Chapter Two

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Approaching Democracy:
Some brief introductory notes on concepts and methods

Olle Tornquist (University of Oslo)
and
Nicolaas Warouw (Gadjah Mada University)

The making of 'Democracy assessments' has become an industry in its own right, parallel to that of measuring economic development in countries around the world. The high-profile Stockholm-based International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) states that there are six major assessment frameworks (Beetham et.al. 2008).

The first framework focuses on more or less comprehensive human rights in various countries. It is typically carried out by governments such as that of the United States and organisations and institutes like Amnesty and the Freedom House. A second type gives priority to governance, including elections but primarily the rule of law and accountability. These studies are often propelled by governments, aid agencies and their associates such as the Indonesian Partnership for Governance Reforms in order to evaluate support for institution building.

A third framework referred to as the 'democracy indices' has been generated by researchers who relate democratic rights and elections to 'independent factors' such as development and conflict. Fourthly, there are democracy audits which have been carried out by governments, academe and civic organisations in the global North to find out and lay the foundation for public discussion about the strength and weaknesses of various dimensions of democracy.

Fifthly, the economic and social assessments which have been conducted by governments and international organisations to evaluate the outcomes of democracy and to guide support for improving structural conditions. Sixthly, IDEA's own framework. This has been implemented by its associates among governments, international organisations, related NGOs and scholars. The aim is similar to that of the democratic audits in the old democracies but the ambition is to facilitate its application in the global South too. The prime focus has been to assess the quality of the democratic institutions through expert panels as well as various indicators in addition to surveys of public opinions and attitudes. One should also add the assessments made by associations and scholars of the democratic quality of civil society, social movements and so-called social capital in terms of inter personal trust to facilitate collective action.

Interestingly, our own alternative framework for participatory research-based democracy promotion has not been acknowledged. This framework is based on experienced expert-practitioners conducting surveys on the ground. It focuses on understanding political identity, assesses the standards of democratic institutions and democracy actors' will and capacity to use and promote that infrastructure. This framework has been developed in co-operation between reflective activists and scholars in the pilot case of Indonesia since 2002 and has proven itself to be a feasible framework for analysis.

Basically pro-democracy activists were not satisfied working with frameworks that reflected the preconceived values, political interests and development priorities of donor organisations and their close associates. There is of course nothing wrong with donors' needs to evaluate their support for democracy (which many democrats were in fact dependent on). Similarly, the political patrons who support democracy must be able to identify and foster like-minded partners; that is the basics of international relations. And related scholars should test and foster their theories and recommendations.

But what the Indonesian democrats asked for was an instrument to evaluate *their* problems and options and related arguments. In fact, they were confused and divided and wanted to judge to what extent

different theories and recommendations made more or less sense, not just one or the other favoured argument by this or that donor or scholar or activist.

In addition they were in pressing need of more reliable data and information. Academically critical research after decades of authoritarianism remained weak, the various case studies that existed were scattered.

The pro-democracy activists were quite rightly disturbed by the preoccupation in most of the existing assessments with static descriptions of the qualities of rules and regulations without paying much attention to the dynamic relations of power among various actors.

In addition the pro-democracy activists asked concerned scholars to consider the insights of the activists on the ground and to communicate experiences of struggle for democracy from other parts of the world. In fact, while the Indonesian activists had fought for democracy for many years, the powerful elite and experts that suddenly dominated the conduct of assessments of democracy had previously been quite indifferent or even on the other side of the frontline.

Similarly, the international experts had mainly introduced elitist donor perspectives on the crafting of democratic institutions and consensus among the powerful actors. Meanwhile the experiences and insights of the pro-democrats in Indonesia and elsewhere had largely been ignored and they themselves had not found time to write up their stories and findings. Finally several democrats did not want to just write reports and talk in seminars but wanted to go from findings to recommendations and concerted efforts to foster implementation of them.

In order to develop an alternative framework we therefore added these explicit needs to the core elements of the theoretically most convincing and flexible parts of the mainstream frameworks, primarily to be found among the democratic audits and International IDEA's conceptual apparatus. Meanwhile however, we had to keep in mind that such an alternative framework must be able to be implemented quite swiftly (since the democratic options were fading away) and without access to huge funds (since that would have called for compromises).

Basic Definitions and Variables

One crucial point of departure was similar to that of the mainstream audits and IDEA's framework: the separation of the aims and the means of democracy. This made it possible to focus on the extent to which the means really promoted the aims. Moreover, as David Beetham had argued convincingly, the disagreements on democracy

were primarily about the means of democracy while there seemed to be general agreement on *the aim in terms of popular control of public affairs on the basis of political equality* (Beetham 1999).

That said, one had to ask which 'people' (demos) would control public affairs? Who would be the citizens? Would the demos be based on, for instance, religious or ethnic or political identity? While not being able to go into the details of how such identities had been formed, one must be able to discuss if and how they could be combined, especially in a multicultural society like Indonesia.

Secondly we asked the question, what constitutes the 'public affairs' that people should control and what is rather deemed to be private matters to be handled within the family, various networks, on the market or by religious or ethnic communities? Again, in-depth analyses of the construction of public affairs would be impossible, but one had to analyse the substance of democracy in terms of what matters were included and what were set aside.

Thirdly, what is meant by 'control' and 'political equality' and how can they be achieved? Following Beetham et.al. (2002), the following principles are intrinsic: the right and ability to *participate* and *authorise* representatives and their executives; representatives (and their executives) who in turn shall *represent* the main currents of popular opinion and the social composition of the people, be *responsive* to people's opinions and interests and *accountable* to people for what they do – which calls for *transparency* and *solidarity*. In addition, while it is obvious that the principles presuppose Human Rights (including civil, political social, economic and cultural rights), the shaping and practicing of these Rights in turn are also vested with the implementation of the democratic principles.

