

BUILDING-DEMOCRACY ON THE SAND

Advances and Setbacks in Indonesia

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Editors

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Preface



he year of 2008 marked by the tenth anniversary of Indonesian *reformasi*, which was enacted after the fall of the Suharto-led New Order regime through protest actions backed by university students. For ten years, we have witnessed some promising changes. Yet, such a period of time is not sufficient enough to consolidate the fundamentals of democracy and human rights promotion. Indonesian democracy remains unsteady!

This is the general description of Demos' 2007 Survey on Problems and Options of Indonesian Democratisation. This Survey was the second of its kind to be conducted, following the first survey, which was conducted in 2003-2004. The results from both surveys show there has not been much improvement during this period of time, however we are convinced that the process of democratisation cannot be left behind or stopped, as the results of the Demos surveys also revealed some existing options that may be used to achieve a better, meaningful democracy.

This survey is based on the results of the survey which included assessments by 903 informants from 13 frontlines in all provinces in Indonesia, from Aceh to Papua. In order to gather information from the informants, Demos gained incredible support from key informants and research assistants in 33 provinces. Members of Demos' research team who were involved in this survey were Syafa'atun Kariadi (coordinator),

AE Priyono, Attia Nur, Nur Iman Subono and Sofian Munawar Asgart. Willy Purna Samadhi, Demos' Deputy for Research conducted internal supervision of the survey. Contributions in providing administrative supports were also made by Antonio Pradjasto, Melanie Tampubolon, Gilang Desti Parahita, Debbie Prabawati, Ingggrid Silitonga, Ami Priwardhani, Christina Dwi Susanti and Laksmi Pratiwi.

The executive summary of this survey was presented in Jakarta on May 2008. The more regional based results were also presented in six cities in Indonesia, namely Ambon, Palu, Mataram, Banjarmasin, Bandung and Palembang. We are glad and grateful at the same time, that participants in the forums contributed useful comments, criticisms and suggestions for improving the analysis of our empirical data.

This report is the result of cooperation between Demos and Gadjah Mada University, in this case the Centre for Social and South East Asian Studies (CESSAS). This cooperation is expected to produce more critical empirical studies that at the same time also meet academic standards.

We are grateful to Professor Mohtar Mas'ood, Dr. Pratikno, Cornelis Lay, M.A, Budi Irawanto, M.A, who have played a significant role in the establishment of this Demos-UGM cooperation. They have also contributed important comments, criticisms, and suggestions to this report. We are also particularly grateful to Dr. Nicolaas Warouw who provided his precious energy and time in becoming the editor of this report.

We would like to thank Dr. Olle Törnquist, Professor of Political and Development Science from the University of Oslo, Norway, who has been very enthusiastic and consistent in giving all of his attention to this cooperation.

For the English manuscript of this report, we are indebted to Rebecca Meckelburg, responsible in proofreading work, for her enthusiastic and constructive comments and suggestions.

We also extend our thanks to the Embassy of Norway in Indonesia, The Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation (NORAD), and the Swedish Development Aid Authority (Sida), for supporting our scientific integrity and independence in promoting democracy in Indonesia.

The survey results discussed in this report did reveal that the situation for democracy in Indonesia remains critical. Yet, the fact that pro-democracy actors now believe that engagement in political processes is one of the important ways to attain popular sovereignty is one point worthy of consideration. Several political attempts were promoted to

strengthen democratic consolidation by using the emergence of several national political communities. Unfortunately, some pro-democracy actors took a populist shortcut; which called for harder work by pro-democracy actors to strengthen consolidation amongst themselves. This becomes more important when the elites are consolidating themselves by using existing democratic instruments but refusing to promote them. Therefore, we believe that this report will provide an important contribution to the promotion of Indonesian democracy.

We invite suggestions and comments on this book.

Yogyakarta, December 2008

Asmara Nababan
Demos Executive Director

Dr. Aris Arif Mundayat
CESSAS-UGM Director

Chapter One



Indonesia's Held Back Democracy and Beyond Introduction and Executive Briefing: Advances, setbacks and options, 2003-2007

Olle Törnquist (University of Oslo)



This book has been produced jointly by Demos' researchers, coordinated by Willy P. Samadhi and a team of senior democracy scholars at Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM), Indonesia, coordinated by Dr. Nicolaas Warouw, in co-operation with myself. It is dedicated to the 'end of the beginning' of three processes.

Firstly, it marks the 'end of the beginning' of attempts to rebuild fruitful relations between public academia and civil society. The book has its roots in the collective work of the early 1990s, the work of scholars and activists on democratisation; a collective work which soon however had to take refuge in civic organisations because of the lack of academic freedom.

The first book, *Aktor Demokrasi*, (Budiman and Törnquist 2001) was researched and distributed in drafted versions during the dismantling of the Soeharto regime. The second book on the *Post-*

Soeharto Democracy Movement (Prasetyo et.al. 2003) drew attention to the paradoxical marginalisation of pro-democrats in the then building of democracy. Thus the results called for more comprehensive analysis of the political dynamics. This would be to generate better knowledge as a basis for deliberation and improvement.

The organisation 'Demos' was formed to facilitate the work. The aim was to generate research-based democracy promotion through participatory surveys. Participatory surveys of how some 900 experienced activists from the frontlines of all crucial efforts at democracy in all provinces assessed the problems of and options for democracy. A rigorous analytical framework with hundreds of theoretically-based questions was developed and applied. While it is true that support was always there from a handful of scholars, it is only the joint work with the current book that marks the successful conclusion of a first round of broader co-operation.

Secondly, the book is dedicated to the 'end of the beginning' of attempts to establish both a theoretically and an empirically solid basis for the analysis of Indonesian democracy. Most analyses of democracy are driven by the needs of government offices and foreign supporters to prepare and evaluate their policies and projects. The democracy movement, however, in addition to any serious scholar and student, needs more theoretically and empirically inclusive and impartial assessments. This is to make it possible to consider the pros and cons of a wider spectrum of arguments as well as to extend the sources of information beyond the established elite to the experienced democrats in the field.

While a more solid foundation for the analyses of democracy has been generated through Demos' surveys, this book also makes an effort to include crucial results from dispersed already existing studies as well as new research of major problems. Much of this work has been conducted within a new international education and research programme on *Power Conflict and Democracy* using theoretical and comparative perspectives. The founding partners are UGM with Demos, University of Colombo and University of Oslo (UiO) who, in their joint efforts, seek to foster the 'local' needs and priorities of students and scholars in South- and Southeast Asia and their close partners.

In the future, the academic effort with UGM in co-operation with Demos may provide the impartial and legitimate public sphere that is needed to discuss and share in a transparent way results from donor- and government driven assessments of democratic challenges; assessments that may both add crucial insights as well as themselves benefiting from independent analyses.

Thirdly, the book is of course dedicated to what one may hope is the 'end of the beginning' of Indonesia's transition from authoritarian to meaningful democratic rule. Ten years ago, Soeharto's 'New Order' began to be replaced by the world's largest 'New Democracy'. It is time to evaluate advances and setbacks, and to identify options for the future.

In the present book, the results from the all-Indonesia re-survey – a continuation from the original survey held in 2003 – which was carried out in 2007, are analysed in view of the data from the first survey which was conducted in two rounds in 2003/2004 and which are available in Priyono et.al (2007). Being a new democracy in constant transformation, Indonesia requires resurveys of the problems and options as frequently as the general elections.

The theoretical and methodological approach and framework is presented and discussed in detail in chapter two. It has also been subject to a separate academically critical self evaluation. (Törnquist 2008b). The full questionnaire is available in the appendix. The lead sponsors – in addition to major sections of the democracy movement and scholars at the UiO and UGM with associates – is the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs through its embassy in Indonesia, with Sida (the Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency) and other partners, including the Ford Foundation. The commitment and support of the Scandinavian sponsors as well as their policy of non-interventionism in academic matters has been crucial to the success of this project.

In brief, the re-survey and supplementary research reveals that between 2003/04 and 2007 Indonesia has developed into a consolidated top-down democracy dominated by its powerful elites. The standard of governance-related instruments of democracy (such as rule-of law, anti-corruption and accountability) has improved – though from very low levels. A country-wide political community is evolving as a substitute for the crumbling Jakarta driven nation-state – though the new polity remains constrained by elitist and localised identity politics and economic globalisation. The military is on the retreat from politics, and a majority of the widened and localised establishment make use of formally democratic rules of the game – though clearly to their own benefit and only sometimes in favour of the aims of democracy.

Much of the comparatively successful democracy-building is thus built on loose foundations. Compared to four years earlier, most of the relatively impressive freedoms and rights that were observed at that time are stagnating and backsliding. The sections of the powerful elite that rarely win elections seem to be interested in a partial return to the old idea of promoting stability and economic growth ahead of popular freedoms and sovereignty.

This was once labelled 'politics of order' (Huntington 1965) and used to legitimise the rise of the 'New Order'. Now it has been baptised as 'sequencing democracy' (e.g. Mansfield and Snyder 2005). Most seriously, however, organised politics is exclusionary. Most people are not integrated from below, only, at best, incorporated from above.

In spite of attempts by pro-democrats to the contrary, there is a lack of representation by people themselves and of basic issues and interests related to the middle classes, women, labour, farmers and fisher-folks, urban poor and indigenous populations. While voting is free, running in elections is only for the well financed and the powerful. Hence the world's largest new democracy is held back. And since the party system is closed to actors without economic and cohesive power, and since popular organisation remains weak, there is a need for popular and civic organisations to form Democratic Political Blocs behind basic platforms on local and central levels, to thus foster and control 'least worst candidates' who can facilitate more meaningful democracy by which people can improve their social relations and standard of living.

Design versus Structure

The generally accepted meaning of democracy is popular control of public affairs on the basis of political equality. How far has Indonesia moved towards this ideal? And how much further will it now go? Put differently: how much of the old Soeharto-era oligarchy remains in place, still governing, but doing so via formally democratic elections? What, if any, are the chances of advancing towards more meaningful democracy, in terms of sufficiently favourable means and capacities of ordinary people to really control public affairs and thus promote development in accordance with their own priorities?

There are two predominant and rather extreme kinds of answers to these questions. The first comes from the 'designers'. Beginning in the global third wave of democracy, from the late 1970s onwards, some concerned scholars and practitioners placed their faith in the design of a limited number of institutions. Get the institutions rights, such people argued, and democracy will flourish.

The institutions they had in mind related to civil and political liberties, the rule of law, free and fair elections, and 'good governance'. Internationally this trend began with the elite-led transitions from authoritarian rule in southern Europe in the 1970s, with Spain as the paradigmatic example. It then travelled to Latin America, it effected the transformation of South Africa and it was exported to the rest of Africa south of the Sahara in addition to Eastern Europe. (E.g. O'Donnell and

Schmitter 1986, Lintz and Stepan 1996, Grugel 2002). Finally it was taken aboard in parts of Asia too; and with the end game in Jakarta it was introduced to Indonesia by scholars such as William Liddle (2001).

At present, many of these ideas are applied in international agencies for democracy building like the National Democratic Institute and International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). In this view and by international standards among new but often poorly advancing democracies, Indonesia is doing fine, especially given the traumatic history of the elimination of the popular movements in 1965-66, and the more than thirty years of militarised capitalism that followed. Hence, the achievements may testify to what is possible even under harsh conditions.

It is true that the designers acknowledge that the system poorly represents the real needs of ordinary people, but they believe that this problem too can be improved through better institutional design. The measures they propose include more direct elections of government executives, and 'simplification' of the political party system. The latter step would result in a few major parties that, although top-driven, would at least be able to develop policies, 'pick up' demands from society, recruit people for government jobs and supervise the executive. The designers think that popular representation from below is unrealistic and that top-down democracy dominated by powerful elites will have to do. In this view, 'deepening democracy' is instead limited to direct participation by 'responsible citizens' in civil society, usually, in fact, excluding 'the masses'. (E.g. Catón 2007)

The second answer comes from 'structuralists' on both the left and the right of the political spectrum. The 'structuralists' use a similarly narrow definition of democracy but are much more pessimistic. They say that the structural conditions do not permit decent democracy. As a result, the oligarchs have retained their power and ordinary people their poverty.

From a radical political economy position, this is most forcefully argued by Vedi Hadiz and Richard Robison (2004) and recently by Max Lane (2008), advocating the need to return to extra parliamentary actions. According to other structuralists, freedoms and elections have even generated worse identity politics, conflicts and corruption, and less economic growth (e.g. Mansfield and Snyder 2005).

Thus, there is a new emerging international thesis: that enlightened groups should 'sequence democracy'. While major parts of the left focus on fighting global neo-liberalism, saying it blocks real democracy, the right wants to build solid institutions, 'good governance',

growth alliances and organisations of 'responsible' citizens, *before* entrusting the masses with even the limited freedom of electing top-down parties dominated by powerful elites. This position is gaining ground in, for instance, many ministries for foreign affairs, conservative think- tanks and development bodies such as the World Bank. (C.f. the review by Carothers 2007a,b)

Alternative Focus on Universal Factors in Contextual Processes

Both these arguments are theoretically and politically dubious. The first assumes that once the elites have agreed to the establishment of a few democratic institutions, democracy has been achieved. This is, of course, as naive as stating that basic capitalist or socialist institutions always generate prosperity. Yet, most designers, whom as already mentioned were introduced to Indonesia by scholars such as Liddle, have at least held on to their belief in democracy.

That is not always the case with the structuralists. They insist that rather narrowly defined democracy is meaningful only if certain prerequisites have already been met. For the conventional left, this usually means greater social and economic equality, workers or the poor having strong bargaining power, and the like. For the right, it means strong institutions, good governance, associations of 'responsible' citizens and economic growth.

As a result, the structuralists by definition exclude the possibility of creating such conditions through improved democracy. Instead, they become pessimistic about the promise of democracy, or argue or indicate – including reportedly Vice President Jusuf Kalla (e.g. Suwarni 2007, Simamora 2008) – that it should be limited or even postponed.

In between the two extremes (both applying a narrow definition of democracy but one engineering elite institutions, the other waiting for massive social change) democracy can be understood instead as a *contextual process* where universal dimensions and intrinsic democratic institutions can only be analysed in view of contending actors' democratic will and their political capacity to use and promote the institutions over time.

A framework for such an analysis was developed and applied in our two national surveys of Indonesia's democracy. At each point in time Demos asked some 900 experienced campaigners-cum-experts on democratisation in all provinces about the extent to which the existing institutions really supported the universally accepted aims and means of democracy.

The theoretical framework and method are presented and discussed in detail in Chapter 2, but the first focus was on the performance, spread and substance of the 32 intrinsic instruments for promoting and applying democracy that we had identified in accordance with mainstream theories. These instruments included the major dimensions of equal citizenship, international law and human rights conventions, rule of law and justice, civil and political rights, economic and social rights, free and fair elections, good political representation, democratic and accountable government, freedom of media, press and academic freedoms, additional civic participation, direct participation.

Second, questions were asked about the extent to which the most important actors that the informants had identified had actually promoted, avoided, used or abused the intrinsic instruments of democracy. Third, attention was directed at the capacity of these actors to promote and use the instruments. The major dimension in this respect was the extent to which the actors (a) were included or excluded in politics at large; (b) had relevant sources of power and ability to transform them into authority and legitimacy; (c) were able to put their main issues and interests on the agenda (i.e. politicise them), (d) could organise and mobilise collective action in democratic ways, and (e) had the capacity to approach decision making and executive institutions of governance, directly and or by means of representation.

The combined results from both surveys make it clear that the extreme institutionalist and structuralist arguments are not just theoretically but also empirically mistaken. Let us turn to a general outline of the findings.

Eight Major Conclusions

(1) Deteriorating Freedom

A first conclusion from these surveys is that while many civil and political rights are being upheld – which is in contrast to most other new democracies – the advances have somewhat deteriorated since 2003/04. By then the general standard of freedoms were outstanding as compared to the other institutional dimensions of democracy. Informants reported that in addition to major problems of the ‘freedom to form parties on the national or local level (or teams of independent candidates) that can recruit members, and participate in elections’ – to which we shall return – the ‘freedoms of religion, belief, language and culture’, ‘freedom of speech, assembly and organisation’, ‘freedom of the press, art and academic world’, ‘citizens’ participation in extensive independent civil

associations' and 'public access to and the reflection of different views within media, art and the academic world' have regressed. (For an overview of the details, see the index in Chapter 3.)

(2) Improved Governance

The second conclusion is that there has been a general improvement since 2003-2004 in top-down efforts by government institutions to improve the miserable performance of the rule of law, particularly the control of corruption. These improvements are particularly noticeable with regard to the 'subordination of the government and public officials to the rule of law', 'the equality before the law', 'the transparency and accountability of elected government and the executive', 'government's independence from strong interest groups and capacity to eliminate corruption and abuse of power', and 'the capacity of the government to combat paramilitary groups, hoodlums and organised crime'. It is true that these improvements are starting from very low levels and that most of these crucial problems remain, but the advances remain commendable.

(3) Country-Wide Political Community

Third, the disintegration of the centralistic New Order has not led to the balkanisation, characterised by separatism and ethnic and religious cleansing, that many observers and politicians had predicted. What has emerged instead is a unitary *political* (rather than ethno-nationalist) community with extensive space for local politics. It is true that this space implies huge inequalities among the provinces and regions, and that it has often been occupied by powerful groups. The attempts to develop democratic politics on the basis of real issues and interests on the ground are under the threat by elitist and localised identity politics and economic globalisation. But in Aceh, where foreign donors have so far contained the military and big business and where separatists have been able to substitute political participation for armed struggle, decentralisation has paved the way for peace and potentially fruitful democracy.

(4) The Relative Stability of Democracy Rests With Elitist Inclusion of People

At the same time, politics *in general* continues to be dominated by the powerful elite. Yet, the dominant elite groups are more broadly-based, more localised and less militarised than under Soeharto. Hence the surveys and associated research qualifies the general thesis that the

powerful elite from the New Order has simply captured democracy (C.f. Hadiz and Robison 2002). Remarkably, it is rather an extended elite that have taken advantage of the new institutions that are supposed to promote democracy.

This is not to say that there are no abuses, but decentralisation and elections have enabled more diverse sections of Indonesia's elite to mobilise popular support. Of course, elites often mobilise such support by making use of their clientelistic networks, their privileged control of public resources and their alliances with business and communal leaders. Yet, the interest of such elite groups in elections is *both* a crucial basis of the actually existing democracy *and* its major drawback. Without this elite support, Indonesian democracy would not survive; with the powerful elite support, it becomes the domain of 'rotten politicians' who prosper and entrench themselves through corruption (the research programs 'Renegotiating Boundaries' and 'In Search of Middle Indonesia' at the KITLV institute in the Netherlands (www.kitlv.nl) and Center for Local Politics and Regional Autonomy Studies at Gadjah Mada University are providing comprehensive case studies in this area.).

In short, democratic institutions and people's capacities remain weak. Yet, much of the required infrastructure is now in place, and in spite of their weaknesses and biases, Indonesia's institutions are solid enough to accommodate powerful actors and, at least partially, alternative actors as well. Theoretically, this is the bottom line. It is the reason why Indonesia may be called an emerging democracy.

In this respect, Indonesia may thus begin to resemble India, the most stable democracy in the global South which is dominated primarily by politically oriented powerful elites that incorporate vulnerable people into politics, win elections and of course benefit in various ways from the powers thus gained – and therefore also sustaining certain procedural fundamentals of democracy – while the more 'modern' and cosmopolitan affluent middle classes increasingly often opt for private solutions to their problems (e.g. CSDS 2007, Chatterjee 2004, Corbridge and Harriss 2000, Harriss-White 2003).

(5) Monopolisation of Representation

So what would it take to make the most of this democratic potential? The major problem when compared to India is that Indonesia's system of representation and elections is not open enough to the possible inclusion of the aspirations of the majority at large and also erects high barriers to participation by independent players. Indonesia's democracy

is thus held back even in a very basic and procedural sense. Civic and popular organisations are prevented from getting into organised politics. Moreover, and to a large extent due to decades of repression and the continuous monopolisation of representation but also because their own mistakes, these groups remain hampered by their own fragmentation and weak mass organisations.

Moreover, supplementary research indicates clearly that these weaknesses in turn are related to problems of representation, even in basic terms of being responsive to the prime daily problems and aspirations of people on the ground in developing policies and strategies. In this respect Indonesia still seriously lags behind. This underdevelopment of democracy is with regard to both the people and the issues and interests that are excluded.

The survey reveals firstly that the powerful actors, those with capacity to affect the course of the dynamics of democracy, in society dominate politics and the political economy. Political institutions (including the executive) and 'good contacts', either economically or politically defined, are their primary sources of power; 'pure' economic bases are less crucial. Alliances are mainly within these powerful sections of the elite in a broad sense of the word (thus also implying of course that there are also other elites, alternative-political, cultural intellectual elites with less access to power). Legitimacy of the powerful elite is mainly sustained through their ability to connect with people and gain authoritative positions.

The major issues on the agenda include hard issues of governance and economic development. Ordinary people are brought into politics primarily through clientelism and populism; and in this context the control and use of the mass media is becoming increasingly important. Comprehensive organization, however, remains insignificant; attempts to build from below are the weakest of all.

Secondly, the ever-resourceful elites prevent ordinary people and *their* small parties (but not the petty parties of the resourceful) from entering politics. Independent local parties are only allowed and functional in Aceh. Participation in elections in other parts of the country (even of local parliaments) calls for 'national presence' requiring branch offices all over the country. Hence, it is almost impossible to build more representative parties from below without having access to huge funds. For those with such funds, however, it is rather easy to set up an eligible party and get represented, thus causing problems of inefficient governance by squabbling elite politicians with special vested interests.

Furthermore, only big parties or extensive coalitions may nominate candidates for elections of governors, mayors and district heads. Aside from the elections of individual representatives from the provinces to an insignificant national assembly (DPD), independent candidates have been prohibited -- and the newly announced 'openings' call again for huge financial resources on the part of the candidates. In addition, candidates for various positions must have comparatively advanced formal schooling, thus excluding leaders from the labouring classes. Those running in village elections usually even have to share the substantial administrative costs of the election. In addition, there are no efficient measures to counter vested interests and private political financing or to promote internal party democracy, and the guidelines to foster equal gender representation have generated little result.


Thirdly, there are no substantive efforts to foster direct democratic representation in public governance through local representatives and popular organisations based on interest and special knowledge such as trade unions and environmental movements -- only privileged contacts and top-down selection of figures and groups. Hardly anywhere in Indonesia can we see substantive representation of crucial interests and ideas of the liberal middle classes, workers, farmers, the urban poor, women, or human rights and environmental activists.

In short so far, Demos' surveys and supplementary research reveal that the fundamental problem of Indonesian democracy is weak popular representation. Many freedoms are at hand, and the rule of law and public governance are at least improving. But democratic political relations between the state and the people remain poor. Typically it is difficult for actors and ideas that reflect fundamental social and economic cleavages to engage in public affairs. In the absence of effective popular control over public affairs, economic and political power rests instead with actors related to the state and private businesses. The leverage of these dominant actors has increased with whittling away of public resources that were vested within the state.

In this context, the post centralist and authoritarian relations between the state and the people (the 'demos') are instead increasingly mediated on the one hand by market institutions and on the other by communal, patronage and network based groups, including 'alternative patronage' via civil associations. Neither of these mediators is subject to democratic control, (Figure 1). Moreover, in spite of the rhetoric of competition, the reduction of the public space in favour of religious and ethnic communities is not incompatible with neo-liberal perspectives. Rather the communal perspectives are in line with the whittling away of

public resources. The reduction of public social security and education, for instance, generates both profitable private hospitals and schools for the rich on the one hand and more communitarian charity and schools for the poor, on the other; ironically at times fostering extreme identity politics.

Figure 1.1. The challenges of democratic popular control of public affairs



(6) The Risk: Return to ‘politics of order’

The defunct representation is not only bad for democracy as such. It also undermines ordinary people’s chances to use it to foster their views and interests – and the possibilities to alter the unequal division of power that prevents socially and environmentally responsible development. In addition, the monopolisation of representation nourishes a general lack of trust in democracy. Most worrying, upper and middle class groups who rarely manage to win elections may well use this discontent with powerful-elite democracy to gain wide support for alternatives to democracy and to promote ‘better preconditions’ through ‘politics of order’. Supporters of ‘middle class coups’ typically say that they aim to prevent disruptive populist rule and to build stronger preconditions for democracy. Their views find an echo in some of the previously mentioned international support for proper ‘sequencing’ of democracy.

Indonesia has been down this path once before, in the 1960s, and it gave rise to Soeharto's New Order regime; and similar dynamics have more recently been at work in the Thai metropolitan middle class who have failed to win broad popular support but rather take to the streets, calling for the rule of the educated citizens and linking up with the King and the army against what are no doubt corrupt and devious politicians but who hold wide electoral support.

In contemporary Indonesia, Vice President Jusuf Kalla's statements on Poso and similar areas of conflict are also cases in point. The message was that democratic elections held too early were behind the conflicts and that profitable business-driven development would be the best way to handle them. Other illustrations include the quest for presidentialism and stronger executives, the 'streamlining' of the party system towards a majoritarian two-party system, and general admiration for Singapore and China's attempts to introduce and promote stability and economic growth ahead of 'excessive' democracy. Meanwhile religious activists argue for the need to reduce the public sphere, but this time in favour of religious values, communities and leaders.

