EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
DEMOCRACY BASELINE SURVEY

POWER WELFARE AND DEMOCRACY (PWD)
Universitas Gadjah Mada and University of Oslo

Purwo Santoso, Amalinda Savirani, Olle Törnquist, Eric Hiariej, Hasrul Hanif, Willy Purna Samadhi, Debbie Prabawati, Wening Hapsari M

A. Introduction

Power, Welfare and Democracy (PWD Project) is a follow up of the long term and research-based project aiming to strategically support democratization process in Indonesia. The support is highly critical. Complexity within the existing procedural-oriented set up of democracy potentially drifts Indonesia back into authoritarianism. In doing so, it enhances the existing set of collaboration between academic-based communities in their endeavor to: (1) set critical agenda of democratization on the basis of assessment, (2) empower the pro-democracy movements in their research and analytical competence, (3) nurture the engaging think tanks on human rights and democracy.

The basic idea of this project is to contribute to democratization process through academic means. It is strategic in the sense that Indonesia's democratization cannot afford to miss. Power relation and the link between democracy and welfare are things that ordinary mode of democracy movement tended to emphasize. Democratic procedures and civil and political rights are important, but they are not enough. Nonetheless it is necessary to disclose who has the power to control the means/institutions of democracy (the procedures) (and how do they do it). Furthermore: What is the public/state capacity to implement in a non-corrupt way democratic decisions about for instance more fair power relations and welfare measures? To what extent and in what way can democratic rights and governance contribute (or not contribute) to solve problems (that have been specified) of sustainable and welfare based economic growth.

B. Method

The Baseline Survey on Development of Democracy is the main component of the project. The aim of Baseline Survey is to assess problems and options of democratisation in Indonesia.

1

The assessment takes Beetham's substantive definition of the aim of democracy in terms popular control over public affairs on the basis of political equality (Beetham, 1999) as a point of departure.

By contrast to other democracy assessments, we ask a number of questions that relate to various theories of democratisation (see Törnquist 2013) in order to find out in the theoretically most inclusive and unbiased way the extent to which most important means the means have fulfilled these aims:

(i)   do the institutions (such as freedoms and elections) foster democracy?
(ii)   do the actors adjust to the rules of the game?
(iii)   do people accept and understand the ways in which the people and public affairs are constituted?
(iv)   what is the capacity of dominant and alternative actors to use the democratic rules of the game and develop alternative politics and policies? (v) how do such such politics and policies affet the further development of democracy?

This survey is a continuation of the two previous surveys. The first was conducted in 2003/2004 and the second was in 2007. Both were organized by Demos (Indonesian NGO) and University of Oslo (UiO) UGM was also involved in the writing of the second concluding report. In this third round the survey was conducted by a team of Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM) and UiO.

The team developed survey instruments; built and maintained coordination with local teams, comprising 28 key informants (local coordinator) and 147 local researchers on 28 cities/regencies and 2 special regions in 25 provinces; processed and analyzed the data. The team also selected locations of survey which is based on four categories; geography, degree of modernization, level of social cohesion and violence, and availability of pro-democracy activists. The team also conducted survey at national level. However, the data is not available yet and the following report is based on findings at the local level.

The informants of our survey are experiences and critically self-reflective pro-democracy actors who were actively involved in promoting democratisation in their respected fields. Hence they should know best! The Team took three steps to choose the informant. First, the team asked 28 of our local coordinators to choose 3-5 important frontlines in their area. Second, together with local coordinators 3-5 informants in each front line were identified. Finally, the list of informant was evaluated in order to ensure a balance proportion of gender, age, educational level and political backgrounds.

Table 1
Profile of informant

NO	AGE GROUPS	PERCENT
1	25 and younger	1.7
2	26-30	5.6
3	31-35	17.4
4	36-40	21.1
5	41-45	17.7
6	46-50	11.3
7	Older than 50	20.3
8	Unknown	4.9
	TOTAL	100.0

Table 2
Gender composition of informant

NO	GENDER	FREQUENCY	PERCENT
1	Female	130	22.0
2	Male	462	78.0
	TOTAL	592	100.0

Table 3
List of Frontline

NO	FRONTLINE	NUMBER OF INFORMANTS	PERCENT
1	Education	64	10.8
2	Health	26	4.4
3	Ecology and environment	69	11.7
4	Labor movement	30	5.1
5	Informal sectors	33	5.6
6	Agrarian and Land reform	19	3.2
7	Women and children rights	62	10.5
8	Clan, ethnic, religious inter-relation	66	11.1
9	Media and Social Media	26	4.4
10	Security sector reform	11	1.9
11	Anticorruption	58	9.8
12	Human rights	48	8.1
13	Party and election reform	58	9.8
14	Business sector	22	3.7
	TOTAL	592	100.0

Figure 1
Map of Survey Area

We interviewed 592 informants in 30 cities/regencies. The idea is not statistical representation but to get the best possible information from crucial sectors and localities. The top five frontlines are ecology and environment; clan, ethnic, religious inter-relation; education; and women and children rights. The bottom three of our frontlines are security sector reform; agrarian and land reform; and business sector. The finding shows that 78 percent of informants is male. The majoriy of female informants are from women and children rights frontline. Age composition of our informants is dominated by 36-40 years old and older than 50 years old. The lowest percentage belongs to the youth generation under 25 years old.

Figures of informants outlined above reveal an interesting feature about activists at local level. First, it continues to be male dominated. Second, the majority of activists are at the age between 30 and 50 years old. On the one hand the survey might have seen a group of activists who have been in their field for some times. On the other hand the small percentage of those who are between 25 and 30 years old might be a sign of a growing problem of recruiting new generation of activist. Third, the proportion of frontlines demonstrates the growing importance of issues related to welfare. This seems to support, as will be discussed later, the dominance of welfare in the current Indonesian public issues.

The idea is that each sector should be equally important. If they answer very differently that should not make the survey biased because there are such an unequal number of respondents between them.

The informants are not just crucial in providing correct information. They are also crucial in following up the work by making the results available and useful along their own frontlines of work and in the districts and towns where they live

and work. At best, they can add more detailed studies and thus build a real basis for more unified and effective efforts at democratic development.

C. Findings

The following discussion of survey's findings will be divided into five topics: (1)democratic institutions, (2) actors and institutions, (3) "figure-based politics", (4) the longing for welfare state and (5) the emergence of populism.

1 Institution

Realization of popular control and political equality, (c.f. Beetham, 2007) in Indonesian can be measured against the presence and the performance of democratic institutions in the country. Institution here does not refer to "organization" only but more importantly norms, values, procedures, conventions, social roles, regulations, believes, codes, cultures and knowledge that constitute or structure social or individual behaviors and orientations (see Lauth 2000: 23; Olsen & March, 1989:22)

By adapting David Beetham's ideas on democratic institution (Beetham, 1999:154-155; Landman, 2008:11-12), this survey tries to identify the progress of current Indonesia democracy by assessing the performance of rules and regulations classified into following categories. The first category is rules and regulations related to the idea of citizenship, which includes Equal citizenship, Rule of law, Equal justice and Universal human rights. The second can be put under the rubric of **representation** consisting of democratic political representation, Citizen participation, Institutionalized channels for interest- and issue-based representation, Local democracy, and Democratic control of instruments of coercion. The third group of rules and regulations are those associated with democratic governance, comprising governance, transparent, impartial and accountable governance, and government's independence to make decisions and implement them. The final category is vibrant **civil society** consisting of freedom of and equal chances to access to public discourses, and democratic citizen's self-organizing. By categorizing these democratic rules and regulations in detail, this survey aims to assess the quality of democracy without falling into generalization.

