourgeoisie and middle classes at first hand that turned against remnants of absolutist state government of society. This is how they enforced constitutionalism, the rule of law and property rights – which in turn fostered economic growth.[17] And it was only thereafter that the organised working class, the radical liberals and at times (especially in Scandinavia) the progressive sections of the independent farmers were able to propel democracy, and thus also more humane development.

But what is the implication of all this for Indonesia? Is it that one should not ask for the so-called purely political aspects of democracy such as universal suffrage and genuine political competition at this point but first improve free markets relations, strong property rights, the rule of law, and open up for international trade and investments, because that would discipline corrupt politicians and administrators and generate growth, either by way of neo-liberal policies or state guidance?[18] No, Indonesia is not really like Europe a century ago. For more than 30 years neither domestic business nor substantial sections of the middle classes and their respective international partners enforced comparable reforms, but rather enjoyed privileged access to the fruits of authoritarian rule - until despotic liberalism collapsed in 1998, and popular protests paved the way for a revision of the rules of the game.

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[17] With regard to Indonesia, North America is a non relevant special story of massive settler-colonisation, elimination of natives, import of slave labourers, and then frontier democracy among the settlers.
[18] C.f. Guido Tabellini,'s 'Economic Reforms Proceed Democracy', *Jakarta Post* September 15,2005 and Khan (2005).

So who would implement the separation between state and economy in Indonesia? China is sometimes cited as the current economic success story - including its death penalties for corruption. Should we thus perceive of a, by whatever means, appointed Indonesian politburo of economists, lawyers and politicians and their civil and military servants in order to get rid of state companies, market regulations and disturbing aspects of democracy?

In order to answer this question, there are two further questions that must be addressed. First, who would be in a position to uphold basic human rights, direct the rulers and ensure accountability? Second, who would enforce such an 'enlightened' high command. The currently dominant elite? The survey clearly indicates that the sources of power of the dominant elite are neither exclusively in private business nor in the state but in the combination of both; and this in turn is the basis for their monopolisation of the supposedly pro-democratic rights and institutions.

The observant reader may argue that we are setting aside two other common proposals in the public discourse. The first is inspired by recent radical nationalist-populism in countries such as Venezuela and Bolivia. The second draws on the attempts among Muslims at value based anti-corruption and welfare schemes. As for radical populist nationalism, previous attempts at state-led 'national democratic development' like during Sukarno undermined democracy and have been invalidated by capitalist globalisation. The recent admiration for Latin American populist-nationalists Chavez and Morales has little relevance beyond struggle against international finance capital and foreign dominance of natural resources. The crucial issues of how to fight and build an alternative to the symbiosis between state, communitarianism and private business, increase economic growth for more public resources and demonopolise democracy are almost as neglected as during the hegemony of the radical nationalists in the late fifties and early sixties.

As for the Muslim value based alternatives, the main problem from a democratic point of view is not only the serious reductions of the public sphere and illiberal measures, but that most of the comparatively impressive anti-corruption and social welfare measures are meditated between state and people through communities and patron-client relations rather than direct and through impartial institutions facilitated

by civic organisation. This breeds rivalries, undermines the anti-corruption efforts and reduces the pro-democratic potential. There is also no strategy for how to break away from the unholy alliances between the communitarian ideals and related strongmen in relation to both the state and private business at central and local levels.

Given the severe limitations of the dominant prescriptions, the informants of the survey logically rather point to an alternative way, beyond neo-liberalism, stateism, populist nationalism and Muslim value-based politics. As mentioned earlier, the historical lessons from, for instance, South Africa and Brazil to parts of India, East Asia and Europe suggest that pacts between production-oriented capitalists and labour calls for strong organisations on each side, especially amongst the labour movement, and must be negotiated and guaranteed by a democratic state – something which calls for more and better democracy, not less.[19] There is also a need for a fine balance between various dynamics and interests, as indicated by the current debates in South Africa and Britain over neo-liberal lopsidedness. These conditions seem to be even more important in Indonesia where, as we have seen in previous chapters, the main elite groups would stand to lose, independent private business and professionals are weak, and labour is both weak and poor. The democracy movement might therefore be the only potential force that could facilitate a social pact. This uphill task calls for radical rethinking (that may benefit from international comparisons) on how to identify possible individuals and clusters of people within business, middle classes as well as labour who may be interested in such a pact, given some basic agreement on alternative arrangements.