The empirical evidence from Demos' survey and supplementary research speaks quite clearly against the thesis that the roots of Indonesia's current conflicts and problems of corruption as well as economic development are the new civil and political freedoms. On the contrary the results show that it is the defunct instruments of democracy – and especially the poor popular capacities to foster them – that have made it difficult to use the freedoms to alter the relations of power, prevent the abuse of them and thus improve law, policies and governance. There is a shortage of institutionalised channels for interest and issue group participation, beyond clientelism and 'good contacts'. Even popular representation in formal government is held back by elitist control of party and electoral systems. The party and election systems sustain elitism on behalf of the powerful. The separate issue- and interest group representation is weak and undemocratic; and so is direct popular participation.

(7) The Challenge: Overcoming the constraints of popular representation

It is imperative, therefore, that civic and popular organisations be able to scale up their ideas and alliances. By connecting communities and workplaces, at local and central levels, it is possible to challenge elite control over politics. Demos' survey and case studies suggest, however, that scaling up into organised politics is not only hampered by elite monopolisation of politics but also by civic groups and political activists themselves.

The survey and supplementary studies reveal that even if many alternative actors now try to enter into politics, to not just be confined to civil society activities, many challenges still remain ahead. There are few decisive improvements in popular representation when compared to the first survey.

One problem is the poor presence of popular organisations within state, politics and business as well as in related workplaces. Another is that the sources of access to power and the ways of gaining authority and legitimacy remain focused on knowledge and public discourse at the expense of organisation, attempts to gain public mandates and win elections. Moreover, the issues that are put on the agenda typically focus on specific rights and complaints, neglecting broader perspectives of how to promote better governance, development and public welfare. Finally and in spite of advances, civil groups remain poorly connected to social movements and popular organisations (and vice versa); collective action is mainly based on individual networking, popular leaders or alternative patronage as against broad and representative organisations; and attempts to approach elections, parliaments and the executive remain primarily by way of media, NGOs and pressure and lobby groups.

Comparative case studies also show that the problems in these respects are typically addressed instead by either bringing together people on the grass-roots level or by top-down organising or by attempts to facilitate issue-specific direct connections between people and the executive or leading politicians. In many instances, these efforts are quite impressive and stimulating. To mention but one, the local farmers' organisations in Batang in Central Java, have rallied behind broad agendas and won a number of village elections. They now wish to scale up to the regional level, but one problem is sufficiently democratic selection of candidates and of course the lack of funds.

So far, the only *major* opening has been in Aceh, thanks to the unique possibility of building parties from below and of launching independent candidates after the peace treaty. Yet, these parties are short of well organised constituents beyond old activist groups, activist networks and influential leaders.

Moreover, these results also point to a number of problems. Unity from below has proven difficult because of the myriad of specific issues, approaches and contending projects and leaders. Political action aiming at majorities behind common platforms calls for ways of combining different specialisations and interests, such as between farmers and plantation labourers. There must be converged agendas for necessary alliances and equal-citizen-based governance. Loose networking and

polycentric action – the methods favoured by most Indonesia's NGOs and pro-democracy activists – are not enough.


However, attempts to compensate for this by way of socialist or other ideologies, centrally co-ordinated new or established organisations (some with charismatic figures at the helm), or simply the creation of a joint political vehicle or individual candidates offering support in return for popular votes, tend to preserve top-down structures and generate divisions among social movements and popular civil organisations.

The alternative attempts to by-pass 'dirty politics' by facilitating direct linkages between 'people' and the executives (inspired by, for instance, participatory budgeting) are no doubt important supplements but have little to say on how to co-ordinate different sections of 'the people', or how to scale up the operation beyond the local and facilitate fair representation. Elsewhere, in fact, the latter has called for top-down measures through, for instance, the office of a governor or mayor.

(8) The Recommendation: Democratic political blocs

Hence, there are two major lessons: First, basic popular and civic groups must co-ordinate instead on an intermediate political level, between the specific grass-roots issues and the top-level perspectives. This is in order to define joint platforms, gain wide support through alliances, and to control genuine politicians – rather than being the victim of fragmentation and dominated by various parties or political actors. Second, this may also be the level on which it is possible to combine parliamentary and extra parliamentary activities, as well as representative and direct participation.

It is not new that both old and new democracy driven organisations suffer from insufficient links between civic and more popular oriented groups on the one hand and problems of relating to organised politics on the other. This was made quite clear already before 1998 (c.f. Törnquist 2002). It was expanded on in the analysis of the post-Soeharto movement (Prasetyo et.al. 2003), where the blame could no longer be put on excessive authoritarianism. It was confirmed on a general level in the first all-Indonesia survey (Priyono et.al. 2007). However, the more recent results for the second survey and especially supplementary research (c.f. Priyono et.al 2009, Törnquist et.al 2009) have identified quite clearly that the crucial problem of fostering such linkages relates to democratic representation (Figure 2).

Figure 1.2. The challenges of politicising the democracy movement

In other words, the major challenge along each of the axes is to develop improved democratic representation. This is to enable the scaling up of issues, groups, communities and workplaces. Since structural conditions cannot be altered immediately, people need to get together and act collectively. If this is to be attempted democratically, it calls for trustworthy representation in terms of solid chains of popular sovereignty. This includes authorisation, mandates, responsiveness, transparency and accountability. In addition, this requires clear definitions of what demos are supposed to control parts of public affairs – to avoid polycentric confusion between factions of the demos.

To facilitate scaling up through democratic representation, Demos' recommendation is that democratic social movements, popular and civic associations wishing to engage in politics should build co-ordinated Democratic Political Blocs at local and central levels.

Such political blocs call for leadership and commitment to the building of democracy through popular mandates and accountability, both within and between organisations and in relation to elections. Unfortunately, many democracy activists are unlikely to become involved in democratic representation and electoral politics so long as it remains easier for them to lobby and network.

Similarly there is the recent argument that one should recall the tradition of the many scattered militant groups during the anti-colonial liberation struggle and prioritise extra-parliamentary action in the streets. (Cf. Lane 2008) Organising constituencies and winning

majorities in elections implies hard work. Further, party-political activists need to realise that there will never be one party only among pro-democratic elements. Hence, they need to avoid dominating and dividing basic social movements and popular organisations. Politicians and political parties may well participate in building Political Blocs, but preferably as members of the movements and associations, and definitely not in dominant positions. The negative international experiences of the unfortunate party-politicisation of civic and social movements cannot be overstated.

While the task of building Democratic Political Blocs is thus next to impossible there are options. Historically, of course, this was the way Scandinavian popular and civic organisations built broad political movements, parties and rights based economic development. At present, the Labour Party with civic and popular organisations in Brazil has tried similar roadmaps, including by facilitating participatory budgeting.

The Acehnese even proved that some advances are feasible in spite of very poor conditions. The alternative framework for change was that the party system was de-monopolised to allow for local parties and independent candidates, and that the civic and political organisations were willing and sufficiently well-organised to win votes and thus take advantage of the democratic openings. Neither of these factors are present elsewhere in the country.

It is true that Aceh at present suffers from a lack of firmly and democratically organised interest and issue-based movements that can put vital issues on the agenda and keep parties and leaders accountable. There is a risk, therefore, that client-based and populist means of political inclusion (and associated favouritism and corruption) will dominate while referring to special needs during a quite unspecified period of transition, which may rather take Aceh right down the same drain of primitive accumulation of capital (by way of coercive means) as has occurred in many other provinces. This must be countered by creating broad demands from below for political facilitation by the newly elected leaders (and supportive donors) of participatory democratic institutions.

Furthermore, it needs to be stressed that the situation beyond Aceh is less favourable. The possibilities of building political representation from below have been blocked. According to the most recent legislation, participation in elections in other parts of the country (even of local parliaments) requires 'national presence' with branch offices in 60% of the provinces, 50% of the districts and municipalities, and 25% of the sub-districts. Even the heroic attempt by social and political activists in PPR (*Partai Perserikatan Rakyat*) to measure up to the demands has failed. Unfortunately some of the PPR's leaders now think that there

is no other way to enter into politics than to subordinate themselves to bosses and retired generals in new parties with huge resources and in temporary need of activists. Similarly, the demands for the collection of signatures of independent candidates in direct elections are so high that one needs to be a local equivalent of Italy's Berlusconi to stand a chance. In addition, women, still tend to be marginalised and no ordinary workers, farmers or fisher- folks can run even in village elections because of lack of supposedly 'sufficient' formal education and the demands to pay for the basic administrative costs of taking part in the process.

Conclusion

There is a common expression among builders of democracy in Indonesia that the infrastructure is at hand and that most actors have adjusted to the rules of the game but that what remains is to build a democratic culture and foster social and economic gains which may satisfy ordinary people. This is misleading and partly wrong! It is true that most actors – even the powerful – adjust to the actually existing rules and regulations. But giving priority to the outcome and general habits (culture) is to neglect that the democratic infrastructure is far from sufficient and that to some extent it is not even existent. A large portion of the contextual rules and regulations do not really support the 32 universal means towards democracy. The alternative actors in particular are short of sufficient capacity to use and promote the means of democracy. Organised democracy and especially the system of representation is monopolised by the powerful elite.

In short, democracy is held back. It is true that all people are allowed to vote, but women (who are not well connected) and poor and subordinated people, especially migrant labourers, are *de-facto* prevented from standing as candidates and sometimes even from voting, thus from trying to develop popular representation. Basic issues of equal civic rights and political equality thus present a similar challenge but also an opportunity as did the movements for the right to vote in the old democracies.

Hence the immediate need to develop well organised and non-party-dominated Political Blocs – to foster independent popular influence within organised politics in spite of elitist monopolisation; to enable, moreover, ordinary people to use *and* promote democracy; to alter, thus, the current relations of power through more popular representation and participation; to improve, also, the efficiency of democratic governance; and to increase, finally, bargaining power to foster compromises that move towards rights-based sustainable development.

Chapter Two



Approaching Democracy: Some brief introductory notes on concepts and methods

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he making of 'Democracy assessments' has become an industry in its own right, parallel to that of measuring economic development in countries around the world. The high-profile Stockholm-based International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) states that there are six major assessment frameworks (Beetham et.al. 2008).

The first framework focuses on more or less comprehensive human rights in various countries. It is typically carried out by governments such as that of the United States and organisations and institutes like Amnesty and the Freedom House. A second type gives priority to governance, including elections but primarily the rule of law and accountability. These studies are often propelled by governments, aid agencies and their associates such as the Indonesian Partnership for Governance Reforms in order to evaluate support for institution building.

A third framework referred to as the 'democracy indices' has been generated by researchers who relate democratic rights and elections to 'independent factors' such as development and conflict. Fourthly, there are democracy audits which have been carried out by governments, academe and civic organisations in the global North to find out and lay the foundation for public discussion about the strength and weaknesses of various dimensions of democracy.

Fifthly, the economic and social assessments which have been conducted by governments and international organisations to evaluate the outcomes of democracy and to guide support for improving structural conditions. Sixthly, IDEA's own framework. This has been implemented by its associates among governments, international organisations, related NGOs and scholars. The aim is similar to that of the democratic audits in the old democracies but the ambition is to facilitate its application in the global South too. The prime focus has been to assess the quality of the democratic institutions through expert panels as well as various indicators in addition to surveys of public opinions and attitudes. One should also add the assessments made by associations and scholars of the democratic quality of civil society, social movements and so-called social capital in terms of inter personal trust to facilitate collective action.

Interestingly, our own alternative framework for participatory research-based democracy promotion has not been acknowledged. This framework is based on experienced expert-practitioners conducting surveys on the ground. It focuses on understanding political identity, assesses the standards of democratic institutions and democracy actors' will and capacity to use and promote that infrastructure. This framework has been developed in co-operation between reflective activists and scholars in the pilot case of Indonesia since 2002 and has proven itself to be a feasible framework for analysis.

Basically pro-democracy activists were not satisfied working with frameworks that reflected the preconceived values, political interests and development priorities of donor organisations and their close associates. There is of course nothing wrong with donors' needs to evaluate their support for democracy (which many democrats were in fact dependent on). Similarly, the political patrons who support democracy must be able to identify and foster like-minded partners; that is the basics of international relations. And related scholars should test and foster their theories and recommendations.

But what the Indonesian democrats asked for was an instrument to evaluate *their* problems and options and related arguments. In fact, they were confused and divided and wanted to judge to what extent

different theories and recommendations made more or less sense, not just one or the other favoured argument by this or that donor or scholar or activist.

In addition they were in pressing need of more reliable data and information. Academically critical research after decades of authoritarianism remained weak, the various case studies that existed were scattered.

The pro-democracy activists were quite rightly disturbed by the preoccupation in most of the existing assessments with static descriptions of the qualities of rules and regulations without paying much attention to the dynamic relations of power among various actors.

In addition the pro-democracy activists asked concerned scholars to consider the insights of the activists on the ground and to communicate experiences of struggle for democracy from other parts of the world. In fact, while the Indonesian activists had fought for democracy for many years, the powerful elite and experts that suddenly dominated the conduct of assessments of democracy had previously been quite indifferent or even on the other side of the frontline.

Similarly, the international experts had mainly introduced elitist donor perspectives on the crafting of democratic institutions and consensus among the powerful actors. Meanwhile the experiences and insights of the pro-democrats in Indonesia and elsewhere had largely been ignored and they themselves had not found time to write up their stories and findings. Finally several democrats did not want to just write reports and talk in seminars but wanted to go from findings to recommendations and concerted efforts to foster implementation of them.

In order to develop an alternative framework we therefore added these explicit needs to the core elements of the theoretically most convincing and flexible parts of the mainstream frameworks, primarily to be found among the democratic audits and International IDEA's conceptual apparatus. Meanwhile however, we had to keep in mind that such an alternative framework must be able to be implemented quite swiftly (since the democratic options were fading away) and without access to huge funds (since that would have called for compromises).

Basic Definitions and Variables

One crucial point of departure was similar to that of the mainstream audits and IDEA's framework: the separation of the aims and the means of democracy. This made it possible to focus on the extent to which the means really promoted the aims. Moreover, as David Beetham had argued convincingly, the disagreements on democracy

were primarily about the means of democracy while there seemed to be general agreement on *the aim in terms of popular control of public affairs on the basis of political equality* (Beetham 1999).

That said, one had to ask which ‘people’ (demos) would control public affairs? Who would be the citizens? Would the demos be based on, for instance, religious or ethnic or political identity? While not being able to go into the details of how such identities had been formed, one must be able to discuss if and how they could be combined, especially in a multi-cultural society like Indonesia.

Secondly we asked the question, what constitutes the ‘public affairs’ that people should control and what is rather deemed to be private matters to be handled within the family, various networks, on the market or by religious or ethnic communities? Again, in-depth analyses of the construction of public affairs would be impossible, but one had to analyse the substance of democracy in terms of what matters were included and what were set aside.

Thirdly, what is meant by ‘control’ and ‘political equality’ and how can they be achieved? Following Beetham et.al. (2002), the following principles are intrinsic: the right and ability to *participate* and *authorise* representatives and their executives; representatives (and their executives) who in turn shall *represent* the main currents of popular opinion and the social composition of the people, be *responsive* to people’s opinions and interests and *accountable* to people for what they do – which calls for *transparency* and *solidarity*. In addition, while it is obvious that the principles presuppose Human Rights (including civil, political social, economic and cultural rights), the shaping and practicing of these Rights in turn are also vested with the implementation of the democratic principles.

What would be the necessary means, then, to enable and promote democratic constitution of the demos and the public affairs as well as the above-mentioned principles to foster popular control and political equality? IDEA’s framework and most audits focus on democratic institutions and related values among people at large. While this was in accordance with standard political science of democracy and democracy building, and the views of most donors, it was insufficient for the Indonesian democrats.

Firstly, they wanted to be able to evaluate a wider set of theories and arguments about the necessary means in order to discuss in a more fruitful way what seemed to be most valid in Indonesia. Further, they needed to go beyond assessments of fixed rules and regulations towards a more dynamic perspective. Hence they wanted to consider the

possibilities of change by also including informal institutions and power relations among various actors in politics, the political economy, civic associations and social movements. Finally, it was clearly not fruitful to only come up with some kind of 'national' assessment in a country where despotic central rule was being dismantled and politics was becoming increasingly localised. Similarly, the definition of the demos as well as of public affairs called for additional indicators. Hence the conclusion that one had to go beyond previous perspectives by considering three basic means of democracy.

The Basic Means of Democracy: Institutions, will and capacity

The *first* major type of democratic means were of course the conventional focus on the standard of a number of democratic institutions related to (a) constitutionalism (citizenship, law and rights), (b) popular sovereignty (elections, political representation and the responsiveness and accountability of public governance) and (c) civic participation (through associations, media, academic life and direct participation).

However, in contrast to other assessment frameworks one should not only ask for formal but also informal institutions. Further one must supplement the assessment of the performance by adding specific questions about the geographical spread and the thematic substance of the institutions (i.e. how many matters were within the democratic framework and how much was being privatised). While adding these crucial concerns, Demos' framework began by drawing on IDEA's rather widely acknowledged though extensive list of institutions. This has been a starting point for relevant revisions and simplifications. For the details, see Box 1.

These means are universally valid. This is because they are theoretically derived by asking what means are necessary to promote the equally generally valid aim of democracy. The specific rules and regulations, however, vary of course with contextual factors. Hence, the major point is to assess the extent to which such contextual formal and informal rules and regulations promote the institutional foundations of democracy. In doing so, the fundamental dimension of civic and political identity is separated from the others as the latter have been possible to include in an index on the quality of democratic institutions. Out of 100 index points, the relative importance of formal as compared to informal institutions is estimated to be 70 versus 30. Further, the relative importance of performance as compared to spread and substance is estimated to be 50, 25 and 25 respectively (Within the 50 points for formal institutions, the importance of positive scores is of course reduced if informants deem

some of the institutions to hardly even exist.). All attempts to weight however the various intrinsic institutions (which usually rest anyway with some kind of expert estimate) are however set aside in favour of transparent discussion of various theories.

Box 1: Basic institutions of democracy.

To what extent are they effective, well spread and inclusive (inclusive of vital matters in society)?

Institutions outside the index

The People (demos): the constitution of the demos through political/civic, ethnic and/or religious identity and engagement regarding public issues.

Institutions considered inside the index

- 1 Citizenship (Equal state-citizenship; The rights of minorities, migrants and refugees, Reconciliation of horizontal conflicts)
- 2 Government support of international law and UN human rights
- 3 Subordination of the government and public officials to the rule of law
- 4 Equality before the law (Equal and secure access to justice; The integrity and independence of the judiciary)
- 5 Freedom from physical violence and the fear of it
- 6 Freedom of speech, assembly and organisation
- 7 Freedom to carry out trade union activity
- 8 Freedom of religion, belief; language and culture
- 9 Gender equality and emancipation
- 10 The rights of children
- 11 The right to employment, social security and other basic needs
- 12 The right to basic education, including citizen's rights and duties
- 13 Good corporate governance
- 14 Free and fair general elections (Free and fair general elections at central, regional and local level; Free and fair separate elections of e.g. governors, mayors and village heads)
- 15 Freedom to form parties on the national or local level (or teams of independent candidates) that can recruit members, and participate in elections
- 16 Reflection of vital issues and interests among people by political parties and or candidates
- 17 Abstention from abusing religious or ethnic sentiments, symbols and doctrines by political parties and or candidates.
- 18 Independence from money politics and powerful vested interests by political parties and or candidates
- 19 Membership-based control of parties, and responsiveness and accountability of parties and or political candidates to their constituencies

- 20 Parties and or candidates ability to form and run government
- 21 Democratic decentralisation of government in all matters that do not need to be handled on central levels.
- 22 The transparency and accountability of elected government, the executive,(bureaucracies), at all levels
- 23 The transparency and accountability of the military and police to elected government and the public
- 24 The capacity of the government to combat paramilitary groups, hoodlums and organised crime
- 25 Government independence from foreign intervention (excluding UN conventions and applicable international law)
- 26 Government's independence from vested interest groups and capacity to eliminate corruption and abuse of power
- 27 Freedom of the press, art and academia
- 28 Public access to and the reflection of different views within media, art and academia
- 29 Citizens' participation in extensive independent civil associations
- 30 Transparency, accountability and democracy within civil organisations
- 31 All social groups' – including marginalised groups – extensive access to and participation in public life
- 32 Direct participation (People's direct access and contact with the public services and government's consultation of people and where possible facilitation of direct participation in policy making and the execution of public decisions)

The second is a dynamic perspective of the main actors when asked if and how they relate to the more or less democratic institutions. Two crucial steps are involved. The first is the specification of the main actors. All actors cannot be included in a viable assessment. Given the localisation of politics this should primarily be on the provincial level. Further, one needs to include powerful actors as well as crucial alternative ones.

In the alternative assessment framework, local informants are asked to identify the three most powerful and the three most important alternative actors in their context. A number of problems are of course associated with the identification of these actors but the stumbling blocks rest mainly with the identification of and the quality of the informants, which we shall return to.

The second step is to enquire then into if and how the actors relate to the democratic institutions. Do the institutions make sense to them? To what extent is democracy 'the only game in town'? More

precisely – with regard to each type of institution: do the actors promote and use the institutions? Do they only use them? Or do they use and abuse or even avoid them? Low figures in responding such questions mean that democracy is not meaningful because the standard of the institutions is too low and/or the capacity of the actors to use and promote them (which we shall return to shortly) is insufficient. Additional negative conditions are set aside. This is not because such conditions are unimportant but because of a crucial assumption about the minimum requirements of democracy.

The alternative framework refutes arguments that democracy calls for extensive social and economic rights, equality, modernisation, pro-democratic culture etc. The framework ‘only’ calls for sufficiently meaningful institutions as listed above and for sufficient capacity of the actors to use and promote the institutions (which we shall soon discuss in more detail). Given that these conditions are present, the actors can use emerging democracy to promote more social and economic rights, among other things. Of course, firm judicial institutions, economic modernisation and social and economic equality are likely to contribute to high scores on the indices of democracy. But if more rights, equality, modernisation, favourable culture etc were included as necessary conditions for democracy, they would have to be created by non-democratic means. This is not necessary. It has been proven possible to create them by way of gradually improved democracy. There are degrees of democracy; and democracy is a process.

Hence the argument that there is a need to ‘sequence democracy’ by somehow introducing favourable institutions ahead of popular sovereignty (e.g. Mansfield and Snyder 2005) as well as Samuel Huntington’s (1965) old thesis that strong institutions must be at hand to prevent modernisation from generating popular upheavals are refuted. As many Indonesians know, the latter argument was used to legitimise the elimination of popular movements in 1965/66 as well as the rise and existence of the New Order regime.

The same applies to a number of other related theses. One is that a certain level of economic development is a must; another is the old extreme left thesis that equality and radically different power relations must be created by more or less revolutionary means ahead of ‘people’s democracy’. It is true that the fate of the global third wave of democracy brought about through top-down institution building and elitist compromises is rather depressing. But given that the non-democratic introduction of favourable structural conditions is not necessary, the crucial matter is instead what kind of specific and concrete *politics of democratisation* that various actors and their international supporters opt for.

If this is accepted, the growing critique of the liberal democratic emphasis on crafting the institutional procedures of democracy on the basis of agreements between already dominant actors does *not* imply that all designing of democratic institutions is in vain. The implication is 'only' that priority should be given to institutions that open up the opportunity for enhanced capacity among ordinary people to foster additional institutions for more political equality and popular control. If the predominant trend so far has been in favour of liberal democracy, this seems to point thus in a social democratic direction.

The *third* means of democracy is where the actors are not just willing but also capable of promoting the institutional infrastructure. Consequently the alternative assessment framework considers a number of key factors related to power, resources and movements. However, this is only done to the extent that such factors are crucial for the people's capacity to act as democratic citizens in civil as well as political society. Hence we have combined three analytical approaches: one that focuses on institutions, a second that pays attention to the actors and a third that addresses power in collective action.

It is more complicated to measure up the actors' political capacity than it is that of democratic institutions. Previous studies and theories about political power, movements and other actors point to five clusters of parameters. These have been discussed elsewhere in more detail (Törnquist 2002, Harriss et.al. 2004, Törnquist 2008, Törnquist et.al. 2009). The first variables are to indicate if the actors are present rather than marginalised on central and local levels and in parts of the political landscape such as the business sector, interest- and issue groups, self management (including co-operatives), parties, parliaments, and executive public institutions. These indicators relate to theories about exclusion and inclusion, differences between new and old movements, sectoral fragmentation, centre versus periphery, and the opportunity structure in terms of the relative openness and closeness of politics in general. Alternatively one may analyse similar factors by drawing on Pierre Bourdieu's (Wacquant 2005, Stokke 2002, Stokke and Selboe 2009) concept of fields of interrelated actors and relations of power.

A second cluster of variables relate more exclusively to Bourdieu's focus on how the actors within the aforementioned 'fields' are able to transform their different sources of power in terms of economic, social and cultural capital¹ into legitimacy and authority – to thus gain symbolic power and political influence (ibid).

