Democracy and the left: experiences from Indonesia
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Leftist liberals and socialists have been decisive in the struggle against colonialism and for improved democracy in the global South but two crucial questions worry concerned scholars, experts, activists and pro-democrats in general. Firstly, why have not the leftist struggles been more successful but at times even ended up in the rise of authoritarianism? Secondly, why has it proved possible for internationally supported actors to achieve limited levels of democracy in their own benefit, ignoring civil society groups and social movements? In looking for answers to these puzzles I discuss primarily Indonesia which is the largest of the new democracies and has several characteristics that are reminiscent of Nigeria, including the symbiotic relations between politics and the economy and the importance of religious and ethnic divisions but also the crucial role of students, NGOs, and farmers' and workers' struggles.

The end of anti-colonial democratisation
As in many other colonies, the first wave of democracy in Indonesia grew out of the struggle against imperialism, racism and indirect rule through local strongmen. The first wave came to a halt after the national elections in 1955, followed by partial local elections in 1957. Ironically, there was little wrong with these elections. But the outcome was a stalemate between nationalists, traditional and modern oriented Muslims as well as the rapidly advancing communists, including the failure of the liberal socialists.

An attempted coup, the stepping down of the Vice President, and the protests in the regions led most actors to conclude that democracy was the problem, not the solution (e.g. Bourchier and Legge 1994). There was also the fear that the remarkably successful Communist Party was about to be elected into power. Both the liberal oriented socialists (often in agreement with those in Singapore) and the Muslims in the 'western camp' assumed that real democracy was impossible before the country had been properly modernised. In addition, the communists themselves did also not give priority to democracy, arguing that it was crucial to struggle against those who were siding with the West in the cold war (Törnquist 1984).

All important actors thus abandoned democracy, most prominently, President Sukarno, along with mainly Java and Bali based nationalists, communists, as well as traditionally oriented Muslims and military officers in favour of a unitary state, developing instead an anti-colonial campaign to 'liberate' West New Guinea. It was used to nationalise all Dutch properties and to introduce 'guided democracy'. The West sought to attract liberal

technocrats and anti-communists in the national army command. In addition to relying on the army, the measures included generous western education of economists, administrators and officers in cooperation with American military academies, as well as university based area studies, and in particular the Ford Foundation. In short, all major actors and their international sponsors agreed that, however defined, democracy was premature and had to be preceded by structural and institutional changes.

Modernisation and middle classes

Thereafter, from the mid-1950s, only a small fraction of the emerging Indonesian middle classes took a pro-democratic position. Most thought that democracy was premature and that the right conditions first had to be generated. They advocated for the rule of law and for certain rights and freedoms, but not for popular sovereignty. However, not even liberal intellectuals were consistent. Many supported the army-led crackdown and the mass killings of the members of communist-oriented popular movements in 1965-1966.

Some of the intellectuals later disagreed with Suharto's so-called new order but were unable to build a substantial middle class constituency even for their opposition to corruption and clientelism. Most members of the middle classes enjoyed the social and economic benefits under Suharto and it was only when their special privileges were undermined by the Asian crisis in 1998 that many gave passive support for change. Intellectual dissidents with roots in the middle classes were in the forefront of the final struggle against the Suharto regime but they lacked a constituency in the socio-religious reform movements. Nor were they able to draw on clientelism based on positions in the state and in business. The attempts to build parties based on liberal, middle class ideas and interests have failed miserably until today.

Politics of order against democracy

Huntington's (1965) idea of a strong state that precedes democracy, the so-called politics of order, was successful internationally. It provided legitimacy for Suharto's coup against Sukarno (which resembled the so-called middle-class coups in Latin America and elsewhere) as well as to the subsequent decades of an authoritarian 'new order'. Yet, there were no signs that the regime was able to give birth to the institutions that were capable of controlling corruption and establishing the rule of law and which were supposed to pave the way for democracy at a later point. Indeed, Indonesia continues to suffer from corruption and disrespect for the rule of law also after the overthrow of the Suharto regime. There have been severe problems of combatting these plagues by relying on the politicians that have been elected since 1998. But it is an irony that the old argument about the need for stable institutions ahead of democracy, which created the

problem in the first place, seems to return to the fore, much like it has done among educated liberals, businessmen and royalists in Thailand.