A number of scholars observing contemporary Indonesian democracy have published their assessment with various judgments and conclusions. According to Larry Diamond (2009), as a new democracy in East Asia, Indonesia has performed better than most experts anticipated. Democracy in Indonesia will be secured for a very long time and will be further improved with more progress

toward better governance. On the other hand, Henk Schulte Nordholt (2004) and Gerry van Klinken (2009) emphasize on the continuation of political clientelism in decentralized democracy. Marcus Mitzner (2012) suggests a stagnation in the post Soeharto's democracy. Mitzner in fact argues that the process of democratic consolidation has been frozen. While civil society organizations emerge as the most important defender of democracy, the anti-reformist elites want to roll back the process.

The survey shows that there is a significant improvement in the performance of democratic institutions in the country. However, the level of improvement varies from one category od rules and regulations to the other. (see Table 4). **The most impressive achievement is on vibrant civil society (freedom of equal chances and citizen self-organizing)** (52%). Political liberalization in Indonesia has opened more and more new political spaces for civil society. Civil society has more opportunities to access, involve and influence public discourse. Furthermore, the capacity of civil society to organize self-organizing or selfgoverning organization in democratic ways has been significantly getting better.

Table 4
General assessment on democratic formalized rules and regulations

NO	Group of Rules and Regulations	Good	Fair	Bad
		(% of Informants)		
I	Citizenship	27%	39%	32%
II	Representation	24%	41%	32%
III	Governance	19%	38%	39%
IV	Civil Society	44%	33%	21%
	Average	28%	38%	31%

The least impressive performance is on democratic institutions related to governance. This confirms the findings of other research stating that corruptions, lack of accountability, pork-barrel legislations and so forth remain unbreakable obstacles in Indonesian democracy (for example Aspinall & Klinken [eds.], 2011).

The most progressive and improved rules and regulations since the first *Pemilukada* is also related to vibrant civil society (54.1%). However, there is no significant change in democratic governance (50.4%). A quite significant number believes that democratic governance is worsened. It can be argued that initial effort by Indonesian government to enhance transparency by introducing Law on Openness of Public Information in 2008 does not improve the quality of governance (see table 5).

Table 5
Quality of the means of democracy (formalized rules and regulations)

NO	Group of Rules and Regulations	Improved	Worsened	Not Changed
		(% of informants)		
I	Citizenship	30%	24%	43%
II	Representation	29%	24%	43%
III	Governance	26%	26%	45%
IV	Civil Society	45%	18%	34%
	Average	33%	23%	41%

Table 6
How informal rules and regulations limit or contradict the formalized means of democracy

NO	Group of RULES AND REGULATIONS	INFORMALITY CONTRADICTS FORMAL MEANS OF DEMOCRACY		
		Values	Organization	Mechanism
A	CITIZENSHIP	36%	11%	53%
B	REPRESENTATION	35%	15%	51%
C	GOVERNANCE	24%	16%	59%
D	CIVIL SOCIETY	35%	17%	49%

Even though the performance of democratic institutions is generally improved, the quality of its implementation and the substance of rules and regulation remain low. While a large number of new regulations with good orientation have been issued at both national and local level of government, the implementation is weak and contradictions in the substance is hardly resolved.

It can be argued that, as suggested by Diamond (2009; 2012), the process of democratization in Indonesia is relatively successful in terms of building and maintaining democratic rules and regulations. The success story however can potentially conceal the variety in the level of performance and improvement of different institutions. As mentioned above, while the performance and improvement of vibrant civil society and citizenship related instutions is the most impresive, representation and democratic governance associated rules and regulations are on the oposite end. By taking into account such variety, it might be further argued that the process of democratization seems to be biased towards the first two categories, which are closely related to liberal values and

norms. On the other hand, the later two categories, which are close to the idea of the inclusion of people into political process are left behind. Does it mean that Indonesia is witnessing the rise of more liberalism and less democracy in the democratization process? In addition, as will be discussed later, considering such variety will significantly reveal the fact that different actors promote different rules and regulation. It is then impotant to ask, in promoting democratic institution, why actors act discriminately towards rules and regulations.

2 The Strengthening of "Figure-Based Politics": on actors.

Clearly, actor is an important element in the survey. David Beetham (1999) understands democracy as "popular control of public affairs on the basis of political equality 'Actor' in Beetham-ian democracy refers to the establishment of popular representation. They are individual or group of people who reside outside the realm of state and they are originally from the grass root movement. Actor is more than 'elite' or 'leader' as majority of scholars in conventional democracy understands it. Democratic actor is necessary to ensure the strengthening of this popular movement. Most importantly actors are the citizens who exercise popular control over public affairs.

Our questions on actors are about their existence, and their roles in establishing popular control. We asked our informants to identify four influential actors in their region who play roles in four arenas: state and local government, political society, business sector, and civil society. Thus, each of them lists sixteen names. Not all of our informants mentioned all of the sixteen influential actors we requested. In total, we obtain 5,801 influential actors from our informants. We later divide the influential actors into two group: "dominant" and "alternative" actors. What we refer as "dominant" actors are those who control public policies making, and discourse making. "Alternative" actors or sub-ordinated actors are actors who challenged the power of dominant actors, they control public discourse but no power in decision-making process.

Who are these actors? We attempt to group them into two category: whether they are related to New Order or not: a) administrators/bureaucrats during New Order era, b) committee of Golkar, c) members of New Order corporatist institutions such as AMPI, FKPPI, and d) Crony capitalist. This grouping is to understand their social and political background and to discuss former scholars who suggest that Indonesian elites are former New Order apparatchik (Hadiz 2004), and they the oligarch now. Our finding shows that from 5,801 influential actors, there are 25.6% are old elites (connected to New Order) and 74.4% are new elites, having little or no connection to New Order. Thus, there is a tendency of mixture of the profile of local elites between those connected to New Order and those who are not. To what extent this finding can be linked to the debate

on the feature of Indonesian democracy as an oligarchy? Our data can not support to test the argument although it is very tempting to say so.

Furthermore we want to know what these influential actors' current position. We group them into 13 positions. The following is the result of what positions are the most influential actors at the local level.

Table 7
Current position of Influential Actors

No	Current position of influential actors	%
1.	CSO Activists	16.4%
2.	Businesspeople	14.6%
3.	Elected public officials	14.3%
4.	Member of local parliament	11.8%
5.	Party leader/prominent figure in party	10.6%
6.	Public figures/Adat leaders/ethnic group leaders	10.5%
7.	Administrators/bureaucrats	5.6%
8.	Professional/academician	5.3%
9.	Religious leaders	3.3%
10.	Military/police officers	1.2%
11.	Members of state's auxiliary body/commissioners	1.0%
12.	Others	5.3%

The top five positions of influential actors at the local level are CSOs activists, businesspeople, elected public officials, members of local parliament, and party leaders/prominent figure in party.

From 5,801 influential actors that our informants mention, we asked our informants to select only four actors: two dominant actors and two alternative ones. Dominant actors are those who occupy positions at state's arena, and alternatives ones are who stay at the civil society arena. In total there are 2,222 actors. From these numbers, the "dominant" actors are 1,143, and "alternative" actors are 1,079. The following graph shows what these two groups of actors current positions.

Graph 1

Composition of dominant and alternative actors and their current professions

From the data above, we see that the top three positions for dominant actors are elected public officials, member local parliaments, and businesspeople. For alternative actors are CSOs activists, professional/academicians, and public figures/Adat leader/ethnic groups. The "dominant" actors are majority at state arenas and the "alternatives" ones are at civil society arenas.

