Introduction

by

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Democracy and democratisation are the new buzzwords of the 90s. They constitute the discourse within which even authoritarian rulers feel pressed to legitimate their special interests and struggles over hegemony – not to talk of entrepreneurial students and researchers. Thus there is a good deal of confusion and a great need for reflection. Reflection to get some perspective; to develop fruitful approaches; and to move ahead while preserving scientific and political integrity.

Earlier approaches

Modernisation – towards democratic or authoritarian rule?

In spite of the serious challenge posed by dependency theory, the most widely held ideas within the social sciences about preconditions for democracy in the third world were still, a few decades ago, related to the need for capitalist expansion and modernisation, in accordance with an idealised Western pattern. Modernisation would in turn generate political development and democracy. Marxists as well as non-Marxists produced society-centred analyses. But while those inspired by conventional Marxism (including Barrington-Moore[1]) emphasised the socio-economic structure, and spoke of the need for a national bourgeoisie (which would produce a nation-state, thus overpowering remnants of feudalism with popular support), non-Marxists spoke of modern (versus traditional) values among groups and individuals, and stressed the importance of the middle class as the bearer of those values.

[1]Barrington Moore Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1966.

Soon enough, of course, others refined this perspective. Capitalist expansion and social and economic modernisation, they said, did not automatically generate so-called political development, including democracy. According to non-Marxists like Samuel Huntington,[2] modernisation generated instead new social and political conflicts. These led to disruption, since the old political institutions could not handle all the demands and movements. Hence there was a need for "political order", through the building of stable and modern institutions – at worst by drawing on the military, as in Indonesia or Ethiopia – in order to channel some middle class participation and prevent popular upsurge.

Similarly, Eastern European Marxists noted that modernisation rarely produced a "national bourgeoisie" and a working class strong enough to introduce functioning liberal democracy. Hence it was both possible and necessary to bet instead on progressive politicians and administrators within the state, at worst even officers. To build "non-capitalism" within "national democracies". To withstand imperialism. And to introduce land reforms and industrialisation, which could in turn generate stronger popular forces.

Dependency theorists, on the other hand, turned the picture upside-down, by drawing initially upon Latin American experiences and analyses. Capitalism and modernisation, they said, could not generate democracy, only dictatorship. The countries were not really sovereign. The rulers depended more on foreign capital than on their own resources and subordinates. A kind of permanent state of emergency was inevitable. At worst people had to take up arms, but at least they had to mobilise and organise politically in order to challenge their rulers.

It is true that Marxist class analysts soon put nuances into this picture by stressing the balance of forces and the different ways in which organised interests tried to affect and make use of the state. It is equally true that some of them also spoke of an "overdeveloped" third world state that had inherited strong colonial apparatuses and become relatively autonomous, as no class was able to really dominate all of them. But even if this made it possible to explain why at least elitist democracies could emerge in a few countries like India, Marxists primarily contributed more detailed and dynamic analyses of the rise of authoritarianism in the great majority of third world countries.

Finally, many scholars said that the lack of democracy was more because of the state, and the social forces within its institutions, than because of the classes in civil society. Neo-classics maintained that politicians and bureaucrats were selfish rent-seekers

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[2]Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968.

benefiting from the monopolisation of huge state apparatuses and regulations. Many neo-institutionalists claimed that developmental states presupposed autonomous, efficient, and authoritarian governance. The erosion of democratic governance in countries like India was due, they claimed, to the lack of universalistic administration and solid political institutions. Post-Marxists, on their side, maintained that third world capitalism often emerged from within the state, through privileged control and usage of the state's own resources and regulative powers, which, again, required authoritarian rule, or at least state-corporatism, or a combination of populism and *cacique* (Caribbean Spanish origin: political boss) democracy.

Mainstream current approaches

Neo-modernism, rational elites, civil society, and "good governance"

Here we stood – in the late seventies and early eighties – when, despite everything, some democratisation began to occur. That is, here we stood with a lot of exciting analyses and explanations of more or less authoritarian rule – which simply did not make much sense when we also had to understand democratisation.

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On the one hand, therefore, much of the modernisation perspectives got a new lease on life. Actual developments indicated, many said, that the good old theses proved right.