More capitalism, no democracy
Indonesian trade unions and labour organisations were important in the struggle for national independence. They were found on plantations and within transportation and other sectors of the colonial economy. Workplace struggles and politics were often combined. After independence, the priorities of labour were subordinated, however, to the broader aim of building a national economy. Populist President Sukarno and the reformist Communist Party took the lead. One of the largest peaceful popular movements in the Global South failed to stimulate economic growth and to prevent the military and its business allies from capturing the benefits of the massive nationalisations of foreign companies. Labour leaders were eliminated, class-oriented labour organisations were repressed, and the few remaining unions were subordinated to authoritarian state-corporatism.

Despite the rapid expansion of capitalism since the 1970s, neither industrialists, nor the growing numbers of professionals and workers were able to push the Suharto new order in the direction of more democracy. Labour primarily resisted excessive exploitation and major strikes took place in the export producing factories which tried to minimise wages in order to compete internationally. It is true that labour also opposed brutal primitive accumulation and attempted to place social and civil rights on the agenda. But the connections between unionism and actions more directly in favour of democracy were weak. Labour did not play a major role in the fall of Suharto (Törnquist 2004).

This does not mean that the conflicts between labour and capital were unimportant in preparing for the change. It was only after the Suharto regime could no longer regulate the tensions of despotic capitalism that finance capital and other dominant groups lost confidence in its ability to deliver. Ironically, it was to a large extent the anger among ordinary people over Suharto's and his advisors' decision to reduce subsidies even more than demanded by the IMF that boosted student protests and convinced the ruling elite that the captain would have to leave the ship.

Why has labour not been able to take advantage of the post-Suharto opportunities? Part of the explanation lies in the crisis that generated his removal. The world's third largest democracy was not born out of the successful development of capitalism but from its social and economic crisis. Thus labour's bargaining power had substantially diminished. Equally important, however, is its lack of capacity to benefit from the new political space that opened up, at least temporarily. Small autonomous groups and organisations were each fighting the remnants of authoritarianism in their own factories and workplaces.

Paradoxically, the divisive patronage offered by the authorities, NGOs, sectoral organisations, and by foreign supporters aggravated matters. Meanwhile, there was no clear-cut, unified enemy to fight given the deliberate disintegration of the state apparatus, privatisation, and the decentralisation of resources. Power struggles were increasingly localised in a jungle of private bosses and semi-private militias. Some labour activists have looked for new patrons at the centre, recreating top–down organisations. Almost all continue to rely on pressure politics, lobbying, and networks or more old fashioned clientelism (Cf. Törnquist 2004; Ford 2009).

Sukarno and PKI nationalism undermine democracy
The major proponents in Indonesia of the thesis that successful anti-feudalism and radical nationalism had to precede efforts at a democracy were President Sukarno and the Communist Party, PKI, which by the early 1960s, next to the Soviet Union and China, was the largest communist party in the world with some three million members and about 15 million organised sympathisers.

Communist-led popular movements and ultimately Sukarno as well were eliminated because of its involvement in the so-called 30th September Movement directed against the conservative top military leadership. Its actions triggered and legitimised army-led repression and the mass killings across the country, supported by the West. It is now beyond doubt (thanks to John Roosa 2006) that the party chairman Aidit engaged secretly in this adventurous movement and a common explanation for PKI's collapse is thus that Aidit betrayed the party. This however avoids the more fundamental question of why he engaged in these manipulations in the first place. My own studies suggest that Aidit's involvement was rational, given that the party's strategy had been undermined (Törnquist 1984). Aidit's involvement was not just an individual 'mistake' but was part of an attempt to weaken the anti-communist military leaders. Thus, the fundamental problem was not his actions but that the party's strategy itself was counterproductive. The strategy was to set aside 'bourgeois democracy' and to link up with Sukarno's 'guided democracy', land reform and radical nationalism. However, neither helped to alter the balance of power. They even helped to strengthen the grip of the military over the economy and the state.