The third type of indicators are used to analyse whether and how actors are able to politicise those of their concerns and aspirations that are not personal, i.e. to put their issues, interests and ideologies

on the political agenda. This relates to theories inspired by for instance Jürgen Habermas about the public sphere, Antonio Gramsci about hegemony, Pierre Bourdieu about “habitus” (internalised norms, understandings and patterns) and the general importance of culture. But the same indicators connect also to analyses of increasingly fragmented priorities and agendas, especially among actors in civil society and related difficulties to generate common platforms (e.g. Törnquist 2002, 2008a, Törnquist et.al 2009)

The fourth cluster of parameters are used to capture whether and how the actors are able to organise and mobilise support. This is directly linked to theories of power, politics and movements such as those advocated by Nicos Mouzelis (1986) and Sydney Tarrow (1994), distinguishing between incorporation into politics by way of elitist populism, clientelism and alternative patronage – and related political financing – and those more integrated by way of networks and or comprehensive organisation from below. In addition, it relates to arguments such as made by Mahmood Mamdani (1996), Partha Chatterjee (2004), Houtzager et.al (2007), and Harriss (2006), arguing different inclusion of citizens, subjects, and denizens without recognised capacity to use most rights except the ones to rally behind and vote for or against leading politicians.

Fifth the roadmaps to analyse whether and how the actors are able to approach various governance institutions. The major source of inspiration is the growing consensus that the key problem of democracy in the global South in particular is the dominance of powerful elites and the poor standard of popular representation in spite of exciting attempts to initiate new routes. This was a prime result from Demos’ first all-Indonesia survey. Hence there is a special need for closer studies within this field.

The Fundamental Problem of Representation

Such analyses in turn call for creative analytical tools. Representation is a complex and contented concept. The alternative framework draws on a recent attempt to develop an inclusive perspective on the basis of theory and empirical studies of efforts to counter the demise of popular politics (Törnquist, Stokke and Webster 2009).

As outlined by Pitkin (1967), representation presupposes a representative, the represented, something that is being represented and a political context. The dynamics are primarily about authorisation and accountability, which presuppose transparency and responsiveness. That is represented may be substantive, descriptive and/or symbolic.

Substantive representation is when the representative 'acts for' the represented, for instance a leader advancing the interests of workers. Descriptive representation is when an actor 'stands for' the represented by being 'objectively' similar. For instance, a woman represents women and a resident in a village represents the other villagers. Symbolic representation, finally, is when an actor is perceived by the represented to once again "stand for" them, but now, for instance, in terms of shared culture and identities. However, symbolic representation may also be understood, with authors such as Bourdieu (Wacquant 2005, Stokke 2002) and Anderson (1983), in the wider sense of constructing the demos, the groups and the interests that are being represented and claiming to be a legitimate authority as a representative.

There are two major approaches to representation. The first may be called the chain-of-popular-sovereignty approach. It is typically adhered to by students of political institutions, focusing on formally regulated politics, government and public administration. The second is what will be labelled the direct-democracy approach. This is more common among political sociologists, anthropologists and students of rights and law. They emphasise the importance of informal arrangements and the need for alternative participation through popular movements and lobby groups as well as civic action in for instance neighbourhood groups and associations for self-management.

There are two related tendencies towards deteriorated representation within the chain of popular sovereignty approach. One is where public matters and resources have been reduced and fragmented under neo-liberalism and globalisation beyond democratic representation. The other tendency is where almost all of the links in the chain itself are tarnished. This is especially with regard to the intermediary representative institutions ranging from civic organisations to political parties.

Mass based interest organisations have been radically weakened, most severely those based on class. While public resources and capacities are shrinking, politicians and political parties lose firm and independent popular roots. The privatisation, informalisation, depoliticisation and weakening of the intermediary political institutions generate further distrust in the authority of representatives and their mandates. Representative politics is often looked upon as a particularly dirty business characterised by money and personality oriented politics, non-programmatic organisational machines and crooked politicians.

This in turn has generated alternative routes. But the various supplementary forms of democracy –through judicial action, mediation by civil society organisations, direct participation, pressure groups,

and informal contacts – are largely detached from the chain of popular sovereignty. The civic organisations and activists themselves are rarely subject to basic principles of democratic representation, authorisation and accountability. Moreover, communal ethnic and religious organisations as well as families and clans cater to an increasing number of popular worries and needs, typically amongst the weaker sections of the population with insufficient capacities to make use of civic rights. When not claiming equal civic, political and socio-economic rights for all but specific communal privileges, these organisations and solidarities tend to fragment the demos and to undermine democracy.

While the advantage of the chains-of-popular-sovereignty approach is precision and conceptual consistency in relation to democratic theory, one drawback is that practices outside the formally recognised chain tend to be set aside such as attempts at participatory governance and struggles over public affairs that have been privatised or informalised.

Unfortunately however the direct-democracy approach does not provide a good alternative but rather focuses on the neglected other side of the coin. Interestingly, this is done from two directions, one which is more market oriented, supported, for example, by the World Bank (1997) and in favour of user- and consumer participation (rather than citizenship and popular sovereignty); another which is advocated by critics of globalisation like Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000) who argue that the state and power has been so dispersed and localised that there is no decisive unit left to fight and that increasingly many producers are regulating social relations themselves, so that strong parties and representative democracy are unnecessary and even irrelevant.

Both positions thus support the position of Robert Putnam (1993) and others that the 'real' demos develops organically from below among self managing and co-operating citizens (thereby developing 'social capital'), not in relation to ideologies, institutions and political engagement. Hence, representation becomes redundant since the people act directly through the same contacts and associations that have constituted the people in the first place. In the process almost whatever the 'civic' organisation it becomes 'part of the people itself'. Hence there is no need to analyse, for instance, differences between organisations that relate to 'rights-bearing citizens' and people who lack sufficient capacity to promote their own rights. Further, one does not need to discuss the importance of intermediary variables such as politics and ideology. The fact that Scandinavian democracy and welfare states as well as contemporary participatory budgeting, for instance, have all been


politically facilitated and then sustained is conveniently forgotten.

However, many civil society activists are now more anxious than before to legitimate their work in terms of whom they try to represent (Houtzager et.al 2007). Moreover, the new institutions for direct participation such as participatory planning are (just like previous Scandinavian experiences of combining liberal political democracy and interest based representation and cooperation between government and associations) attempts to initiate a new layer of representation between electoral chains of popular sovereignty on the one hand and associational life and populism on the other. (C.f. Avritzer 2002, Baiocchi 2005, Esping-Andersen 1985, Berman 2006) Yet, a number of questions remain to be answered such as how to guarantee authorisation and accountability, and even more difficult, how to identify and agree on what parts of the demos should control what sections of public affairs on the basis of political equality.

Against this backdrop, the final dimension of actor's political capacity that is considered in the alternative assessment framework draws on a recent attempt to develop a conceptual model to combine the two approaches, one focusing on the chains-of popular-sovereignty and the other on direct-democracy. *The key is to apply the primacy of popular sovereignty also within collective efforts to widen democracy beyond the formal public institutions.* This may be done by situating political practices in formal public as well as other institutions within a comprehensive conceptual frame where it is possible to map and analyse how actors relate to each other and to the institutions in view of the basic principles of democratic representation.

If this is accepted there are three basic pillars: (1) the people (demos), (2) the public matters, and (3) the different intermediary ways of exercising popular control of the input as well as output sides of democracy; i.e. policymaking and implementation. Democratic policy making (input) and implementation (output) need to be representative by firstly being based on the principles of political equality and impartiality and second, subject to authorisation by mandate and to accountability through transparency and responsiveness. The actual content of what is thus being decided and implemented is due to the will of the demos but must not be opposed to the principles of democracy and the absolutely necessary means to develop and apply them. Figure 1 presents a preliminary integrated framework for the study of democratic representation.

Figure 1. A model for the study of democracy oriented representation



A number of crucial problems may be addressed within this model (Törnquist 2009). First, to what governance-institutions do the most important actors turn to in the first instance? Second, how do the most important actors reach and affect the institutions of governance? Directly and/or by way of some mediating institutions?

There are two particularly significant clusters of problems that may be analysed in view of these questions.

The first cluster relates to the general tendencies of less public and more polycentric governance. A particularly crucial issue is the prospect for democratic regulation of more or less privatised institutions of governance rather than reclaiming these institutions, which may not be feasible. Along the top row in Figure 1, privatised collective transportation, schools, or health services, for instance, would thus be subject to democratically decided rules and regulations.²

Another basic question is whether or not democratic governance would be conducive in fighting corruption and promoting environmentally and socially responsible economic growth. There is

an urgent need to analyse democratic alternatives to the resurgence of the thesis about the need to promote firm institutions, rule of law and economic development ahead of popular sovereignty by supposedly enlightened authoritarian rule. The same holds true for democratic alternatives to accommodate the separatists like those in Aceh, rather than by divisive clientelism and 'special favours'. (Törnquist et.al 2009a)

In the figure on representation, attempts to apply participatory governance to improve responsiveness and accountability (such as attempted at for instance in Brazil; e.g. Baiocchi 2005) would be through more substantial arrangements for participation and representation that are attached to the various institutions for governance (especially the executive ones) and sections of the demos. Further, the renewed interest in learning from old Scandinavian social pacts (c.f. Beckman et.al. 2000, Beckman 2004) may be indicated in terms of triangular relations and agreements (about the exchange between state guaranteed economic growth and collective wage agreements, and universal unemployment- and social welfare schemes) between productive sections of capital within the context of private governance, relevant sections of the institutions for public government, and well organised trade unions and related movements.

The second cluster of problems addresses the mediation between the demos and public affairs. The mediation relates both to the input and output side of democracy; to the politically equal creation of policies and to their impartial implementation (the latter of which seems to be positively related to the more universal as opposed to means-tested measures that are applied; c.f. Rothstein and Torell 2005). Arrangements for participation and representation that are related to the different institutions for governance of public matters are in the upper part of the model. This includes not only the elected legislative assemblies and their executives on the central and local levels. There are also, for instance, various possible institutions for consultation and participation in relation to a number of administrative boards and commissions, workers' participation in company management, the meetings of a neighbourhood organisation, or academic self-rule.

In the majority of cases the introduction of these institutionalised forms of representation may well have been enforced from below through pilot cases and demands on politicians. However, their implementation tends to be a product of top-down measures and decentralisation. In Scandinavia and Kerala, for instance, it was on the basis of strong state apparatuses or state-building projects and the legacies of free farmer communities and land reforms respectively. For good and for bad,

moreover, these roots and measures in turn have then formed much of the system of representation, including parties, movements and even the constitution of the demos.

Far down in the model, representation is also framed by the different formations and expressions of the demos and their means of representation. The means include the actors and their mandate, responsiveness and accountability – as well as their capacity to voice interests and ideas and act accordingly, ideally on the basis of political equality. On the left side of the model are the forms of self-representation and participation. Strictly speaking, this is the only form of direct democracy, i.e. where no representative is involved. On the right side is the representation via mediators. A basic distinction may be made between mediation via (a) civil society defined as associational life among rights bearing citizens, primarily within civic oriented NGOs, local communities, popular organisations, media, academia, and cultural life; (b) informal leaders and non-civic-associations such as patrons, fixers, communal associations, clan leaders and “popular figures”; and (c) political society including political parties, politically related interest organisations and pressure and lobby groups.

One related question is the fate of democracies dominated by clientelism through informal leaders and privileged political financing. Another dilemma (that has been addressed in thematic studies related to Demos’ research; Priyono et. al. 2009, Törnquist et.al 2009) is the weak and generally problematic linkages between on the one hand civic associations (that are often rather small and confined to middle class residents or activists), and more mass based and popular oriented movements. The same applies to the crucial problems of scaling up such linkages and co-operations on various levels and to make an impact within the organised politics which tend to be dominated by powerful elites.

Box 2: The five major variables used to assess actors' capacity to promote and use the instruments of democracy

People need to be:

1. Present rather than excluded from different parts of the political landscape (e.g. in business, interest groups, parties, the bureaucracy, the parliament etc.);
2. Able to transform their sources of power into authority and legitimacy;
3. Able to turn non-private concerns into public political matters (e.g. the politicisation of a certain problem through focussing on the specific issue, or by combining several issues and/or by relating them to general concepts or ideas);
4. Able to mobilise and organise support (e.g. by way of popular leaders, clientelism, alternative patronage, networks and/or comprehensive organising from below; by connecting people through identities, personal networks and/or interests and ideas; and by building and financing various alliances);
5. Able to approach various governance institutions (e.g. directly to the executive or by means of representation through informal leaders or parties or NGOs)

Sources and Measurement

It is one thing to design the best possible alternative framework for assessing democracy; it is quite another to make it possible to measure the various indicators and to collect the best possible sources. Democratic audits draw primarily on available results from previous research and available data banks. It is also common to commission a number of studies to cover unexplored problems and to conduct base line surveys of citizens' attitudes and ways of relating to democracy. Typically one then allows for the assessment of all this information by a limited number of experts. The related but innovative South Asian survey comes closer to the original audits in the global North by being able to draw on already available research, a number of commissioned case studies and by giving even more importance to a grand survey of people's attitudes, opinions and relationship with democratic institutions (CSDS 2008).

While there are many similarities, the alternative assessment framework differs from these patterns in some vital respects. First, in Indonesia as well as in many other countries in the global South there is much less qualified and critical research on problems of democracy than in the north or in old 'southern democracies' such as India. Further, there is a particular lack of written sources on the institutions and practices of various actors on the local level, particularly of course with regard to

vulnerable people but also in relation to powerful groups. The kind of internet resources that one is often referred to (including by IDEA) do not really offer a way out of this dilemma but rather reflect the tendency among researchers and various organisations to collect data among metropolitan experts with occasional contacts on the ground. This is not to say that one should not collect and draw on whatever results are available as well as conduct new research; we shall return to that. But the most crucial problem is to find the best possible substitute for the lack of previous studies and data banks.

In principle there are three major alternatives. The most common is to draw on the assessment of the elite among scholars, experts and political and economic leaders. The problem as already hinted at is that this tends to exclude information and experiences on the ground around the country, especially among ordinary people and committed pro-democrats that remain in the margins of economic and political life.

The second alternative is to conduct extensive surveys among people in general as was done in the South Asian survey. However it is quite difficult to ask revealing enough questions and to really obtain frank answers, especially in a country where many people still find it troublesome to disclose their opinions on sensitive issues. Moreover, while knowledge of people's relation to democratic institutions and values is always important, it is no substitute for the lack of research on a number of crucial problems. To 'ask the people' is fine but there are no real populist shortcuts to qualified assessments and analyses of complicated problems. This calls for scholarly knowledge of various concepts, arguments, comparative perspectives etc. Hence our alternative assessment framework gave priority instead to finding the best possible grounded experts in the form of experienced and leading democracy activists within all major frontlines of democracy work in all the provinces; activists who had a reputation for being able to reflect critically.

In addition, the expert survey also enabled us to ask many rather straight forward yet complicated questions. Finally and equally importantly: the expert survey among pro-democrats around the country paved the way for participatory research with committed associates. Very few informants dropped out. Many rather helped us to obtain the best information and tried to make the best possible of complicated questionnaires. The participants also learnt about democracy as they went through the extensive questionnaire with our field assistants and most people involved were interested in learning from the results, give feedback, helping us to develop recommendations and then in attempting to implement them.

Once again, this does not mean that one should not mobilise additional information from previous research, conduct additional case studies and engage various 'elite' experts, students and scholars in the work. We shall return to this. But firstly to address a number of drawbacks with the participatory expert surveys is from below.

One rather frequently voiced opinion is that Demos' local expert-informants are not representative, impartial and critically reflective enough. This critique comes in two versions. The first is that the informants are not good enough experts. However, everybody who has read at least a summary report on the results from the first all Indonesia survey and the resurvey knows that this has been proven incorrect. The statements made by the informants on the actual situation are much more detailed, locally rooted and notably more balanced than those expressed by many leading experts in media-centred articles and seminars.

The second critique is rather that the informants are not representative. This calls for a closer discussion. One version of this position is that Demos has not made a statistically valid selection of respondents among pro-democrats, keeping in mind a number of basic criteria such as age, sex, thematic focus and geographic location. The answer to this critique is simple. Given that it would have been possible in the first place to identify the total population of pro-democrats from which a statistical selection could be made, Demos would not have been knowledgeable enough of local contexts to formulate sufficiently valid and simple enough questions to get reliable answers. Rather, there was a need for respondents with ability to understand rather complicated and often abstract questions. Moreover, Demos has argued that the survey was a substitute for the lack of data banks, written documentation and previous analyses – it was not intended to collect opinions. Hence, Demos opted instead for an expert survey. This meant that the challenge was to find the best possible experts and information given the questions, rather than the best statistical sample to measure opinions or experiences.

The second version of the critique for poor selection of the informants accepts the principle of an expert survey but discusses whether the best experts have been selected. This is among the most important critiques and some valid points have been made in the discussion. To appreciate the importance of the critique, one must first review how Demos has actually gone about identifying the best possible experts in all the provinces and within all major fields of democratisation. The question is whether the following criteria (which have been applied) have been sufficient and feasible: at least five years of consistent work with the democracy movement, wide knowledge and experience within

the identified fields of democracy work, and renowned capacity to reflect critically.

The starting point was to identify generally respected key-informants in every province. These key-informants would be part of the team and thus also publicly accountable for their work. With the exception in the first all Indonesia survey of one province out of more than thirty, this part of the selection process has worked according to plan and there has been no serious critique.

Secondly, there has not been any noteworthy critique of the identification of the major fields of democracy work. This was carried out according to plan on the basis of the previous survey and case-studies of and with the post-Soeharto democracy movement. (Prasetyo et.al 2003) A few potentially important fields were added. They were selected on the basis of the comparative work and included attempts to promote professionalism in public and private administration and build democratic political parties. Regular reviews of the general efforts at democracy around the country have not called for any substantive revision of these fields over time, only corrections for overlaps and simplification. The fields of democratisation from which informants were selected for the current resurvey are in Box 3.

Box 3: The fourteen frontlines of democratisation from which informants have been selected

1. *The efforts of farmers and agricultural labourers to gain control of their land and fisher folks to defend their fishing waters.*
2. *The struggle of workers for better working conditions and standard of living.*
3. *The struggle for the social, economic and other rights of the urban poor.*
4. *The promotion of human rights.*
5. *The struggle against corruption in favour of 'good governance'.*
6. *The efforts at democratisation through the political party system and the building of popular based parties.*
7. *The promotion of pluralism as a basic dimension of democracy and conflict reconciliation.*
8. *The efforts to improve and democratise education.*
9. *The promotion of professionalism as part of 'good governance' in the public and private sectors.*
10. *The freedom, independence and quality of the media.*
11. *The struggle for gender equality.*
12. *The improvement of supplementary non-party representation at the local level.*
13. *The attempts to promote interest based mass movements.*
14. *The struggle for sustainable development.*

There are four remaining and unfortunately valid points of critique. It is quite surprising that such an extremely high percentage of informants (something like 90%) have anyway done their utmost to answer almost all the hundreds of questions. At times it has taken several meetings of three to four hours of interviewing, especially when the extremely busy leading activists have been interrupted by various urgent matters.

The minimum time that has been allotted to the questionnaires has been between five and six hours. This if anything is possibly the best indicator one can get for (a) the democratic commitment of the informants, (b) the extent to which they have found the research based efforts of Demos to be relevant and crucial and (c) the extent to which they have trusted the team.

As already indicated, it is difficult for regular interviewers (such as from the Asia barometer) to get people to answer comparatively non-sensitive questions on political matters. In preparing briefer versions of the survey for local and more participatory use and in face of the resurvey that is reported on in this book, the team has done its very utmost to clarify and simplify the questionnaire, without undermining its scientific standards. Tests indicate that we have brought down the time it takes to complete the interviews substantially. Quite frequently, however, it was still necessary to use two sessions of some two hours, given the unavoidable interruptions.

The second of the remaining points of valid critique is that Demos has not given priority to the full servicing and enrolment of the key informants, the temporary assistants and the survey informants in order to initiate a popular education movement. Similarly it is clear that more emphasis could have been given to education and training of the temporary assistants. A related matter is that much of the results and data have so far only been made good use of by a limited number of students and scholars within the academe. There may be different approaches to these problems, and this author in particular may be too optimistic in arguing that one may learn from popular educational efforts in other parts of the global South such as Kerala in India. But there is agreement on the need to address the issues and one may hope that the current book in cooperation with the academe can be one opening.

The third and probably most serious critique is that the expert informants must not be confused with the people (which we have already discussed). In addition, one must discuss whether they have the best knowledge of the conditions of democracy on the ground. Many of the 'pro-democrat experts' are involved in NGOs and actions groups. They

might well try their best to serve vulnerable people and represent some of their ambitions, but there are many examples of experts giving emphasis to theoretically derived agendas without really having firm knowledge of the immediate challenges in the workplaces and communities. Therefore, their judgements may be influenced rather easily by dramatic and political developments that are reported on extensively in media. These and similar problems will be addressed in the second part of this chapter.

Supplementary Research and Data

One major conclusion in this respect is the need for supplementary in-depth case studies. Moreover, such studies may in many cases be even more difficult to carry out than well-structured surveys. Hence there is a need for education and training of students and researchers too. What can be done?

As was spelt out earlier, the choice to emphasise participatory expert surveys from below did not mean that it was unimportant to also collect and add related results from previous research, emerging data banks (including valid and reliable opinion polls) and supplementary case studies. Yet it has to be admitted that it has not been possible so far to prioritise this task.

It is true that attempts were made by Demos to carry out a number of thematic studies on problems that were identified in the first all-Indonesia survey and which called for in-depth approaches. One such task was to analyse experiences of pro-democrats in local direct elections of political executives. But even if the case studies have been concluded the analysis and writing up has been delayed due to more time consuming than expected work on the reports from the basic survey.

There have been similar problems with a number of case studies of experiences among civil society organisations to engage in politics. But in this case several of the conclusions have been more explicit and possible to incorporate in this volume. The same applies to the authors' even more delayed reports on strategies among pro-democrats to develop popular representation in order to combine civil and popular organisation and make a difference in formal institutional politics.³

This joint book between the Demos team and concerned democracy scholars at UGM is a crucial step towards addressing these drawbacks. One ambition is that the academic scholars will be able to expand the analysis of the data from the expert survey and add supplementary results from other research.

Another aim is to expand the co-operation into several additional fields. This is to gain improved joint analyses and scholarly guidance of the activist researchers as well as more relevant studies and data that can contribute to even better assessments of Indonesian democracy. Firstly, Demos' new case study programme will gain from academic guidance and be open for contributions from concerned colleagues and students. The focus is on experiences from efforts to (a) use democracy to promote social and economic rights, (b) combine customary rights and democracy and (c) foster political facilitation of democratic direct participation in for instance local budgeting and governance agendas.

Second, the academic partners (at Universitas Gadjah Mada, UGM, with contributions from the University of Oslo, UiO) are already providing education for participatory researchers in an intensive course on basic theory and analytical tools as well as a post-graduate education programme. This post-graduate programme includes research to produce a number of masters and Ph.D theses. The ambition is that the thematic focus of these theses and the results will add to the knowledge about crucial aspects of Indonesian democracy. To provide coordination and further facilitation, the joint work as well as thesis writing is currently being organised in an international education-, research- and publication programme on Power Conflict and Democracy (PCD). This is directed by senior scholars at UGM, UiO and University of Colombo as well as related partners in a number of other universities and organisations, including of course Demos itself.

The long term aim is thus to sustain the unique participatory surveys and democracy promotion from below while moving in the direction of a more comprehensive democratic audit in comparative perspective; an audit that just like the audits in the global North and to some extent in South Asia includes results from several other research projects and surveys.

Much of this co-operation is also open to other interested parties in Indonesia or with a focus on Indonesia. The crucial priorities so far in addition to those that have already been mentioned includes 'popular politics of democratic representation in a comparative perspective', 'the role of democracy in peace and reconstruction in Aceh', 'political financing', 'decentralisation and representation', 'conflict resolution', 'state-civil society relationship and governmentality', 'labour, citizenship and politics', 'local politics and democratic representation', 'women and politics', 'ethnicity and democracy' and 'new ways of controlling media'.

Surveys Over Time

While these efforts will hopefully broaden and deepen the knowledge of and changes in rigorously assessing power, conflict and democracy in Indonesia in theoretical and comparative perspectives, it remains crucial that the expert surveys be sustained as a basis for this. Even if we manage to foster and summarise substantial amounts of additional results and promote better education and training of democracy, it is no substitute for the unique information obtained through the grounded participatory surveys in the country at large. Moreover, one can foster popular education through the implementation of the surveys and dissemination of the results as well as develop and promote research-based non-partisan recommendations.

The current plan is to conduct such surveys in due time before every general elections. This is to promote impartial and academically critical analysis and updates on the problems and options of democracy and suggest what should be given priority to – in co-operation with the concerned academic community, students and the democracy movement at large.

One question that has been raised is if there should be longer periods in between the surveys, as basic factors may not change quickly. The simple answer is that democracy is not a special set of rules and regulations but a process with many dimensions. Further, Indonesia remains in transition from authoritarianism towards, hopefully, more meaningful democracy and there are still constant and crucial changes.

Between the first and the second all-Indonesia surveys, for instance, we have seen radical changes on a number of factors such as the weakening of freedoms, the improvements in governance, the consolidation of top-down democracy, the transformation of the conflict in Aceh into a democratic political framework and the efforts by pro-democrats to engage in organised politics while the powerful elite continues to monopolise the same – all of which do not just reflect temporary events such as an election campaign.