To begin with, non-Marxist modernists emphasised that socio-economic modernisation in general, and the rise of stronger middle classes in particular, really did generate democracy. For instance, a huge new US project was initiated in the mid-1980s by Larry Diamond, Juan Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset.[3] The relationship between capitalism and democracy and the key role of the rising middle classes was still taken for granted, even though different patters were now allowed for and the key role of effective and democratically committed leadership was given special emphasis. Samuel Huntington, of course, put forward similar arguments in his celebrated *The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*,[4] though adding, as usual, a note on the importance of stable political institutions.

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[3]Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Semour M. Lipset (eds.), *Democracy in Developing Countries. Vol. 2, Africa; Vol. 3, Asia; Vol. 4, Latin America*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 1988 (vol. 2) and 1989 (vols. 2-3).

[4]Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave. Democratization in the Twentieth Century*, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman and London, 1991.

For similar reasons, much of the modernist Marxian ideas that capitalist development would pave the way for some democratisation also returned to the forefront. Some argue that political monopolies, arbitrary and complicated administration, and exclusionary practices obstruct the forceful expansion of capital.[5] This may thus necessitate negotiations and liberalisation – which in turn may lead to some democratisation. At any rate, they say, the contradictaions and structures generated by capitalism drive democratic reform. Others, and most convincingly Rueschemeyer and the Stephens,[6] focus more on the social forces at play within such a framework and emphasise the primary role of the working class – in contrast to the conventional modernists' preoccupations with the middle class and national bourgeoisie respectively.

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On the other hand, many of those who grew up with dependency-oriented analyses of capitalism generating authoritarian rule did not really abandon their long term structural perspectives, but set them aside. Guillermo O'Donnell et al. analysed thus the actual transitions from authoritarian rule as an open-ended process of liberalisation and struggles between hard-liners and soft-liners during political conjunctures characterised by economic and ideological crisis and institutional decay.[7] Their explanations in terms of actors' rational action (with often unintended consequences), and elite-level negotiation of pacts and institutional rearrangements, vary, thus, from country to country. But a common framework is, "that the bourgeoisie, or at least important segments of it, regard the authoritarian regime as 'dispensable' (...) either because it has laid the foundation for further capitalist development or because it has demonstrated its incompetence for doing so," and that there is some "resurrection" of civil society.[8]

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Similarly, those inspired by neo-classical perspectives held on to the thesis about selfish political rent-seekers who nourished "over-politicisation" and futile "political shortcuts". Hence, they say, democratisation presupposes the dismantling of the state, minus law and order, the promotion of capitalist market economy, and the deepening of civil society – including on the international level. And finally, of course, such efforts, like structural adjustment, are also employed to explain democratisation.

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[5]See e.g. Richard Robison, *The Dynamics of Authoritarianism: Theoretical Debates and the Indonesian Case,* Paper to ADSAA Conference, Griffith University 1990.

[6]D. D. Rueschemeyer, E. Huber-Stephens, and J.D. Stephens, *Capitalist Development and Democracy,* Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992.

[7]Se eg. G. O'Donnell and P.C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies,* The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1986.

[8]Ibid. p. 27 and 48 ff. respectively.

This, however, was also the time when less sterile institutionalist perspectives returned to the fore. Many political scientists brought "the state back in"[9] – a state which did not only cater to the interests of the dominant classes but also had its own functions and interests, for instance in political stability and favourable positions vis-à-vis other states. This in turn called for extensive resources and some popular support, which might open up for liberalisation and democratisation.

Other analysts were more interested in institutions as rules of the game, which then in turn affect human action. Hence, the many studies of how, for instance, institutional arrangements affect negotiations during transitions from authoritarian rule and how different electoral systems may then contribute to the consolidation of democracy.[10] Similarly, all the queries into the importance of the rule of law and of clean and efficient administration. India's severe problems of democracy, for example, are often explained in terms of over-politicisation on the one hand, and weak political and administrative institutions to handle demands and implement policies on the other.[11] The primary recipe here is, of course, the World Bank sponsored notion of "good governance".[12] But we should not forget the widespread appreciation – also in the West – of the efficient and stable institutions of some East Asian developmental states and their attempts at political incorporation of significant groups by way of co-optation and corporatist practices.

Finally, yet other institutionalists concentrate more on how culture and institutions in the society at large affect government and administration. For instance, Robert Putnam and his followers say that social capital, in terms of trust and co-operation, promotes democratic performance.[13]

How fruitful are the current approaches?