The issue of democracy has been neglected in the debate about the failure of the PKI, the massacres, the rise of the 'New Order', as well as the failure of resistance. In leftist circles the focus has been on the deficiencies of individual leaders, including their failure to pursue 'proper' Maoist strategies. Only recently Max Lane (2010:41-51) has pointed to the fact that the PKI gave up on democracy in the late 1950s and early 1960's by supporting Sukarno's 'guided democracy'. The party failed to object when elections were cancelled by the regime and even supported the banning of critical parties, politicians and

artists. It failed to insist on 'bourgeois democratic' protection or to prevent the army from taking up leading positions in the economy and civil administration.

It would certainly have been risky for PKI to do without the protection of the nationalist forces loyal to Sukarno. In India in the mid 1970s the old Communist Party held on to Mrs Gandhi's state of emergency and protection in much the same way as the PKI did in relation to Sukarno. The more forceful break-away Communist Party-Marxist, however, was able to link up with 'bourgeois forces' in support of democracy. It could survive state repression while mobilising popular support behind its own radical social and economic reforms. It contributed to the termination of the emergency, the defeat of Indira Gandhi's government and ensured that a Marxist party could lead for long periods Left Front governments in both West Bengal and Kerala. It is true that the Indonesian army was more prepared to intervene in politics and to engage in repression than its Indian counterpart but the vulnerability of PKI could possibly have been compensated for by broad political alliances. At least it would have made it more difficult for the army to gain full support of both the opposition domestically and the West for its bloody repression.

Moreover, the communists may well have emphasised that the constitution of 1945, which Sukarno reintroduced, offered protection for both human rights and genuine elections. In principle it would have been possible to struggle for a combination of liberal democracy and interest group based representation instead of accepting Sukarno's 'guided democracy', which Suharto later transformed into a system of state-corporatism and patrimonialism controlled by the military.

The question remains: Why did PKI give up on democracy? It takes us to the party's analysis of the accumulation of power and capital in Indonesia and its understanding of how people would be able to resist and build alternatives. In Indonesia as in many other post-colonial countries the capitalist entrepreneurs were weak. It did not mean that they were necessarily lackeys of the old colonisers and new imperialists or engaged in the 'national bourgeois' or 'non-capitalist' projects envisaged by the PKI. On the contrary, unable to accumulate by dispossessing people of their land and other means of production, local capitalists were using politics, including state and military coercion, to accumulate. In addition, they were able to take advantage of nationalisations of foreign owned companies and benefit from foreign aid.

In short, the PKI failed to acknowledge that the prime base of their adversaries, which tended to be led by the military, was in their control of politics, state and coercion rather than in their links to imperialists and (the rather few) landlords, which the party continued to regard as the main enemies.

The consequences were devastating. The 'national bourgeoisie' and the state leaders, who supported or at least accepted Sukarno, did not act as expected. Although PKI constrained militant labour activism in order to build a social pact with the 'national bourgeoisie' and the supposedly progressive nationalists in the state apparatuses, little happened in terms of dynamic investments and growth. The result was severe economic mismanagement and crisis. Protests against looting and corruption resulted in more repression but the communists could not fight back as they would thus have lost the support of Sukarno. People were mobilised for the nationalisation of foreign companies and in support of anti-imperialist policies with the purpose of undermining the strength of the so-called bureaucratic capitalists because their power was supposed to be based on foreign capital and the West. But the military leaders continued to extend their control over both nationalised foreign companies and state resources in general. Although, the rural scene was more complicated, there was certainly not much land to distribute and few big landlords to fight. It was very difficult to avoid infightings among small landholders, tenants and labourers, who were subject to more indirect means of exploitation by patrons and local strongmen, who had gained political and administrative power and dominated production and trade. Later, under Suharto's new order, the extraction of surplus by political and administrative means became more brutalised, of course, and was also used for outright expropriation of land. At this point, therefore, the main enemy of the rural poor was rather perceived as the state itself and those in command of it rather than the landlords and strongmen with a base in private capitalist production (Törnquist 1984a).