What would be the necessary means, then, to enable and promote democratic constitution of the demos and the public affairs as well as the above-mentioned principles to foster popular control and political equality? IDEA's framework and most audits focus on democratic institutions and related values among people at large. While this was in accordance with standard political science of democracy and democracy building, and the views of most donors, it was insufficient for the Indonesian democrats.

Firstly, they wanted to be able to evaluate a wider set of theories and arguments about the necessary means in order to discuss in a more fruitful way what seemed to be most valid in Indonesia. Further, they needed to go beyond assessments of fixed rules and regulations towards a more dynamic perspective. Hence they wanted to consider the

possibilities of change by also including informal institutions and power relations among various actors in politics, the political economy, civic associations and social movements. Finally, it was clearly not fruitful to only come up with some kind of 'national' assessment in a country where despotic central rule was being dismantled and politics was becoming increasingly localised. Similarly, the definition of the demos as well as of public affairs called for additional indicators. Hence the conclusion that one had to go beyond previous perspectives by considering three basic means of democracy.

The Basic Means of Democracy: Institutions, will and capacity
The *first* major type of democratic means were of course the conventional focus on the standard of a number of democratic institutions related to (a) constitutionalism (citizenship, law and rights), (b) popular sovereignty (elections, political representation and the responsiveness and accountability of public governance) and (c) civic participation (through associations, media, academic life and direct participation).

However, in contrast to other assessment frameworks one should not only ask for formal but also informal institutions. Further one must supplement the assessment of the performance by adding specific questions about the geographical spread and the thematic substance of the institutions (i.e. how many matters were within the democratic framework and how much was being privatised). While adding these crucial concerns, Demos' framework began by drawing on IDEA's rather widely acknowledged though extensive list of institutions. This has been a starting point for relevant revisions and simplifications. For the details, see Box 1.

These means are universally valid. This is because they are theoretically derived by asking what means are necessary to promote the equally generally valid aim of democracy. The specific rules and regulations, however, vary of course with contextual factors. Hence, the major point is to assess the extent to which such contextual formal and informal rules and regulations promote the institutional foundations of democracy. In doing so, the fundamental dimension of civic and political identity is separated from the others as the latter have been possible to include in an index on the quality of democratic institutions. Out of 100 index points, the relative importance of formal as compared to informal institutions is estimated to be 70 versus 30. Further, the relative importance of performance as compared to spread and substance is estimated to be 50, 25 and 25 respectively (Within the 50 points for formal institutions, the importance of positive scores is of course reduced if informants deem

some of the institutions to hardly even exist.). All attempts to weight however the various intrinsic institutions (which usually rest anyway with some kind of expert estimate) are however set aside in favour of transparent discussion of various theories.

Box 1: Basic institutions of democracy.
To what extent are they effective, well spread and inclusive (inclusive of vital matters in society)?

Institutions outside the index
    The People (demos): the constitution of the demos through political/ civic, ethnic and/or religious identity and engagement regarding public issues.

Institutions considered inside the index
1 Citizenship (Equal state-citizenship; The rights of minorities, migrants and refugees, Reconciliation of horizontal conflicts)
2 Government support of international law and UN human rights
3 Subordination of the government and public officials to the rule of law
4 Equality before the law (Equal and secure access to justice; The integrity and independence of the judiciary)
5 Freedom from physical violence and the fear of it
6 Freedom of speech, assembly and organisation
7 Freedom to carry out trade union activity
8 Freedom of religion, belief; language and culture
9 Gender equality and emancipation
10 The rights of children
11 The right to employment, social security and other basic needs
12 The right to basic education, including citizen's rights and duties
13 Good corporate governance
14 Free and fair general elections (Free and fair general elections at central, regional and local level; Free and fair separate elections of e.g. governors, mayors and village heads)
15 Freedom to form parties on the national or local level (or teams of independent candidates) that can recruit members, and participate in elections
16 Reflection of vital issues and interests among people by political parties and or candidates
17 Abstention from abusing religious or ethnic sentiments, symbols and doctrines by political parties and or candidates.
18 Independence from money politics and powerful vested interests by political parties and or candidates
19 Membership-based control of parties, and responsiveness and accountability of parties and or political candidates to their constituencies

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20	Parties and or candidates ability to form and run government
21	Democratic decentralisation of government in all matters that do not need to be handled on central levels.
22	The transparency and accountability of elected government, the executive,(bureaucracies), at all levels
23	The transparency and accountability of the military and police to elected government and the public
24	The capacity of the government to combat paramilitary groups, hoodlums and organised crime
25	Government independence from foreign intervention (excluding UN conventions and applicable international law)
26	Government's independence from vested interest groups and capacity to eliminate corruption and abuse of power
27	Freedom of the press, art and academia
28	Public access to and the reflection of different views within media, art and academia
29	Citizens' participation in extensive independent civil associations
30	Transparency, accountability and democracy within civil organisations
31	All social groups' – including marginalised groups – extensive access to and participation in public life
32	Direct participation (People's direct access and contact with the public services and government's consultation of people and where possible facilitation of direct participation in policy making and the execution of public decisions)

The second is a dynamic perspective of the main actors when asked if and how they relate to the more or less democratic institutions. Two crucial steps are involved. The first is the specification of the main actors. All actors cannot be included in a viable assessment. Given the localisation of politics this should primarily be on the provincial level. Further, one needs to include powerful actors as well as crucial alternative ones.