Endnotes

- 1 While the meaning of economic capital may be self evident (and may well be expanded by more qualified analysis of the political economy between neo-liberalism and state sponsored business under globalisation; see Harriss-White 2003, Kohli 2004 and Khan 2005), social capital is mainly about “good contacts”, and cultural capital involves information and knowledge. In Demos’ survey another category has been added that covers ‘power by way of coercion’, including by military force but also through mass demonstrations such as the “people power” phenomenon in the Philippines.
- 2 This is a long established practice of social democratic governance but it has also been tried in scattered local settings in, for instance, the Philippines (e.g. Rocamora 2004 and Quimpo 2004) and in cases such as Brazil, South Africa and the Indian state of Kerala and West Bengal (see e.g. Avritzer 2002, Baiocchi 2003 and 2005, Fung and Wright 2003, Heller 2001, Isaac and Franke 2000, Tharakan 2004, Jones and Stokke 2005, Buhlungu 2006, Ballard et.al 2006, Webster 1992, Rogaly et.al 1999).
- 3 A number of efforts to address issues of women and politics, social pacts and legal problems and options by pro-democrats and to engage in politics have not been very successful.

Chapter Three



A Decade of *Reformasi*: The fragility of democracy

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and
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The 2003-2004 Survey on *Problems and Options of Democratisation in Indonesia*, which was the first for Demos, suggested a democracy deficit in Indonesia, as indicated, on one hand, by the widening gap between comparatively impressive civil-political freedoms and, on the other, by the poor condition of operational instruments (Priyono et.al 2007).

How has this democracy being in a state of deficit changed after the first survey? The recent 2007 Survey¹ indicates that the standard of the rules and regulations supposed to promote democracy in Indonesia are improving, particularly in relation to the operational instruments of governance. Some instruments of democracy—such as, independence of executive power from vested-interest groups, capacity to eradicate corruption, lessening abuse of power, subordination of government and

public officials to the rule of law, as well as equality before the law – are showing remarkable progress. It is admitted, however, that the progress emerges only from poor initial conditions.

The democratic political framework appears to be working well and gaining acceptance. Most actors seem to have accepted democracy as the 'only game in town'. Most remarkably, attempts by the old elements to reintroduce a centralised state, such as that found during the New Order era, in post-1998 have received less sympathy from the population in outer islands. Concern about the recurrence of the eastern European experience of territorial disintegration following the end of the authoritarian regime does not seem to have empirical ground in this case. Instead, as this survey suggests, people appear to want to give way to democracy as a means to increasingly implement a nation-wide democratic political community.

Nevertheless, the progress does not, in itself, improve the expression of democracy in a real sense. Firstly, the improvement in the operation of instruments of democracy departs from a very poor situation, leaving the standard as it exists insufficient. Secondly, the narrowing down of the gap between warranted freedoms and poor instruments of democracy may also be regarded as the result of a decline in the quality of most aspects of fundamental freedoms. Thirdly, political representation, interest-based representation, and direct representation by the people have largely stagnated. In addition, the deterioration of the quality of democracy is, ironically, related to the freedom to form parties and participate in elections at all levels. Fourthly, political practices remain elite-dominated. Fifthly, politicisation of issues and interests, organisations, and political mobilisations are top-down driven and characterised by clientelism and populism. Lastly, pro-democrats are beginning to engage in political action and no longer just active at the society level. They, nevertheless, continue to be poorly organised, fragmented, and marginalised from electoral participation, thus making them increasingly cynical of representative democracy and opting primarily for forms of direct participation. In short, the structure of democracy even with its remarkable progress seems to be erected on sand and its foundation remains poor.

Although democracy has been more functioning as a system and a national political framework, representation remains the most persistent problem. Considerable progress is lacking in three dimensions of representation: party-based political representation, interest representation based on civil associations and social movements and direct participation. As long as these dimensions are not included in the main agenda of political democratisation, Indonesian democracy

continues to be monopolised by the interests of the oligarchic elite. At least, this is the sign clearly reflected in the country's current party system.

Compared with the 2003-2004 Survey, some fundamental aspects of freedom have noticeably declined. A regression has occurred if one compares the current situation with the relative freedom enjoyed by citizens during the early years of *reformasi*. This was when citizen's participation and freedom to establish political parties and several aspects related to political representation were apparent. Indonesia's democratisation also suffers from additional problems such as the lack of improved access and participation for all social groups, particularly marginalised groups, in public life, the poor condition of gender equality, the persistent low standards of military and police transparency and accountability to the elected government and the public, as well as strong government dependence on foreign intervention.

A decade later, Indonesia's path toward democracy has shown both progress and deterioration or stagnation. As a national political framework, democracy works and has been relatively successful, compared to some other countries. Nonetheless just as any structure built on sand, Indonesian democracy lacks a strong foundation.

The State and Dynamics of Democracy: How are they assessed?

Prior to presenting the results of the 2007 Survey and comparing it with those of the 2003-2004 Survey, some issues regarding methodology require clarification.

Assessment of the situation and the dynamics of democracy that were required from the informants is classified into three aspects. The first aspect relates to the performance and the scope of the instruments of democracy. The identification and the assessment of this aspect is based on an approach introduced by David Beetham (1999) from Democratic Audit, a research group in the Human Rights Centre in the University of Essex, used to assess the situation of democracy examined against 80 democratic instruments. This approach has, subsequently, been adopted as the standard for assessment on democracy employed by International IDEA (Beetham et.al 2002).

Nonetheless, Demos has, since the 2007 Survey, made some necessary adjustments to the Beetham's instruments in accordance with particular circumstances experienced in Indonesia (Priyono et.al 2007). We shall return to this aspect shortly when discussing the capacity of actors of democracy in promoting and putting the instruments of democracy into operation, as well as the extent to which the actors are capable of doing so.

The second aspect of assessment is the capacity of the actors to promote and use the instruments of democracy relevant to their particular circumstances and interests. This is crucial as the overall assessment of democracy and democracy as a process does not occur in a vacuum. Comprehension of the capacity of the actors involved in the process would not merely help us to understand the progress of democracy. It equally leads to an understanding of the strength and weakness of the actors. The results of this second aspect will, in turn, allow the current survey to provide insights which can form the basis for drawing recommendations for activists promoting democracy.

The study on how and whether the actors actually establish relationships with democracy makes up the third aspect of assessment. Do they both promote it and use it, or just use it? Do they tend to manipulate it, or disregard it and instead, make attempt to influence politics and people in other ways considered to be against the principles of democracy? This aspect is relevant in the sense that democracy provides an opportunity for every member of a community to exercise equal political control on matters mutually agreed to. It helps to ascertain the extent to which democratisation and its actual situation may give benefit to the majority or, instead, undercut the public role and fail to become a channel for the *demos*.

We shall now return to the first aspect. The 2003-2004 Survey was conducted in two stages. From the instruments list used by Beetham et.al (2002), Demos identified 35 instruments of democracy during the first stage. Later, during the second stage, the list was reformulated to contain 40 instruments in order to obtain more accurate information about the implementation of democracy. During the 2007 Survey, however, for practical reasons, the list was simplified, without losing the substance, to only contain 32 instruments of democracy as shown in Box 3.1 below.

Box 3.1. The Instruments of Democracy

- 1 Citizenship (Equal state-citizenship; The rights of minorities, migrants and refugees, Reconciliation of horizontal conflicts).
- 2 Government support of international law and UN human rights.
- 3 Subordination of the government and public officials to the rule of law.
- 4 Equality before the law (Equal and secure access to justice; The integrity and independence of the judiciary).
- 5 Freedom from physical violence and the fear of it.
- 6 Freedom of speech, assembly and organization.
- 7 Freedom to carry out trade union activity.
- 8 Freedom of religion, belief, language and culture.
- 9 Gender equality and emancipation.
- 10 The rights of children.
- 11 The right to employment, social security and other basic needs.
- 12 The right to basic education, including citizen's rights and duties.
- 13 Good corporate governance.
- 14 Free and fair general elections (Free and fair general elections at central, regional and local level; Free and fair separate elections of e.g. governors, mayors and village heads).
- 15 Freedom to form parties on the national or local level (or teams of independent candidates) that can recruit members, and participate in elections.
- 16 Reflection of vital issues and interests among people by political parties and or candidates.
- 17 Abstention from abusing religious or ethnic sentiments, symbols and doctrines by political parties and or candidates.
- 18 Independence from money politics and powerful vested interests by political parties and or candidates.
- 19 Membership-based control of parties, and responsiveness and accountability of parties and or political candidates to their constituencies.
- 20 Parties and or candidates ability to form and run government.
- 21 Democratic decentralisation of government of all matters that do not need to be handled on central levels.
- 22 The transparency and accountability of elected government, the executive (bureaucracies), at all levels.
- 23 The transparency and accountability of the military and police to elected government and the public.
- 24 The capacity of the government to combat paramilitary groups, hoodlums and organised crime.
- 25 Government independence from foreign intervention (except UN conventions and applicable international laws).
- 26 Government's independence from vested interest groups and capacity to eliminate corruption and abuse of power.
- 27 Freedom of the press, art and academia.
- 28 Public access to and the reflection of different views within media, art and academia.
- 29 Citizens' participation in extensive independent civil associations.

- 30 Transparency, accountability and democracy within civil organizations.
- 31 All social groups' – including marginalised groups – extensive access to and participation in public life
- 32 Direct participation (People's direct access and contact with the public services and government's consultation of people and when possible facilitation of direct participation in policy making and the execution of public decisions).

Informants were requested to assess the performance and the scope of each instrument in their own specific regional context. The question, firstly, dealt with whether applicable rules and regulations existed at all before they were asked to make assessments on what they had been doing in a particular field in relation to a particular instrument. This was meant to investigate the extent to which the existing formal rules and regulations were able or otherwise to generate the desired output. To what extent, for example, were the existing rules and regulations supposed to foster freedom of speech, assembly and organisation?

Moreover, in order to identify the scope of the instruments of democracy, informants were requested to make assessment in two ways. Firstly, the geographic scope of the implementation of the instrument. Secondly, to what extent did the substance of freedom of speech, assembly and organisation impact on applicable rules and regulations? The ideal outcome for both assessments would be, certainly, to describe the instruments as being wide spread and substantially performed.

During the 2007 Survey, instruments of democracy were categorised into, on the one hand, formal rules and regulations and on the other hand, informal arrangements. Formal rules and regulations referred to all forms of state regulations, while informal arrangements include customs, *adat*, norms and values, including conventions agreed to by communities over generations. This formal-informal categorisation, which hardly existed in the 2003-2004. Survey, was drawn for three reasons. It was firstly aimed at making assessment against each instrument of democracy easier for the informants. The distinction was secondly made to differentiate the levels of operation and the efficacy both of formal rules and regulations as well as informal arrangements.

During the first survey, there was no distinction made when examining whether it was the former or the latter that had more influence on the process of democratisation. Thirdly, the peculiarity both of formal and informal arrangements is inevitable in the inquiry into the extent of the state's adaptation to democracy and the level of the people's vigilance in the process of democratisation.

While the 2003-2004 Survey focused on the institutional outcome of the instruments of democracy, the 2007 Survey obtained informants' assessments on the output of the institutional outcome. This was made possible as the recent survey considered that the performance and the scope of assessment was based only on existing instruments, leading to the more positive assessments as compared to the findings from the first survey.

The result led to the development of a method for comparing the two different sets of data. It is an index system drawn from informants' assessment of each instrument of democracy from both surveys. The index values ranged from 0 (poor) to 100 (good). An index value of 50%, 25% and 25% was, respectively, based on informants' assessment of performance, geographical spread, and substantive coverage. In addition, in the second survey where formal and informal instruments were treated differently, the values were, respectively, 70% and 30%. The value for the formal instruments was reckoned by reducing the proportion of informants stating that no formal rules and regulations existed. This procedure was essential in order to compute the negative factor of informants stating that no formal rules and regulations existed. Table 3.1 below features the comparison of the index for each instrument of democracy.

Table 3.1. Instruments of democracy Index: 2003/2004 and 2007 survey results

NO	INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY	INDEX 2003/04	INDEX 2007
Legal instruments and Rights			
1	Citizenship (Equal state-citizenship; The rights of minorities, migrants and refugees, Reconciliation of horizontal conflicts)	32	42
2	Government support of international law and UN human rights	27	46
3	Subordination of the government and public officials to the rule of law	16	45
4	The equality before the law (equal and secure access to justice; The integrity and independence of the judiciary)	18	44
5	Freedom from physical violence and the fear of it	28	47
6	Freedom of speech, assembly and organisation	74	60

7	Freedom to carry out trade union activity	57	51
8	Freedom of religion, belief; language and culture	74	66
9	Gender equality and emancipation	47	46
10	The rights of children	27	53
11	The right to employment, social security and other basic needs	22	45
12	The right to basic education, including citizen's rights and duties	37	59
13	Good corporate governance	21	40
Political Representation			
14	Free and fair general elections (Free and fair general elections at central, regional and local level; Free and fair separate elections of e.g. governors, mayors and village heads)	63	64
15	Freedom to form parties on the national or local levels (or teams of independent candidates) that can recruit members, and participate in elections	71	40
16	Reflection of vital issues and interests among people by political parties and or candidates	24	36
17	Abstention from abusing religious or ethnic sentiments, symbols and doctrines by political parties and or candidates.	38	44
18	Independence of money politics and powerful vested interests by political parties and or candidates	20	40
19	Membership-based control of parties, and responsiveness and accountability of parties and or political candidates to their constituencies	23	38
20	Parties and or candidates ability to form and run government	24	38
Democratic and Accountable Government			
21	Democratic decentralisation of government of all matters that do not need to be handled on central levels.	33	43
22	The transparency and accountability of elected government, the executive,(bureaucracies), at all levels	23	43

23	The transparency and accountability of the military and police to elected government and the public	23	35
24	The capacity of the government to combat paramilitary groups, hoodlums and organised crime	20	39
25	Government independence from foreign intervention (except UN conventions and applicable international laws)	24	36
26	Government's independence from strong interest groups and capacity to eliminate corruption and abuse of power	18	43
Civic Engagement and Participation			
27	Freedom of the press, art and academic world	60	59
28	Public access to and the reflection of different views within media, art and the academic world	57	47
29	Citizens' participation in extensive independent civil associations	62	54
30	Transparency, accountability and democracy within civil organisations	42	48
31	All social groups' - including marginalised groups - extensive access to and participation in public life	46	38
32	Direct participation (People's direct access and contact with public services and government's consultation of people and, when possible, facilitation of direct participation in policy making and the , execution of public decisions)	25	40
INDEX SCORE AVERAGE		37	46

Let me now turn to the exploration of findings to determine whether or not changes had taken place in Indonesian democracy over the past four years win the period between the first survey (2003/2004) and the second survey (2007).

Impressive Advances: Governance-related aspects

The fall of the New Order has allowed democracy to be accepted widely as a way of governing the people while, at the same time, the authoritarian character in the country's politics is steadily weakened. Since 1998, democracy has become a relatively well-functioning system

as a national political framework,² replacing the authoritarian political system from the previous era. Indonesia has reached a point of no return where democracy moves ahead, albeit little by little, toward progress. In an optimistic scenario, this has been made possible following the dramatic improvements of civil and political rights in the early years of democratisation.

Table 1.1 above shows a remarkably positive picture. On the average index of all instruments of democracy, it improved by 25%, from 37 to 46. Some instruments' index score showed a considerably sharp increase. The index score for subordination of government and public officials to the rule of law increased from 16 to 45 and the equality before the law increased sharply from 18 to 44. A significant increase was also obvious in government's impartiality towards vested interest groups and its capacity to eliminate corruption and abuse of power. Progress was, moreover, apparent in political parties' and candidates' neutrality from the money politics and powerful vested interest groups regardless a slight increase in score index (from 20 to 40). Other improvements were equally evident in areas, such as the capacity of government to curb paramilitary groups, hoodlums and organised crime (from 20 to 39), the protection of the rights of children (from 27 to 53), good corporate governance (from 21 to 40), the right to employment, social security and other basic needs (from 22 to 45), and the transparency of the elected government and its bureaucratic apparatuses at all levels (from 23 to 43).

Excluding the rights of children, good corporate governance, the right to employment, social security and other basic needs, and the neutrality of political parties and candidates from money politics and vested interests groups, instruments with significant increases in their indexes' could be grouped together under the heading of the government's managing capacity in the judicial and executive sectors. Other instruments related to aspects of governance, namely democratic decentralisation free from intervention from the central government, the government's independence from foreign intervention, and the transparency and accountability of the military and the police force to the elected government and to the public increased similarly, though less dramatically when compared to the others. On average, the indexes of eight instruments related to aspects of governance increased by almost 100% (from 22 to 42; see Table 3.3 below). This trend could possibly have been caused by, among other reasons, an agenda by the current administration under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Vice President Jusuf Kalla, that emphasises reform of the badly-performing aspects. Another cause may be the actual situation at the local level following the implementation of regional autonomy.

Table 3.2. Index of instruments of democracy related to aspects of governance:**2003/04 and 2007 results**

No	No of Instruments	Instruments Related to Aspects of Governance	Index and Rank (1)		Index Increase (%)
			2003/04	2007	
1	3	Subordination of the government and public officials to the rule of law	16 (32)	45(15)	181
2	4	The equality before the law (Equal and secure access to justice; The integrity and independence of the judiciary)	18(30)	44(16)	144
3	21	Democratic decentralisation of government of all matters that do not need to be handled on central levels.	33(14)	43(20)	30
4	22	The transparency and accountability of elected government, the executive,(bureaucracies), at all levels	23(24)	43(18)	87
5	23	The transparency and accountability of the military and police to elected government and the public	23(23)	35(32)	52
6	24	The capacity of the government to combat paramilitary groups, hoodlums and organised crime	20 (28)	39(26)	95
7	25	Government's independence from foreign intervention	24(20)	36(30)	50
8	26	Government's independence from strong interest groups and capacity to eliminate corruption and abuse of power	18(31)	43(19)	139
AVERAGE INDEX			22	41	97

(1) numbers in brackets show rank

Some critical aspects are worth noting. First, the fact that more corruption cases have been brought to trial shows not only government's commitment to eradicating corruption, but also underlines the fact that corruption remains pervasive. The arrest of parliamentarian Al Amin Nasution and the former governor of the Bank of Indonesia Burhanuddin Abdullah, on one hand, indicates a critical attempt to fight corruption, while, on the other, it proves that the practices of corruption still persist.³ The arrest of a prosecutor, leading a team established by the General Attorney to investigate the case related to the abuse of Bank of Indonesia's Liquidity Assistance (Bantuan Likuiditas Bank Indonesia, BLBI), for accepting bribes worth IDR 6 billion (around USD 600,000) proves at least two points.

Firstly, the government's fight against corruption is often waged by corrupted law enforcement agencies. Secondly, it creates new practices of corruption within the administration.⁴ A recent report on Indonesia's Corruption Perception Index in 2007 by *Transparency International* similarly indicated that efforts at fighting corruption by the Indonesian government in 2007 (2.3) had weakened from 2.4 in 2006 to 2.3 in 2007.

The second critical note is that improvements that relate to governance do *not* in itself indicate positive performance in good governance. Table 1.4 shows that the index score for governance-related instruments was small and the rank of the respective instruments was low. When compared to the score of other instruments, as seen in Table 1.1, democratic instruments related to practices of governance were ranked low. Subordination of the government and public officials to the rule of law had the highest index score (45) of all instruments related to governance and ranked 16th out of 32. The government's impartiality towards vested-interest groups and its capacity to eliminate corruption and abuse of power had previously ranked 31st but is currently ranked 18th. A slower shift was found in transparency and accountability of the elected government and the bureaucracy where the rank shifted from 24th to 19th. Transparency and accountability of the armed forces and the police force to the elected government and to the public declined from the 23rd to the bottom of the 32 instruments. In other words, three of the instruments of democracy related to the practices of governance were in the list with the worst possible score index (≤ 40). See Table 3.3.

Tabel 3.3. The Instruments of Democracy with Index Score ≤ 40

No	No of Instru-ments	INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY ⁽¹⁾	INDEX	RANK
1	23	<i>The transparency and accountability of the military and police to elected government and the public</i>	35	32
2	16	Reflection of vital issues and interests among people by political parties and or candidates	36	31
3	25	<i>Government independence from foreign intervention (except UN conventions and applicable international law)</i>	36	30
4	19	Membership-based control of parties, and responsiveness and accountability of parties and or political candidates to their constituencies	38	29
5	31	All social groups' – including marginalised groups – extensive access to and participation in public life	38	28
6	20	Parties and or candidates ability to form and run government	38	27
7	24	<i>The capacity of the government to combat paramilitary groups, hoodlums and organised crime</i>	39	26
8	32	Direct participation (People's direct access and contact with the public services and government's consultation of people and when possible facilitation of direct participation in policy making and the execution of public decisions))	40	25
9	18	Independence of money politics and powerful vested interests by political parties and or candidates	40	24
10	13	Good corporate governance	40	23
11	15	Freedom to form parties on the national or local level (or teams of independent candidates) that can recruit members, and participate in elections	40	22

⁽¹⁾ The instruments related to governance are in italics.

Threats to the Fundamentals of Democracy

Despite nominal progress made on both institutional and legal fronts, Indonesian democracy remains intrinsically volatile when it comes to the discussion about substance. There are countless incidents in which the legal framework to protect the democratic rights of citizens is in contradiction with the implementation of and, moreover, interpretation of practical issues encountered by the population.

1. Withering freedoms

As in the previous survey, instruments related to freedoms and civil and political rights were in good shape compared to other instruments. Nonetheless, when compared with the earlier survey, the 2007 Survey indicated a deterioration in the instruments of democracy.

Freedom of religion and cultural expression remained high. Freedom of speech, assembly, and organisation was still among the best although had shifted from second to the third place. Free and fair general elections improved moving from fourth to second place. Moreover, freedom from physical violence and fear improved its position from 16th to 10th place.

The index of instruments related to civil and political rights were relatively better compared to other instruments. As seen in Table 3.4 below, six out of 11 instruments of democracy with index scores above the overall average (>46) were those related to freedom and civil and political rights.

Table 3.4. The Instruments of Democracy with Index above Average Index Score (>46)

NO	No of Instru-ment	INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY ⁽¹⁾	INDEX ⁽²⁾	RANK ⁽²⁾
1	8	Freedom of religion, belief; language and culture	66(74)	1 (1)
2	14	Free and fair general elections (Free and fair general elections at central, regional and local level; Free and fair separate elections of e.g. governors, mayors and village heads)	64 (63)	2 (4)
3	6	Freedom of speech, assembly and organisation	60 (74)	3 (2)

4	12	The right to basic education, including citizen's rights and duties	59 (37)	4 (13)
5	27	Freedom of the press, art and academic world	59 (60)	5 (6)
6	29	Citizens' participation in extensive independent civil associations	54 (62)	6 (5)
7	10	The rights of children	53 (27)	7 (18)
8	7	Freedom to carry out trade union activity	51 (57)	8 (8)
9	30	Transparency, accountability and democracy within civil organisations	48 (42)	9 (11)
10	5	Freedom from physical violence and the fear of it	47 (28)	10 (16)
11	28	Public access to and the reflection of different views within media, art and the academic world	47 (57)	11 (7)

⁽¹⁾ The instruments written in italics are related to freedom and civil and political rights

⁽²⁾ The numbers in brackest indicate the results of 2003-2004 Survey

Though listed as the best instruments, most instruments representing fundamental aspects of democracy – freedoms and civil and political rights - in fact experienced deterioration or, at least, stagnation. The instruments related to freedom of religion, belief, language and culture previously ranked at the top with an index score of 74, decreased to an index score of 66. The index for freedom of speech, assembly and organisation, previously with an index score of 74, was down to 60. The index of instruments related to freedom to establish trade unions and carry out activities shifted from 57 to 51.

Table 3.5. Instruments of Democracy related to freedoms and civil and political rights whose indexes decreased: Comparison of 2003/04 and 2007 Survey results.

No	No of instrument	INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY	INDEX		CHANGE
			2003/04	2007	
1	6	Freedom of speech, assembly and organisation	74	60	-19%
2	7	Freedom to carry out trade union activity	57	51	-11%
3	8	Freedom of religion, belief; language and culture	74	65	-11%
4	9	Gender equality and emancipation	47	46	-2%
5	27	Freedom of the press, art and academic world	60	59	-2%
6	28	Public access to and the reflection of different views within media, art and the academic world	57	46	-18%
Average index score			62	55	-15%

The decline in the index in political freedom and civil rights appears likely to be confirmed by realities on the ground. The banning of Jamaah Islamiyah Indonesia from exercising its religious freedom, and the pressure placed on individuals in localised religious sects (e.g. Lia Aminuddin of Jamaah Salamullah, Ahmad Mushadek of Al-Qiyadah Al-Islamiyah) to condemn their beliefs and to conform with the mainstream interpretation by the state-sanctioned authority have created grave concerns for the condition of civil rights. In addition, a religious decree, or *fatwa*, issued by the council of Islamic clerics (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) forbidding discourse of pluralism, liberalism and tolerance is likely to make the fundamentals of democracy worse.