In addition to that, from the finding of alternative actors, data show on the tendency of the increased of so-called "individual politics", as the number of "elected public officials" is almost 50%. "Individual politics" has become a major feature of Indonesian politics, at least the local level. We can also suspect that this "figure-based politics" run election by using their individual networks and capital, rather than institutions such as political parties or grass-root organizations. This type of politics is "one-man show" in feature. Findings in section 5 of the survey on "actors' capacity" confirm this tendency. When asked about how the dominant and alternative actors become legitimate and authoritative, most of the answers suggest that dominant actors use three main instruments i.e. big economic capital (20%), their own personal authority (14.4%) and being active in democratic organizations (7.2%). Individual can use the two first instruments without any assistance to from the politics-based organizations, while the last one is more collective instrument (institutions).

Another support of data in the argument of "individual politics", is the identification of method that the dominant and alternative actors use to increase their capacity to mobilize and organize supports. They do that by three main methods a) develop populism (45.4%), offering patronage (in terms of economic protection and general protection) (12 %), and using their own charisma (11.8%). "Populism" here refers to direct relation to people on program offered, and wider scope and reach of the program. This again is another fact on the increased of individual politics in Indonesia. There is no used of political parties, let alone popular movement at the grass root level. People tend to runs for public positions individually, even if they mobilize supporters, it is only in the context of gaining voters through short-term welfare benefit rather than educating and empowering with long-term benefit.

The figure for alternative actors is quite similar. The top three positions where the alternative actors are nested are CSOs activists, professional/academicians, and public figures/Adat leaders. There is a tendency that the three are also individual-based, rather than institution ones. Thus, there has been a failure in politics-based organization at the party and society level.

3 On Actors Relation to Institutions
As outlined above, actors play significant role in the process of democratization. Assessing the quality of democracy in Indonesia is hardly sufficient should the focus be only on the performance and the level of improvement of rules and regulation. More importantly, the quality of democracy should also be measured against the relation between democratic institution and main actors in public affairs. Differing from Diamond's and other's work assessment on democracy, this survey asked whether actors promote or abuse such rules and regulations. The finding shows that both dominant and alternative actors tend to promote the rules and regulations . It seems that **democracy has become "the only game in town" in Indonesia** as the main actors avoid using non-democratic methods in political process.

Table 8
Actors' tend to promote rules and regulations

No	Group of Rules and Regulations	Dominant Actors (%)	Alternative Actors (%)
A	CITIZENSHIP	51	67
B	REPRESENTATION	48	58
C	GOVERNANCE	44	56
D	CIVIL SOCIETY	46	61
	AVERAGE	47	61

Table 9
Actors' tend to abuse rules and regulations

| No	Group of Rules and Regulations	Dominant Actors (%)	Alternative Actors (%)
A	CITIZENSHIP	32	7
B	REPRESENTATION	29	7
C	GOVERNANCE	35	8
D	CIVIL SOCIETY	21	5
	AVERAGE	29	7

Furthermore, dominant actors promote different rules and regulations from alternatives actors. Dominant actors mainly tend to endorse rules and regulations related to citizenship and political representation. While alternative actors enhance rules and regulations related to democratic and accountable governance and vibrant civil society.

What does such finding mean? First, it seems that the main actors are only concerned with rules and regulations related to the arena in which they operate. Since the majority of dominant actors consist of state officials, parliament members and politicians, their attention is largely directed to institution associated with the formation of political society. Similarly, since the majority of alternative actors is CSO activists, it is not surprising that they promote institutions related to the emergence of vibrant civil society than others rules and regulations. Second, the fact that the main actors are only concerned with their own arena might imply that there are relatively limited connections between political society based actors and civil society based actors. This at least supports the isolated nature of CSO activists as previously noted.

4. The Longing for Welfare State: On Public Issues and the Formation of 'Demos'

As mentioned earlier, public issue or public affair is an important aspect in Beetham's notion on democracy. It is what makes people to get together oin political communities, and it is their very first reason to do so. We asked this question to our informant: what they think as the most important issues according *for themselves*, and according to what people think. There are four main issues that our informants think as the most important public issue, namely public services which consist of health, education, physical security, public transportation, traffic, and public housing. The public service issues have become increasingly popular over the past half decade. There is hardly any politicians who run for positions who did not have any free education and health care. Once they are elected, the two favorites program they would implement will be education and health care.

Graph 2
Types of public issue

The next question was about whether public governance shall deal with these public issues. Our informants say yes to four groups of list of issues, although they answer different percentage in the groups of answer. In the sector of "public service", 55% of our informant says that public governance should deal on public service; 29.5% says that public governance should take care of economic development; 18.2 % suggest that citizens' right should be in the hand of public governance.

What we can argue from the data above is that people is generally would like to have a welfare state. We think that this finding can be generalized for all Indonesians. Welfare state here refers to state that can function and deliver roles in public welfare namely education, health care, public transportation, public housing, and security.

The popularity of public service as major public issue in Indonesia is a result of electoral democracy that has been since the political change in Indonesia. One of the electoral process that contribute to the wide-spread acknowledgement of public issue is campaign activities. During the activities, all kind of promises from the candidates are broadcasted to attract voters. Eventually, a candidate for elected public offices (be it presidential, governor, mayor/district head) will always bring along their campaign material. The most popular ones are the topic of public services.

However, despite of the quest for state to take care of public services, according to our findings, market and self-organized community have been the most two important institutions that provide deal with public services, not state or public governance mechanism. Thus, citizens wish to have welfare state, yet since state does not function well, state gives its citizens market to provide and fulfill basic k services. State seems to imply its market-oriented framework in providing basic services. It does not mean state has not functioned, it has but it remains in term of regulatory body, which produces and issues series of regulation, but most of them are merely formalistic. This is the arena where state mostly function, rather than the act of implementing the regulations it issues. Amidst this too narrow oriented on law making, market takes major role in everyday life of Indonesian in providing basic services.

5 Demos and Public Discourse

The most active group in society who talk and discuss about public issues, according to our finding, is civil society organizations. We can tentatively argue that this active civil society is the 'demos' of the Indonesian.

Graph 3
People Involved in Public Debate

People Involved in Public Debate

Different from scholars who argued on the absence of 'demos' in Indonesia, and it becomes the reasons of the stagnation of democracy. 'Demos' does exists, at least in the discussion of public issue. Furthermore, its existence is rather solid. This is perhaps due to the fact that the issues we are referring here is public issue, which have become a main topic in Indonesian politics over the past one-decade. The importance of this issue has increased thanks to electoral democracy, which has become institutionalized.

Yet, to be able for an issue to be taken as a public issue, political society elements i.e. parliament and representative institutions should be part of the discussion. They will be the one who would take over and follow up the issue and push it as a mechanism of public governance. In short, political society is needed to make "public issue" to become "public affair", and later to be taken as a policy. Thus, engagement between civil society organizations and political society is needed to allow public issues become public matters. As long as there is a gap between civil society and political society, Indonesian democracy will be stagnant, using a term of Mietzner's (2012). As it only pushes political freedom and but not provides welfare.

Of course, however, PWD survey findings is a general picture in Indonesia. Amidts this generalization, there is a particular case that is againts the main trend. The success of formation of health security system in Indonesia (BPJS), is one of that exception. Together, elements of civil society organization, labour union, and limited number of politicians has been successful to guide the health scheme. This will be explored in the conclusion section of this summary.

5 Emerging Populism

Democracy in Indonesia has been described as being continuously plagued by political clientelism. Even though always considered as an ancient practice that will be swept away by modernization, a number of researches (see, for example, Klinken 2009) suggest that the democratization process in countries such as Indonesia merely turns the practice of clientelism into an alternative to democratic accountability. On the one hand political clientelism is a practice of offering personal benefits such as money, jobs or access to public services for electoral support.This is in contrast to candidates and parties who rely on policy based benefits to attract voters.