In the alternative assessment framework, local informants are asked to identify the three most powerful and the three most important alternative actors in their context. A number of problems are of course associated with the identification of these actors but the stumbling blocks rest mainly with the identification of and the quality of the informants, which we shall return to.

The second step is to enquire then into if and how the actors relate to the democratic institutions. Do the institutions make sense to them? To what extent is democracy 'the only game in town'? More

precisely – with regard to each type of institution: do the actors promote and use the institutions? Do they only use them? Or do they use and abuse or even avoid them? Low figures in responding such questions mean that democracy is not meaningful because the standard of the institutions is too low and/or the capacity of the actors to use and promote them (which we shall return to shortly) is insufficient. Additional negative conditions are set aside. This is not because such conditions are unimportant but because of a crucial assumption about the minimum requirements of democracy.

The alternative framework refutes arguments that democracy calls for extensive social and economic rights, equality, modernisation, pro-democratic culture etc. The framework 'only' calls for sufficiently meaningful institutions as listed above and for sufficient capacity of the actors to use and promote the institutions (which we shall soon discuss in more detail). Given that these conditions are present, the actors can use emerging democracy to promote more social and economic rights, among other things. Of course, firm judicial institutions, economic modernisation and social and economic equality are likely to contribute to high scores on the indices of democracy. But if more rights, equality, modernisation, favourable culture etc were included as necessary conditions for democracy, they would have to be created by non-democratic means. This is not necessary. It has been proven possible to create them by way of gradually improved democracy. There are degrees of democracy; and democracy is a process.

Hence the argument that there is a need to 'sequence democracy' by somehow introducing favourable institutions ahead of popular sovereignty (e.g. Mansfield and Snyder 2005) as well as Samuel Huntington's (1965) old thesis that strong institutions must be at hand to prevent modernisation from generating popular upheavals are refuted. As many Indonesians know, the latter argument was used to legitimise the elimination of popular movements in 1965/66 as well as the rise and existence of the New Order regime.

The same applies to a number of other related theses. One is that a certain level of economic development is a must; another is the old extreme left thesis that equality and radically different power relations must be created by more or less revolutionary means ahead of 'people's democracy'. It is true that the fate of the global third wave of democracy brought about through top-down institution building and elitist compromises is rather depressing. But given that the non-democratic introduction of favourable structural conditions is not necessary, the crucial matter is instead what kind of specific and concrete *politics of democratisation* that various actors and their international supporters opt for.

If this is accepted, the growing critique of the liberal democratic emphasis on crafting the institutional procedures of democracy on the basis of agreements between already dominant actors does *not* imply that all designing of democratic institutions is in vain. The implication is 'only' that priority should be given to institutions that open up the opportunity for enhanced capacity among ordinary people to foster additional institutions for more political equality and popular control. If the predominant trend so far has been in favour of liberal democracy, this seems to point thus in a social democratic direction.

The *third* means of democracy is where the actors are not just willing but also capable of promoting the institutional infrastructure. Consequently the alternative assessment framework considers a number of key factors related to power, resources and movements. However, this is only done to the extent that such factors are crucial for the people's capacity to act as democratic citizens in civil as well as political society. Hence we have combined three analytical approaches: one that focuses on institutions, a second that pays attention to the actors and a third that addresses power in collective action.

It is more complicated to measure up the actors' political capacity than it is that of democratic institutions. Previous studies and theories about political power, movements and other actors point to five clusters of parameters. These have been discussed elsewhere in more detail (Törnquist 2002, Harriss et.al. 2004, Törnquist 2008, Törnquist et.al. 2009). The first variables are to indicate if the actors are present rather than marginalised on central and local levels and in parts of the political landscape such as the business sector, interest- and issue groups, self management (including co-operatives), parties, parliaments, and executive public institutions. These indicators relate to theories about exclusion and inclusion, differences between new and old movements, sectoral fragmentation, centre versus periphery, and the opportunity structure in terms of the relative openness and closeness of politics in general. Alternatively one may analyse similar factors by drawing on Pierre Bourdieu's (Wacquant 2005, Stokke 2002, Stokke and Selboe 2009) concept of fields of interrelated actors and relations of power.

A second cluster of variables relate more exclusively to Bourdieu's focus on how the actors within the aforementioned 'fields' are able to transform their different sources of power in terms of economic, social and cultural capital[1] into legitimacy and authority − to thus gain symbolic power and political influence (ibid).

The third type of indicators are used to analyse whether and how actors are able to politicise those of their concerns and aspirations that are not personal, i.e. to put their issues, interests and ideologies

on the political agenda. This relates to theories inspired by for instance Jürgen Habermas about the public sphere, Antonio Gramsci about hegemony, Pierre Bourdieu about "habitus" (internalised norms, understandings and patterns) and the general importance of culture. But the same indicators connect also to analyses of increasingly fragmented priorities and agendas, especially among actors in civil society and related difficulties to generate common platforms (e.g. Törnquist 2002, 2008a, Törnquist et.al 2009)

The fourth cluster of parameters are used to capture whether and how the actors are able to organise and mobilise support. This is directly linked to theories of power, politics and movements such as those advocated by Nicos Mouzelis (1986) and Sydney Tarrow (1994), distinguishing between incorporation into politics by way of elitist populism, clientelism and alternative patronage – and related political financing − and those more integrated by way of networks and or comprehensive organisation from below. In addition, it relates to arguments such as made by Mahmood Mamdani (1996), Partha Chatterjee (2004), Houtzager et.al (2007), and Harriss (2006), arguing different inclusion of citizens, subjects, and denizens without recognised capacity to use most rights except the ones to rally behind and vote for or against leading politicians.