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[9]P.B. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, and T. Skocpol (eds.), *Bringing the State Back In,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985.

[10]See e.g. Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market. Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America,* Cambridge University Press, 1991.

[11]Atul Kohli, *Democracy and Discontent: India's Growing Crisis of Governability,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990.

[12]*Governance and Development,* World Bank, Washington D.C., 1992; see also, e.g., Göran Hydén and Michael Bratton (eds.),*Governance and the Politics in Africa,* Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder and London, 1992.

[13]Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy.* Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1993, and e.g. Hans Blomkvist, Per Nordlund och Ashok Swain, *Democracy and Social Capital in Segmented Societies. A Research Proposal,* Uppsala University, 1994.

How relevant and fruitful are the explanatory frameworks discussed so far for our attempts to analyse third world democratisation?

Let us examine this with reference to some concrete contexts.

We may distinguish between three rather typical types of cases. One is made up of those countries (like India or Mexico) where nation-state-led development and centralised democratic governance are in serious problem. Another contains the many countries (especially in Latin America and Africa but also the Philippines) where authoritarianism first replaced limited democratic forms of rule but then went aground and experienced a kind of middle-class resurrection of civil society and elitist democracy. And finally the countries where (as in Algeria) authoritarian governance contributed or (as in the Far East) still contributes to rapid socio-economic development and where, at least according to the dominant groups, too much democratisation may undermine it all.

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Firstly, the non-Marxist thesis that socio-economic modernisation and stronger middle classes generate democracy.

Of course there is something to this. However, the same processes and forces are also behind much of the current problems of democracy. Parts of the economic and political deregulation may be inevitable, but it certainly adds to the earlier problems of de-institutionalisation. But even the widely esteemed middle-class democratisations continue to resemble much of the old elitist or "cacique" democracies, even though the old socio-economic basis of political clans and clientelism is often dwindling. Hence, there is still no new solid foundation for further democratisation, including reasonably clear-cut representation of different interests and ideas of societal change. Finally, in countries where politics has been particularly important in promoting development there is a lack of even the comparatively independent business and middle-class forces which gave resonance to much of the transition from authoritarianism elsewhere.

On the other hand, the real importance of some new-middle class professionals in the process of democratisation is demonstrated when they form independent organisations to protect their own rights and integrity as professionals, or to be able to do serious development work, and simultaneously link up with broader popular demands and efforts. This, however, is rarely considered within the conventional modernisation framework of analysis.

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Secondly, the modernist Marxian ideas of capitalism undermining political monopolies and arbitrary rule, creating some free space and giving birth to a working class able to enforce democratic change.

This does, of course, also carry important insights. It is difficult, however, to generalise from European historical experiences to the third world, perhaps less so in Latin America but definitely difficult in the many cases where politics has been or still is of special importance in attempts to engineer the expansion of capitalism. Even though deregulation, privatisation and efforts at more efficient state administration have been and still are on the agenda in most countries, surviving rulers and executives usually manage to re-organise their old "fiefdoms" and networks. The division of labour, the subordination of people, and the appropriation of surplus are extremely complex and contradictory. Even in the newly industrialising countries we are far from a classical protracted industrial and cultural transformation in general and the emergence of a large and comparatively homogeneous working class in particular. Even if workers are likely, anyway, to be of utmost importance in third world democratisation, we must thus find out what is different today in comparison with the historical cases on which the general models of capitalist growth and democratisation have been constructed – in order to thereafter, perhaps, be able to adjust and make use of similar generalisations.[14]

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Thirdly, the studies of actors' rational action and negotiations at elite level – or the study of crafted instant democratisation.

This, for obvious reasons, makes a lot of sense in most of the third world. Elitist horse-trading has characterised much of the actual transitions, for instance in Chile, South Africa and the Philippines. The elitist perspective, however, neglects most of the long and widespread struggles which paved the way for and also conditioned the transitions and negotiations. Furthermore it does not help us to understand why most of these popular forces have rarely been able to participate and make much impact in the very transitions, nor play a decisive role in the consolidation and deepening of democracy that follows.