**Linking elitist crafting of institutions to actions in civil society**

The most extensive critique of the fate of democracy in Indonesia is directed against the elitist political pacts that have contributed to the marginalisation of most pro-democrats and paved the way for the top down crafting of rights and institutions. Many of the dissidents say democracy should have been built up from within civil society.

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[19] For the importance of organised labour, see e.g. Beckman et.al. (2000) and Beckman 2004).

According to the survey, the critique is largely correct – but the conclusion is less convincing. All the data does point to the fact that the achievements of the elitist path of transition from authoritarianism to democracy have been limited. As mentioned in the introduction, this is a general trend in almost all new democracies. One may well promote political pacts to get a majority of the establishment aboard the ship of democracy, and one may well craft a democratic infra-structure to hopefully discipline the elite and allow the dissidents to re-enter into a thus designed political landscape. But this does not prevent the elite from bypassing the new system or, as is equally common in Indonesia, from dominating the new rights and institutions. And it certainly does not guarantee that the marginalised pro-democrats, and even less the people at large, have enough capacity to promote and use the rights and institutions.

At the same time however, the civil society alternative has proved equally problematic. As described at length in chapter five, the pro-democrats remain critical within associational life and as pressure groups but are scattered, fragmented, single issue oriented, short of a broad social base with mass organisations and unable to present a viable alternative. Neither do women seem to have made their way into the movement on a broad scale. In addition, most activists prioritise efforts at direct democracy leaving the rest of the political system wide open for the established elite. Beyond the pro-democracy groups, moreover, much of the actually existing civil society has been captured by associations that do not necessarily promote popular control of public affairs based on political equality.

This picture is common in most new democracies. There is an obvious case for bridging the extreme positions of crafting institutions at the top and working from civil society on the ground. Democracy oriented experts, intellectuals and professionals, for instance, must have broad backing in order not to be turned into technocratic servants of the dominant elite; and civil society activist need to go beyond lobbying and pressure group activities towards more institutionalised forms of participation and actual influence.

The best Indonesian illustration of these problems is probably the struggle against corruption. Civic groups provide ammunition and backing for professionals within the

judiciary and administration, in addition to a few committed politicians. On the eve of the 2004 elections, there was also a similar campaign against 'rotten politicians'.

In the process, however, civic groups and related professionals have become so tired of politicians that their favourite option seems to be to avoid and disempower them, rather than reform or replace them. In the survey, we were not fully able to capture this dynamics (since the questions did not always separate between legislative and administrative institutions), but there are many indications to suggest broad interest in the combination of efforts at 'good governance' and participatory direct democracy on the ground, thereby bypassing most of political representation.

Interestingly, this is in line with the ideas of the World Bank – and to some extent the thinking and practices of more radical experiments such as the participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre. The former is of course more eager to include market and business than the latter. Moreover, the Porto Alegre model is much more institutionalised and regulated in favour of the poor, just to mention some of the differences. But the fundamental problem remains the political and democratic deficit involved.[20]

The links between individuals, the various civil groups and 'good' administration remain unspecified. These links are much of what politics is all about, including the aggregation of different interests and issues from the private to the public sphere and from the local to the centre. And beyond the very local level where ideally everybody can participate, this is the main field for representative democracy – based on a reasonably clearly defined *demos*, participation, authorisation, responsiveness, specific responsibilities, transparency, accountability and solidarity. If representation is set aside, who is responsible for what and accountable to whom? Are all NGOs and social movements equally good or how does one differentiate between them? What issues and sectors are covered by what group? Who do they represent and who are they responsible to? And if representation is set aside, how can corruption be fought in a democratic way? How can better rules be decided democratically? Should various groups and civic activists with good connections and networks lobby bureaucrats and lawyers, who then decide on the actual rules and on what should be done? There may