Fifth the roadmaps to analyse whether and how the actors are able to approach various governance institutions. The major source of inspiration is the growing consensus that the key problem of democracy in the global South in particular is the dominance of powerful elites and the poor standard of popular representation in spite of exciting attempts to initiate new routes. This was a prime result from Demos' first all-Indonesia survey. Hence there is a special need for closer studies within this field.

The Fundamental Problem of Representation

Such analyses in turn call for creative analytical tools. Representation is a complex and contented concept. The alternative framework draws on a recent attempt to develop an inclusive perspective on the basis of theory and empirical studies of efforts to counter the demise of popular politics (Törnquist, Stokke and Webster 2009).

As outlined by Pitkin (1967), representation presupposes a representative, the represented, something that is being represented and a political context. The dynamics are primarily about authorisation and accountability, which presuppose transparency and responsiveness. That is represented may be substantive, descriptive and/or symbolic.

Substantive representation is when the representative 'acts for' the represented, for instance a leader advancing the interests of workers. Descriptive representation is when an actor 'stands for' the represented by being 'objectively' similar. For instance, a woman represents women and a resident in a village represents the other villagers. Symbolic representation, finally, is when an actor is perceived by the represented to once again "stand for" them, but now, for instance, in terms of shared culture and identities. However, symbolic representation may also be understood, with authors such as Bourdieu (Wacquant 2005, Stokke 2002) and Anderson (1983), in the wider sense of constructing the demos, the groups and the interests that are being represented and claiming to be a legitimate authority as a representative.

There are two major approaches to representation. The first may be called the chain-of-popular-sovereignty approach. It is typically adhered to by students of political institutions, focusing on formally regulated politics, government and public administration. The second is what will be labelled the direct-democracy approach. This is more common among political sociologists, anthropologists and students of rights and law. They emphasise the importance of informal arrangements and the need for alternative participation through popular movements and lobby groups as well as civic action in for instance neighbourhood groups and associations for self-management.

There are two related tendencies towards deteriorated representation within the chain of popular sovereignty approach. One is where public matters and resources have been reduced and fragmented under neo-liberalism and globalisation beyond democratic representation. The other tendency is where almost all of the links in the chain itself are tarnished. This is especially with regard to the intermediary representative institutions ranging from civic organisations to political parties.

Mass based interest organisations have been radically weakened, most severely those based on class. While public resources and capacities are shrinking, politicians and political parties lose firm and independent popular roots. The privatisation, informalisation, depoliticisation and weakening of the intermediary political institutions generate further distrust in the authority of representatives and their mandates. Representative politics is often looked upon as a particularly dirty business characterised by money and personality oriented politics, non-programmatic organisational machines and crooked politicians.

This in turn has generated alternative routes. But the various supplementary forms of democracy –through judicial action, mediation by civil society organisations, direct participation, pressure groups,

and informal contacts – are largely detached from the chain of popular sovereignty. The civic organisations and activists themselves are rarely subject to basic principles of democratic representation, authorisation and accountability. Moreover, communal ethnic and religious organisations as well as families and clans cater to an increasing number of popular worries and needs, typically amongst the weaker sections of the population with insufficient capacities to make use of civic rights. When not claiming equal civic, political and socio-economic rights for all but specific communal privileges, these organisations and solidarities tend to fragment the demos and to undermine democracy.

While the advantage of the chains-of-popular-sovereignty approach is precision and conceptual consistency in relation to democratic theory, one drawback is that practices outside the formally recognised chain tend to be set aside such as attempts at participatory governance and struggles over public affairs that have been privatised or informalised.

Unfortunately however the direct-democracy approach does not provide a good alternative but rather focuses on the neglected other side of the coin. Interestingly, this is done from two directions, one which is more market oriented, supported, for example, by the World Bank (1997) and in favour of user- and consumer participation (rather than citizenship and popular sovereignty); another which is advocated by critics of globalisation like Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000) who argue that the state and power has been so dispersed and localised that there is no decisive unit left to fight and that increasingly many producers are regulating social relations themselves, so that strong parties and representative democracy are unnecessary and even irrelevant.

Both positions thus support the position of Robert Putnam (1993) and others that the 'real' demos develops organically from below among self managing and co-operating citizens (thereby developing 'social capital'), not in relation to ideologies, institutions and political engagement. Hence, representation becomes redundant since the people act directly through the same contacts and associations that have constituted the people in the first place. In the process almost whatever the 'civic' organisation it becomes 'part of the people itself'. Hence there is no need to analyse, for instance, differences between organisations that relate to 'rights-bearing citizens' and people who lack sufficient capacity to promote their own rights. Further, one does not need to discuss the importance of intermediary variables such as politics and ideology. The fact that Scandinavian democracy and welfare states as well as contemporary participatory budgeting, for instance, have all been

politically facilitated and then sustained is conveniently forgotten.

However, many civil society activists are now more anxious than before to legitimate their work in terms of whom they try to represent (Houtzager et.al 2007). Moreover, the new institutions for direct participation such as participatory planning are (just like previous Scandinavian experiences of combining liberal political democracy and interest based representation and cooperation between government and associations) attempts to initiate a new layer of representation between electoral chains of popular sovereignty on the one hand and associational life and populism on the other. (C.f. Avritzer 2002, Baiocchi 2005, Esping-Andersen 1985, Berman 2006) Yet, a number of questions remain to be answered such as how to guarantee authorisation and accountability, and even more difficult, how to identify and agree on what parts of the demos should control what sections of public affairs on the basis of political equality.