In general the survey partly confirms the clientelistic nature of democracy in Indonesia. It is revealed that practices associated with patron-client relations) such as persuasive action and using of patronage remains the most important method applied by the dominant actors in overcoming the problem of exclusion (see Table 10).

Table 10
Actors' attempt to overcome exclusion

No	ATTEMPT TO OVERCOME EXCLUSION	Dominant Actors (%)	Alternative Actors (%)
1	Using patronage	7%	2%
2	Using money	3%	1%
3	Using media/information/discourses	9%	18%
4	Using democratic organization and institutions	6%	5%
5	Using coercion/intimidation	2%	0%
6	Using propaganda/campaign	7%	4%
7	Persuasive action	30%	15%
8	Using authority	8%	1%
9	To open access for public/To involve people	8%	5%
10	Building political image	2%	0%
11	Mass action/Network	3%	16%
12	Doing advocacy, real program	2%	4%
13	Others	3%	2%
14	Doing nothing	8%	2%
	TOTAL	100%	100%

The survey further shows that the primary bases of the same actors to become a legitimate and authoritative political leader are economic resources and good connections. Although both types of resources do not necessarily imply the presence of political clientelism, it is widely understood that a combination of economic base in terms of money and connections has always been the major elements of patron-client relations. Therefore, this specific finding might be seen as supportive to the argument of the continuation of political clientelism in Indonesian democracy.

Nevertheless, patron-client relation is no longer the only alternative to programmatic accountability. The survey also suggests that Indonesia is witnessing a growing tendency towards populism. Even though offering patronage to clients remains the key figure, the dominant actors become more depending on developing populism and charismatic leadership in mobilizing and organizing supports (see Table 11 and 12). Interestingly, those who are supposed to be the alternative leaders also rely on populism. In contrast methods that can be associated with democratic accountability in mobilizing and organizing supports such as building and developing organization from below and coordinating interest groups and movements constitute a small percentage for both types of actors.

Table 11
Dominant actors' capacity to mobilize and organize support

No	Methods of Mobilization	RANK 1 (%)	RANK 2 (%)	RANK 3 (%)	Total Responses (%)
1	Develop populism	47%	6%	5%	20%
2	Charismatic leadership	12%	20%	4%	12%
3	Offer patronage to clients	12%	11%	8%	11%
4	Offer alternative protection and support	5%	8%	6%	6%
5	Provide contacts with influential people	4%	17%	10%	10%
6	Utilize family or clan connections	6%	12%	15%	11%
7	Build networks between equal actors	6%	12%	22%	13%
8	Coordinate groups and movements	4%	10%	15%	9%
9	Facilitate the building of organizations from below	3%	5%	15%	8%
	TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 12
Alternative actors' capacity to mobilize and organize support

No	METHODS OF MOBILIZATION	RANK 1 (%)	RANK 2 (%)	RANK 3 (%)	Total Responses (%)
1	Develop populism	31%	5%	4%	14%
2	Charismatic leadership	10%	8%	2%	7%
3	Offer patronage to clients	4%	3%	4%	3%
4	Offer alternative protection and support	20%	13%	9%	14%
5	Provide contacts with influential people	6%	11%	6%	8%
6	Utilize family or clan connections	2%	5%	3%	4%
7	Build networks between equal actors	10%	21%	14%	15%
8	Coordinate groups and movements	9%	23%	26%	19%
9	Facilitate the building of organizations from below	8%	11%	32%	16%
	TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%

Populism in this study is understood as a Political style. Dimensions of populism are three (see, for example, Raadt, Holladers, Krouwel 2004). First, it refers to "the people" who the populist leaders claim to have acted on their behalf. Second, this specific political style is associated with the idea of creating and forging a non-mediated relationship between the populist leader and the people. Third, populism also contains heavily anti-establishment and anti elite sentiments. The prime example of populism is in the current buzzword of *blusukan* in describing the increasingly popular political style of leaders such as the governor of Jakarta, Joko Widodo.

In terms of political inclusion both populism and clientelism tend to incorporate "the people" through more vertical and heteronomous manner, rather than integrate them, into political process (Mouzelis 1998). However, populism is clearly different from clientelism. Instead of exchanging material benefits for political support to clearly defined groups or even individuals via a system of patron-client networks, a populist leader try to communicate directly with the people and offers more general support to attract voters. Typically the populist measures are either identity oriented – such as searching support on the basis of ethnic or religious communalism and symbols – or focusing on people's material well-being. In fact, offering populist measures, in terms of policies related to

welfare issues as previously mentioned, is the prime concern of Indonesian political elite (see section 2). Furthermore, as demonstrated in this survey, the main actors, who increasingly rely on populism, start to put more emphasis on getting wider supports (see Table 13 and 14).

Table 13
Indicators of successful in mobilizing and organizing support

NO	Indicators of Successful	Dominant Actors (%)	Alternative Actors (%)
1	Enable to conducting more frequent demonstration, rally	0%	2%
2	Have good connection, link to parties	3%	2%
3	Have many friends, connection, alliances	3%	8%
4	Engage in policy making processes collectively	3%	2%
5	The issue become public interest, get media coverage	15%	26%
6	Enable to get into power, formal public/political position	28%	14%
7	Enable to form mass organization	3%	2%
8	Have supporter, mass base	31%	34%
9	Others	13%	11%
	Total Responses	100%	100%

Table 14
Causes of failure in mobilizing and organizing support

No	Causes of failure in mobilizing and organizing support	Dominant Actors (%)	Alternative Actors (%)
1	Fragmentation	6%	5%
2	Lack of ideology	3%	3%
3	Loose network, not well organized	16%	23%
4	Active only in social media (facebook, twitter, etc)	0%	0%
5	Unclear concepts/substances/issues	3%	2%
6	Fail to identify basic problems and mapping the actors	14%	13%
7	The opponent is stronger and well organized	19%	12%
8	Lack of public support/ Public	20%	14%

	resistance/cynical		
9	Lack of political awareness	5%	4%
10	Lack of institutions/personal capacity	10%	21%
11	Others	4%	4%
	TOTAL	100%	100%

Similarly, when asked about how to turn issues into public matters, it is clear that support from societies, political parties, key figures and coalition of interests is the key factor (see Table 15 and 16).

Table 15
Indicators of successful in turning their issues into public matters

NO	Indicators of Successful	Dominant Actors (%)	Alternative Actors (%)
1	Presence in media	4%	5%
2	Presence in public discourse	8%	12%
3	Presence in agendas of government, parliaments, parties and and/or social movements	2%	3%
4	Resulting in physical infrastructures	1%	1%
5	Resulting becoming a state official, a member of parliament	14%	14%
6	Resulting in welfare policies and/or the implementation of welfare policies (education, health, physical security, income rate, working condition, etc.)	7%	5%
7	Resulting in political in political supports from society, other groups/parties, etc. and formation of coalition as well as ending of tensions	17%	16%
8	Resulting in a good governance	4%	3%
9	Resulting in a specific material/financial benefits and/ or socio-political status advantages	4%	1%
10	Resulting in social activities and events involving people	2%	1%
11	Resulting in development program in general and economic development in particular	4%	1%
12	Resulting in policy change	2%	2%
13	Resulting in new regulations	6%	3%

14	Resulting in peaceful condition, (political) fairness, implementation of human rights, improved political awareness, ethical improvement of social life and/or democracy	2%	7%
15	Resulting in a successful program, strategy or policy	5%	3%
16	Resulting in fulfilled demands and in influencing political process	3%	10%
17	Others	10%	9%
18	Combined	5%	5%
	TOTAL	100%	100%