The same applies in part to the cases where nation-state-led development and centralised democratic governance are in serious problems. Here most of the important efforts at rebuilding and deepening democracy are going on among popular grass-root organisations which are not fully integrated, or are unable to make an impact, within the

[14]For an exciting early start, see Nicos Mouzelis, *Politics in the Semi-Periphery. Early Parliamentarism and Late Industrialisation in the Balkans and Latin Amerika,* Macmillan, 1986.

political system. In the countries where authoritarian governance contributed or still contributes to rapid socio-economic development, and where the most likely scenario may well be one of negotiated pacts between different factions of the elite, we must also recall the frequent lack of both the rather strong bourgeois and middle-class forces and the reasonably independent civil society which have given resonance elsewhere to most of the elitist resurgence of democracy.

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Fourthly, the liberal thesis about civil society against the state.

Of course, nobody denies that free citizens and associations are part of or necessary prerequisites for democracy. However, theories suggesting that the deepening of civil society does in itself promote democratisation are hardly fruitful. Middle-class resurrection of civil society and elitist democracy have primarily given way to political bossism at the local level and personality oriented populism at the national level. Where nation-state-led development and centralised democratic governance are in serious problems, liberalisation basically nourishes clientelism, group-specific organisation, and populistic mobilisation on the basis of religious and cultural identities. Furthermore, where authoritarianism still persists, privatisation and deregulation, as already mentioned, usually imply that politicians, bureaucrats and officers re-organise their "fiefdoms". Thus the separation between state and civil society remains rather blurred.

There is also an international dimension to the thesis about civil society against the state. Globalisation and international support of human rights, many say, tend to undermine authoritarian rule and promote democracy – especially when geared through so-called civil society organisations at both ends. On the one hand it is not difficult to agree, especially from the point of view of repressed pro-democracy groups under authoritarian rule. But on the other hand, it is worth remembering that a necessary prerequisite for democracy is a clearly defined *demos* (Greek: people, citizenry) – citizens or members having the right to govern themselves. We are not aware of any reasonably genuine processes of democratisation – past or present – not related either to nation-states, relatively autonomous regions or communes within the frameworks of nation-states, or taking place within associations with clearly defined memberships.

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Fifthly, the neo-institutionalists and the much wished for "good governance".

This should be credited at least with having convinced some people of the fact that not only socio-economic factors but also political institutions have a bearing on democratic

forms of rule. However, while nobody would object to the need for clean and efficient government, the main problem is to find out under what conditions it may emerge. This is very rarely done. Instead, "good governance", along with the crafting of instant democracy, is often traded in the same way IMF-economists sell neo-liberal market solutions around the globe.

Moreover, the comparatively few neo-institutionalists who look for causes and reasons behind good or bad governance tend to apply a top-down perspective à la Samuel Huntington. Hence, popular dissidence from below is seen as dysfunctional. The efficient East Asian governing of the markets is usually explained in terms of state autonomy vis-à-vis societal forces. Robert Wade even concludes his book by recommending that "effective institutions of political authority" (be developed) *before*, (and) corporatist institutions *as* or *before*, the system is democratised".[15] Inefficient governments are usually explained in terms of over-politicisation and the weakness of political and administrative institutions meant to handle demands and implement policies, as we have already seen in the writings of Atul Kohli.

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Sixthly, the renewed interest in civic virtues, trust and co-operation – now labelled "social capital".

This, clearly, is an important dimension of the forms of democracy which seems also to have a bearing on the content or outcome of democracy.

To state that a democratic culture promotes democracy is, of course, almost tautological. Many proponents of this approach claim however to refer rather to the performance of already existing democracies than to democratisation as a process. But then the rise of social capital itself remains to be explained more convincingly than by reference to historical continuity or "path dependence". At any rate, if social capital is seen as a precondition for "good democrcay", which is plausible, then the current social capital school – just like the old Marxian capital-logic school – is still likely to face the well-known problems connected with essentially reductionist ways of explaining politics and policies, without considering interest groups, political movements and organisations, strategic calculation, and so on.

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[15]Robert Wade, *Governing the Market. Economc Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization,* Princeton University Press, 1990, my combination of Wade's perscription 8 and 9, pp. 372 - 77.

Essential themes for further research

Therefore, given the serious limits of mainstream approaches to third world democratisation, the following factors and linkages worth exploring and giving priority to may be listed.