Against this backdrop, the final dimension of actor's political capacity that is considered in the alternative assessment framework draws on a recent attempt to develop a conceptual model to combine the two approaches, one focusing on the chains-of popular-sovereignty and the other on direct-democracy. *The key is to apply the primacy of popular sovereignty also within collective efforts to widen democracy beyond the formal public institutions*. This may be done by situating political practices in formal public as well as other institutions within a comprehensive conceptual frame where it is possible to map and analyse how actors relate to each other and to the institutions in view of the basic principles of democratic representation.

If this is accepted there are three basic pillars: (1) the people (demos*)*, (2) the public matters, and (3) the different intermediary ways of exercising popular control of the input as well as output sides of democracy; i.e. policymaking and implementation. Democratic policy making (input) and implementation (output) need to be representative by firstly being based on the principles of political equality and impartiality and second, subject to authorisation by mandate and to accountability through transparency and responsiveness. The actual content of what is thus being decided and implemented is due to the will of the demos but must not be opposed to the principles of democracy and the absolutely necessary means to develop and apply them. Figure 1 presents a preliminary integrated framework for the study of democratic representation.

Figure 1. A model for the study of democracy oriented representation

PUBLIC AFFAIRS					
Matters of common concern which may be governed in more or less public ways					
Institutions for private governance	Institutions for civic self-governance	Auxiliary state institutions and institutions for sub-contracted public governance	**Institutions for public government**		
			The civil and military administration	*The judiciary and police*	**The political executive**
Institutions for participation/representation at all levels and in all sectors					**The political legislative at all levels**

DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION

In politically equal policy-making (input) *and* impartial implementation (output):

* authorisation with mandate

* accountability with transparency and responsiveness

Self-representation / Direct participation

Representation via mediators		
Civic society	**Political society**	**Informal leaders**
* Civic/NGOs * Popular organisations * Civic 'experts' (media, academics, cultural workers)	* Political parties * Politically related interest organisations * Pressure/lobby groups	* Patrons, fixers * Communal associations * Clan leaders * Popular figures

Legitimated authority to represent various sections of the demos symbolically, descriptively and substantively		
Symbolic representation 'Standing for': belief, identity	Descriptive representation 'Standing for': territory, community groups	Substantive representation 'Acting for': views, ideas, interests

PEOPLE / DEMOS
The articulated people: Social units, conflicts, cleavages and actors with capacities, interestsm ideas and positions on public matters

A number of crucial problems may be addressed within this model (Törnquist 2009). First, to what governance-institutions do the most important actors turn to in the first instance? Second, how do the most important actors reach and affect the institutions of governance? Directly and/or by way of some mediating institutions?

There are two particularly significant clusters of problems that may be analysed in view of these questions.

The first cluster relates to the general tendencies of less public and more polycentric governance. A particularly crucial issue is the prospect for democratic regulation of more or less privatised institutions of governance rather than reclaiming these institutions, which may not be feasible. Along the top row in Figure 1, privatised collective transportation, schools, or health services, for instance, would thus be subject to democratically decided rules and regulations.[2]

Another basic question is whether or not democratic governance would be conducive in fighting corruption and promoting environmentally and socially responsible economic growth. There is

an urgent need to analyse democratic alternatives to the resurgence of the thesis about the need to promote firm institutions, rule of law and economic development ahead of popular sovereignty by supposedly enlightened authoritarian rule. The same holds true for democratic alternatives to accommodate the separatists like those in Aceh, rather than by divisive clientelism and 'special favours'. (Törnquist et.al 2009a)

In the figure on representation, attempts to apply participatory governance to improve responsiveness and accountability (such as attempted at for instance in Brazil; e.g. Baiocchi 2005) would be through more substantial arrangements for participation and representation that are attached to the various institutions for governance (especially the executive ones) and sections of the demos. Further, the renewed interest in learning from old Scandinavian social pacts (c.f. Beckman et.al. 2000, Beckman 2004) may be indicated in terms of triangular relations and agreements (about the exchange between state guaranteed economic growth and collective wage agreements, and universal unemployment- and social welfare schemes) between productive sections of capital within the context of private governance, relevant sections of the institutions for public government, and well organised trade unions and related movements.

The second cluster of problems addresses the mediation between the demos and public affairs. The mediation relates both to the input and output side of democracy; to the politically equal creation of policies and to their impartial implementation (the latter of which seems to be positively related to the more universal as opposed to means-tested measures that are applied; c.f. Rothstein and Torell 2005). Arrangements for participation and representation that are related to the different institutions for governance of public matters are in the upper part of the model. This includes not only the elected legislative assemblies and their executives on the central and local levels. There are also, for instance, various possible institutions for consultation and participation in relation to a number of administrative boards and commissions, workers' participation in company management, the meetings of a neighbourhood organisation, or academic self-rule.

In the majority of cases the introduction of these institutionalised forms of representation may well have been enforced from below through pilot cases and demands on politicians. However, their implementation tends to be a product of top-down measures and decentralisation. In Scandinavia and Kerala, for instance, it was on the basis of strong state apparatuses or state-building projects and the legacies of free farmer communities and land reforms respectively. For good and for bad,

moreover, these roots and measures in turn have then formed much of the system of representation, including parties, movements and even the constitution of the demos.