Democratisation or business as usual?
By the early 1980s there were two main positions on democracy in Indonesia. The predominant one was that the rise of post-colonial capitalism under Suharto was based on centralised neo-patrimonial regime. It had been successful in terms of economic growth but had failed to bring benefits to the middle classes and people in general who were prevented from organising politically while dissidents were suppressed and marginalised (e.g. Crouch 1994 and Robison 1996). The other position, including my own, was that the rise of post-colonial capitalism had generated contradictions that would in themselves nourish radical struggle for democracy. Democracy, in this view, was necessary to fight post-colonial capitalism which was based on the monopolisation of the means of primitive accumulation (often state-based) and the subordination and repression of common people. In fact many, including poor farmers, fisher folks, urban poor and labourers as well as businessmen and members of the middle classes had already began to turn against the regime, students in particular, at least those who were not given special privileges. The prognosis was therefore that the opponents would come to share a basic interest in democratisation which could be politicised by pro-democracy groups. This proved generally correct. It is true that initially democratisation was not on top of the dissidents' agenda, but things changed within a decade and as is well known political

liberalisation and democracy was a major issue when Suharto was overthrown. Unlike what was expected, however, those opposing Suharto's dictatorship and the primitive accumulation that his regime had facilitated in favour of liberal democracy did not also opt for democratising the state but rather to reduce state and politics by way of privatisation and a minimum of formal democracy. How did this happen?

Nobody had dared to challenge Suharto until the student protests gained momentum by April and May 1998. Key local military and political leaders as well as foreign governments were at first hesitant to abandon him. As formal powers were transferred to Vice President Habibe the process of displacement was at first passive and slow. However, it was soon followed by the quick repositioning of the elite. Leading actors were anxious to protect their authority, legitimacy, contacts, and access to resources within the disintegrating Suharto regime. In less than a year and a half after the overthrow of Suharto most of the organised pro-democracy groups had thus lost momentum and much of their influence (Törnquist 2000).

Even if the pro-democrats were politically marginalised and even if there were a few turbulent years, however, Indonesia soon turned into a success story in the views of those who were seen to be promoting democracy internationally (cf. Aspinall 2010). Indonesia, with the largest Muslim population in the world, with a Christian minority and a wide range of ethnic groups, has gone from being the most authoritarian to the most liberal country in Southeast Asia. Although Papua remains a problem, East Timor has become independent and the civil war in Aceh has been replaced with rudimentary local self-government and democracy. The political role of the military has been significantly reduced. Corruption is severe but much criticised. The economy does well thanks to the export of raw materials and middle class consumption.

What happened? How was it possible to achieve these partial yet important victories without strong pro-democrats and without really altering the structural conditions? It is tempting to conclude that Indonesian democracy is fake, that it is an oligarchy based on Suharto's old elite and that the main difference with Suharto's time is that the various sections of this elite are now formally govern themselves through democratic elections in which they use the huge funds that they have accumulated in the past as well as their influence in media and various public and private institutions to get the people to vote for them (Robinson and Hadiz 2004).

A more careful examination (e.g. Piryono et.al. 2007 and Samadhi and Warouw 2009), however, emphasise the process of de-politicisation. In this view, centralised political governance of public affairs, including business opportunities, has been replaced by decentralisation, privatisation, and delegation to numerous non-government institutions.