It is unfortunate that the current government has demonstrated a degree of tolerance for the elements within the society responsible for such violations. It seems that maintaining its 'populist' image, by appeasing the dominant groups' anger toward the practices of the minority, is more important to the present administration. The government, hence, has failed to defend political freedom and civil rights (Naipospos et.al 2007). Having said that, it is timely to understand why the state of democratic freedoms and civil rights has declined.

2. Representation as the worst problem and the sharp deterioration of participation

Threats to the fundamental aspects of democracy cannot, however, be exclusively viewed from the declining conditions of political and civil rights. Other fundamental aspects, such as political representation and government's impartiality, which performed poorly in 2003-2004 Survey and appear to be stagnant in the 2007 Survey, may similarly contribute to weakened fundamentals. The index related to freedom to form parties either at national or local level took a nose dive from 71 to 40 and was situated in 22nd position out of the 32 instruments. Table 3.6 below shows the index of democratic instruments related to the aspect of political representation.

Table 3.6. Index and Ranking of Instruments related to Political Representation

No	No of Instruments	Instruments related to political representation	Index 2007 ⁽¹⁾	Rank ⁽¹⁾
1	14	Free and fair general elections (Free and fair general elections at central, regional and local level; Free and fair separate elections of e.g. governors, mayors and village heads)	64 (63)	2 (4)
2	15	Freedom to form parties on the national or local level (or teams of independent candidates) that can recruit members, and participate in elections	40 (71)	22 (3)
3	16	Reflection of vital issues and interests among people by political parties and or candidates	36 (24)	31 (22)
4	17	Abstention from abusing religious or ethnic sentiments, symbols and doctrines by political parties and or candidates.	44 (38)	17 (12)
5	18	Independence of money politics and powerful vested interests by political parties and or candidates	40 (20)	24 (29)
6	19	Membership-based control of parties, and responsiveness and accountability of parties and or political candidates to their constituencies	38 (23)	29 (25)

7	20	Parties and or candidates ability to form and run government	38 (24)	27 (21)
8	32	Direct participation (People's direct access and contact with the public services; Government's consultation of people and when possible facilitation of direct participation in policy making and the execution of public decisions)	40 (25)	25 (19)
INDEX SCORE AVERAGE			43 (36)	

⁽¹⁾ The number in brackets shows the result of 2003/04 survey.

As the table shows, instruments related to aspects of political representation do not indicate substantial improvement. On average, the score indexes of instruments in the 2007 Survey related to the aspects of political representation were not particularly high (43) and only increased by 18% from 36 in the 2003-2004 Survey. In fact, the ranking of six of the eight instruments declined. This demonstrates the negligence of aspects of political representation in the issues of improving democracy.

Serious attention should be paid to two findings. Firstly, the indicator regarding free and fair elections was the only one of eight instruments related to the aspect of representation with a relatively high and consistent index score. According to both the 2003-2004 Survey and the 2007 Survey, the score index for the instrument was above the average index score for all instruments. This indicates that the institutionalisation of free and fair elections tended to be regarded as the main means to promote representation. The optimistic trend shown by instruments related to free and fair elections does not necessarily improve political representation. In a different situation where the instruments related to general elections should be excluded, then the average score index for the other instruments would only reach 39.

Secondly, this agonising condition is clearly shown by the decline in the index of instruments related to freedom to form parties and participate in elections from 71 to 40. The data clearly indicates that the ongoing process of democratisation barely provides sufficient space for broadening participation in order to promote representation.

The situation may just worsen following the newly-introduced law on political parties that holds back the establishment of new parties. The failure of a number of parties to pass the verifying process by the Department of Law and Human Rights indicates a setback. Of the 115 new parties registered with the Department of Law and Human Rights,

only 24 passed the process to become a legally acknowledged political party according to Law No. 2/2008. Once the parties passed the gate in the Department, another verifying process by the Commission of General Election is waiting to decide whether or not the parties will qualify for the 2009 General Election.

3. Additional setbacks

Other fundamental aspects of democracy are social, economic, and cultural rights. The instruments for these aspects are the right to basic education, including citizen's rights and duties; protection of the rights of children; and the right to employment, social security and other basic needs, and good corporate governance. The 2007 Survey indicated that indexes for the group of social, economic, and cultural rights were increasing. The results may be somewhat surprising, at least for Jakarta residents who do not have adequate information about improvements of social, economic, and cultural conditions in other parts of the country. The assessment appears to be unbalanced, particularly with the problems in social, economic, and cultural fields encountered by the population in eastern Indonesia, including their poor capacity to struggle for basic rights.

Nonetheless, achievements made in economic, social and cultural rights should be treated with reservation especially when the index score remained low at 46. Compared to the previous index of 37, there was no impressive increase only an increase of around 20%. As most mass media suggested, the economic, social and cultural conditions of most of the population remained a great concern. People have been left vulnerable in fulfilling their basic needs, not only because of constant soaring prices, but also because some vital necessities have become scarce. Even the small and medium industrial enterprises have suffered from the drastic hike in fuel prices.

Formal Democracy Remains Incomplete

Indonesia, as claimed by many, has admittedly adopted and implemented most formal rules and regulations – by which the actors of democracy just have to abide – necessary for the democratisation process. Informants in the recent survey, however, stated that such a belief is incorrect and that democracy has yet to be completely institutionalised. On average, thirty-five per cent of informants stated that there are no formal rules and regulations regulating the 32 instruments of democracy. Around 35% or more of informants stated that 17 instruments were not actually regulated by formal rules.⁵

Some instruments, on the one hand, were considered to have had been formalised, such as those relating to free and fair elections. Approximately 81% of informants stated that formal rules already existed. Other instruments assessed by more than 70% of informants as being regulated by formal rules were mainly related to freedom of speech, assembly and organisation (78%); the right to basic education (78%); freedom of religion, belief, language, and culture (77%); freedom of the press, art and academic world (74%); and freedom to carry out trade union activity (72%).

On the other hand, instruments considered to not yet be formalised were transparency and accountability of the armed forces and the police force to elected government and to the public (53%); abstention from abuse of ethnic and religious sentiments, symbols and doctrines by political parties and or candidates (51%); the capacity of parties and or candidates to form and run government (49%); the capacity of the government to combat paramilitary groups, hoodlums and organised crime (49%); government independence from foreign intervention (49%); membership-based control of parties, and responsiveness and accountability of parties and or political candidates to their constituents (48%); and extensive access and participation of all social groups—including marginalised groups—in public life (47%).

Furthermore, the recent survey also suggested that the performance of informal arrangements—customs, norms, value, traditions, etc—in supporting the infrastructure of democracy were showing a relatively steady positive trend. On average, sixty four per cent of informants stated that informal arrangements were sufficiently supportive of the infrastructure of democracy. They seemed to reject the common scepticism that claims that elements of local culture and democracy do not mix.

Conclusions

There are four conclusions. Firstly, in general terms, improvements in the indexes of the instruments of democracy are apparent. Secondly, the gap between the indexes of the instruments of democracy is narrowing. Thirdly, however, the narrowing gap does not necessarily suggest that all indexes of instruments have improved. Indexes of instruments related to basic freedoms and party-political participation that previously showed good indexes are now lower. Improvement in governance may at worst be at the expense of reduced freedoms. Fourthly, other aspects of fundamentals of democracy, namely, political representation and the independence of government,

are not improving. However, aside from the elections, the indexes of the instruments required to promote political participation are not among the worst. Finally, economic, social, and cultural rights seem to have improved in certain parts of the country, although it is obvious that the situation remains unbalanced. The combination of these conclusions reveals a potentially disturbing picture: fundamental aspects of democracy are being at the same time threatened.

Endnotes

- 1 Data collection was conducted in July-October 2007. The survey aims to verify the main findings of the previous survey (2003/04). Other than that, the findings are expected to form the basis of recommendations for the pro-democracy activists and movements in anticipation of the forthcoming 2009 general elections.
- 2 Our previous survey (2003/04) revealed a similar democratic situation in various regions in Indonesia. This indicates that the national approach or framework for democratisation has been widely accepted in Indonesia.
- 3 According to the chairman of the Commission for Corruption Eradication (KPK), Antasari Azhar, Al Amin was arrested in regard to the case of the reassignment of the status of protected forest in Bintan Buyu, Riau to urban human settlement. In order to make the reassignment successful, a recommendation from parliament was required. Al Amin was under suspicion of having facilitated the recommendation by in exchange of Rp 3 trillion, as the vice chairman of KPK, M. Yasin stated. Ironically, this case involved nine other parliamentarians and the Regional Secretary of the Bintan district. According to the Honorary Council of the House of Representatives, the nine members of parliaments were at the place of the incident when Al Amin was arrested. Al Amin was arrested at the Ritz Carlton hotel Mega Kuningan, South Jakarta. The Secretary of the Bintan district, Azirwan, was among the arrested. See Koran TEMPO (13/4/2008).
- 4 Such a critical response was provided Kristiadi (Kompas, 11/3/2008).
- 5 For complete data on informants' assessment on formal regulations, see Appendix.

Chapter Four



A Rough Road to Political Citizenship: Under the shadow of local communalism

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The rise of Partai Golkar (PG/Golkar Party) and Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (PDI-P/Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle), which was characterised by their conformity with nationalist and secularist platform, and their success in winning the 2004 General Election by, respectively, 21.62% and 18.31%, indicated that a national framework and nation as an 'imagined community' (Anderson 1983) remain relevant to the majority of national voters. The fact that parties with a religious character or who were strong advocacates of sectarian politics managed to gain only around or lower than ten percent of total votes, provided evidence that religious belief and local identity may not be in direct correlation with electoral preference at the national level. This is without mentioning the secularist nationalist Partai Demokrat (PD) that had not existed at the time of the 1999 Election yet gained 7.46% of votes in the 2004 elections, benefiting

from being the electoral vehicle for Susilo Bambang Yudoyono, a former army general and an acclaimed nationalist and secularist.¹ Moreover the 2003-2004 Demos Survey, as a matter of fact, demonstrates that 40% of informants confirmed the nation-state, Indonesia, as being their main source of identity. This figure appears substantial when compared to the proportion of informants whose main source of identity was their place of origin (11%), their ethnicity (20%) or their religion (12%).

However when it comes to local elections, both at provincial and lower level, the reality demonstrates a different character. The winning of coalitions of non-secular, mostly Islamist-based, parties during elections at a provincial level might confirm the project of a nation-state as not being relevant to the actual aspirations of the voters. It may similarly show that other forms of identity become one of the key sources of political identification for local constituents. This is not to say that those parties do not aspire to the nationalist framework but they are, at least, acknowledged by the public as representing a religious, local, or maybe ethnically-based image. The 2008 provincial local elections in West Java and North Sumatra are some good examples in which the victorious candidates were mainly backed by coalitions of Islamist-based parties. Apart from Dede Yusuf, the winning candidate for deputy governor of West Java who was a movie actor, his running-mate as well as the duet from North Sumatra were comparatively less-known to the wider local voters when compared to their competitors, who had more popularity and were mainly backed by PG and PDI-P.

Apart from analysts' claims for their success in the elections as ranging from the effective use of media to the application of innovative methods for campaigning, what occurred in the local elections mentioned above may reveal the shape of the nation-state project. From the results of the 2003-2004 Survey, Demos concluded that the nation-state project was in the grip of a crisis.

There are at least two reasons for this claim. Firstly, if the source of identity was stated as being the place of origin, ethnicity or religion, is then regarded as representing non-nationalist sentiments and placed into a single category, it would constitute 43% of those surveyed. If this is compared to Indonesia as being the source of identity, the proportion of respondents in both categories would be, more or less, equal. However if the 12% of informants who stated that their source of identity was as residents of a district, a city or a province were added into the category of non-nationalistic sentiments, the comparison unbalances no longer more or less equal.

This finding might provide an explanation for why voters in local elections were more attracted to the call of the primordial and less nationally-framed ideas. The issue of, for example, *putra daerah*, which refers to one's genealogical connection with a particular place or culture, or someone's religious background being considered as determining the voters' preference suggested the relative absence of the nation-state as a political framework. People appeared to be less engrossed in the candidate's democratic programmatic agenda, for which a candidate could actually be made accountable politically to his or her constituents.

Secondly, the data revealed that citizenship-based politics had not formed as a basis for developing democracy. People remained politically associated with their cultural entities based on religion, ethnicity, localism, or communitarian relations, and were likely to advocate aspirations within that framework.²

This circumstance creates a further concern for the nation as it has been, since the pre-colonial kingdoms and, later, during colonial domination, considered to be a "plural society" (Furnivall 1948, also Anderson 1983, Lombard 1996) with no established roots of domination by a single ethnic group or theocratic state. Even during the centralised New Order era, believed to be under the influence of Javanese political culture (Anderson 1990, Pemberton 1994), Indonesia was not a 'Javanese state'. The end of the authoritarian regime in 1998, moreover, has reduced the centralist character of Indonesian state and has reduced, though not completely removed, the Javanese political culture inherited from the Soeharto era. Having said that, the existence of present-day Indonesia is greatly dependant on how to best manage the multi-ethnic character and religious diversity of the nation on the one hand, and how to combine these aspects with democracy as the principle of political equality. Failure to address this challenge would risk the society being overshadowed by the crisis caused by cultural diversity, leading to the balkanisation of the country.

The 2007 Survey, however, points out a different trend. Fragility in the form of the separation of people along ethnic and religious lines is evident. The implementation of Islamic syariah law at district level in West Java and Aceh and people, believed to be part of particular ethnic groups, being denied access to manufacturing employment such as in Banten are some disturbing examples. Nonetheless the ongoing process of democratisation and the increasingly more open political space, which at a local level is also marked by respect for some principles of human rights, are clearly promoting the development of a political community in all regions, instead of an ethnic-national community.

Political Community without Nationhood

Local politics, however, exposes a contradictory reality with regard to voters' self-identification. In response to local politics, informants, as shown in Table 4.3, validated a trend towards a reversal of the above-mentioned situation. At this level, religion, ethnicity, and sentiment of indigenouness were the prime factor. During local elections, 40% of informants found that people had identified themselves as residents of their city/district/province, while 23% identified themselves as members of their ethnic community or clan. During local conflicts, ethnic or clan-based identity became important in the context of local conflicts (36%). Similarly, in terms of the establishment of new local government, most people tend to identify themselves as belonging both to an ethnic group and a regional identity.

Table 4.1. Informants' assessment of people's identity in some political occasions at a local level

In regional elections how do people first identify themselves? How do people identify themselves when they face situations of conflict caused by social, economic and political tension? In responding to issues of regional administrative division of provinces or districts, how do people at first identify themselves?				
NO	PEOPLE'S IDENTITY IN POLITICAL OCCASIONS	LOCAL ELEC-TIONS	LOCAL CON-FLICTS	REGIONAL AD-MINISTRATIVE DIVISION
		(% of informants)		
1	As residents of their district/city/province	40	12	37
2	As residents of their village and hamlet (dusun)	11	12	30
3	As members of their ethnic community	23	36	26
4	As members of their religious community	4	12	1
5	As members/supporters of a political party	13	1	0
6	As members of a social class	7	23	0
7	Others (including as 'residents of Indonesia)	2	0	4
8	No Answer	1	4	3

Percentages based on number of informants (N=903).

Table 4.1 shows, at least, two salient points. Firstly, local elections introduced since 2006 have demonstrated the sentiment of ‘localism’ manifested in the issue of, among others, *putra daerah*. Candidates not able to show his or her genealogical or cultural connection to the locality where the election is taking place would find it difficult to gain support from local voters. In addition, a political party has to enquire about this aspect of cultural connection for potential candidates upon which electoral support would generally depend. Forty percent of informants believed that local identity, seen from one’s association with a district/city/province, had been crucial in local elections. Localism can also appear in the expression of ethnically-based sentiments, when being a migrant to a locality or belonging to a minority group would really matter to local voters claiming to be native residents of a place. The combination of identification with district/city/province and identity with ethnic community would result in the percentage representing the importance of localism being 63%. This finding however does not necessarily mean that direct local elections are a mistake.

Learning from The Newly-Recovered Democracy: Aceh

The political climate in Aceh after the signing of the Helsinki agreement between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM/Free Aceh Movement) appears to point in the direction of a nationally-framed political system and a democratic arrangement. The rise of independence candidates during the local election for governor had nothing to do with disengagement from the national political framework—represented by the existing national political parties— or separatism let alone an aspiration for a renewed armed movement. The subsequent emergence of local parties does not necessarily invigorate or augment separatist sentiments against Jakarta but rather, widens out the process of participation and public control, allowing a democratic competition like in other provinces in the country. The case of Aceh reveals that democratic political organisations at a local level, disengaged from the national structure, may have a chance for deepening democracy without putting the national political framework at stake.

Demos’ 2006 Survey on Aceh indicates that during local elections the Acehnese tended to identify themselves as residents of a district/city/province, as village residents, and as supporters of a political party. Moreover, affiliation to an ethnic grouping or religious faith seemed to be less important as compared to attachment to a political party. See Table 4.2 below.

Table 4.2. Acehnese' identification at local elections

In regional elections, how do people at first hand identify themselves?		
NO	ACEHNESE' IDENTIFICATION IN LOCAL ELECTIONS	PERCENTAGE
1	As residents of their district/city/province	31
2	As residents of their village and hamlet (dusun)	18
3	As members of their ethnic community	6
4	As members of their religious community	4
5	As Acehnese or non-Acehnese	9
6	As members/supporters of a political party	16
7	As members of their social class	10
8	Others (As residents of Indonesia)	6
9	No Answer	1

Percentages based on number of informants. (N=131)

Source: Aceh Survey (Demos, 2006). <http://www.demosindonesia.org/aceh/>

The major element of the third wave of democracy was the elitist introduction of democratic institutions, to promote peace and less unfair development. This model is now losing ground around the world. Recent examples include the post-election violence in Kenya and that democratic Sri Lanka has gone to war again with the Tamil Tigers, with the two sides having failed to join hands in post-tsunami relief and reconstruction. Theory and strategy have already adapted to the new trend. Yesterday's elitist democratisation is now deemed to undermine the rule of law and economic development, and to generate corruption, conflicts and identity politics. Mansfield and Snyder's *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War*, for instance, seems to be a bestseller. The general thesis is that such problems must be tackled ahead of democracy, by strong institutions, 'good governance', 'growth alliances' and NGOs. The elite should 'sequence democracy'. What of Indonesia? To know for sure, we must wait until May 6, when Demos will publish conclusions from its national resurvey of democracy. However, results from related studies in Aceh are already available. And they prove the critics wrong! Democratic institutions only for the elite are indeed insufficient – but with additional popular capacities to use and develop the instruments, there is a road ahead.

By 2004, Aceh resembled all the pessimistic arguments. The *reformasi* in other parts of the country did not apply. Aceh continued

to suffer from militarised corruption, exploitation and abuse of ethnic and religious identities – both on the part of Jakarta and sections of GAM. After the tsunami, therefore, most experts agreed that donors, technocrats and NGOs with funds and civic institutions must protect relief and reconstruction from these vicious dynamics; while a bold Finnish negotiator and his monitors would try to handle the ‘security problem’.

Fortunately, however, this is not the full story of the miraculous peace and comparatively successful relief and reconstruction. The real story is instead about people’s ability to expand and use new democratic opportunities and *thus* foster peace and reconstruction. Moreover, if this is recognised and supported by donors and Jakarta, the democrats still stand a chance in preventing Aceh from sliding back into conflicts and corruption, just like so many other devastated parts of the world, when most of the donors, technocrats and NGOs will hand over responsibility to the local politicians and administrators within a year. Let us look at the empirical evidence.

To begin with, a comparison between Aceh and Sri Lanka proves that the rationale of the recent Nobel Peace Prize for work against the global warming is insufficient. Widespread consciousness of an environmental disaster and massive international support for peace and development is insufficient. All were at hand after the tsunami in both cases. But since Sri Lanka failed and Aceh was successful, we have to find additional explanations. Moreover, simple notions of liberal democracy generating peace are also not vindicated. Sri Lanka’s ‘consolidated’ democracy did much worse than Aceh.

Secondly, a number of advantages that existed in Aceh as compared to Sri Lanka are also insufficient explanations. It is true that there were weaker rebels and stronger civil society in Aceh; and it is correct that the newly elected president and his deputy in Jakarta were more interested in negotiating peace, containing the military and including business than their colleagues in Colombo. Yet all these advantages were also at hand in other Indonesian contexts where efforts at peace and development have been much less successful than in Aceh, for instance in Poso where low-intensity violence continues and hidden attempts to make peace profitable spur corruption and generate new conflicts.

Now, the situation in Aceh is showing signs of similarity with the other regions. In some aspects even, Aceh appears to be more democratic than the rest of the country. On one hand, the spread of development of a democratic political framework has opened up good opportunities for peace negotiators, post-tsunami donor agencies, civil groups, and

political powers to reach agreements aimed at ending the conflict and to transform it into a fledgling democracy. On the other hand, this would have never been possible had the local political system not been opened up for a more genuine political participation by giving citizens the right to set up their own local parties and allow the participation of independent candidates in direct local elections, both at provincial and district level. Also, the presence of negotiators and international institutions—albeit temporary—were instrumental in creating a situation conducive to entering a process of peace and democracy. At the same time, the condition hindered the ability of parties, including certain military factions and business interests, from manipulating the situation as was the case in other conflict areas, like Poso. Finally, it was an inevitable imperative that dissident groups and Acehese nationalists organise themselves to enable them to draw the benefits from democratic openness and even to win elections.³

In other words, the fledgling, decentralised Indonesian political community and the granting of increased opportunities for greater political participation at a local level have paved the way for peace and democratic development in Aceh. At the same time, this new arrangement has narrowed down the opportunities for groups with vested interest to stir up the situation. These were made possible not solely because of a top-down approach from the central government.

So what *was* crucial in Aceh? Firstly, nationalism in Aceh was indeed ethnic but more rooted in a territorially defined political project than based on separate ethnic and religious community-organising as in other disturbed areas in Indonesia and in Sri Lanka. Secondly, GAM's strategy of not winning militarily but causing trouble while waiting for Indonesia to crumble was undermined by the decentralised and semi-democratic system in other parts of the archipelago that prevented balkanisation. Thirdly, the old GAM guard in Stockholm was less able to transform this from a drawback to an asset than the younger and civic partners. The latter developed their own contacts with pro-democrats outside Aceh, especially when in exile under Megawati's military campaign. Fourthly, GAM refused Indonesian Vice President Kalla's strategy of granting profitable secret deals for its own leaders, opting instead for comparatively open negotiations by adopting and briefing civic partners and insisting on a truce that would grant equal rights to all residents in future politics and its implementation. Fifthly, Ahtisaari blocked negotiations on 'impossible problems', focussing instead on basic issues of decommissioning, sharing of natural resources *and* most importantly, on political institutions to handle other issues through

'self-rule'. Sixthly, this in turn enabled the democratic side of GAM to develop extensive political proposals for *democratic* self-rule with local political parties and independent candidates; proposals which Jakarta, wisely, did not refuse. Seventhly, when later on divisions developed in GAM over decision-making and participation, the critics and their civic partners could mobilise their numbers and grass roots by advocating internal democracy and declaring independent candidates (rather than compromising with Jakarta-based parties) in the December 2006 elections, thus scoring landslide victories.

The Aceh experience proves that broader public freedom at local level to participate in political organisations, either by establishing local parties or non-party political channels, can become effective in overcoming communal segregation and minimising ethnic and religious sentiments. Moreover, it reveals that the existence of local parties is not in contradiction with the regulations on local elections set at national level. This is not to say that Aceh is now free from problems. For this remarkable success to continue, there is a need to form additional democratic political linkages between the newly elected politicians, the old administration, and the people. The improved political system as compared to elsewhere in the country enhances the chances for the Acehnese to move in a democratic direction rather than slipping back into the usual Indonesian problems of local politics being monopolised and dominated by the powerful elite.

What has been taking place in Aceh has inevitably formed a robust foundation for transforming armed conflict into political struggle in a democratic framework. The basic instrument has been the demonopolisation of politics in Aceh by maintaining the special autonomy status of the province and allowing the participation of independent candidates and local parties in local politics. The slow process of conflict settlement in Poso and Maluku may have a lesson to learn from the Acehnese experience.

However, it is worth noting that there is also a difference between, on the one hand, Aceh, and, on the other hand, Poso and Maluku. 'Acehnese-ness' seems likely to be a territorial and political identity rather than an ethnic or religious identity that promotes the spirit of separatism as in the case of Poso and Maluku. Accordingly, conditions for conflict settlement that could be put forward to these two conflict-torn areas should not be merely based on the ethnic and religious framework.

Another major difference is that possibilities for local democrats to establish locally-based political organisations is limited as a result of domination by national parties and elites who are in close

collaboration with capital interests and some sections within the armed forces (Aditjondro 2006). Efforts to negotiate for peace and subsequent initiatives for cooperation were regarded as being far from transparent and accountable to the public, including civil society organisations (ibid.).

Of course it is also true that as opposed to both Sri Lanka and Poso, funds and support in Aceh were not given on the condition that politicians and administrators would favour peace but that donors and experts would be allowed to act autonomously to minimise 'normal' Indonesian abuse and corruption. This *did* limit much of the expected corruption and military subordination of the people – which in turn gave democracy a chance. However, the very precondition for the relatively successful relief and reconstruction was not the donors, the technocrats and the NGOs but the peace-deal. And the peace deal rested both with agreements on democratisation to handle the problems on a political level and the capacity of nationalists to promote and use the new political institutions.