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[20] See Harris, Stokke, Törnquist (2004)

well be systems for internal (or so-called horizontal) accountability within administration, but what of the vertical accountability to the people? And who takes the policy decisions in the first place? What is left of popular control of public affairs on the basis of political equality if networks and good contacts are what matters? In Indonesia, pro-democrats may like to know that they are not alone but share many of these challenges, even with old democracies like Norway and Sweden, and of course with the democratic deficit in the European Union.[21]

Remarkably, much of this is neglected in the discourse in Indonesia, as well as in many other contexts. In Porto Alegre one may have addressed some of the challenges of local issues at local level through firm institutionalisation and regulation from top down, to thus avoid clientelism and special interests in existing organisations. But it is difficult to replicate this under less favourable conditions such in Indonesia and on regional and national levels. In Kerala, moreover - the other showcase in the international discourse, the lack of new politics in-between citizens and the campaign administration generated a public space that very few but the clientelistic bureaucrats and politicians have so far been able to take advantage of.[22]

**Dilemmas of politicisation**

At the heart of the challenges defined by the informants in the survey lies the final debate between, on the one hand, the advocates of de-politicised but institutionalised links between public administration and citizens in civil society for deliberation and participation, and on the other hand those proposing contentious representative politics based on mass action and organisation, common interests and ideology.

It is clear from the survey that the first position has no solution to the basic problem of the pro-democrats of by-passing the politics of representation as well as the challenge of building the kind of mass movements and broad based interest organisations that were curbed under Soeharto's authoritarian 'floating mass' politics.

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[21] For a relevant summary in English of major results from the recent extensive project on power and democracy in Norway, for instance, see Østerud and Selle (2005)
[22] For a wider discussion, see e.g. Harriss, Stokke and Törnquist (2004).

However, it is also obvious that the advocates of contentious politics often resort to elitist and centralistic tendencies, and that their organisations are equally fragmented and scattered.

Similar problems are also evident elsewhere. In the Philippines for example, people in favour of good governance and alternative governance agendas find it problematic to co-ordinate their work with more demand and action oriented campaigners.[23] In Kerala, conflicts between the advocates of the 'peoples' planning campaign' had problems of relating to 'ordinary' political and trade union activists, and vice versa.[24] In Porto Alegre, the Workers' Party that brought about the 'participatory budgeting' has recently been voted out of power, partly because the participatory scheme was unable to handle address problems that lay beyond the local level.

There are two major responses to the problem of insufficient politicisation and representation. One emphasises the reform of political parties and party systems, primarily through top-down education (in Indonesia advocated by for instance *Sekolah Demokrasi)* or by entering into existing parties. The other realises the additional need for new organisations and political engagement, but also stresses the necessity of building genuine representation from the ground, based on politically equal citizens There are various attempts to promote this. One tendency emphasises interest based mass organisations such as trade unions. Another proposal is to connect civic action and political and electoral interventions through alliances and political blocks. A third vision is that of building up genuine parties from below, starting on the local level. In my understanding, comparative studies actually point to the importance of combining rather than separating these attempts.

While in no way rejecting the first path of top down education and reforming existing political parties, the results from the survey point to the need for grounding pro-democratic political interventions in the civic movement, to give priority to political equality, *and* organised interests, to build popular representation and political capacity. This combination of citizenship and interests in turn is in order not to be co-

[23] See Rocamora (2004) and Quimpo (2004)
[24] C.f. Tharakan (2004) and Törnquist (2004)

opted but be able to alter dominant political practices, no matter whether one wants to reform existing organisations and movements or build new ones.