Elected executives, parliamentarians, and NGO leaders have taken over from those who were in the past appointed by the authorities. There have been no safe heavens for the old oligarchs but they have been given the best possible opportunities to accommodate to new alliances with former dissident politicians, businessmen, and social leaders. Both central and local government institutions as well as political parties have thus been de facto monopolised by the powerful elite thanks to funds, networks and control of media. Formal rules prevent ordinary people from running as candidates even in local elections. Only parties that have funds enough to establish offices and collect signatures in the country at large are allowed to contest. Candidates need to be well educated and on the village level they must often pay for the administrative costs of the elections out of their own pockets. Suharto's corporative system of top-down representation has not been replaced. Democratic issue- and interest based representation continues to be overshadowed by pressure group politics, lobbying, and media campaigns, which require good contacts and access to substantial funds.

In short, elitist democratisation has been feasible because of de-politicisation of public affairs. But why was this possible? The main answer is the lack of a powerful alternative capable of mobilising a broader stratum of popular forces on a democratic platform. This calls for a separate analysis.

The limits of 'new politics'
The pro-democracy movement which was critically important in the process that finally incapacitated the Suharto regime and opened up for *reformasi* soon lost momentum and much of its potential significance, rather surviving as a congregation of watch dogs and lobby groups with only occasional influence. The movement had three major roots (e.g. Törnquist 1997; Lane 2008; Aspinall 2005). One strand was made up of the liberal and socialist oriented intellectuals, including student groups, which had been critical of the authoritarianism of Sukarno's and PKI's radical nationalism. Some even supported the military in 1965 before they later realised that Suharto's coup involved mass killings, which they found abhorrent, and that the military, rather than the middle-class technocrats and intellectuals, would be at the helm.

Another strand of the pro-democracy movement came from the non-communist trade unions and the civil society organisations that focussed on the farmers and urban poor. A third strand belonged to a new generation of civil society groups concerned with 'alternative development', often focusing on the environment or issues of human rights and corruption. These groups agreed among themselves that the authoritarian state was a major obstacle and that 'civil society' was the basis for any alternative. Class differences were not in the forefront and the new groups were neither based on extensive membership nor country-wide organisations outside the major cities, functioning rather as

influential networks. The focus was on specific issues, rights, and problems. While there were occasional radical actions, a predominant worry was how to avoid provoking major repression.

By the late 1980s leftist-oriented students tried to alter this cautious approach. They argued that any substantive improvement called for radical change. Democracy was crucial for the transformation of Indonesia's repressive and exploitative model of development. Such change, they said, called for political leadership and closer links between civil society groups, activists and ordinary people. The points were widely accepted but there was no agreement on how to implement them. While occasionally forming temporary coalitions, most groups kept to their own projects in opposing the regime. Moreover, the radical would-be political leaders made good use of the NGOs to win sympathisers, gain contacts and resources and build their own organisations. Thus the groups were suspicious of each others. Meanwhile other activists tried to reach out to ordinary people by relating to existing socio-religious organisations but, before the fall of Suharto, only rarely to separatist-cum-nationalist leaders in East Timor, Papua and Aceh in order to avoid accusations of betraying the country.

It is correct to talk about a 'democracy movement' in the sense that groups agreed on the need for political change and democratisation but there was no ideological unity or nation-wide coordination, and almost no attempts at forming united fronts and parties. While important in undermining the legitimacy of the Suharto regime it stood for no coherent alternative. A major claim was that 'civil society' and the people themselves should run the country. The movement failed to develop and alternative transitional arrangement and snap elite-negotiated elections made activists to loose momentum. They became socially and politically marginalised.

Why was it so difficult for the various fragments of the democracy movement to come together and form a genuine political alternative? The answer is simple: there was no strong reason for any of the actors involved to do so. This conclusion comes out clearly from the extensive studies of the democracy groups, both before and after Suharto (Budiman and Törnquist 2001, Prasetyo et.al. 2003, Priyono et.al. 2007, Samadhi and Warouw 2009) and also covered in country-wide surveys in 2003 and 2007. Typically, the pro-democrats only relate to sections of the population, rarely providing links between them. There were only few attempts, for instance, to link activities in workplaces, residential areas, and communities. Activists were engaged in specific localities, paying little attention to wider issues of governance, development, and public welfare. There was much focus on the rule of law, human rights, corruption, and civil control of the army, less on citizenship and almost nothing on representation and the capacity of governments to implement policies.