Should efforts for making democracy in Aceh meaningful move forwards, there is a good cause for optimism with regard to the future of Indonesia as a nation. Local processes of democracy – among others, special autonomy, participation of local parties, and independent candidates – should be regarded as providing an affirmative contribution to the process of democracy on a national scale.

Democratic Alternatives to Corruption and New Conflicts

However, in spite of the democratic 'miracle' in Aceh analysed so far, a Nobel Peace Prize should have been inconceivable. Ahtisaari and his monitors got things on track, but others developed and used the opportunities. President Yudhoyono facilitated the deal by keeping the military at bay, but Vice President Kalla, who is of *Bugis* origin, was more important with regards to being on speaking terms with the Acehnese and by 'convincing' fellow politicians in Jakarta and others to come along. However, Kalla's central idea of making peace profitable for the powerful worked in Aceh only because donors, technocrats, NGOs and democrats contained at least some of the excesses of exploitation, corruption and new conflicts that this policy has nourished in other disturbed provinces. In this context GAM's Hasan di Tiro was not really the best symbol of the new Acehnese democrats and thus deserving of the prize.

This is not just history. The importance of democracy in Aceh has not yet been fully acknowledged. Many experts, donors and NGOs subscribe to the fashionable idea of 'sequencing democracy'. Being convinced that they themselves (plus Ahtisaari and the monitors) 'did

it', and that corruption and new conflicts will blossom when elected politicians and their administrators take over, they do not even seem to have much of a strategy for how to prevent it, besides containing the expansion of democracy. This is tragic and dangerous. To weather the obstacles, one should rather focus on developing democratic alternatives.

The real problem now is how to handle the post-conflict problems of economic and social development in favour of not only the victims of the tsunami but also the many more victims of violence (who are not only ex-combatants), without falling into the usual trap as in similar situations (like in East Timor) of mismanagement, corruption and even new conflicts within the nationalist movement. So far, the major hurdle has been the lack of funds for reintegration as compared to re-construction. This has already spurred attempts to find clientelistic and corrupt shortcuts to funds and business opportunities; both by people asking for favours and by political groups competing for support and votes.

Unfortunately, the 2006 elections did only consider economic development and reconstruction in very general terms. The priorities and details were supposed to be taken care of separately, by experts, donors and NGOs. Hence there were no clear mandates in this respect. So far, moreover, only the very top-leaders are elected. It is true that the insulation of the economic issues of reconstruction and development protected initially the process of democratisation against powerful vested interest, but with the elections the protection became a blessing in disguise that must be compensated for.

Meanwhile, preparations for the transition of the responsibility for economic reconstruction and support for reintegration of the victims of violence have been delayed. With only a year to go, the external agencies are finally making preparations. But until today, for instance, support has not even been granted to the governor's crucial efforts at fighting corruption. The donors and experts seem to prefer to continue working under their own flags.

Aside from some anti-corruption campaigners, there is little civic capacity to monitor and fight bad governance from below. Even principled pro-democrats have problems of resisting clientelism as they build parties and compete for supporters. Also, there are few interest-based organisations such as trade unions and farmers movements that could monitor and channel support to people. One partial but possibly crucial exception is the women's organisations, which are less involved in macho politics.

Of course it is easy to argue, then, that more democracy would only makes things worse by favouring nepotism, corruption and even

conflicts. Many say, one should give priority to stern top-down measures towards rule of law, strong institutions and external investment that might provide more opportunities and resources. Nobody denies the need for this. But nobody has been able to show who will really enforce these measures consistently from above.

However one should examine positive experiences from other contexts where there has been a need to curb corruption without being able to rely fully on either the state, leaders, parties or 'popular' organisations. Such experiences such as those in parts of Brazil, South Africa, the Philippines and the Indian state of Kerala point in another direction. They suggest that it is possible to mobilise some of the actors in favour of not running in elections but rather facilitating alternative, democratic and impartial channels for participatory planning and budgeting as well as the accounting of public executives and institutions. Typically this has then been done through a governor's or mayor's office, or a planning board.

To get such efforts functional within a year under the present conditions may seem next to impossible. Yet, as we know, wide sections of the society have already shown a remarkable ability to develop and use the new democratic opportunities. With concerted efforts on the part of pro-democrats in government – including the governor and his deputy – as well as from political and social movements from below, and with at least some support from the donors, it might be possible to get started in a number of districts with inspiring pilot cases of participatory budgeting and social auditing. If so, there is at least this time no doubt that the people of Aceh deserve encouraging international attention for once again having shown to the world that there is a great potential in improvements by democratic struggle rather than by keeping it on hold.

In short, it was possible to promote peace and thus also relief and reconstruction by taking advantage of the democratic openings *and* to expand on them. Likewise it should be possible right now to also introduce measures for good governance of further development. The major difference is that last time it was sufficient that the experts, donors and NGOs insulated relief and reconstruction from dominant politics and 'business as usual'. This time, they also need to support the shaping of alternative democratic channels. Democratic channels that enable people themselves to abstain from personal patronage and instead to voice their own needs, while also keeping politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen accountable. In short, there is no need to 'sequence democracy' – 'only' to pave the way for gradual improvements by developing democratic instruments *and* popular capacities to advance and use them.

Political Citizenship is Possible

The 2003-2004 Survey indicated that the circumstances surrounding the advance and the retreat of democracy are comparatively similar in geographical spread, be it in Sumatra, Java and Bali, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Eastern Indonesia. Pro-democracy actors in these regions seemed to be encountering problems, options, and situations that were similar to each others. Despite some dissimilarity in findings obtained from Aceh and Papua, Indonesian democracy in general, as concluded by Demos, was in good shape within a country-wide political framework.

A similar situation is evident from the results of the 2007 Survey despite each region producing a different picture. The average index of the instruments of democracy in Java and Bali stand out as the most prominent, indicating a better democratic situation compared to other regions. In addition, while the average index of the instruments in Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Eastern Indonesia are relatively comparable, Sulawesi appears to be lower than the others. This may partly reflect the fragile conditions brought by conflicts that have occurred in some parts of the island, such as in Poso in Central Sulawesi. Comparatively speaking, the average index for all regions (Table 4.3) has seen an improvement when contrasted with the results of the previous survey.

**Table 4.3. Average index of the instruments of democracy:
Regional and national**

NO	Region	Average index 2003/04	Average index 2007
1	Sumatra	36	47
2	Jawa and Bali	37	53
3	Kalimantan	42	45
4	Sulawesi	36	38
5	Eastern Indonesia	35	43
6	National	37	46

In a country-wide political framework, the presence of a civil political community is crucial. The results of the 2007 Survey reveal a strong tendency for people to state their source of identity as being Indonesian residents during the 2004 General Election. Party affiliation similarly formed an important source of identity. In contrast, the results for religious or ethnic groups as a source of identity were comparatively low.

**Table 4.4. Informants' assessment of people's identity
in 2004 general elections**

NO	PEOPLE'S IDENTITY IN 2004 GENERAL ELECTIONS	PERCENT
1	As a residents of Indonesia in general	35
2	As residents of their city district/province	12
3	As residents of their village and hamlet (dusun)	7
4	As members of their ethnic community	8
5	As members of their religious community	5
6	As members/supporters of 'their' political party	24
7	As members of their social class	8

Percentages based on number of informants (N=903).

Assuming that the categories of 'residents of Indonesia', 'members/supporters of a political party', and 'social class' as being the source of identity do represent the consciousness of a nationally-bound political community, Table 4.4 indicates that 66% of informants assessed 'the nation of Indonesia' as being a political framework for voters during the 2004 Election. In contrast, there were only 13% of informants who confirmed that people tended to identify themselves as members of a religious or ethnic community. In short, the Election appears to have been quite successful in fostering citizens' identity in terms of "Indonesianity".

Another research by Demos conducted in 2006 and 2007 aimed at reflecting the experience of pro-democracy actors involved in local elections (Demos 2008) reveals that direct local elections have opened up opportunities for alternative actors to gain political positions. At a local election in 2005 in the District of Serdang Bedagai in the Province of North Sumatra, a candidate with an activist background succeeded in gaining support from the constituents of farmers and labour networks. A local election in the District of East Belitung of Bangka Belitung Province, held in 2005, was won by an alternative actor, who had been a campaigner for the fulfilment of basic needs of local people. In the District of Manggarai of East Nusa Tenggara Province, an alternative actor was also successful in a local election in 2005 for his 'door-to-door' approach. In spite of some successes, social movements remain ironically fragmented. The research, therefore, recommends the need to organise the social movements into a mutually-agreed joint platform to challenge the political monopoly of the powerful elite.

Secondly, the religion-based identity is not as prominent as the ethnically-based identity. Moreover, in the context of conflict, the latter (36%) appears to be more essential than the former (12%). In addition, those who saw social class to be central to identity remained higher than those stating religion was central. Therefore, conflicts in Poso or Ambon being arguably motivated by religion may not conform to the findings, rather had possibly been caused by accumulated resentment among ethnic groups and social classes overlapping with groupings based on religious difference.

The tendency toward identifying with a nationally-set political framework may make a contribution to maintaining the integration of Indonesia as a political society. The use of jargon and symbols that refer to ethnic or religious affiliation by parties and mass organisations at a local level is, of course, acceptable if it does not put at risk the equality of people with regards to civil and political rights within the national political framework. Indonesia is not the only society in the world that has a diverse composition of ethnic and religious identities. The experience of the Indian state of Kerala is an example in which democracy and human rights are celebrated by people with different cultural backgrounds and identities. The historic struggle against the caste system and domination during the colonial era are based on the fact that most socio-religious reform movements mostly demanded equality of civil and political rights for all citizens. Struggling for the interests or rights for the benefit of one particular group is rare.

With this in mind, it should be noted that the best available way for political engagement within a democratic political framework is the opening up of *democratic* political spheres at a local level. Yet, this does not mean that there would be no obstacles. Firstly, the data shows that 40% of informants believed that people were not interested in politics.⁴ This means that the existing political space may become a playing ground dominated solely by the powerful elite. The experience of Aceh, however, shows that once the local political system is no longer monopolised, by allowing local parties and independent candidates, people tend to develop enthusiasm and interest in *democratic* politics.

A separate 2006 Survey on Aceh by Demos (2007) indicated that only 15% of informants believed that people had little interest in politics. Secondly, most informants (83%) also argued that people tended to consider politics as a struggle to take over and to manipulate power, which is strictly the business of the elite. Only 14% of informants believed that people considered politics to be a form of public control over public matters. This indicates that most people take the elite's monopoly on

politics for granted. In addition, as well as promoting 'go politics' actions to pro-democracy activists to prevent political domination by the elite and maintaining the NGOs' domain of activities of strengthening civil society, it is also important to encourage citizens to build their awareness of inclusiveness, without which civil society organisations would potentially fall into sectarianism often used by the powerful elite to advocate their narrow-minded vested interests.⁵

Conclusions

What conclusions can be drawn from this discussion?

- Firstly, the strengthening of identity in relation to ethnicity (compared to religion) and the '*putra daerah*' issue continues to indicate that Indonesia is not yet fully a country based on nationhood. Should such conditions continue to develop, there is a high risk that Indonesia will disintegrate into ethnically and religiously based political communities. The potential for conflict caused by difference of ethnicity and religious sentiments as well as feelings of regionalism are symptomatic of a serious nationhood problem.
- Second, the expression of 'Indonesian-ness' becomes prominent in the 2004 General Election, strongly pointing to the existence of a functioning political community. Still, this is not a necessary indication, that all is well with the citizenship situation.
- Third, the need for a widespread political community is strongly indicated by the crucial role it played in the Aceh peace process.
- Fourth, the organisation of democracy at a local level has positively contributed to the country-wide political framework, as proven by the important role of local parties and democratic political forces in Aceh. On the other hand, the settlement of conflicts in Maluku and Poso were not as successful given the absence of democratic transparency, demonopolisation of the political system and, thus, the chances to build a democratic local political power. The 'central-government' oriented approach applied to the settlement of the conflicts in Poso and Maluku may even have caused additional problems, such as corruption, violence and intimidation by local business interested and factions within the military. As the experience of Aceh suggests, it is necessary to open up local and democratic political spaces.
- Fifth, closed local political spaces cause people to become easily entrapped in religious, ethnic and regional sentiments, thus facilitating conflicts. Poso and Maluku are cases in point. It is correct that sociologically the people in Poso and Maluku are more diverse than in Aceh, and that, therefore, people think that conflict

settlement in that region is more difficult; and that is exactly where the problem lies. Endeavours to resolve a conflict without opening new political spaces at local level is a hurdle to process. The case of Aceh has proven that the opening of political spaces enabled the Indonesian government and the Aceh nationalist movement (including GAM but also other organisations) to link their interests and opt for the transformation of an armed conflict into a democratic political framework. Therefore, opening up local political spaces will also bring together the interests of ethnic and religious groups, thus lessening the potential for conflicts.

Endnotes

- 1 The party was, in fact, one of elements within the parliament that endorsed the controversial, and rather sectarian, anti-pornography bill recently passed. The parliamentary committee responsible for the bill was chaired by a leading member of the party.
- 2 The 2003-2004 survey was compiled in "Towards the Agenda of Human Rights Based Meaningful Democracy", Executive Report, 20 January 2005, unpublished. Also see, Priyono, *et.al.*, *Op. cit.*
- 3 Much of these insights are from Demos' special Aceh survey (2006-2007) and a number of special studies on the role of democracy in Aceh that are being conducted by a special team directed by Stanley Adi Prasetyo in partnership between *Demos* and a separate project directed by Professors Kristian Stokke and Olle Törnquist, University of Oslo and supported by the Norwegian Research Council on the politics of peace and reconstruction in post-tsunami Sri Lanka and Aceh.
- 4 See Table B.2. in Appendix.
- 5 A survey in New Delhi, India, shows that the people involved in civil society associations have high awareness. See Harris (2005). Civil society associations are able to promote non-civil sectarian interest. "Derived from diverse backgrounds, the civic associations can sometimes be used to promote the interests of one of social groups that is the opposite of other groups for non-democratic purpose," See Hefner (2007). Also see Nordholt and Sidel (2004) who investigates the development of various local politics, including those in Indonesia.

Chapter Five



The Politics of Dominating Democracy and The Consolidation of Powerful-Elite

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As democracy in its formal forms becomes a norm, actors from different political spectrums have adopted instruments of democracy during the process of democratisation. Powerful actors, identified by informants as those wielding actual political and economic power, tend to use and promote the instruments of democracy more than in the past. While the results of the 2003-2004 Survey suggest that only 50% of these actors tended to use and promote, or only use, the instruments of democracy, the 2007 Survey shows that the proportion of these actors increased significantly. According to informants, 36% of powerful actors used the instruments of democracy, while another 35% used and promoted them.

How shall we understand these complex dynamics? Despite, on the one hand, the fact that most democratic rights and freedoms persist,

democratic governance improves and standards of free and fair elections remain high, on the other hand, several basic freedoms have deteriorated. Indexes related to representation are among the worst of the instruments of democracy according to the results of the 2007 Survey. The worst index of all is that of the freedom to form parties at a national or local level (including independent candidates). In public discourse strong opinions against democracy, dubbed as a Western concept hence incompatible with local cultures, are being voiced. In addition, democracy-framed elections, for instance, are believed to enable money politics to grow and to cause conflicts. In this chapter, we shall observe and analyse some of the aspects related to the capacity of powerful actors with regard to the ongoing process of democratisation.

The 2007 Survey suggests five major characteristics. The first is the continued consolidation of the power of these powerful actors and their domination in organised politics, especially in the representation system. The second is that the powerful actors are becoming much larger than that which supported Soeharto. The third is that local powerful actors are committing abuses by draining public resources. The fourth is the cynicism and lack of trust from the powerful actors towards the work of democracy. This also expressed by the liberal educated middle class and upper elite who have failed to win elections. The fifth is the spreading of the idea of 'sequencing democracy', referring to the development of institutions that lay the basis for rules and regulations for people's participation.

Dominating Democracy

With regard to the instruments, the 2003-2004 Survey and the 2007 Survey clearly show a contrasting picture. The 2003-2004 Survey reveals that a large numbers of actors are considered to have manipulated or bypassed the instruments of democracy. Table 5.1 below shows the shift in the relation of powerful actors to the instruments of democracy.

Table 5.1. Powerful actor relationship to the 11 categories of the instruments of democracy

NO	CATEGORY OF INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY	Powerful actor relations with the institutions of democracy									
		USE AND PROMOTE		USE		USE AND MANIPULATE		AVOID OR OPT FOR ALTERNATIVES			
		2003/04 ⁽¹⁾	2007 ⁽²⁾	2003/04 ⁽¹⁾	2007 ⁽²⁾	2003/04 ⁽¹⁾	2007 ⁽²⁾	2003/04 ⁽¹⁾	2007 ⁽²⁾		
		(% of powerful actors)									
1	Equal citizenship	18	44	30	31	35	18	14	6		
2	International law and UN HR instruments	10	32	32	40	28	12	17	14		
3	Rule of law and justice	12	32	22	35	41	22	19	9		
4	Civil and political rights	15	40	27	34	37	17	15	8		
5	Economic and social rights	14	36	28	35	36	18	15	10		
6	Free and fair elections	17	36	35	35	26	23	9	5		
7	Good representation	7	29	22	39	20	21	5	11		
8	Democratic and accountable Government	13	32	25	33	36	24	19	10		
9	Freedom of media, press and academic freedoms	17	36	34	38	31	18	11	8		
10	Additional civil political Participation	12	31	33	40	30	17	12	11		
11	Direct participation	15	33	29	35	35	18	13	13		
	Average	16	35	33	36	36	19	15	10		

⁽¹⁾N= 1,795; ⁽²⁾N= 1890; All figures are in percentages based on the number of powerful actors that were assigned to each category in both surveys.

In general terms, the number of powerful actors tending to manipulate and bypass the instruments of democracy is significantly different from the number of those who generally opt to use and promote the instruments. If they are added together, the number of powerful actors using and promoting democracy is in the order of 71%. With such a picture, it is no longer suitable to say that the dominant elites hinder democracy or even show anti-democratic attitudes, as they commonly did in the New Order or in the early days of *Reformasi*. Yet, the data must be carefully interpreted before we are able to make any assumptions about democracy being won. At this point, it is safe to say that democracy as a procedure has become the acceptable norms.

Although the table above clearly shows a generally positive development, four points should be paid particular attention. Firstly, the data shows that the use of instruments of democracy related to good representation are insufficiently promoted, and the index is low (only by 29% of powerful actors) if compared to other instruments. Both surveys indicate that powerful actors tend to use, rather than to promote, these instruments of democracy.

Secondly, the instruments related to representation are the most manipulated and neglected by powerful actors (21% and 11%, or 32% if taken together). Compared to the results of the 2003-2004 Survey, the trend of powerful actors manipulating and bypassing representation has increased in the results of the recent survey.

Thirdly, the powerful actors tend to have an interest in forms of direct participation. Interestingly, they seem to promote forms of direct representation as shown by their relations with the instruments relating to good representation. This shows that powerful actors prefer using less organised forms of representation rather than improving the system of political representation. Nonetheless, informants assessed that the condition of representation remained poor.

Fourthly, the average proportion of powerful actors tending to manipulate and bypass the instruments of democracy in the 2007 Survey is quite large (19% and 10%, or 29% overall). The proportion of powerful actors seeking alternatives outside of the instruments of democracy did not rapidly decrease as compared to the results of the previous survey, namely from 15% to 10%. This is probably a clear indication of the existence of old powerful elites within the ranks of the powerful actors. It is, however, necessary to add that an analysis has been made of the grim picture of democratisation in Indonesia as elites are breaking up.¹ Some experts conclude that old elites, including bureaucrats, politicians and business people, have returned to dominate Indonesian politics through

some adjustments or repositioning of their roles and positions.² In spite of these analyses or explanations, there are strong signs that political domination by the oligarchy, both at national and local level, is taking place. Research by Gerry van Klinken shows that democratisation had enabled local elites to emerge and rise.³ His claim, to some extent, is supported by findings made by Demos.

Elite groups are more broadly-based, more localised, and less militarised than under Soeharto. Remarkably, most have managed to adjust to the new, supposedly democratic, institutions. This is not to say that abuses are absent, but decentralisation and elections have enabled diverse sections of the country's elite to mobilise popular support, more often, by calling up clientelistic networks, privileged control of public resources, and alliances with business and community leaders. Yet, the interest of such elites in elections is *both* a crucial basis for existing democracy *as well as being* its major drawback. Without the elites' support, Indonesia's democracy would not have survived and now has become the domain of 'rotten politicians' who prosper through rampant corruption.

In all these respects, Indonesia may thus begin to resemble India, the most stable democracy in the global South. One big difference, however, is that Indonesia's dominant party and election system is not inclusive of the major interests of the people at large and also erects high barriers to participation by independent players. This prevents civic and popular organisations from entering organised politics. It is in this respect that Indonesia still seriously lags behind. Moreover, these groups remain hampered by their own fragmentation and weak mass organisation.

The Composition and the Presence of Extended Democratic Elite

It is possible that the failure to improve representation has been made possible through the dominance of the powerful actors. Based on the identification of informants in the 2007 Survey, actors with state and organised political backgrounds, such as bureaucrats and government officials, politicians and parliamentarians, constitute the biggest proportion of the powerful actors, 70% of the total. This number has increased quite significantly compared to results of the 2003-2004 Survey, where these actors were less than 60% of the total.

**Table 5.2. The Composition of powerful actors
based on the 2007 and 2003/04 surveys⁽¹⁾**

NO	POWERFUL/DOMINANT ACTORS	2003/04 (N=1.795)	2007 (N=1.945)
		(percent)	
1	Government/Bureaucracy	40	46
2	Political parties and parliament members (central+local)	17	23
3	Religious or ethnic groups and adat councils	12	9
4	Police and military; underworld and militia	16	7
5	Business	12	6
6	Professionals	-	5
7	Others	2	5

⁽¹⁾ In both surveys we asked the informants to identify the 3 actors considered to have actual and significant political power. All figures show the percentages based on the number of main actors that were assigned each category in both surveys.

Apart from identifying powerful actors with a state and organised politics background, Table 5.2 also reveals at least two shifts in the composition of powerful actors. Firstly, if compared to the results of the 2003-2004 Survey, coercive actors (police and military, as well as militias) in the 2007 Survey are no longer assessed as being powerful actors in the political process. The proportion of actors in this category was 16% in the 2003-2004 Survey. This figure declined to 7% in the recent survey. This may indicate that the process of democratisation is operating on the basis of civil and political freedoms. However, this claim does not seem to conform with the index score recorded for instruments of democracy related to civil and political rights as well as basic freedoms, which declined from 59 to 53. The decline in percentage of coercive forces being assessed as being powerful actors should, therefore, be interpreted with utmost care as these forces may still be not be democratically controlled. In fact, the influence and role of these forces remains significant.

Secondly, shift in the composition of powerful actors takes place in the form of a declining proportion of actors with a business background. As seen in Table 5.2, the percentage in this category drops from 12% to 6% of all powerful actors identified by informants. The broad level of playing field of powerful actors combined with the fact that they are identified mostly through their activities during elections and in government offices in turn reduces the space for business people. Despite the fact that business actors remain very powerful, there is an indication

that they are increasingly dependent on political practices dominated by actors within government, the bureaucracy and political parties. Moreover, a number of business people have made a transformation and begun a political career as in the case of Soetrisno Bachir of Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN/National Mandate Party).

Thirdly, assessments by informants in some regions show a similar composition of powerful actors who are no longer significantly related to military figures or those using coercive means. The powerful actors now exist both at local and national levels, triggered by the implementation of decentralisation and local elections.

Slightly different from the results of the 2003-2004 Survey, the recent survey found that the oligarchy is not uncontested. Data from the 2007 Survey shows that the alternative actors have managed to enter the political arena that had previously been the domain of the dominant elites, such as in the parliament and government. As discussed in the beginning of the chapter, there are strong signals from the alternative actors that they intend to make democracy the only option. In doing so, they have committed themselves in a number of political actions characterised by direct representation. Although direct representation is less organised and less democratic in term of participation and control—more like a shortcut, the alternative actors have succeeded in gaining positions in parliament and in executive positions.

Nonetheless, political domination by the powerful actors remains prominent, as stated by informants, and the existence of these actors is in a variety of political spheres and arenas. The powerful actors were assessed to be present, more than the alternative actors, in most arenas: political parties, bureaucracy, government offices, business, as well as the armed forces and the police force. It is only in lobbying groups and interest organisations that the presence of these actors was less prominent than the alternative actors.⁴

The domination of powerful actors is evident in the comparison between the two surveys. Activities of powerful actors are more prominent in political parties (including parliament) and in government. The following Table 3.4 shows the comparison of the results of the recent and previous survey on the spheres where the powerful actors are present and influential. At the same time, alternative actors also show similar interest in taking part in these spheres. In 2003-2004, there was only 19 percent of informants who stated that pro-democracy actors tended to be active in political parties, parliament and the government, while in 2007 the number increased to become 32 percent. Therefore, these arenas are considered to be the most strategic domain for both groups of actors.

Activities of the powerful actors in non-profit organisations, the armed forces and police force however, show a considerable decline. This data is consistent with the decline in groups with non-political organisation and military backgrounds within the powerful actor group.