Table 16
Cause of failure in turning issues into public matters

NO	Causes of failure in turning issues into public matters	Dominant Actor (%)	Alternative Actor (%)
1	Commercialization of media control, fragmentation	0%	2%
2	The powerful are dominating everything	1%	11%
3	Education is poor so no demands for important issues	4%	4%
4	People are afraid of some issues so these are avoided	0%	0%
5	Lack of support and trust from society, other parties, other (key) figures and/or other institutions	28%	19%
6	Unreliable and unperformed institutions and institutional framework (e.g. being inefficient, ineffective, malfunction, etc.)	8%	5%
7	Political apathy	1%	2%
8	Lack of "sosialisasi", good and proper communications, and reliable social and political networks	3%	4%
9	Cultural difference (e.g. ethnic and religious differences)	2%	1%
10	Conflicting interests	3%	2%
11	Lack of economic, social and political resources	4%	13%
12	Geographical barriers	1%	0%
13	Democracy, political inclusions, increasing	5%	1%

	political awareness		
14	Political conflict	9%	5%
15	Actor's lack of capacity	5%	4%
16	Actors are involved in and/or implied by political scandals (e.g. corruption, power abuse etc.)	3%	2%
17	The problem is on the strategy, on the selected issues and on how the society is approached	2%	4%
18	Others	12%	8%
19	Combined	10%	10%
	TOTAL	100%	100%

It is important to note that there is a gulf between populism and democratic accountability. While offering general support to voters is inevitable for populist leaders, it does not necessarily lead to the formulation of good and appropriate policies that respond to public concern. The survey supports this argument in two ways. First, accompanying the emergence of populism is the main actors preoccupation with acquiring political power. Although widening political supports is the main factor, for both dominant and alternative actors becoming state officials would allow them to put issues into political agenda (see Table 15). It seems that the position of state officials provide them with political power and authority; and possessing this sort of political resources tends to be their ultimate goal. This is more apparent, especially for the dominant actors, when asked on why they go to specific institutions, organization or figures to address their problems and promote their interests. The large percentage will prefer those mediating agencies that possess power and authority (see Table 17).

Table 17
Reasons for opt to specific institutions and mediators

No	REASONS	Dominant Actors (%)	Alternative Actors (%)
1	Quick and good results	13%	17%
2	Strategic calculation	15%	18%
3	Have good connection with people in the institution	4%	5%
4	Other institutions are not welcome	1%	2%
5	The institution has authority	27%	21%
6	The institution has strong influence	16%	14%
7	Lobby and personal contact	0%	0%

8	The institution is rooted in society	1%	3%
9	Need institutional based solution, not personal	2%	2%
10	The institution is under influence of main actors	10%	5%
11	The institution is independent	2%	4%
12	More trust to informal leaders	1%	2%
13	The institution can solve the problems effectively	2%	3%
14	Others	6%	6%
	TOTAL	100%	100%

The survey also shows that regulations, policies and development programs are also significant indicator of main actors' successful effort in turning issues into public matter. Nevertheless, producing policies related to welfare issues is less important.

It can be argued at this stage that even though public issues (and wider political supports) is central in Indonesian democracy that is witnessing the emergence of populism, it seems to be resulted only in main actors acquiring political power rather that good and relevant policies. The lack of policy orientation and debate in emerging populism is further confirmed by the fact that the main actors are also more concerned with getting popularity. At least, being popular in terms of receiving media coverage and public debate are still the important goal of turning issues into public matter and mobilizing support (see Table 13 and 15).

Second, as previously indicated there is a tendency in the emerging populism towards a figure-based politics. Despite of sharing similar concern with the public on welfare issues, relying more on wider supports, working with political parties and interest groups in putting specific issues into political agenda, and having to offer political programs to people, the dominant actors in particular seem to be preoccupied more on her/his own political career. The dominant actors, as further demonstrated in here, tend to combine the public attention on welfare issues, the importance of wider supports and the primacy of policy based benefits for her/his own advantage of becoming political leader and state official, or, at least, getting popular. This might explain why the dominant actors depends more on the possession of economic resources and authority, instead of participating in democratic organization, for instance, to become legitimate and authoritative political leader. For they have to cling on their own resources and capacity.

Hence, the emergence of populism is also accompanied by, and seems to lead to, the rise of a number of popular figures. Rather than inviting debate on policies,

popular figures are more concerned with enhancing one owns resources and popularity. This will help them to achieve their most important goal, which is to become *gubernur*, *bupati* or a parliament member. The current typical example of figure-based politics is perhaps in the so-called *politik pencitraan* (or the politics of branding one own figure). Having become a widely used political vocabulary in the last several years in Indonesia, *politik pencitraan* is a practice of building, developing, promoting and sometimes manipulating one own image through various types of media to attract supports.

6 From stagnation to democratic transformation: towards a roadmap (reflection)

The previous eight major conclusions from the 3rd national democracy assessment indicate quite clearly that even though Indonesia is not governed by oligarchs (as some scholars have suggested), there is also not a dynamic process of further democratic advances.

It is certainly an achievement that the introduction of important liberties and the expansion of civil society in-depth and across the country have so far been combined with stability, thus invalidating the increasingly common international position that there is a need to impose strong institutions ahead of popular sovereignty. But there are also setbacks and bleak results, such as with regard to fighting corruption and money politics and in promoting representation. The general picture isS one of few major advances of popular control of public affairs on the basis of more political equality.

In other words, the period of transition to more democracy seems to have been replaced by consolidation of achievements so far – of business as usual, of normalisation. It certainly remains an accomplishment that most actors have adjusted to several of the "democratic institutions" such as of the rule of law, a number of freedoms, a multi-party system, rather free and fair elections, decentralisation, subordination of the military to elected politicians and more. But the obvious problem is that the "democratic institutions" have not always promoted more democracy. In short, the ways in which the powerful actors have been able to adjust to the rules of the game have also allowed them to protect their interests and privileges. Thus the price for stability has been stagnation.

This is not just bad news for principled pro-democrats but for anyone who does not benefit from stagnation. Stagnation is not good for those who are against the inefficient and biased policy implementation as well as the abuse of judicial, political and administrative authority and public resources.

Stagnation is also not good for anyone who wishes to improve the quality of the political representation; for example by upgrading Indonesia at least to the far from ideal Indian standards that recently enabled the people of New Delhi to form their own participatory-democracy and anti-corruption 'Common People's Party' (AAP), to make stunning electoral advances and to gain power for a brief period in the capital's municipality council.

Finally, stagnation is of course even depressing for those who think that civil society including media could make a difference. The assessment shows that as compared to previous surveys the civil society organisations have expanded in-depth as well as geographically, covering by now the country at large. But the dominant actors too relate to and build civil society organisations. Moreover, supplementary thematic studies verifies impressions from the assessment that mainstream media is dominated by powerful business and political leaders, and that the new social media helps in terms of mobilising people for meetings and protests but not in organising fostering democratic representation. In addition, the assessment confirms that most pro-democrats remain scattered and without well organised social and economic bases. It is true that the assessment indicate that more CSO-activists supplement specific civil society engagements by 'going politics' in order to challenge elitist control of organised politics. But the assessment as well as parallel PWD related case-studies show also that this is largely by way of individual CSO-leaders who run as candidates for mainstream parties, and as members of commissions and forums for stakeholder participation. There is little coordination, no common bases in ideas and interests. and the participation in parties, commissions and forums is mainly by top-down invitation, not by election from below by those in need of being represented.

New cleavages and openings

Yet, everything is not bleak! The assessment study has also identified two potentially positive processes: (i) the need for elitist politicians to supplement patronage with populism in order to win elections combined with (ii) the growing quest for welfare state policies.