Far down in the model, representation is also framed by the different formations and expressions of the demos and their means of representation. The means include the actors and their mandate, responsiveness and accountability − as well as their capacity to voice interests and ideas and act accordingly, ideally on the basis of political equality. On the left side of the model are the forms of self-representation and participation. Strictly speaking, this is the only form of direct democracy, i.e. where no representative is involved. On the right side is the representation via mediators. A basic distinction may be made between mediation via (a) civil society defined as associational life among rights bearing citizens, primarily within civic oriented NGOs, local communities, popular organisations, media, academia, and cultural life; (b) informal leaders and non-civic-associations such as patrons, fixers, communal associations, clan leaders and "popular figures"; and (c) political society including political parties, politically related interest organisations and pressure and lobby groups.

One related question is the fate of democracies dominated by clientelism through informal leaders and privileged political financing. Another dilemma (that has been addressed in thematic studies related to Demos' research; Priyono et. al. 2009, Törnquist et.al 2009) is the weak and generally problematic linkages between on the one hand civic associations (that are often rather small and confined to middle class residents or activists), and more mass based and popular oriented movements. The same applies to the crucial problems of scaling up such linkages and co-operations on various levels and to make an impact within the organised politics which tend to be dominated by powerful elites.

> **Box 2: The five major variables used to assess actors' capacity to promote and use the instruments of democracy**
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> People need to be:
> 1. Present rather than excluded from different parts of the political landscape (e.g. in business, interest groups, parties, the bureaucracy, the parliament etc.);
> 2. Able to transform their sources of power into authority and legitimacy;
> 3. Able to turn non-private concerns into public political matters (e.g. the politicisation of a certain problem through focussing on the specific issue, or by combining several issues and/or by relating them to general concepts or ideas);
> 4. Able to mobilise and organise support (e.g. by way of popular leaders, clientelism, alternative patronage, networks and/or comprehensive organising from below; by connecting people through identities, personal networks and/or interests and ideas; and by building and financing various alliances);
> 5. Able to approach various governance institutions (e.g. directly to the executive or by means of representation through informal leaders or parties or NGOs)

Sources and Measurement

It is one thing to design the best possible alternative framework for assessing democracy; it is quite another to make it possible to measure the various indicators and to collect the best possible sources. Democratic audits draw primarily on available results from previous research and available data banks. It is also common to commission a number of studies to cover unexplored problems and to conduct base line surveys of citizens' attitudes and ways of relating to democracy. Typically one then allows for the assessment of all this information by a limited number of experts. The related but innovative South Asian survey comes closer to the original audits in the global North by being able to draw on already available research, a number of commissioned case studies and by giving even more importance to a grand survey of people's attitudes, opinions and relationship with democratic institutions (CSDS 2008).

While there are many similarities, the alternative assessment framework differs from these patterns in some vital respects. First, in Indonesia as well as in many other countries in the global South there is much less qualified and critical research on problems of democracy than in the north or in old 'southern democracies' such as India. Further, there is a particular lack of written sources on the institutions and practices of various actors on the local level, particularly of course with regard to

vulnerable people but also in relation to powerful groups. The kind of internet resources that one is often referred to (including by IDEA) do not really offer a way out of this dilemma but rather reflect the tendency among researchers and various organisations to collect data among metropolitan experts with occasional contacts on the ground. This is not to say that one should not collect and draw on whatever results are available as well as conduct new research; we shall return to that. But the most crucial problem is to find the best possible substitute for the lack of previous studies and data banks.

In principle there are three major alternatives. The most common is to draw on the assessment of the elite among scholars, experts and political and economic leaders. The problem as already hinted at is that this tends to exclude information and experiences on the ground around the country, especially among ordinary people and committed pro-democrats that remain in the margins of economic and political life.

The second alternative is to conduct extensive surveys among people in general as was done in the South Asian survey. However it is quite difficult to ask revealing enough questions and to really obtain frank answers, especially in a country were many people still find it troublesome to disclose their opinions on sensitive issues. Moreover, while knowledge of people's relation to democratic institutions and values is always important, it is no substitute for the lack of research on a number of crucial problems. To 'ask the people' is fine but there are no real populist shortcuts to qualified assessments and analyses of complicated problems. This calls for scholarly knowledge of various concepts, arguments, comparative perspectives etc. Hence our alternative assessment framework gave priority instead to finding the best possible grounded experts in the form of experienced and leading democracy activists within all major frontlines of democracy work in all the provinces; activists who had a reputation for being able to reflect critically.

In addition, the expert survey also enabled us to ask many rather straight forward yet complicated questions. Finally and equally importantly: the expert survey among pro-democrats around the country paved the way for participatory research with committed associates. Very few informants dropped out. Many rather helped us to obtain the best information and tried to make the best possible of complicated questionnaires. The participants also learnt about democracy as they went through the extensive questionnaire with our field assistants and most people involved were interested in learning from the results, give feedback, helping us to develop recommendations and then in attempting to implement them.

Once again, this does not mean that one should not mobilise additional information from previous research, conduct additional case studies and engage various 'elite' experts, students and scholars in the work. We shall return to this. But firstly to address a number of drawbacks with the participatory expert surveys is from below.

One rather frequently voiced opinion is that Demos' local expert-informants are not representative, impartial and critically reflective enough. This critique comes in two versions. The first is that the informants are not good enough experts. However, everybody who has read at least a summary report on the results from the first all Indonesia survey and the resurvey knows that this has been proven incorrect. The statements made by the informants on the actual situation are much more detailed, locally rooted and notably more balanced than those expressed by many leading experts in media-centred articles and seminars.