- What are the conditions and possibilities for the deepening and consolidation of middle-class democratisation? Even the showcases, as we know, continue to resemble in many ways the old *cacique* democracies.

- What will happen where authoritarian governance contributed or still contributes to rapid socio-economic development and where there is even a lack of comparatively independent middle classes?

- What is the character and importance of organisation among new middle class professionals and their linking up with broader popular movements?

- What are the conditions for workers under politically engineered expansive capitalism to play an equally important role in democratisation as did workers in Europe?

- How does widespread popular struggle pave the way for and how does it condition elitist negotiation over transition from authoritarian rule and on to further democratisation?

- Why and how is it that popular forces rarely make a direct impact in such negotiations and transitions, nor play a decisive role thereafter in the consolidation and deepening of democracy? What are the conditions for the integration of popular forces into politics as opposed to the predominant incorporation of them by way of either clientelism and populism or co-optation and corporatist measures?

- What are the conditions for the emergence of a reasonably autonomous civil society under politically engineered capitalism? And how does, then, the deepening of such a civil society affect democratisation?

- What is the impact of globalisation and international support of human rights and democratisation on the necessary formation of a clearly defined *demos* in order to build democracy – something which so far has been linked to nation-states and relatively autonomous regions and communes found within their frameworks?

- Under what conditions may so-called good governance emerge? And what is, then, the relation between top-down efforts at efficient institutionalisation on the one hand, and popular dissidence, movement and organisation from below on the other?

- When and how does "social capital" develop – within and between various groups and communities?

- What, besides "social capital", are the causes and reasons for the convergence of popular movements and organisations around broader issues and perspectives able to generate extended politics of democratisation and efficient policies of development?

Approaching the foundations of democratisation

These vital but comparatively neglected problems within the scholarly discourse on democracy have one thing in common – they all call for a closer look at the deeper dimensions or real foundations of democratisation.

The most fruitful way of approaching this, we think – against the backgroundof capitalist expansion in general – is to focus on politics on the one hand, and the partly new and complicated social and economic conflicts brewing on the other. This is in order to be able, in a second step, to concentrate on how this all affects, and is perceived by, the popular forces able potentially to take democratisation beyond the merely elitist playground – within nation-states and their relatively autonomous regions or communes.

Could it be, for instance, that the current issues and conflicts carry the seed of a new generation of radical popular demands, movements and organisations crystallized through the call for democratisation? How would this, then, become part of restructured political systems in a process of globalisation? How would it relate to more or less reform-oriented old movements and organisations which once emerged on the basis of different issues and conflicts, such as anti-imperialism and land reform?

To our knowledge, there is not much research done within this field. Those who do enter it usually come from three different directions. One is from rather general studies of the integration or incorporation of popular forces into mainstream politics. Another direction is from mainly sociological and anthropological studies of the rise and character of social movements (including discursive analysis). Yet another one results from queries into more structured issue-oriented or interest-based organisations, such as action groups and unions, and eventually, of course, political parties.

These, we think, are the same tracks along which we should now move on – in order to develop new insights and more fruitful questions and approaches. The contributions to the present book have all been planned, conceptualized, and written in order to address this task in various ways, fitting more or less closely into one or more of the three types of approaches just outlined.

As seen from the table of contents, we start out with an introductory part of theoretical reflections on our theme, followed by four historically and regionally contextualised parts and finally a case study of one particular form of international support for democratisation.

Part I

Theoretical reflections on development, democratisation and civil society

In Part I we encounter first Peter Gibbon's theoretical reflections on 'civil society' and political change. These go straight to the heart of the matter we are concerned with. What could "sustainable democratisation" possibly be all about? What are the conditions for it to materialize? How can the concept of 'civil society' be used to shed light on these questions of undisputable historical relevance?

Gibbon criticizes current sweeping claims that the 'deepening of civil society' will necessarily imply enhanced democracy. He develops his argument in reference to Marx' critique of Hegel's political philosophy by making an illuminating distinction between the 'deepening' and the 'politicization' of civil society. The latter is shown to be more directly relevant to democratisation than the former, as it involves people organising themselves in relation to publically relevant issues as opposed to limited, particular and atomising ones. Gibbon's discussion helps us discern significant limitations of current simplified notions of civil society and democratisation. In the second part of his chapter, Gibbon puts his theoretical findings to use by entering into a more specific discussion with Mahmood Mamdani on issues of democratisation and civil society in rural versus urban areas of Africa. In order for minimal democratisation of rural areas to occur in Africa, "the rural political arena must," Gibbon says, "be opened for the organisation of contending political forces and not merely for individual 'participation' on the one hand or institutional pluralisation on the other" (p. x/26-27).