Moreover, supplementary case studies indicate that two additional dynamics might enable well-planned actors to further develop this new space for populism and welfare state policies in the direction of transformative democratisation. These enabling factors are, firstly. that wider sections of the middle and impoverished classes seem to come together against corruption and plunder and, secondly, that vital trade unions and related politicians and activists begin to promote broader alliances for welfare driven development among hitherto fragmented social movements and civil society groups.

Post-clientelism

As mentioned earlier in the third major conclusion in the above, the assessment study lends strong support to the argument that many elitist politicians Indonesia, as in several other countries in the Global South (c.f. Manor 2013), are developing a number of practices to supplement clientelism.

It is true that strong elements of the patronage politics and coercive bossism (that were documented in the previous assessment surveys, and supported the results by scholars such as van Klinken e.g. 2009) are sustained. Even the internationally unique promotion of peace and reconstruction in Aceh through inclusive democratisation has been abused by conservative commanders in search of power and benefits. Reformists and civil society activists have been harassed, and even the electoral institutions have been subordinated to power sharing agreements with former enemies in Jakarta; while foreign well-wishers have kept silent (Cf. Törnquist, Prasetyo and Birks 2011, and Törnquist 2012 and forthcoming).

Generally, however, populism is on the rise. This is basically to attract a variety of people that are no longer under the firm control of patrons and employers who can deliver votes. The ethno-nationalistic, religious and other forms of identity oriented populism that we know from paradigmatic cases such as in India and Sri Lanka are certainly problematic, and some signs are there in Indonesia too. But from a democratic point of view there are also more promising cases in which charismatic leaders and media are used to reach out directly to people in general with a broad menu of promises such as welfare schemes as well as negotiated solutions when farmers, agricultural workers, fisher folks and urban poor are threatened by land grabbing, logging, property development, infra structural development and more. Similarly, mainstream politicians also need to develop projects and programmes such as against corruption and traffic congestion and for green cities to attract middle class voters, especially in urban areas.

A major point here is that the need among many elite politicians to go beyond clientelism to win elections by way of welfare oriented populism and cooperation with certain civil society groups shifts some of the attention from special group-benefits and the distribution of funds and privileges to more general measures via government programmes. The aim of the powerful politicians is still to sustain their dominance, of course; and the executives may well prefer that the programmes are technocratic rather than democratic and participatory. Yet the changes *might* pave the way for somewhat more universal policies that tend to be easier for people to relate to with broad movements for common demands about improved content and genuinely democratic rather

than top-down directed participation. Further, media, CSOs and social movement leaders typically gain importance by serving as mediators and popular figures. If these mediators are able to deliver votes, directly or indirectly, they might also be able to negotiate potentially pro-democratic policies. The cooperation between CSOs, social movements and the Jokowi government in Solo is a good case in point (c.f. Pratikno and Lay 2013 for the background).

Most importantly, nothing is certainly given. Case studies suggest that media, CSOs and popular figures sometimes do quite the opposite. Even when populism on part of the dominant actors is welfare rather than identity oriented, it is indeed only a supplement to patronage and bossism in order to gain votes. The good news is just that there is wider space for developing transformative politics. Hence, the outcome depends on factors such as the ideological orientation of the actors of change, their ability to develop attractive and transformative reforms, and the degree to which they are co-opted or can counter this by being based on firm roots among people and by being responsive and accountable to popular movements.

Similarly, new middle class groups themselves may also develop civic groups, movements and policy proposals that are useful in the electoral competition (such as in Bandung) and can be more or less progressive.

Yet again: the important observation is that there is wider space for progressive action in a number of places in the country, and that the result rests with the politics and policy proposals of the actors of change.

The quest for welfare state policies

Equally important: the clear and potentially dramatic shift documented in the assessment study (summarised in the major conclusion number eight in the above) from the decade long emphasis on dismantling the power of the New Order-state in favour of markets driven development and self-help in civil society to quests for welfare state policies on various levels and among various groups. This is not just among the poor but also, it seems, among rather well to do middle classes having to think about social security beyond families and patrons. The wide support for the social security laws and policies that were initiated in parliament 2010-2011 and in a number of districts is a strong indication to this effect.

As all around the world, historically (as for example in Scandinavia) and contemporary (as in Latin America, India and East Asia), increasing demands and engagement in welfare state policies and social and economic rights may open up important field for potentially unifying demands among broad sections of the population, given that they are not just related to specific groups (such as

state employees and members of unions with exceptional bargaining power) or driven by authoritarian movements,

In this case too, nothing is certainly given. There are many types of citizenship rights and welfare states, and they all rest with structural opportunities as well as political ideologies and strategies that need to be studied in comparative perspective. But there is a new focus on welfare policies that relate to potentially broad social and economic interests and demands.

Insufficient conditions?

The major worry is that Indonesia differs from the previous historical cases of successful welfare states and the development of sustainable social and economic rights that rested with what Polanyi (1944) called double movements against original accumulation of capital (dispossessing people of their means of production and livelihood) and the commodification of everything in the context of supposedly self-regulating markets. With industrialisation, then, broad and comparatively unified working classes, and their allies among affected classes and movements too, developed their social democratic welfare state model as in Scandinavia, and compromise-models with liberal and conservative perspectives, as in Britain and Germany respectively (Esping-Andersen 1990 for a classical study).

But does this hold for Indonesia too? It is certainly true that the neo-liberal development in the Global South have generated inequalities and resistance. And as indicated by our survey, people seem to have lost trust in the visions that markets and self-help in civil society would cater to welfare, returning instead to previous expectations that politicians and state will deliver. But suffering and expectations are not the same as forceful struggle for a welfare state. So there are good reasons to doubt that similarly powerful quests for welfare state policies and social rights can emerge in countries like Indonesia as in the old industrial countries. The very uneven economic growth and industrialisation generate much more scattered and fragmented labouring classes as well as employers; and also more privileged positions of skilled workers and sections of the educated middle classes as compared to the classical cases (e.g. Therborn 2012 and Bardhan 2011).

In short one needs to ask if the space for progressive action under the new populism that focus on the standard of living rather than identities and the new wide quest for welfare state policies may, really, open up for democratisation towards less market driven policies and more social and economic equality combined with inclusive development? Is there anything that can compensate for the historically unique working class and its allies and their ideologies as the

agents of broad and unifying demands for welfare policies that foster social and economic rights and not just contain protests?

In beginning to seek an answer to this intriguing question, it is necessary to also consult tentative results from parallel thematic studies of the experiences among activists in the field.[1] The indications are exciting. They suggest that even if the working class in Indonesia is less broad and unified than in the 'classical' cases of modernisation and industrialisation, the current original accumulation of capital and the neo-liberal industrialisation also generate cleavages that carry some potential of unified action for progressive welfare policies.

Wider resistance against corruption and plunder.

The long standing critique among tax-paying middle classes against corruption that hinders fair competition for jobs and government projects and imposes extra payment for services and rights has never been of prime importance for ordinary people in search of the least bad patron that they may also support in election. By now, however, increasingly many people depend on social rights and public services, and that they become as upset about unfairness and mismanagement as the educated middle classes. A comparative recent example from the other major electoral and partially liberal democracy in the Global South, India, is the new priorities to transparency and social rights, especially since 2004, the extensive resistance against dispossession of people from their means of survival, the remarkably broad anti-corruption movement that have not just attracted middle classes, and the recent victory of the AAP party in New Delhi with a related agenda. Most importantly, the currently most widespread popular protests around Indonesia are clearly against those who use state and politics for original or so-called primitive accumulation of capital. As in India, this is by, on the one hand, privileged control of regulations and taxes that increases the cost of production and transaction, and on the other hand, the dispossession of ordinary people from land, forest, other natural resources and residential areas.