Activists rarely tried to mobilise followers inside public administration and to engage in organised politics, nor were they present in public and private workplaces. Their main achievement was to collect and disseminate information, engaging in lobbying and pressure group activities and promoting self-management and self-help. The way they gained authority and legitimacy was primarily on the basis of their superior knowledge and their participation in the public discourse. This was at the expense of organising with a view of obtaining a public mandate or winning elections. They were poorly connected to social movements and popular organisations. Collective action was mainly based on individual networking and alternative patronage as opposed to participation in broad and representative organisations. Parliaments and executive institutions were primarily approached through lobbying by NGOs and critique through the media. Given the issues that were given priority to, lobbying and media activism was simply a more effective strategy, at least in the short run, than to engage in building mass politics, viable political parties, or broad interest-based organisations.

Those involved in these group activities or as individuals no doubt gained some important experience. As such it was a major achievement compared with the subordination suffered under Suharto when organised politics (except in the government party) was prohibited on the grassroots level in order to turn ordinary people into what the regime called a 'floating mass'. After Suharto, however, the pro-democracy activists themselves were 'floating' by having failed to develop a solid social constituency. They were unable to generate substantial improvements in terms of popular control of public affairs on the basis of political equality. In many cases they even contributed to more privatisation and polycentrism. It was not clear what people (demos) would control what public affairs. In addition, the groups were often marginalised or co-opted by more powerful local actors within politics, administration and business, as well as by international organisations and donors.

Neglected links
Extensive research has been undertaken in cooperation with Indonesian pro-democracy activists who, in response to these problems, have tried to develop new ways of engaging in organised politics. Hence this chapter cannot be concluded before we have examined their experiences. How did these political innovators try to overcome both their own social and political marginalisation and powerful elite's monopolisation of the political system? It is possible to identify eight trends or types of actually existing projects and experiences (Törnquist et.al 2009).

The first was characterised by attempts at *democratising popular communities* such as customary (*adat*) groups, indigenous populations and Muslim congregations on the basis

of equal citizenship. This was meant to provide the foundations for alternative local governance and interventions in mainstream politics. Typically, however, a community would not claim equal citizenship rights for all people in the locality but for itself as a special community. It was also not clear what public affairs (such as what natural resources or citizen rights and obligations) that their community rather than people in general or several communities together would control and on what grounds.

In the second kind of project, there was an effort to bypass 'rotten politics' by building a new model of *'direct politics'* to develop media and public discourse, social auditing, struggle against corruption, and participatory budgeting. Yet again it was not clear what people would control what public affairs and how decisions were taken, who was represented, and to whom activists were accountable. While many issues were no doubt important, it seemed as if the most powerful and resourceful actors with best contacts tended to dominate.

The third type of project that could be identified was that CSOs and labour leaders facilitated *trade union based politics and parties.* In some cases this was combined with community organising in neighbourhoods but also ethnic and religious groups. Commonly, however, the differences between the unions, their leaders and other related communities were also scaled up, thus preventing broader joint work and linkages to other pro-democratic constituencies and wider popular issues.

A similar fourth kind of project was the promotion by CSOs and related leaders of broader *social movement based politics and parties*. One such attempt was based on environmental groups, another on farmers' and agricultural workers' organisations. To counter the suspicion that the political activists would cater to their own interests, it was agreed that candidates in elections would come directly from the basic organisations. Most of these organisations, however, obviously deemed the political project to be too risky and expensive as compared to their usual practices of fostering clients' and members' interests as pressure and lobby groups. Moreover, the questions of how to develop and decide on joint platforms and priorities as well as to elect and keep candidates accountable were never really resolved.