The second critique is rather that the informants are not representative. This calls for a closer discussion. One version of this position is that Demos has not made a statistically valid selection of respondents among pro-democrats, keeping in mind a number of basic criteria such as age, sex, thematic focus and geographic location. The answer to this critique is simple. Given that it would have been possible in the first place to identify the total population of pro-democrats from which a statistical selection could be made, Demos would not have been knowledgeable enough of local contexts to formulate sufficiently valid and simple enough questions to get reliable answers. Rather, there was a need for respondents with ability to understand rather complicated and often abstract questions. Moreover, Demos has argued that the survey was a substitute for the lack of data banks, written documentation and previous analyses – it was not intended to collect opinions. Hence, Demos opted instead for an expert survey. This meant that the challenge was to find the best possible experts and information given the questions, rather than the best statistical sample to measure opinions or experiences.

The second version of the critique for poor selection of the informants accepts the principle of an expert survey but discusses whether the best experts have been selected. This is among the most important critiques and some valid points have been made in the discussion. To appreciate the importance of the critique, one must first review how Demos has actually gone about identifying the best possible experts in all the provinces and within all major fields of democratisation. The question is whether the following criteria (which have been applied) have been sufficient and feasible: at least five years of consistent work with the democracy movement, wide knowledge and experience within

the identified fields of democracy work, and renowned capacity to reflect critically.

The starting point was to identify generally respected key-informants in every province. These key-informants would be part of the team and thus also publicly accountable for their work. With the exception in the first all Indonesia survey of one province out of more than thirty, this part of the selection process has worked according to plan and there has been no serious critique.

Secondly, there has not been any noteworthy critique of the identification of the major fields of democracy work. This was carried out according to plan on the basis of the previous survey and case-studies of and with the post-Soeharto democracy movement. (Prasetyo et.al 2003) A few potentially important fields were added. They were selected on the basis of the comparative work and included attempts to promote professionalism in public and private administration and build democratic political parties. Regular reviews of the general efforts at democracy around the country have not called for any substantive revision of these fields over time, only corrections for overlaps and simplification. The fields of democratisation form which informants were selected for the current resurvey are in Box 3.

Box 3: The fourteen frontlines of democratisation from which informants have been selected

1. The efforts of farmers and agricultural labourers to gain control of their land and fisher folks to defend their fishing waters.
2. The struggle of workers for better working conditions and standard of living.
3. The struggle for the social, economic and other rights of the urban poor.
4. The promotion of human rights.
5. The struggle against corruption in favour of 'good governance'.
6. The efforts at democratisation through the political party system and the building of popular based parties.
7. The promotion of pluralism as a basic dimension of democracy and conflict reconciliation.
8. The efforts to improve and democratise education.
9. The promotion of professionalism as part of 'good governance' in the public and private sectors.
10. The freedom, independence and quality of the media.
11. The struggle for gender equality.
12. The improvement of supplementary non-party representation at the local level.
13. The attempts to promote interest based mass movements.
14. The struggle for sustainable development.

There are four remaining and unfortunately valid points of critique. It is quite surprising that such an extremely high percentage of informants (something like 90%) have anyway done their utmost to answer almost all the hundreds of questions. At times it has taken several meetings of three to four hours of interviewing, especially when the extremely busy leading activists have been interrupted by various urgent matters.

The minimum time that has been allotted to the questionnaires has been between five and six hours. This if anything is possibly the best indicator one can get for (a) the democratic commitment of the informants, (b) the extent to which they have found the research based efforts of Demos to be relevant and crucial and (c) the extent to which they have trusted the team.

As already indicated, it is difficult for regular interviewers (such as from the Asia barometer) to get people to answer comparatively non-sensitive questions on political matters. In preparing briefer versions of the survey for local and more participatory use and in face of the resurvey that is reported on in this book, the team has done its very utmost to clarify and simplify the questionnaire, without undermining its scientific standards. Tests indicate that we have brought down the time it takes to complete the interviews substantially. Quite frequently, however, it was still necessary to use two sessions of some two hours, given the unavoidable interruptions.

The second of the remaining points of valid critique is that Demos has not given priority to the full servicing and enrolment of the key informants, the temporary assistants and the survey informants in order to initiate a popular education movement. Similarly it is clear that more emphasis could have been given to education and training of the temporary assistants. A related matter is that much of the results and data have so far only been made good use of by a limited number of students and scholars within the academe. There may be different approaches to these problems, and this author in particular may be too optimistic in arguing that one may learn from popular educational efforts in other parts of the global South such as Kerala in India. But there is agreement on the need to address the issues and one may hope that the current book in cooperation with the academe can be one opening.

The third and probably most serious critique is that the expert informants must not be confused with the people (which we have already discussed). In addition, one must discuss whether they have the best knowledge of the conditions of democracy on the ground. Many of the 'pro-democrat experts' are involved in NGOs and actions groups. They

might well try their best to serve vulnerable people and represent some of their ambitions, but there are many examples of experts giving emphasis to theoretically derived agendas without really having firm knowledge of the immediate challenges in the workplaces and communities. Therefore, their judgements may be influenced rather easily by dramatic and political developments that are reported on extensively in media. These and similar problems will be addressed in the second part of this chapter.

Supplementary Research and Data

One major conclusion in this respect is the need for supplementary in-depth case studies. Moreover, such studies may in many cases be even more difficult to carry out than well-structured surveys. Hence there is a need for education and training of students and researchers too. What can be done?