**What *can* be done?**

Before turning to the challenging final question of what *should* be done in view of these results, one may first discuss what *can* be done. It is less difficult to identify problems than options. How can 'de-monopolisation' make democracy meaningful by promoting representation, a social pact, the social anchoring of the floating democrats and the combining of their efforts at direct participation with broader demands and constructive governance agendas? How might this even be possible when there is a legacy of more than 30 years of authoritarianism, repression and disorganisation? How can one prioritise such strategic issues of politicising democracy when there are so many short-term needs, demands and emergencies that call for immediate measures and shortcuts? Is it not necessary to focus on self-management amongst the urban poor and radical extra-parliamentary demands for public services when even a friendly elected mayor would be without a loyal administration and lack sufficiently broad and strong popular organisation to implement alternative policies? Alternatively, would it really be possible with some kind of combined strategy? Is it not necessary to give full priority to protests and contentious policies in relation to issues such as the reduction of subsidies for petroleum products when there is no constructive viable alternative? Or would it also be possible for labour and urban poor organisations to explore the options for building a social pact by accepting the reduction of subsidies such as of petrol in exchange for extensive institutionalised influence over the management and distribution of social benefits? This in turn is something which might increase the power of these organisations as well as opportunities for the people to demand equal rights, transparency, accountability etc. from both the organisations themselves and the state, to thus fight clientelism, nepotism and corruption.

It is easy to say that one should not apply tactics that undermine long-term strategies, but conversely these strategies must be clear-cut and realistic. So what is realistic? How strong would pro-democratic trade unions and neighbourhood and urban poor organisations have to be before they can also try to advance through elections and enter into negotiations on a social pact? This we do not know. From this survey we

only know that it is precisely this kind of challenge that calls for additional studies of various experiences in comparative perspective, something which we shall return to in our recommendations as outlined in the following chapter.

In fact, in this regard we also know one more thing from the survey: that there are not just problems but also options. A series of vital freedoms do exist. Pro-democratic sections of civil society are expanding. Technically free and fair elections are at work. Most of the other rights and institutions that are supposed to promote a meaningful democracy are also in place, aside from disturbed regions. Despite being in a poor state of affairs, it does overall make sense to try to use and promote them. The dominant elite do not at first hand bypass this technical infrastructure of democracy, but largely play the game. The rules are typically manipulated and abused, but the dominant groups are usually in opposition and compete within this nominally democratic framework rather than on the level of raw power, where the elite is unrivalled. The political marginalisation of the pro-democrats is not only due to powerful elitist politics, but also to their own lack of a viable alternative beyond participation and direct democracy at local level. Indonesia may be a fragmented nation state – but democratisation is not making things worse, rather it paves the way for improvement. A fledgling democratic system with similar problems and options is developing in the country as a whole.

This allows for further democratisation from below combined with strict rules for equal citizenship against the abuse of ethnicity and religion. (While centralistic measures against local initiatives turn increasingly irrelevant, it is dangerously provoking separatism, ethnic and religious protest). It is already apparent that the expansion and deepening of Indonesian democracy at local level may serve as *the* framework for transforming conflict in Aceh from devastating levels of violence to more productive levels of popular based politics.

Even if politics at local level are fragmented and floating, there *is* a democracy movement that shares a general understanding of the problems facing and options available to a meaningful human rights based democracy. It is not structurally impossible to integrate women and their experiences into the mainstream of pro-

democratic work. Although difficult, there is no structural dynamics that prevents the emergence of broader and better organised democratic movements  from the people at large. There are interesting signs of some overlap between activists specialising in various contentious issues at community level, such as land rights, basic civil and political rights, additional social and economic rights, sustainable and participatory development etc. It seems to be more a question of clear perspectives, leadership and organisational skill rather than uphill structural conditions that prevent a triangular alliance between advocates of green-left-participatory and sustainable development, more labour oriented interest in the workplace and social justice, and productive interest of professionals and business in good governance. The same applies to innovative attempts at combining direct participation and representative democracy, as well as self-management and transparent and accountable public administration.

In short, the survey does not only identify to a series of problems that need to be prioritised but also to a wider space and possible alliances and linkages for democratic action that may be used and developed.