The second contribution to Part 1 is by Nicos Mouzelis. This is a piece of political sociology, where the author suggests a theoretical framework for explaining the occurrence of developmental blockages in "late-developing" countries of the Balkans

and Latin America as opposed to in the "early-developing" ones. He locates the roots of such blockages – weak development of the domestic market and weak or negative connection between industry and agriculture – in anti-developmental linkages established at the cultural level between state and civil society. These linkages tend, Mouzelis argues, to be characterized by clientelistic/populistic ideologies, the substitution of formal rationality for substantial rationality, and ambivalent attitudes toward the national community. All this discourages both the development of an adequate knowledge of reality and, naturally, the proper functioning of the formally democratic institutions. Mouzelis briefly considers the cases of Taiwan and South Korea as contrasting examples to the rule he formulates. Taiwan and South Korea are "late-developers", still their states are very far from anti-developmental in the sense just indicated. Mouzelis suggests interesting explanations for these exceptions to be found in history, external relations and – most importantly in the context of his argument – in national political culture. "In other words," he writes, "favourable internal and external structural conditions in these two countries matched up with appropriate cultural influences" (p. x/20).

Applying Gibbon's distinction between the 'deepening' and the 'politicization' of civil society to Mouzelis' sociological categories, we might say that conditions in "late-developing" countries tend to favour the deepening rather than the politicization of civil society, thus obstructing both economic development and democratisation. It should be noted, however, that this is not exactly the line of thought pursued by Mouzelis himself in trying to explain why economic development and democratisation did occur in Taiwan and South Korea, in spite of the rule established on the basis of his generalizations. Mouzelis' own argument, as indicated, is more about culture and ideology and less about power and organization than Gibbon's. Trying to match them against each other would nevertheless be a worthwhile exercise, precisely for that reason.

Part II

The case of Sweden as an early historical experience

In the second part of this book, the case of Sweden as an early historical experience of democratisation is analysed in two separate studies. The idea is to consider the constitutional and popular components of today's processes of democratisation in the theoretical and empirical light of historical experience. It is of course possible, too, to reverse the perspective by viewing the past in the light of the present, thus opening up for two-way comparisons.

The established picture of European modernisation from agrarian to industrial society, involving the emergence of a civil society composed of clearly demarcated classes as well as politically organised popular movements, integrated into the building of nation states, in turn strongly contributing to democratic transition and consolidation – all of this differs considerably from the established picture of current processes of democratisation in the so-called third world. Comparison might, however, yield new and revealing insights.

Let us indicate two potential areas for such comparison, on the basis of this second part of our book. One is suggested by Lars Pettersson's study of early popular movements in Scandinavian democratisation as exemplified by Sweden, and the other by Bo Rothstein's study of significant aspects of Swedish corporatism.

Pettersson's focus is on Swedish popular movements of the early and mid-nineteenth century, which have been studied much less closely than later ones. He emphasizes that these early movements and associations "reflected top-down mobilization controlled by elites and no autonomous grass-root organizing" (p. x/17). They represented the constitutional and disciplining dimension of democratisation rather than the popular dimension. This disciplined, predictability-oriented and negotiation-oriented heritage was taken over by the later mass movements – including the labour movement – most probably contributing importantly to the subsequent orderly course of Swedish democratisation. It is clearly a crucial question to be asked whether middle-class leadership in today's democratisation processes might function in analogous ways – and if not, why? Single-issue movements, international NGO's, transnationalism, are examples of late twentieth-century factors much more weakly or not at all present in the early Swedish example. Such factors would therefore be significant in comparisons between the early "Scandinavian model" as outlined by Pettersson and what happens in the third world today.

Rothstein's point of departure is the observation that although Sweden was a late democratiser (universal adult suffrage in 1921) and had a rigid class structure, its labour movement was nevertheless a "collaborative" and willing participator in corporatist state arrangements. This makes Sweden a deviant case in the history of democratisation, which Rothstein explains by "the specific structure of the pre-democratic Swedish state – centralized, but not closed; bureaucratic and professional but not especially authoritarian; differentiated but not without central coordination of policy" (p. x/1). A complementary line of explanation is of course suggested by Petterson's contribution.