The fifth project that stood out was characterised by groups which tried to make an impact by negotiating *political contracts* of co-operation with strong political actors who needed to broaden their alliances and support base beyond a predominant clientelist arrangements. The politicians engaged in programmes that attracted wider sections of the population that wished to see, for instance, less corrupt governance and better public welfare systems. In exchange for lending their good names and endorsing the politicians in elections, pro-democracy groups typically tried to sign a memorandum of

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understanding with the politicians, increasing the capacity of wider sections of the population. Many of the actual arrangements were however only statements of intentions and limited to rather narrow issues. Furthermore, most civil and popular actors lacked sufficient bargaining power to enforce the deals. They were typically unable to deliver a substantial number of votes, and lacked an organisation that was able to keep successful politicians accountable after the elections.

The sixth project was to build political *fronts from within* an already powerful party or movement (or to take over the weak local chapters of such parties), turning them in to instruments of change. The problems, however, included the risk of being co-opted and the uphill task of building strength enough to advance when being unable to build fractions inside the party or movement.

The seventh type of project was to fight for the legalising of *local parties and independent candidates* in elections. This project was mainly developed and also proved to be successful in the autonomous war-thorn and tsunami affected province of Aceh. Remarkably, these leaders and activists even managed to build an alliance and to win the 2006 elections of local executives, in spite of resistance from semi-aristocratic GAM leaders in exile and mainstream Indonesian politicians. Thus it was possible to project the new institutions as a model for the country at large as well as for other conflict areas. The advances, however, were rapidly undermined. The international community were busy with the post-tsunami reconstruction work without making much effort to also employ the massive programmes in attempts at better governance in Aceh. This helped making it possible for the semi-aristocratic leaders and local strongmen with access to the command structure of the rebel movement to become dominant, to develop power-sharing agreements with former enemies and to do away with their utmost to marginalise the reformists. Moreover, the reformists themselves were not very successful in using the positions that they had gained in the elections to foster interest based representation and initiate alternative development. Hence most actors turned instead to lobbying, clientelism, and corruption in their efforts to retain their positions. (Törnquist et.al. 2011)

The final major project was to build a national *ideology-driven party* to provide political guidance and coordination to the CSOs and the social movements . Firstly, however, there were simply no strong and broad popular movements. Secondly, the would-be leaders were better read into radical literature than capable of serving as the representatives of the movements that nevertheless hardly existed.

The projects that have been identified above reflected existing priorities and organisational practices among the pro-democrats. The aims were modified, but not their politics. Their main focus was still on issues of immediate concern for their own

movement rather than on interests of wider concern that would have called for broad alliances and mass politics. Moreover, when anyway trying to cooperate, they had problems of poor political representation, both within the groups and organisations themselves and in relation to political parties, parliaments and state institutions.

Conclusion

The 'old' left failed by not making democratisation an integral part in the struggle to control primitive accumulation and the rise of capital. Although the new generation gave priority to democratisation against Suharto, it focused on rights that did not call for popular representation in a context of mass based politics for social and economic welfare and growth. It was assumed that by establishing a liberal political space and a well entrenched culture of civil rights the necessary preconditions would be provided for class-related mass politics. Even after 1998, when much of this 'space' was at hand, there were, however, no sustained attempts to connect the two and influence the direction of democratic politics. Several socially and politically marginalised democracy groups have recently tried to go more 'political', but their politics still reflect old priorities and organisational practices. Thus the problems of democratic representation in the relations between the groups themselves as well as in their links to organised politics and the state remain unresolved. There are no major attempts to combine the focus on civil rights with questions of social and economic welfare and growth that call for mass politics, viable political parties, or broad interest-based organisations. To discuss possible ways ahead, these problems need to be analysed in comparative theoretical perspective. Why, for instance, have similar dilemmas been less important and been tackled more successfully in other cases, including in the paradigmatic historical cases of Scandinavia?

Meanwhile, the weaknesses of the Indonesian pro-democracy movements have provided space for a pattern of elite-based, shallow democratisation. At best this can contain demands for the restoration of 'politics of order', but it is potentially unstable and incapable of fostering genuine representation, welfare-based growth, and fighting corruption.

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