As was spelt out earlier, the choice to emphasise participatory expert surveys from below did not mean that it was unimportant to also collect and add related results from previous research, emerging data banks (including valid and reliable opinion polls) and supplementary case studies. Yet it has to be admitted that it has not been possible so far to prioritise this task.

It is true that attempts were made by Demos to carry out a number of thematic studies on problems that were identified in the first all-Indonesia survey and which called for in-depth approaches. One such task was to analyse experiences of pro-democrats in local direct elections of political executives. But even if the case studies have been concluded the analysis and writing up has been delayed due to more time consuming than expected work on the reports from the basic survey.

There have been similar problems with a number of case studies of experiences among civil society organisations to engage in politics. But in this case several of the conclusions have been more explicit and possible to incorporate in this volume. The same applies to the authors' even more delayed reports on strategies among pro-democrats to develop popular representation in order to combine civil and popular organisation and make a difference in formal institutional politics.[3]

This joint book between the Demos team and concerned democracy scholars at UGM is a crucial step towards addressing these drawbacks. One ambition is that the academic scholars will be able to expand the analysis of the data from the expert survey and add supplementary results from other research.

Another aim is to expand the co-operation into several additional fields. This is to gain improved joint analyses and scholarly guidance of the activist researchers as well as more relevant studies and data that can contribute to even better assessments of Indonesian democracy. Firstly, Demos' new case study programme will gain from academic guidance and be open for contributions from concerned colleagues and students. The focus is on experiences from efforts to (a) use democracy to promote social and economic rights, (b) combine customary rights and democracy and (c) foster political facilitation of democratic direct participation in for instance local budgeting and governance agendas.

Second, the academic partners (at Universitas Gadjah Mada, UGM, with contributions from the University of Oslo, UiO) are already providing education for participatory researchers in an intensive course on basic theory and analytical tools as well as a post-graduate education programme. This post-graduate programme includes research to produce a number of masters and Ph.D theses. The ambition is that the thematic focus of these theses and the results will add to the knowledge about crucial aspects of Indonesian democracy. To provide coordination and further facilitation, the joint work as well as thesis writing is currently being organised in an international education-, research- and publication programme on Power Conflict and Democracy (PCD). This is directed by senior scholars at UGM, UiO and University of Colombo as well as related partners in a number of other universities and organisations, including of course Demos itself.

The long term aim is thus to sustain the unique participatory surveys and democracy promotion from below while moving in the direction of a more comprehensive democratic audit in comparative perspective; an audit that just like the audits in the global North and to some extent in South Asia includes results from several other research projects and surveys.

Much of this co-operation is also open to other interested parties in Indonesia or with a focus on Indonesia. The crucial priorities so far in addition to those that have already been mentioned includes 'popular politics of democratic representation in a comparative perspective', 'the role of democracy in peace and reconstruction in Aceh', 'political financing', 'decentralisation and representation', 'conflict resolution', 'state-civil society relationship and governmentality', 'labour, citizenship and politics', 'local politics and democratic representation', 'women and politics', 'ethnicity and democracy' and 'new ways of controlling media'.

Surveys Over Time

While these efforts will hopefully broaden and deepen the knowledge of and changes in rigorously assessing power, conflict and democracy in Indonesia in theoretical and comparative perspectives, it remains crucial that the expert surveys be sustained as a basis for this. Even if we manage to foster and summarise substantial amounts of additional results and promote better education and training of democracy, it is no substitute for the unique information obtained through the grounded participatory surveys in the country at large. Moreover, one can foster popular education through the implementation of the surveys and dissemination of the results as well as develop and promote research-based non-partisan recommendations.

The current plan is to conduct such surveys in due time before every general elections. This is to promote impartial and academically critical analysis and updates on the problems and options of democracy and suggest what should be given priority to − in co-operation with the concerned academic community, students and the democracy movement at large.

One question that has been raised is if there should be longer periods in between the surveys, as basic factors may not change quickly. The simple answer is that democracy is not a special set of rules and regulations but a process with many dimensions. Further, Indonesia remains in transition from authoritarianism towards, hopefully, more meaningful democracy and there are still constant and crucial changes.

Between the first and the second all-Indonesia surveys, for instance, we have seen radical changes on a number of factors such as the weakening of freedoms, the improvements in governance, the consolidation of top-down democracy, the transformation of the conflict in Aceh into a democratic political framework and the efforts by pro-democrats to engage in organised politics while the powerful elite continues to monopolise the same – all of which do not just reflect temporary events such as an election campaign.

Endnotes

1 While the meaning of economic capital may be self evident (and may well be expanded by more qualified analysis of the political economy between neo-liberalism and state sponsored business under globalisation; see Harriss-White 2003, Kohli 2004 and Khan 2005), social capital is mainly about "good contacts", and cultural capital involves information and knowledge. In Demos' survey another category has been added that covers 'power by way of coercion', including by military force but also through mass demonstrations such as the "people power" phenomenon in the Philippines.

2 This is a long established practice of social democratic governance but it has also been tried in scattered local settings in, for instance, the Philippines (e.g. Rocamora 2004 and Quimpo 2004) and in cases such as Brazil, South Africa and the Indian state of Kerala and West Bengal (see e.g. Avritzer 2002, Baiocchi 2003 and 2005, Fung and Wright 2003, Heller 2001, Isaac and Franke 2000, Tharakan 2004, Jones and Stokke 2005, Buhlungu 2006, Ballard et.al 2006, Webster 1992, Rogaly et.al 1999).

3 A number of efforts to address issues of women and politics, social pacts and legal problems and options by pro-democrats and to engage in politics have not been very successful.