Table 5.3. Powerful actors' areas of activities

NO	AREAS OF POWERFUL ACTORS' ACTIVITIES	2003/04 ⁽¹⁾ (%)	2007 ⁽²⁾ (%)
1	Business and industry (incl. small business)	17	13
2	Self-managed non-profit units	25	2
3	Lobby groups	n/a	9
4	Interest organisations	n/a	14
5	Political parties ⁽³⁾	12	22
6	Elected government	12 ⁽⁴⁾	17
7	The bureaucracy		19
8	The judiciary		3
9	Military and police	9	3

⁽¹⁾ All informants are asked to assess what are the two most important areas and arenas for each powerful actor.

⁽²⁾ In the previous survey, we used slightly different categories

⁽³⁾ In the previous survey, we used the category of "parliament"

⁽⁴⁾ In the previous survey, we used the category of "other state institutions" outside "military" and "parliament"

All percentages are based on responses provided by informants. In the 2007 survey, informants were asked to select the two most important areas where powerful actors are active, while in the previous survey, they were asked to select three.

The powerful actors still demonstrate a tendency to dominate politics. The escalation of their presence in parliament and government may be a response to efforts by alternative actors to gain access to the two institutions. It is possible that the powerful actors have 'allowed' alternative actors to use lobby groups and interest organisations, as they consider them to be less strategic than parliament and government offices. Yet, as Table 5.4 shows, the powerful actors did not consider lobby groups and interest organisations less important.

Sources of Power and How They Become Legitimate

We have long known that the three pillars of power of powerful actors are connections or networks, economic resources, mass support including the use of violence. Through their inter-personal networks, they establish strong intra-elite alliances, including with businesses, to the

exclusion of other parties in politics. The reliance of the business sector on political backing and their vast access to sources of public funds through collusion and nepotism provide funding for their political manoeuvres. This is the reason that powerful actors are able to easily establish a variety of organisations to gather mass support for a mobilisation to achieve their own political goals. Moreover, powerful actors do not neglect control over the mass media.

The results of the 2003-2004 Survey indicated domination by powerful actors over these sources of power already mentioned. According to informants' assessment at the time, the domination of the powerful actors was distributed evenly throughout the four sources of power with a slight emphasis on power through personal networks. The 2007 Survey indicates that the domination of powerful actors was relatively evenly distributed over the four sources of power. The difference between the results of the two surveys lies in the fact that powerful actors tended to rely on mass and political support, including potential coercion. As many as 33% of informants, when asked to assess the main sources of power of these powerful actors, confirmed the claim. In the 2003-2004 Survey, the figure was only 22%. The percentage for networks and interpersonal contact resources decreased from 38% to 28%. In addition, the percentage for economic and information resources remains relatively stagnant at 25% and 13% in the 2007 Survey and 23% and 17% in the 2003-2004 Survey.⁵

The data may indicate several points. *Firstly*, the even distribution of powerful actors' domination over sources of power reflects a large potential for domination of and oligarchic practices in the democratic political institutions they are part of. *Secondly*, the threat to civil and political freedoms may be closely related to a trend which shows that powerful actors are dependent on political and mass power resources, including coercion. *Thirdly*, although the establishment of various organisations to enlist mass support is a method of building political power, it seems that powerful actors only use it for the purpose of mobilisation rather than as a basis for democratically organised politics. Therefore, the data may explain the stagnation of instruments related to political representation.

In addition, powerful actors appear to have changed their approach to political power by shifting to formal and democratic methods, with which powerful actors use their capacity to make connections with the politicians and government officials at various levels as well as with other figures (30%), and through being elected (12%). Findings from the 2007 Survey indicate that these methods had been employed more than those shown in the results of the 2003-2004 Survey.⁶

The data on the sources of power used by the alternative actors seems to confirm the three points made above. On the one hand, the alternative actors tend to show their power over sources of information and knowledge, numbering 37% in the 2007 Survey and 36% in the 2003-2004 Survey. On the other hand, as assessed by informants, they tend to abandon the need for support from economic resources. In a recent survey, economic resources only reached 10% of the total of their sources of power.

While the sources of power represent “capital” in Bourdieu’s (1997) sense, they would only be actual when transformed. The following table illustrates the methods often employed by powerful actors to transform their sources of power:

Table 5.4. How powerful actors transform sources of power

NO	Ways of Transformation	2007 (%)
1	By providing discursive activities within the public sphere through seminars, discussion, hearings	11
2	By providing contacts and dialogue with politicians and administrators at various levels	17
3	By providing and building networks and co-ordination for joint activities	7
4	By creating contacts and partnerships with powerful figures and experts	13
5	By being able to demonstrate collective and mass-based strength	5
6	By generating economic self-sufficiency, self-help activities, co-operatives, etc	2
7	By gaining legitimacy through DPR, DPRD, the judicial system and or the formal executive organs of the state	12
8	By making use of various means of forceful official authority, coercion, demonstration of power and force as well as the generation of fear	7
9	By using state and government budgets and other resources and regulations to the benefit of pro-market policies and various actors in the market	8
10	By providing patronage in various forms (including favourable treatment, loans, aid and charity) to, for instance social groups, communities, civil society organisations (including NGOs) as well as to businessmen, relatives and other individuals	5
11`	By organising support within communities	6

Percentages are based on the number of Informants’ responses

Table 5.4 demonstrates that powerful actors often used lobbying and contacts and networks (48%) to transform their sources of power. In addition, they also employed more formal means through elections and gaining legitimacy through state institutions (18%). It is obvious here that the elites are more eloquent in their political manoeuvres, creating a better relationship between themselves and the instruments of democracy. In fact, they are more prepared to leave behind non-democratic ways, such as coercion and shows of force (8%).

The Politics of Image

The changes highlighted above have inevitably changed the style of political communication employed by the powerful actors. Language and terms to promote issues previously only common amongst the pro-democracy activists now carry some weight. Powerful actors are now eloquent in espousing the issues of human rights, democracy and good governance. Yet, these actors have not yet adequately fought for such issues in the way the alternative actors have. Data indicates that the issue of human rights only amounted to 3% of all issues advocated by the powerful actors. This is in contrast to the proportion of human rights issues promoted by the alternative actors, which was 11%. Issues of democracy, civil and political rights amounted to 10% of all issues nurtured by powerful actors. Yet, the number remained low when compared to the alternative actors who recorded 20%. Issues of good governance and anti-corruption accounted for 13% of all issues raised by the powerful actors, while alternative actors recorded 15%.

It is, however, reasonable for the powerful actors to take up such issues, as they need to broaden their political domination in public arenas. A total reliance on different sources of power is considered to be no longer sufficient as they must conform to democracy as now setting the rules of the game. In other words, the more democratic themes one delivers to the public, the more he or she is able to create a self-image of being a democrat. Thus, for the powerful actors, democratisation is also about the politics of image. Their politics are aimed at maintaining their presence and popularity in the public arena in order to defend their oligarchic power and domination of power. In spite of promoting democracy, the powerful actors, assessed by informants, were reluctant to raise certain issues. As many as 41% of all issues on human rights raised by the powerful actors only covered general themes, while only 19% covered specific issues of human rights violations. Subscribing to the general themes of human rights is probably more advantageous for the purpose of image creation.

Table 5.5. Type of issues and interests struggled for by powerful actors

NO	CONTENT OF INTERESTS, ISSUES, PLATFORMS AND OR POLICIES	TYPE OF ISSUES/INTERESTS/POLICIES ⁽²⁾			
		RESPONSE ⁽¹⁾	SPECIFIC ISSUES OR INTERESTS	COMBINATION OF SEVERAL ISSUES/ INTERESTS	GENERAL CONCEPTS OR IDEAS
		(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
1	Economic development oriented	32	22	48	30
2	Good governance, anti-corruption, rule of law	12	28	44	28
3	Democracy and civil-political rights (and gender issues) ⁽³⁾	11 (1)	28 (61)	40 (21)	32 (18)
4	Religious and ethnic values, morality, conflict and conflict resolution	11	27	46	27
5	Decentralisation and local autonomy	11	27	45	28
6	Public services, basic needs, social security	9	26	46	27
7	Nationalism, integration, national security	6	26	42	32
8	Sustainable development, environment	3	35	44	21
9	Human rights	3	19	40	41
	TOTAL	100	26	45	29

⁽¹⁾ Indicates the proportion of issues the powerful actors struggle for. The percentage is based on the total number of answers provided by the informants.

⁽²⁾ Indicates the proportion of type of issues the powerful actors struggle for. The percentage refers to the number of informants selecting the issues in questions.

⁽³⁾ The numbers in brackets refers to gender issue.

Table 5.5 shows a trend by powerful actors to raise the issues of economic development. In addition, the issues of good governance, rule of law and democracy are those most promoted by powerful actors. This provides an impression that powerful actors are attempting to show that they are a main element in the democratisation process.

Although the powerful actors tend to focus their attention on the issues of economic development, they do not seem to make intensive effort in advocating the more public issues and interests, namely public services and the provision of people's basic needs. The advocacy of

economic development by the powerful actors may have improved the macroeconomic indicators. At the local level, the implementation of decentralisation and regional autonomy along with the call for good governance have encouraged local governments to produce formal rules and regulations aimed at improving public services, particularly the provision of free education and health services. However, the legislation relating to and the implementation of economic development are often working in different directions. It is in this context that we can understand the findings discussed in an earlier chapter regarding the improvement of instruments related to social, economic and cultural rights improving but having a poor actual condition.

The above discussion on the way powerful actors communicate issues and interests confirms the tendency toward the politics of image. As assessed by informants, making a media appearance is a preferred method for these actors.

Mobilisation and Organisation

Another method employed more by powerful actors than the alternative actors is the use of organisations, as an effective means of not only building their image but also to mobilise organisational support. It is likely that in the image-politics process, powerful actors tend to use organisations to mobilise support rather than to establish a real organisation as the basis for political power.

Table 5.6 demonstrates that that the powerful actors often created contacts and partnerships with charismatic figures and established patron-client relationships to mobilise power, rather than building an organisation that integrates various popular organisations. In comparison with the findings from the 2003-2004 Survey in which the powerful actors considered the establishment of systematic organisations important for mobilising support, the 2007 Survey shows that they apply less organisational methods to mobilise support. According to the informants in the 2003-2004 Survey, in regard to methods of mobilising power by powerful actors, 33% referred to organisational methods. In the 2007 Survey, however, the number declined to 11%. However, mobilisation methods relying on charismatic and popular figures remains important as indicated in an increase from 14% in the 2003-2004 Survey to 30% in the 2007 Survey.

The following table illustrates methods of mobilisation by powerful actors:

Table 5.6. Mobilisation methods of powerful actors

No	Methods of Mobilisation Support	2003/04 (%)	2007(%)
1	Popular and charismatic leaders	14	30
2	Clientelism	26	28
3	Alternative patronage	9	10
4	Networks among independent actors	15	22
5	Integration of popular organisations into more general organisations*	33	11
6	Others	2	0
TOTAL RESPONSES		100	100

These percentages are based on the number of informants' responses. Informants were instructed to select two options at the most. All of the percentages are based on the number of responses given by informants. In the 2007 Survey, informants were asked to select two options, while in the 2003-2004 Survey they were asked to select three.

* In the 2003/04 survey the method of integration of popular organisations into more general organisations was categorised into three, (a) non-programmatic political machines (16), (b) federative networks (7), and (c) comprehensive organisation unifying similar perspectives (10).

In addition, Demos found that powerful actors tend to use hierarchical connection (22%) as well as ethnicity and religion based approaches (22%) in their organising methods. They similarly make connections with people with similar vision (15%), professional background (13%), as well as descriptive groups (youth organisations, women organisations)(12%).⁷ The findings indicate that the category of powerful actors are dominated by actors with government and organised politics backgrounds who use the structure of government administration to organise the masses. As powerful actors tend to underplay organisations, then the only remaining hierarchical relationship is the government structure. The strong trend of powerful actors to use ethnic and religious approaches, as well as descriptive groups, shows a lack of organisational capacity on their part. Both organisational methods depend on the division of the society and need no organisational skills. It is worth noting that their approach to youth and women organisations is not atypical and new in nature as it has been commonly employed in all levels of government administration. A similar approach has been used in relation to various ethnic and religious groups.

The Consolidation of the Powerful Elite, but Reluctance for Representation

Having seen the channels utilised by the powerful actors to make linkages with the masses, the question of their capacity to build and consolidate alliances with other forces to elevate issues is worth noting in order to evaluate the efficacy of their organising work.

The first aspect with regard to the powerful actors' capacity to undertake consolidation is the establishment of alliances. It is believed that powerful actors tend to play down the role of other actors in alliances they set up amongst themselves. As assessed by informants, 28% of the allies of the powerful actors are politicians and parliamentarians both at local and central level. Moreover, other important and reliable allies are government officials and bureaucracy (21%). Powerful actors are also connected with businesses, professional groups, as well as ethnic and religious groups, including traditional communities, in oligarchic relations. Such relations between business, community groups and powerful actors enjoy a symbiotic relationship, exchanging interests among themselves. These are seen clearly when analysing the composition of sources of power of the powerful actors. The following Table 5.7 depicts parties with whom powerful actors established their alliances.

Tabel 5.7. Powerful actors' alliances

No	Actors with whom powerful actors build alliances	Response ⁽¹⁾ (%)
1	Political parties and Parliament (central and local)	28
2	Government/Bureaucracy (incl semi-state bodies)	21
3	Religious or ethnic groups; Adat councils etc.	13
4	NGOs and mass organisations	12
5	Business	10
6	Academics, the judiciary/law firms, media	9
7	Police and military; Underworld and militia	6

⁽¹⁾ All percentages are based on the number of responses given by the informants. Each informant was asked to name three alliances at the most, for each powerful actor.

It is interesting to observe that a tendency to form alliances with the military and the police, including with hoodlums, is unlikely. Only 6% of informants assessed that there was the possibility of such alliances. However, the data does not necessarily indicate a declining involvement in coercive practices in politics.

The second aspect concerns the relation of powerful actors to the existing political organisations. The assessment made by informants indicated that the powerful actors tended to have closely-knit relations with established political parties, such as with Golkar (40%), PDIP (17%), some Islamic parties (12%), and Partai Demokrat (PD/Democrats Party) (7%). In addition, they are also in alliances with mass organisations (8%), smaller parties (6%), and Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS/Justice and Welfare Party) (3%).⁸ Linkages with a variety of organisations, nonetheless, do not necessarily indicate an organic relation, but rather a more opportunistic in nature relation in order to mobilise the masses.

Informants also provided information on how parties and political organisations finance their activities. The information is useful when observing the structure of power that supports the political domination of the powerful actors. The actors tend to build close relations with political parties and organisations financially supported by the government and organisations backed by business sponsorships.

By now a clear picture of circles of power dominated by powerful elite groups is obvious. Domination over the political system is made possible by maintaining domination in various aspects. The fact that political parties are less dependent on the contribution of candidates is probably because the relations are less permanent and made only during election. The powerful actors within oligarchic groups seem to feel comfortable with the sharing of power while keeping the symbiotic relationship between the actors, on the one hand, and business interests and communitarian groups on the other. Above all, despite their concerted efforts to maintain the oligarchy, a democratic framework could be expected to develop through the practices the powerful actors have applied so far.

Capacity And Strategies for Approaching Governance Institutions

The last aspect relates to powerful actors' interpretation of the function of political representation in democracy. In order to gather information on this issue, informants were asked to assess the manoeuvres made by powerful actors within the system of government, including the private sector, to reach their political goals.

Powerful actors, as shown in Table 5.8, tend to use executive institutions, parliamentarians and the bureaucracy to reach their political goals. Other institutions within the system, such as the judicial system, state auxiliary bodies, civil organisations, businesses and the armed forces and police force are unlikely to be relied upon.

Table 5.8. Institutions used by powerful actors to reach their political goals

No	Governance institutions where powerful actors go	Responses ⁽¹⁾ (%)
1	The political executive – (the government)	34
2	The legislative (e.g. DPRD)	26
3	The bureaucracy	15
4	The judiciary (including the police)	8
5	Institutions for private management (e.g. the market, the family)	5
6	Auxiliary bodies and institution for sub-contracted public governance	4
7	The military	3
8	Institutions for self-management (e.g. cooperatives)	3

⁽¹⁾ All percentages are based on the number of responses provided by the informants. Each informant was asked to mention two institutions at the most, for each powerful actor.

Data on methods employed by powerful actors in making use of institutions reveals an interesting picture. According to 34% of informants, powerful actors make direct use of institutions without involving mediators. The data clearly reveals that the domination by actors with political organisation and government backgrounds within the powerful actor group gives them a special 'privilege' to use the institutions to attain their political goals. The powerful actors still use mediators as go-betweens, and 26% of informants reported that political parties are the preferred mediating institutions. Other institutions are lobby groups, interest organisations, and the mass media (9-11%). Considering that actors with political party and parliamentary backgrounds are dominant in the composition of powerful actors, the findings on the most used mediating institutions confirms their domination.

This data shows that there is evidence of a crisis of representation. Democracy works under the domination of oligarchic groups who dominate politics. Therefore, promoting representation is the most urgent item on the agenda. It was also found that political work in an

organisational framework has declined even among the powerful actors. The public is no more than a mass that is only worth counting on as an instrument for mobilisation by the powerful actors. The 'public' needs to become a political commodity. As a result, this crisis of representation receives attention from the people who, at the same time, have become more interested in politics, placing democracy under public scrutiny. People have begun to blame democracy as being the cause of the socio-economic crisis and mass riots in some local elections. Some people are even entrapped in the romanticism of New Order stability.

The Politics of Order: The next scenario

In various studies on democracy and democratisation, we recognise the idea of democracy sequencing (Carothers 2007). According to this idea, democratisation – which is interpreted as liberal democracy and is mainly embodied in the organisation of fair and free general elections – does not automatically generate a good result. The most important assumption of this idea is that not all communities are ready to apply democracy. Therefore, if the practice of liberal democracy is directly applied to the communities that are not yet ready for democracy, the results will be terrifying. The process of democracy will trigger ethnic conflicts and even inter-regional wars.

Those in favor of this theory are notoriously known as preconditionists, they believe that democracy commonly will grow after certain conditions exist (Berman 2007). This means that democracy will only exist after the enactment of rule of law, good economic development, social welfare and equality, socio-political stability and good governance. In Indonesia, such an argument was dominant during New Order era, with its slogan of Economic Development and national stability.

Such an opinion and idea is accepted, with regards to its supportive socio-political realities. Horizontal conflicts between the supporters of candidates in many regions in Indonesia, such as Makassar, North Maluku and Tuban⁹ are some examples. In addition, arguments and conflicts in parliament that determine the process of decision-making are other examples. The preconditionists would argue that the conflict has been caused by the excessive number of political parties in the legislature. Such a condition causes the attempts to promote stability futile.

In addition to all of these reasons, democracy is considered costly. The data of The Ministry of Internal affairs stated that in 2008, there will be 160 local leader elections in 13 provinces, 112 municipalities and 35 cities, which are expected to expend 200 trillion rupiah. Therefore,

some ideas for simplifying the process of local elections, among others by delegating the election of governor to the DPRD, have emerged. Aside from being less expensive, the efficiency of the democratic process is assumed to produce better result than the practices of democracy that merely generate riots, conflicts and political instability.

The preconditionists also believe that economic development will be successfully conducted when political stability exists. Democracy does not provide stability. China, Vietnam and Singapore are the examples of successful economic development without democracy. On the contrary, attempts to promote liberal democracy in various countries only produce socio-political conflict, and hamper economic development. For example, Iraq post-Saddam, and the results of elections in Egypt, Lebanon and Palestine (Carothers 2007). This idea, though not exactly similar, resembles Huntington's thesis on politics of order. Emerging in the 1960s,¹⁰ this thesis was adopted by New Order's government with its slogan of 'Three Pillars of Development: Stability, Growth and Equal Distribution'.¹¹

The arguments of the preconditionists seem to correlate with the consolidation of oligarchic democracy that we discussed previously. The similarity is marked by the improvement of managerial aspects of governance, including the rule of law and good governance and by the deteriorating conditions of civil and political freedoms. The plot of the scenario developed by the powerful actors leads to the establishment of politics of order.

It is true that the powerful actors do not leave various institutions of democracy, with which representation is not sufficiently promoted. This is the very reason why public vital interests are excluded in the political process. There is no guarantee of powerful actors fulfilling public vital interests either. Our data, on the other hand, indicates that the powerful actors are deeply occupied with their political symbiosis with the politics of the state as well as business and communalism.

Powerful actors are definitely in control of organised politics. As an illustration, data from the 2007 Survey shows that 22% of powerful actors and 14% of alternative actors worked in political parties, while 39% of powerful actors and 23% of alternative actors work in the government. When comparing these figures with the 2003-2004 Survey, it becomes clear that the number of powerful actors working in political parties has increased by 10% (12%) and by 13% (9%) for government. It can, therefore, be concluded that powerful actors dominate and scale up their activities in political parties and government. Parliament, both at central and regional levels, political parties or politicians (28%), and government

along with state-auxiliary institutions (23%) are the preferred alliance partners of the powerful actors. By comparison, alternative actors have roles in parliament and political parties (17%) and government (16%).

Except in Aceh, parties without strong organisational roots that they have inherited from the Soeharto legacy have only a slight chance of entering the electoral arena. Moreover, most issues and interests are voiced through certain circles, but without representation from civic and popular organisational power that originates from groups of professionals, the liberal middle classes, urban poor, labourers, farmers, fisherpeople and women. They are almost completely excluded from the arena of organised politics. Their absence undermines democracy.

At this point, it may be justified to ask whether factions within the elite are satisfied with the existing political arrangements described by informants. Those who have been able to expand their political role, win elections, strike favourable deals with businesses, the military, executive leaders and the crucial ethnic and religious groups would find the current atmosphere satisfying. But there is also distress among other sections of the elite, particularly those who are unable to win elections. They may originate from the ranks of government, business or civil organisations. Others include some elements of middle class within the elites who failed to obtain the majority of votes in elections. At the same time, disappointment from below about the ongoing political processes within Indonesia's system of democracy has begun to come to the surface.

It is therefore understandable that the recent discourse on democracy is dominated by claims made by the less satisfied elements within the powerful elites. Among others is that democracy is not an objective but an instrument and therefore, can be designed to serve the purpose of efficiency. This claim was made explicit by Vice President Jusuf Kalla on many occasions, as well as by Surya Paloh, the Chairman of the Golkar Advisory Board. To make it clear we have quoted statements from these two high-ranking Golkar officials:

"Democracy is merely a means, an instrument, and not an end, and therefore it can be placed in second place." (Jusuf Kalla in his political speech at the closing ceremony of Golkar's Rapimnas (National Leaders Meeting) in Jakarta, 25 November 2007(Kompas 26/11/2007).

"Democracy is not an end, but merely an instrument to achieve people's welfare. Democracy is useless without welfare. (Surya Paloh during the National Meeting of Golkar dan PDI-P" in Medan, 20 June 2007)(Kompas 21/6/2007).

These notions clearly represent a clash between democracy and people's welfare. Democracy is accused of being the cause or the stumbling block of Indonesia's poor economic condition. People in general are still at the stage of how to put food on their table, and not at the democratic stage.¹² Although not in the same way, this idea of democracy was strongly advocated during the New Order, under the slogan "Economic Development and National Stability". The support by some academicians and intellectuals of such an idea proves its wider acceptance.¹³

At this stage, there are three strategies that stem from the notion of Politics of Order. Firstly, this type of discourse on democracy will limit and hinder the progress of pro-democracy movements' and actors. At the same time, the discourse secures the positions and privileges enjoyed by the powerful elites or the privileged based mostly in the country's capital in Jakarta and the established mass-based political parties. Secondly, the discourse will justify the claim that what the people need is good governance, economic growth and the rule of law before full (liberal) democracy can actually be implemented. This leads to the third issue: who are in the best position to be the driving force to advance these preconditions for democracy. It is clear that Indonesia is far from that of 18th and 19th century Europe with its long history of promoting liberal democracy. Indonesia is not even one of the developing states powerfully promoting development. To date Indonesia lacks a strong and independent development-oriented middle class. It is possible that Indonesia can promote Malaysian-style development but at a social cost, such as the emergence of ethnic and or religious based-authoritarianism.

Endnotes

- 1 See, Crouch (1994).
- 2 See, for example Hadiz (2003).
- 3 See van Klinken (2002). Therefore, according to van Klinken, it is also important to observe how politics work for the people in Indonesia in general, beside the elites' behavior in national level. It means, it is not enough to observe those who have power in national level, but also those in local level, where most Indonesian people live and work.
- 4 According to our informants, lobby groups (21% of informants) and interest organisations (28% of informants) are the most important political spheres and arena for alternative actors.
- 5 See Appendix.
- 6 See Appendix.
- 7 The data is served in the Table E.10 in the Attachment of this report.
- 8 See Appendix.
- 9 The process of local head elections in the regions were ended by opened conflicts between the supporters of the candidates. Although the conflict was actually triggered by unclear rules or conflicts among state institutions, it had generated greater scale of social conflicts.
- 10 See Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (Yale University, 1968).
- 11 Jusuf Kalla stated this while doing religious pilgrimage in Mekkah. See "Umrah: Wapres doakan Indonesia aman dan maju", *Kompas*, 25 January 2008.
- 12 This notion was advocated by, among others, Hasyim Muzadi, The Chairman of Nadhatul Ulama. The politics of democracy in local elections, so he said, are not in balance with people's understanding and knowledge on democracy. According to Mujadi, "People are now thinking of how they are going to be able to eat. People only think of how to fulfil their nine basic commodities. They do not think about how to implement 'right' democracy." See *NU online*, www.nu.or.id, "Hasyim Ungkap 4 Alasan Pilkada Langsung Dihapuskan", 13 March 2008.
- 13 Interestingly, or perhaps, ironically, some academicians and intellectuals supported such ideas, blaming democracy. See, for example Dr. Amir Santoso (*Pelita*, 16 December 2007) and Radhar Panca Dahana (*Seputar Indonesia*, 19 December 2007).