Both the analytical structure of Rothstein's argument and his empirical findings have obvious bearing on the analysis of the recent successful developmental experiences of

the Far East, where mercantilism, state direction, and corporatism are significant traits. Like Petterson's analysis, it also gives clear evidence of the interpenetration of state and civil society, at least in the Swedish case – and by implication the artificiality of trying to view them separately from each other.

Parts III-VI

Parts III-V contain altogether nine different studies of democratisation processes in Asia, Africa and Latin America, by ten different authors. They all address, with varying emphases, the eleven themes or questions about significant factors and linkages listed above. Even the study found in Part VI of our book does of course deal with those questions, although in a way different from that of the others, by focusing specifically on the evaluation of one type of democracy promotion from outside.

The country- and/or region-oriented studies of Parts III-V deal specifically, in concrete ways, with the theoretical issues of *if*, *why* and *how* new conflicts and issues become or do not become politicised in civil society, and how this in turn impacts upon democratisation. The issues are contextualised by the authors through the realities of a number of countries; in Asia – India (Kerala), Bangladesh, the Philippines, Indonesia; in Africa – Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, Zambia, with references also to several other countries; in Latin America – Chile. Although different from each other in the various richnesses of their details, our cases still display a number of strikingly similar traits when viewed at a more general level.

Civil society figures prominently throughout this book. Everything indicates that neither the mere deepening of civil society nor, necessarily, the generation of social capital, nor even the politicisation of civil society does in itself carry any guarantees for such convergence of broader issues, perspectives and organisation which might lead on to sustainable democratisation. Still, no other possible way is indicated by our cases than democratic self-organisation around common issues of survival and development. Some significant specifications of conditions for this to happen or not to happen are, however, indicated.

Asian experiences

In Bangladesh, Kirsten Westergaard tells us, civil society is far from democratic, although a democratic potential is present in the work of some radical NGOs. Thus, she argues importantly, there is no necessary relationship between the politicisation of civil society and democratisation. "There are many macro actors in civil soiety. While NGOs

are mobilizing the poor to fight for their economic and political emancipation, fundamentalist groups are increasingly opposing these strategies." Semi-feudal village elites and fundamentalists work hand in hand in this. (P. x/12.)

The Philippines, as described and analysed first by Karina Constantino-David and then by Olle Törnquist, is a showcase of NGO organisational complexity and middle-class activation of civil society. In her conrete and systematic mapping of the Filipino NGO landscape, Constantino-David points to significant achievements as well as dilemmas in community organising by NGOs among the poor and powerless. According to Törnquist, however, there are only limited signs of politicisation in the sense of providing any long-term basis for legitimate democracy. Törnquist compares the Philippines with the cases of Indonesia and the state of Kerala in India. Indonesia's democracy movement, under authoritarian state rule, has a narrow, middle-class, social basis. Kerala, on the other hand, has a democratic political system and a long history of broadly based social movements. Despite such important differences, Törnquist concludes, in all three cases, "most of the new activists and reformists themselves do not find it possible to really politicise... their development actions" (p. x/36). The reasons for this have to do with capitalist economic expansion of a kind that calls for but does not encourage interest in democratic control and management of the economy as well as with institutional set-ups where non-party activities do not make much sense.

The case of Kerala is analysed by Michael Tharakan as well, who deals in his contribution with cultural and socio-religious reform movements in an historical perspective. Reading Tharakan and Pettersson alongside with each other provides for interesting parallells between Kerala and Sweden. In both cases a long nineteenth-century history of rather top-heavy popular mobilisation, developing later into more broadly based organisation, seems to have set the stage for social welfare and political democracy. Kerala's uniqueness in a third world context, thus, is not only a matter of health and education in spite of low average income but extends also to seemingly significant historical parallells with such a European country as Sweden in terms of early socio-political development.

African experiences

At a general level, as already suggested, the conclusions to be drawn from our African cases do not differ much from those based on Asian experiences.