Moreover, several businessmen and middle class groups realise that plunder and the related conflicts matter for them too. They need to compete on the international market by way of as low costs as possible (which is not just about wages); and in several places like Surabaya, Solo, Jogjakarta, Bandung, Jakarta and Medan they realise that negotiations with the poor are unavoidable if they

---

[1] Including Törnquist's studies since the 1980s of activists' problems and options of going politics, recently updated with some 120 in-depth interviews around the country in partial cooperation with scholars and activists in the PWD reference group (special thanks to Luky Djani, Osmar Tanjung, Surya Tjandra, and Handoko Wibowo) and several of PWD's informants during the assessment survey work.

want to get rid of traffic congestions, flooding, chaotic pedestrian lanes and public spaces and generally make cities more governable and liveable. The best cases in point is possibly the wide support among the poor but also business and middle classes for Jokowi's previous regime in Solo and current strategy in Jakarta of negotiations and social programmes for the people who lose out.

In short, there seem to be a potential for wider unity among previous scattered groups against the corruption and plunder associated with the uneven 'modern' development. This does not necessarily call for undemocratic 'strong' leaders and institutions. As recently in New Delhi, it may rather lend itself to demands for more extensive democratisation and social rights as means to fight the mismanagement and abuse of power. In Batang, North Central Java, for example, small farmers exposed to dispossession of land and livelihood, in addition to several other groups including businessmen and middle classes, have come together against outright corruption and abuse of power, in-spite of being prevented to form and participate with a progressive party (as was possible in New Delhi), and managed to do away with the abusive political executive, now negotiating somewhat better policies with the new bupati (chief political executive in the district).

Neo-liberal work- and employment relations.

In addition to the already predominant unregulated business sectors with informally employed labour, as well as huge numbers of domestic workers and self-employed labour, neo-liberal economies call for increasingly flexible and informal work- and employment relations, including outsourcing. The so-called modern and knowledge based sectors are no exceptions. Given the shortage of clear-cut employers, increasingly many people have to turn to state and engage in politics to get minimum wages and some social security. This applies to in particular to outsourced contract labourer, casual labour, the self-employed and the many domestic workers – the absolute majority of the workforce. They all seem to pay increasing attention to state and politics as compared to labour contractors, patrons and self-help in civil society. The same apply to many employers who call for state involvement in reducing the costs for labour in order to invest and/or sustain their businesses in global competition. This is an international tendency, and again it may be useful to compare with neo-liberal oriented developments in the other major democracy in the Global South, India (e.g. Agarwala 2013).

The neo-liberal dynamics of informalisation but also resistance are obviously crucial factors behind the development of populism as well as the general quest for welfare state measures. Yet, the outcome is uncertain. As many critical scholars and activists argue, the current populism and welfare schemes may

primarily be seen as attempts on part of the dominant actors to 'socialise', as it were, the costs for reproducing labour and increase the profits, as well as to hold back popular discontent (e.g. Chatterjee 2008).

Others are less sure, however, including, for example, the Indonesian activists trying to improve the livelihood of ordinary people and strengthening their political capacities in the framework of populist leaders like Jokowi; their perspectives may be likened to the Indian activists for the right to information, employment and food in addition to measures against corruption, in critical cooperation with certain politicians. In short, these activists and related scholars suggest that scattered classes and groups might put forward potentially unifying demands for basic social and economic security, and that there is scope for the negotiation of policies; and that instead of holding back protests, these efforts may be to the benefit of the scattered and hard pressed people.

From related demands to joint action?

If this proposition is accepted as an important and exciting hypothesis, how should one proceed to try out if it makes sense in reality? The most critical question is obviously who would propel the potentially unifying demands? Is it not more likely that leaders will divide and rule among the scattered groups? Is it not equally likely that the best organised trade unions will hold on to their privileged workplace bargaining power (based on special knowledge, skills and sensitive production-processes)? Is it not a fact that recommendations to civil society activist based on previous assessment surveys to 'go politics', in order not to leave organised wide open for monopolisation by 'crook politicians' (Törnquist, Prasetyo and Priyono 2003, Priyono, Samadhi, Törnquist et al. 2007), has mainly resulted in attempts at political careers by uncoordinated senior CSO leaders and informal figures? Is it not true that the follow-up recommendation (Samadhi and Warouw 2009) to organise political blocks in-between specialised and fragmented CSOs and trade unions, on the one hand, and elitist political parties and politicians, on the other, have only resulted in temporary coalitions and political contracts, after which the leaders have returned to business as usual on the basis of individual organisations and priorities?

All this is true, but there is also an exciting new tendency that might become an historical turning point. Ongoing thematic studies related to the PWD project[2] indicate that even well organised trade unions among skilled workers in the most modern sectors are now losing members as they are threatened by the informalisation of employment relations and of outsourcing. To stand tall and retain a united front they need to include the retrenched workers in their

---

[2] See the previous footnote! C.f. also Caraway and Ford (forthcoming)

struggle. That is, they also need to consider market place bargaining power. Hence the growing importance – even among permanently employed workers with higher wages – of fighting for better minimum wages among their unfortunate work-mates and for regulation of outsourcing and for decent labour contracts and more. To succeed, moreover, they have to affect the regulations, and thus engage in state and politics – and this in turn calls for numbers, for mass protests and for votes. The same applies when they need to go beyond their own employers to secure various health schemes and social security networks – all which, as we know, are increasingly often taken care of by the state at various levels. Again there is a need for broad alliances to secure as broad as possible support.

The well organised trade unions and their leaders who have already realised this (especially the metal workers in FSPMI) were crucial in forging in early 2010 the successful broad alliance (KAJS) among unions as well as the usually so fragmented informal sector labour and related CSOs for the social security legislation, which was finally decided upon in late 2011 (for fine overviews, see Cole 2012 and Tjandra 2014). The equally important parties in the alliance were the civil society activists who facilitated the joint work and a few progressive populist oriented politicians who gained command of the central parliamentary arena. This has been followed by additional joint committees and actions on minimum wages and employment and work regulations.

By international comparison, these unions and leaders have thus taken up a similarly progressive role as the social-movement trade unions in Brazil and South Africa (which is not to negate the numerous challenges that remain). Or to recall the history behind much of the rise of the social democratic hegemony in Scandinavia in the 1920s and early 1930s: firstly, the decision to put pressure on state and municipalities to implement universal welfare, education and labour market policies for all, and to develop democratic issue and interest based representation to share the control of this, thus forming broad communities and extensively defined public affairs, rather than developing social security, schools and other goods for their own members only; secondly, the forging of broad trade union based demands for collective labour agreements and broad universal welfare reforms that also fostered productivity, investments and more jobs (for more detailed analyses and references, see Stokke and Törnquist 2013).

4. Conclusion

There is a new potential for the emergence of a united front for the representation of the issues, interests and movements that have been marginalised in the rise of democracy so far.

The framework is populism and stakeholder participation, to the extent that they are characterised by the need to negotiate with the poor (who lose land and livelihood) and provide social safety nets (for those losing patronage and permanent employment). These processes, spearheaded so far by leaders like Jokowi, might be transformed in more democratic directions in exchange for votes; some activists have already proven that there is a potentil.

The crucial bargaining power is not just the wider unity against corruption and plunder. Strategically even more important: the enlightened self-interest among well organised unions – together with progressive CSO leaders and politicians – in forging a united front among many other labourers, small farmers, fisher folks, domestic workers and civil society activists; a united front to affect political regulations and negotiate with industrialists and politicians towards development policies that combines social security, full employment and growth.

Given the exclusionary and elitist dominated rules and regulations in organised politics, a united front must emerge from outside elections and parliaments – demanding better representation of the interests and actors that may develop a roadmap from stagnation to democratic transformation. This may be both in local and central level contexts. Progressive politicians should certainly be included and supported, but on the basis of following the priorities of the movements and being accountable to them.

Tentatively, the transformative policies that such a front may wish to demand and promote need to consider:

- the chances for ordinary people with good democratic track records (but not necessarily advanced formal education) to become candidates, build parties from below and participate in elections;
- the institutionalisation of channels for minority- and issue- and interest based participation via *democratically selected representatives* in policy development and implementation; this may also contain corruption, increase public trust in public policies and promote more unified and democratic popular movements and organisations.
- the development of transformative policies for such civil, political, social and economic citizenship rights and welfare reforms that we know from similar cases may foster both genuine political equality (by strengthening citizens' democratic capacity) and sustainable production and the generation of more jobs.
- the possibility of seeking inspiration from comparative studies of previous historical as well as current attempts at transformative democratic policies through a think tank with joint teams of concerned scholars and experienced activists.

References

Agarwala, R. (2013) "Informal Labour, Formal Politics, and Dignified Discontent, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Aspinall, Edward & Gerry van Klinken (2011) "The State and Illegality in Indonesia", Leiden: KITLV.

Bardhan, P. (2011) "' Challenges for a Minimum Social Democracy in India" in 'Economic and Political Weekly', March 5. "." EPW XLVI, no. 10: 39–43.

Beetham, David, S. Bracking, I. Kearton, S. Weir (2002) "International Idea Handbook and Democracy Assessment", The Hague, London, New York: Kluwer Law International.

Beetham, David. (1999) "Democracy and Human Rights", Oxford: Polity Press.

Budiman, Arief & Olle Törnquist (2001) "Aktor Demokrasi: Catatan tentang Gerakan Perlawanan di Indonesia" Jakarta: ISAI.

Budlenders, Debbie (ed) (2011) "Budget Advocacy in Indonesia", Jakarta: IDEA, Inisiatif, lakspedam NU, Pattiro, Seknas, Fitra, IBP

Caraway, T.L. and dan Ford, M. (forthcoming) "Labour and Politics under Oligrachy", in in Ford, M. and Pepinsky, T.B. Beyond Oligarcy? Wealth, Power, and Contemporary Indonesian Politics.

Chatterjee, P. (2008). "Democracy and Economic Transformation.", Economic and Political Weekly , April 19.

Cole, R.P. (2012) "Coalescing for Change: Opportunities, Rresources, Tactics and Indonesia's 2010-11 Social Security Campaign", BA hounours thesis, Department of Indonesian Studies, The University of SidneySydney.

Crouch, H. (1975-1976), General and Business in Indonesia, in *Pacific Affairs 48 (4 Winter).* Pp 519-540.

Crouch, H. (1978)., "The Army and Politics in Indonesia", Cornell University Press.

Diamond, Larry (1999) "Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation", Baltimore and London: The John's Hopkin University Press.

Esping-Andersen, G. (1990) "The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism",. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Guan, Lee Hock (2004) "Introduction: Civil Society in Southeast Asia" in Lee Hock Guan (ed) Civil Society in Southeast Asia. Singapore: NIAS & ISEAS

Houtzager, P. P. & A. G. Lavalle (2009) "The Paradox of Civil Society Representation: Constructing New Forms of Democratic Legitimacy in Brazil in Rethinking Popular Representation, Olle Törnquist, Neil Webster, dan Kristian Stokke (Editor), New York: Palgrave.

Jackson, K.D (1978). "Bureaucratic Polity: A theoretical framework for the analysis of power and communication in Indonesia", in K.D Jackson; L Pye (eds). Political Power and communicatin in Indonesia, California ., [etc.]: University of California Press.S

Klinken, G. van (2009) "Patronage Democracy in Provincial Indonesia." In Rethinking Popular Representation , edited by Törnquist, O, Webster, W., and Stokke, K. (Editor) New York: Palgrave.

Laksono, PM., S Sukamdi, Rik Habraken, Lau Schulpen (eds) (2013) "Local Civil Society Dynamics in Indonesia", Yogyakarta: Pusat Studi Asia Pasific & CIDIN Nijmegen University.

Lauth, Hans-Joachim (2000) "Informal Institutions and Democracy in Democratization", Vol 7, No 4, (Winter) 2000, 21-50

Manor, J. (2013) "Post-clientelist Initiatives" In Democratisation in the Global South. The Importance of Transformative Politics, Stokke, K. and Törnquist, O. (eds). New York: Palgrave, 2013.

March, James G & Johan P Olsen (1989) "Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics", New York; Macmillan.

Mietzner, Marcus (2012) "Indonesia's Democratic Stagnation: Anti-Reformist Elites and Resilient Civil Society", dalam Jurnal Democratization 19, No 2, hal 209-229.

Mouzelis, Nicos (1998) "Modernity, Late Development and Civil Society" in Democratization in the Third World. Concrete Cases in Comparative and Theoritical Perspective, Lars Rudebeck, Olle Törnquist bersama Virgilio Rojas (eds), New York: Macmillan

Polanyi (1944/1957/2001) "The Great Transformation: the Political and Economic Origins of Our Time", (Boston, MJA: beacon Press Paperback Edition 2001)

Prasetyo, A. S., A. E. Priyono, and O. Törnquist, (with T. Birks), eds. (2003) "Indonesia's Post- Suharto Democracy Movement",. Jakarta: Demos.

Pratikno and Lay, C. (2013). "From Populism to Democratic Polity. Problems and Challenges in Surakarta, Indonesia." In Democratisation in the Global South: The Importance of Transformative Politics , edited by Stokke, K. and Törnquist, O (Editor), Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013.

Priyono, A. E., W. P. Samadhi, and O. Törnquist (with T. Birks) (2013). "Making Democracy Meaning ful. Problems and Options in Indonesia",. Jakarta and Singapore: DEMOS and ISEAS.

Raadt, Jasper, David Holladers, André Krouwel (2004) "Varieties of Populism: An Anlysis of the Programmatic Character of Six European Parties", Amsterdam: Vrije Universiteit.

Robison, Richard & Vedi R Hadiz. 2004 (2004) "Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in Age of Markets", London: Routledge.

Samadhi, W. P, and N. Warouw, (eds) (2009) ". Building Democracy on the Sand . Advances and Setbacks in Indonesia", Jakarta and Jogjakarta: DEMOS and PCD Press, (1st ed.) December 2008;(2nd ed..).

Stokke, K. and Törnquist, T. (eds) (2013), "Democratisation in the Global South. The Importance of Transformative Politics",. New York: Palgrave.

Therborn, G. (2012), "Class in the 21st Century", New Left Review 78:5-29.

Tjandra, S. (2013) "The Battle of Paradigms and the Indonesian Trade Union Movement", Unpublished paper, Atma Jaya Catholic University, Jakarta.

Törnquist, O. (2012) "Democracy Bashing: On Corruption and Peace in Aceh.", Jakarta Post January, 27.

Törnquist, O. (2013) "Assesing Dynamics of Democratisastion: Transformative Politics, New Institutions, and the Case of Indonesia. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Törnquist, O. (forthcoming) "Aceh: Verandah of Lost Opportunities.", In Building Peace in Aceh: Politics, Reintegration and Communities , edited by Avonius, L., Vignato, S., and Grayman, J. (Editor)

Törnquist, O., S. A. Prasetyo, and T. Birks (eds.) (2011) "Aceh: The Role of Democracy for Peace and Reconstruction", 2st ed. Jogjakarta and Singapore: PCD Press and ISEAS.