Decolonization brought a limited measure of popular sovereignty, and only for some time, Lars Rudebeck points out. The ongoing democratisations of today are bringing some constitutionalism. What forces could possibly bring both at the same time, as

seems to be necessary for democracy to become sustainable? Are there lessons to be learnt from the history of anti-colonial movements with regard to democratic legitimacy and cultural notions of horizontal power, as indicated for instance by the case of Guinea-Bissau? How is ethnicist resurgence of "traditionalism" in politics linked to developmental failures and the potential for democratisation?

Abdul Raufu Mustapha, in his chapter on democratisation and civil society in rural Africa, also raises questions about the growing illegitimacy of the post-colonial African state. Fed up with the dismal economic and political record of the Nigerian state, a peasant is quoted as asking a visiting researcher: "When will Independence end?" Mustapha criticises the way the concept of 'civil society' is most frequently used in the analysis of African politics. The conceptual "'detachment' of society from the state and the rigid juxtaposition of state and civil society is hard to justify," he emphasises (p. x/5) – in the same vein as we concluded above from our studies of the Swedish historical experience. Much exploitation of small farmers is in fact carried out in close interaction between the state and the more informal sector/'civil society'. "The central problem, therefore, is not the liberation or protection of civil society, but its very creation" (p. x/9).

The study by Björn Beckman and Attahiru Jega on the national unions of Nigerian university teachers and students views constitutionalism as a "project of imposing law and order from below on those who exercise power" (p. 5), adding in that sense a highly important dimension to the discussion of constitutionalism introduced by Rudebeck. In contrast to the frequent view of interest groups as representing "special" or "vested" interests, we are presented here with the case of two special interest groups whose agendas link up with broader popular concerns, not least "the advancement of the rule of law in the regulation of the relations between state and society" (p. x/final). It is important to note that in so doing, these two unions contribute to the 'politicisation', as opposed to 'deepening', of Nigerian civil society.

Basing herself upon detailed field work on urban community organisation in the transition to multi-partyism in Zambia, Ann Schlyter gives concrete evidence of structural and cultural obstacles to the integration of women in the Zambian democracy movement. Her study adds significant nuances to our picture of the contradictory potential of 'civil society' with regard to democratisation – in Africa and elsewhere.

A Latin-American experience

Bosco Parra's chapter on governance and democratisation in post-Pinochet Chile enriches our book with a Latin-American example. His focus is on political culture in

Chile, and how this functions as the Weberian 'switchman' between structure and action. According to Parra, Chilean civil society is characterised by a culture of "deference", "submission", and "popular self-restriction", decisively facilitating and even legitimating the exercise of class power. In the period preceding the 1973 coup d'état this cultural stance was, for the first time, seriously shaken in Chile. The coup restored it, thus contributing, perhaps paradoxically, to the liberal democratisation that was to follow toward the end of the 1980s.

In its own way, Parra's contribution further illuminates the complexities inherent in the politicisation of civil society. No "coherent strategy for overcoming popular self-restriction" (p. x/10) is visible yet in Chile. The only potential structural base for such a strategy, indicated by Parra, is in the ongoing development of fragmented work and production processes giving rise to new possibilities of association among people, more autonomous than before in relation to political and economic centres of power. The fact that this is an uncertain base is indicative also of the vulnerability of swiftly crafted top-down democratisation, of which Chile is not the only example in Latin America.

International support in favour of democratisation

Part VI, as mentioned, differs in focus from the rest of the book. The study by John Degnbol Martinussen contained in it is essentially an evaluation of ILO-assisted activities in support of third world trade unions. It is based on the normative assumption that development objectives should be decided by the populations and citizens concerned, to which is linked the hypothesis that democratic procedures and human rights provide the most appropriate framework for this. Interventions, even by international actors, into civil society – and more specifically into workers' organisations – are seen as one way of promoting democracy. The study ends by a series of concrete conclusions on how such promotion can best be designed so as to contribute effectively to workers' empowerment. The focus, in this regard, is on the same kind of broader, politically relevant, effects of interest group activities as brought out in Beckman's and Jega's study of unions in Nigeria.

Thus Degnbol Martinussen, too, concludes on the deepening/politicisation-of-civil-society chord struck throughout the various contributions. Let us recall, therefore, one basic insight strongly emerging from the book as a whole. This is that democratisation and democracy are possible outcomes of complex historically shaped conditions, not easily wished or crafted into sustainable existence.