Chapter Six



Populist Shortcuts to Progress?

Syafa'atun Karyadi (Demos)



he results of the 2003-2004 Survey showed that pro-democracy actors were politically marginalised and floating. The results nevertheless pointed to the potential for development within the growing democracy in Indonesia. While powerful elites could immediately consolidate themselves in order to dominate and abuse the instruments of democracy, pro-democracy actors, in spite of their limited capacity in building up their mass bases and controlling the available political spheres, remained at the backside of the scene.

The marginalization of pro-democracy actors reflects the fact that these actors tend to work in civil society rather than within the state or economic arenas. In addition, these actors lack sources of power in these two arenas. Their marginalised role also shows the tendency in which these actors work only on specific, single issues rather than on a comprehensive agenda. They mostly use intervention in public discourse

as a way to gain legitimacy and political authority instead of gaining the people's mandate by becoming a credible authoritative institution. Their involvement with organisations are moreover, tending towards populism, clientelism and other traditional shortcuts to mobilise support. What is taking place among the pro-democracy actors?

Reformasi in 1998 has raised citizens' enthusiasm for politics. The 2007 Survey showed that 46% of informants made the assessment that people have a greater interest in taking part in politics (46%). This assessment also applies to women who eagerly responded to issues related to politics,¹ no longer considered to be the domain of the elites or public figures. Politics has been well understood as a platform from which to struggle for power.

Some other surveys conducted by Demos² also demonstrated the experiment being made by civil organisations of engaging in politics by entering political domains to promote democracy. This is slightly different from the existing patterns of pro-democracy activism in which advocacy and capacity building of civil society seem to be the norm.

Compared to the 2003-2004 Survey, it is noted that the conditions encountered by pro-democracy actors have changed and, therefore, require new strategies and adjustments in relation to the instruments of democracy. This means that an involvement in formal politics becomes imperative, despite some weaknesses.

In general terms, there are two remarks to be made on the movements of pro-democracy actors. Firstly, they are now more active in the political arenas. Secondly, the actors tend to opt for choices referred to as 'populist shortcuts' to avoid representation in favour of 'direct' relations between individual leaders and their contacts within the elite, on the one hand, and the people on the other.

When Going Politics Become An Option

Following the reintroduction of democracy, Indonesia should have become a breeding ground for its political actors to resolve the socio-political problems encountered by the nation. Pro-democracy actors should thus serve as a balance to the role and influence of the powerful actors.

Having seen the consolidation of power by the powerful actors and their domination in institutional politics in the previous chapter, it is important that the alternative actors make a contribution in politics towards a more equal division of power. What are the capacities available among the pro-democracy actors as alternative actors?

The 2007 Survey has shown that the alternative actors have made some progress, indicated by their increasingly intensive engagement in organised politics.³ In response to the debate on whether civil society organisations need to be faithful to their role in civil society or become involved in politics, pro-democracy actors are developing a passion for involvement in politics following the 1998 *reformasi*. Many are beginning to take part in the sphere of institutional politics. In spite of some attempts by individual actors to compete both for executive and legislative positions, the civil society organisations are beginning to transform themselves into political organisations.⁴

Data shows that in spite of the domination by figures from non-government organisations (NGOs), the composition of pro-democracy actors playing a role as alternative actors also includes members of political parties, government offices, and bureaucratic circles. Table 6.1 below clearly illustrates this.⁵

Table 6.1. Composition of the backgrounds of alternative actors.

No.	ALTERNATIVE ACTORS' BACKGROUND	%
1.	Government/Bureaucracy	10
2.	Police and military	1
3.	Parliamentarians and Politicians	21
4.	Business people	4
5.	NGOs	31
6.	Informal leaders (religious/ethnic, adat leaders)	16
7.	Professionals (academician, lawyers, journalists, etc)	17

Percentages are based on the number of alternative actors identified by our informants (N=1.658)

Similarly, alternative actors are also broadening their sphere of activities. Compared to the 2003-2004 Survey, these actors are now more active in both government institutions and political parties. For institutions like political parties, elected government, bureaucracy, and judicial bodies, the level of participation of alternative actors has increased by almost 100%. However, their presence continues to be remarkably poor in workplaces, the business sectors as well as in government offices. This is in contrast with countries whose states have been used by alternative actors to expand collective services, welfare, and others (see Table 6.2).

**Table 6.2. Alternative actors' sphere of activities:
comparison of 2003/04 and 2007 data**

No	Spheres	2003/04 (%)	2007 (%)
1	Business and industry	7	6
2	Small business	6	3
3	Self-managed non-profit units, Lobby groups & Interest organisations	64	54
4	Political parties & Elected government	12	23
5	The bureaucracy & The judiciary	7	14
6	Military and police	4	2

(1) Percentages are based on the number of informants' responses. Each informant was allowed to select 5 options.

(2) Percentages are based on the number of informants' responses. Each informant was allowed to select 3 options.

The increased involvement of alternative actors in the state domain was confirmed by the map of alliances built by pro-democracy actors in order to influence the political dynamics and to control the political process. Aside from the NGOs and some prominent figures (informal leaders and professionals)—which obtained the highest number in the list—pro-democracy actors are also building alliances with members of government institutions, the bureaucracy, politicians and parliamentarians. In addition, alliances are also built with informal and professional figures, such as academics, lawyers, and the media (see Table 6.3). The data seems to fit into the general pattern of alternative actors having increased their interest in organised politics.

Table 6.3. Alternative actors' alliances

No.	Alliances of Alternative Actors	%
1.	Government/Bureaucracy	16
2.	Police and military	2
3.	Politicians and Parliament	17
4.	Business	4
5.	NGOs	31
6.	Informal Leaders (Religious, ethnic, adat leaders, academicians, lawyers, etc)	13
7.	Professionals (academician, lawyers, journalists, etc)	17

Percentages are based on the number of answers provided by the informants.

The option of becoming active in politics seems to have a relation with the improved capacity of alternative actors as well as their shifting position in relation to the instruments of democracy, such as free and fair elections, good representation, direct participation, and additional civil political participation.⁶ It was found that the capacity of alternative actors has been enhanced in relation to the means of democracy as compared to the 2003-2004 Survey. In addition, an enhanced relation with the instruments of democracy has taken place in terms of a larger proportion of the actors involved.

Table 6.4. Relation and position of alternative actors in using and promoting the instruments of democracy.⁷

No.	CATEGORY OF RULES AND REGULATIONS	Actors' Relation		Actors' Position	
		Use and promote (%)		Strong (%)	
		2003/04	2007	2003/04	2007
1.	Free and fair elections	52	63	57	66
2.	Good representation	35	57	36	64
3.	Civil political participation	57	64	57	73
4.	Direct participation	43	63	43	71
Average		46	66	44	68

(1) Percentages are based on the number of answers provided by informants

(2) In 2003/04 survey, the questions on relation and positions were related to 40 instruments of democracy, while for the recent survey 11.

The improved relations and position of alternative actors towards the instruments of democracy may actually become a new strength that will allow the actors to engage in politics as much in the same way that the powerful actors are able to. In response to the question on channels used to enter politics, informants identified a variety of options, such as developing political blocs, joining the existing political parties eligible to run in the elections, or forming new locally-rooted political parties.

Table 6.5. Informants' assessments of the most appropriate channels to become engaged in the political process

NO	CHANNELS USED TO ENGAGE IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS	%
1	Join a big national political party	32
2	Join a small political party eligible to run in elections	15
3	Establish a new locally rooted political party	13
4	Form a non-party political bloc	37
5	Get active in political discussion	3

Percentages are based on number of informants (N=876)

The options the informants chose demonstrate the enthusiasm of alternative actors for not remaining on the outskirts of political dynamics. Other studies by Demos that look at the attempts made by pro-democracy actors to become involved and engage in politics indicate strategies focusing on popular organisations and additional political channels.⁸ However, a further discussion based on the findings from the 2007 Survey should be made.

Direct Representation Instead of Popular Participation

The fact that alternative actors have managed to improve their access to the instruments of democracy is probably an encouraging progress, despite the fact that it is still necessary to improve actors' political capacity and will. Capacity and will are basically related to (1) sources of power, (2) their transformation in order to gain legitimacy and political authority, (3) issues and interests advocated by the actors, (4) the methods of communication used, (5) the ability to mobilise and organise the people, (6) organisational methods, (7) political parties and organisations to which actors are related, and (8) strategies employed by the actors in the political system.

With regard to the political capacity of the alternative actors, Demos' data shows that the actors often opt for populist shortcuts in the political system. This option actually raises another salient issue of representation which will be discussed in the following sections.

(1) Relying on social forces without sufficient economic capital

An important element related to the capacity of actors to promote meaningful democracy is their sources of power. Both surveys suggest that pro-democracy actors have tended to rely on knowledge and information, social strength and favourable contacts (Table 6.6). Their efforts to make use of economic resources or mass mobilisation are limited. Compared to the 2003-2004 Survey, the number of pro-democrats utilising these sources of power declines.⁹

Table 6.6. Sources of power of alternative actors in 2003/04 and 2007

No.	Alternative Actors' Source of Power	2003/04 (%)	2007 (%)
1	Economic resources	18	10
2	Mass power/Political/ Military coercion	22	21
3	Social strength and favourable contacts	25	32
4	Knowledge, information	36	37

(1) In 2003/04 survey, the answers were categorised into 26 options. Each informant was allowed to select 5. Percentages are based on number of informants' (2) responses. Each informant was allowed to select 3 answers. Percentages are based on the number of informants' responses.

Taking part in producing knowledge and disseminating information, such as seminars and discussion forums, is therefore an alternative to the lack of sources of power in the two above-mentioned sources to gain legitimacy and authority. The establishment of networks and contacts with powerful people is also central as a potential source of power. Alternative actors are gaining legitimacy through community organising by, particularly, prioritising economic independence (4%). This seems to relate to the background of the actors, who are rarely from a business background. Yet, if business is considered beyond their reach, there has been little awareness among these actors to transform alternative resources into main economic ones. In addition, the ability of these actors to demonstrate mass based collective power remains poor (7%).

Table 6.7. Ways for alternative actors to transform sources of power

No	ALTERNATIVE ACTORS' WAYS OF LEGITIMASING POWER	(%)
1	By contributing to the public sphere through seminars, discussions, hearings	23
2	By providing contacts and dialogue with politicians and administrators at various levels	14
3	By providing and building networks and co-ordination for joint activity	16
4	By creating contacts and partnerships with powerful figures and experts	12
5	By being able to demonstrate collective and mass-based strength	7
6	By generating economic self-sufficiency, self-help activities, cooperatives, etc.	4
7	By gaining legitimacy through DPR, DPRD, the judicial system and /or the formal executive organs of the state	4
8	By making use of various means of forceful official authority, coercion, demonstration of power and force as well as the generation of fear	1
9	By using state and government budgets and other resources and regulations for the benefit of pro-market policies and various actors in the market	1
10	By providing patronage in various forms (including favourable treatment, loans, aid and charity) to, for instance, social groups, communities, civil society organisations (including NGOs) as well as to businessmen, relatives and other individuals	3
11	By organising support within communities	11
12	By gaining a popular mandate or getting elected	3
13	By influencing public opinion via the mass media	0

Percentages are based on the number of informants' responses. Each informant was allowed 3 answers for each actor.

It is likely that the alternative actors regard economic development with less interest. The capacity of alternative actors to employ issues in this category is less progressive than that of the powerful elites. The latter actors seem to be way ahead as they begin to combine issues for which to fight. (See Table 6.8).

Table 6.8. Issues and interests actors vie for, 2007

No.	Content of Interests, Issues, Platforms and/or Policies	Powerful Actors (%)				Alternative Actors (%)			
		Response	Specific Issues	Combination of Issues	General Issues	Response	Specific Issues	Combination of Issues	General Issues
1.	Public services, basic needs, social security	9	26	46	27	6	35	31	33
2.	Religious and ethnic values, morality, conflict and conflict resolution	11	27	46	27	12	40	29	31
3.	Democracy and civil-political rights	11	28	40	32	20	28	36	36
4.	E c o n o m i c development oriented	32	22	48	30	17	32	35	33
5.	S u s t a i n a b l e development, environment	3	35	44	21	4	39	41	20
6.	Good governance, anti-corruption, rule of law	12	28	44	28	15	27	41	32
7.	Human rights	3	19	40	41	11	35	38	27
8.	N a t i o n a l i s m , integration, national security	6	26	42	32	2	30	33	36
9.	Decentralisation and local autonomy	11	27	45	28	5	38	46	16
10.	Gender issues	1	61	21	18	7	55	29	16
	Total	100	26	45	29	100	34	36	30

Percentages are based on the number of informants' responses.

(2) Opting for less strategic issues

With regard to issues the actors vie for, some improvements were made by pro-democracy actors by focusing on a single and specific issue. However, they tend to take up the issue of democracy and civil-political rights (20%), good governance and anti-corruption (15%) and human rights (11%). There is little emphasis on issues related to 'bread and butter' issues or economic development. This is in sharp contrast to the dominant actors who manage to focus on these matters while also addressing governance issues (but remaining disinterested in human rights, democracy etc). It is also unfortunate that pro-democracy actors are unable to employ issues that are more local in nature and touch on the need and interests of the people, issues such as those related to public services, basic needs, social security, environment, sustainable development, local autonomy and decentralisation (the figure for each point is 4-6%).

These are issues that can be used in alternative ways by pro-democracy actors to challenge the powerful dominant actors. Their lack of issue-focus and the type of communication methods used may be the reasons why alternative actors have less contact with representational organisations and the media compared to the powerful elites.

Table 6.9. Methods of communication of alternative actors, 2007

No	Method Of Communication	Powerful Actors (%)	Alternative Actors (%)
1	Writing books and articles	6	18
2	Performing in the media (radio, TV, internet, cultural events)	29	19
3	Attending and giving speeches in public seminars/ meetings	19	23
4	Through personal contacts and networks	19	18
5	Through organisations and their meetings and contacts	26	22

Percentages are based on the number of informants' responses. Each informant is allowed 2 answers for each actor.

(3) Limited organisational methods

Table 6.9 indicates methods of communication that the alternative actors use to transform their sources of power. It is obvious that in order to cover up their lack of capacity, alternative actors tend to switch to populist methods by establishing direct contacts with

individual leaders and small organisations as well as with the people.¹⁰ For example, in order to broaden their agenda, alternative actors tend to lobby and contact government officials and politicians, as well as powerful figures (respectively 14% and 12%). This is troublesome as alternative actors seem to show less interest in making efforts to gain a mandate from the people through general elections or to gain legitimacy through government institutions (respectively 3-4%).

The fact that alternative actors tend to use populist methods is likely related to the actors' capacity to use the means of democracy. It is true that the actors' capacity to mobilise and organise people has increased, compared to what the 2003-2004 Survey indicated. This capacity seems to be along the lines of methods usually applied by populists, such as working through popular and charismatic leaders, alternative patronage, and building networks between independent actors (see Table 6.10)

**Table 6.10. Mobilisation methods of alternative actors
2003/04 and 2007**

No.	Way to Mobilise and Organise Alternative Actors	2003/04 (%)	2007 (%)
1	Popular and charismatic leaders	16	21
2	Clientilism	18	9
3	Alternative patronage	15	20
4	Networks between independent actors	24	35
5	Integration of popular organisations into more general organisations	27	15

(1) Percentages are based on number of informants' responses.

In the 2003/04 survey, the answers comprised seven options. Yet, each informant was only allowed to select 3 of them. In the 2007 survey, informants were allowed to select 2 of the 5 options for each actor.

However, improved capacity does not mean much when it fails to put organisations together at a basic level. This shows that the pro-democrats lack the ability to organise the masses, given that they tend to work with people with similar interests (35%) and groups with religious or ethnic backgrounds (17%) rather than those with similar professions or interests (12%) or different ranks and structures (9%) and similarities of origin and domicile (5%)

Table 6.11. Organisational methods of alternative actors, 2007

No.	Organisational Methods	%
1	Descriptive	11
2	Ethnicity, religion, family	17
3	Origin and residence ("putra daerah" identity)	5
4	Hierarchical connecting levels	9
5	Sector, profession	12
6	Visions, ideas, interests	35
7	Personal network	11

Percentages are based on number of informants' responses

The weak capacity of alternative actors to organise politically is also reflected in the ways they make connections with political organisations that they consider important. They also prefer to tread on safe ground by joining major national parties that often take over their constituents rather than by establishing alternative local parties as their base.¹¹

The survey also indicates that alternative actors, when deciding to build alliances with political parties, tend to prioritise established political parties. Only some (5%) decided to ally with non major, alternative parties.

Table 6.12. Alternative actors' major political party alliances, 2007

NO.	POLITICAL PARTIES	%
1.	Golkar	15
2.	PDIP	9
3.	Hanura, PPRN	1
4.	Demokrat	2
5.	PKS	5
6.	Major Islamic-based parties (PAN, PPP, PKB)	12
7.	Small parties	5
8.	Alternatif parties (PPR, PRD, Papernas)	5

Percentages based on number of informants' responses.

The tendency of alternative actors to privilege populist methods in politics is confirmed by data on alternative actors' preferred political strategies. In addition, data shows that most alternative actors

tended to make contacts with individuals from the legislative bodies and the executives (each 28%), followed by the judicial institutions, state-auxiliary bodies, self-management units (each 10%) and the bureaucracy (7%).

This may, indeed, be undertaken by way of representation, but a crucial problem arises when the question of how the pro-democracy actors make contact with the governance institutions is raised. Data shows that most actors made direct contact with the institutions (28%). Some used NGOs, experts and lobbying groups as mediating institutions (11-14%). This becomes a problem when the actors tend to make little use of political parties (7%) and interest organisations (5%) as alternatives. When the actors make direct contact with members of legislative assemblies, the political parties play only a small role (9%).

Table 6.13. Alternative actor strategies in the political system

NO.	GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS	DIRECT	MEDIATING INSTITUTIONS %									L O B B Y / PRESSURE GROUPS
			NGOS	PEOPLE'S ORG.	EXPERTS, MEDIA	POPULAR FIGURES	PATRONS/ FIXERS	COMMUNAL GROUPS	NEIGHBOR- HOOD GROUPS	POLITICAL PARTIES	INTEREST ORG	
1.	The judiciary (incl the police)	27	18	8	16	3	3	2	1	4	3	13
2.	The political executive - (the government)	28	13	9	14	4	4	3	11	8	5	11
3.	The legislative (e.g. DPRD)	28	14	10	13	3	3	3	1	9	5	11
4.	The bureaucracy	30	9	8	13	5	5	4	3	8	6	9
5.	The military	31	11	6	8	3	4	5	2	9	10	11
6.	Auxiliary bodies and institution for sub-contracted public governance	28	17	9	12	5	4	5	2	5	3	10
7.	Institutions for self-management (e.g. cooperatives)	29	14	10	11	5	5	5	2	5	4	10

(1) Percentages are based on number of informant responses

(2) Informants are allowed to select at the most two types of governance institutions and three ways to contact the institutions both directly and through mediating institutions.

This picture shows that although pro-democracy actors have opted for political channels, they prefer using direct methods and neglect political parties and interest organisations. These direct methods are probably often of an individual and informal nature which adds another problem to the future of democracy and to any attempt to promote representation. This is clear from the fact that the conditions of the instruments of democracy related to direct participation remain, as mentioned earlier, critical.¹²

It is likely that alternative actors' option for employing direct methods of communication in politics reflects their frustration when dealing with the domination by the powerful elites. However, these methods do not resolve the problems but rather create new ones. Opting for direct methods of communication makes alternative actors unable to be prepared to provide solutions to the problem of representation.

The data shows that the problems of representation are the biggest problems for pro-democracy actors. Instead of providing alternative options, alternative actors seem to run away from attempting to balance a democratic process that is dominated by the powerful elites. As already discussed in earlier chapters, pro-democracy actors seem to drift in the current mainstream. Relying on social and information resources and suffering from a weakness in their capacity to link the interests of mass based popular organisations with that of civil society organisations, pro-democracy actors are putting democracy at risk.¹³

Demos' data also points to a crisis in representation in relation to the institutions entrusted by the people to respond to questions about public matters.¹⁴ Most pro-democracy actors tend to prioritise the media and pressure or lobby groups (32%), then NGOs and informal leaders (28%), and executive officials or bureaucrats and law enforcement institutions (16%). Political parties and parliamentarians seem to gain less trust from the people (14%). It is important to note that the use of local interest groups potential to be part of the representative institutions is the lowest on the list (4%).

Table 6.14. Public complaints Institutions

No.	Institutions	%
1.	Media, Pressure and Lobby Groups.	32
2.	NGOs, Informal Leaders	28
3.	Government Officials, bureaucracy, law enforcement institutions	16
4.	Political Parties, politicians, parliamentarians	14
5.	Stare-Auxiliary Bodies (Komnas HAM, KPK, Ombudsman, etc)	6
6.	Interest Groups	4

Percentages are based on number of informants' responses

This is a true picture of an acute representation crisis. People—at least those identified by informants—put their trust in NGOs, community groups, and informal leaders more than in genuine representative institutions, such as interest-based organisations, political parties, the legislative, and the executive. The low trust of the people in representative institutions reaches alarming proportions compared to what has happened in countries such as India and Brazil.¹⁵ In those countries, where the process of democracy continues to grow, there have been alternative attempts to increase people's political participation¹⁶.

The major reaction against the deficits of the political system has been to bypass so-called rotten politics through direct participation. This was initially through separate involvement by people facing specific problems of human rights, corruption, environmental destruction etc. Polycentrism, however, is difficult to combine with democratic representation. It is not clear what people are supposed to control in which parts of public affairs as political equals on behalf of whom and in a responsive and accountable way. Moreover, Demos' research shows clearly that the "direct" strategy has not promoted much needed scaling up of issues, people, communities and workplaces to enable the pro-democrats to make a political difference.

The internationally most innovative way of responding to this critique (and to the fact that participation through local associations is sensitive to favouritism) has been by institutionalising new forms of direct representation in sectoral public councils and participatory local governance. Early Indonesian attempts in this direction included the national commission for human rights and legendary human rights leader Munir's attempts to engage the victims and their supporters in

directing and implementing the work of legal aid organisations. Until now, certain women activists and the Corruption Watch, among others, have tried to foster social audits and participatory budgeting. However, there have been few attempts to substitute democratic representation of organised interests for Suharto's state driven corporatism. At times of conflicts, civic groups have rather facilitated informal contacts between people and executive government.

Moreover, little attention has been paid to the importance of political struggle and leadership to facilitate participation and impartial representation. There is a slim chance that this will be possible to mobilise in Aceh because of the positive interest among some of the elected executives with roots in the nationalist movement and their advisors. In Indonesia at large, however, political facilitation of democratic institutions for direct participation remains an unresolved matter, so far only addressed indirectly by anti-corruption activists trying to support "good" politicians and environmentalists planning a green political bloc.

Potential for Improving Representative Institutions

The crisis of trust in representative institutions—possibly caused by the less than optimum performance of political parties and other representation-related instruments—actually makes the establishment of independent organisations in Indonesia imperative. In spite of their weaknesses, political parties remain crucial to the process of democracy. Together with lobby and interest-based organisations, political parties play an important role and function in politics. Thus, it is necessary to reform these institutions or build new ones.

It is true that political participation can be both direct as well as through representative institutions. The latter is probably not often effective given that people want to make sure that their voices reach the right channels. In addition, it may marginalise people unable to voice their aspirations. It is, therefore, necessary to establish representative institutions that function as a medium for those lacking capacity for direct participation. In addition, political institutions serve as channels connecting state institutions with the people. Direct participation will cut the relation of these two entities. Even in direct representation, it remains necessary to set up institutions to facilitate the addressing of people's aspirations to political institutions. Such institutions may, for instance, relate to participatory budgeting or representation of trade unions in advisory boards to the government. There is no direct participation beyond self-representation.¹⁷

As agents of change, pro-democracy actors should not abandon

the problems of representation. Democracy is a political system that requires people's control over public matters based on political equality. Representative institutions have the capacity to implement popular control over public affairs.¹⁸ The next chapter seeks to analyse this.

Conclusions

In concluding this discussion, several options for pro-democracy actors are identified:

- The condition of the process of democracy has improved, indicated by, among others, people's (including women) interests in politics. Moreover, in spite of increasing cynicism of politics in Indonesia at large—more than in Aceh, where the political system is more open—politics are not primarily understood as the business of some dominant groups or individuals, but at least as a way to gain power.
- As alternative actors struggle for political equality, pro-democracy actors begin to enter the realm of politics. They also prioritise democratic instruments, including those related to organised politics, enabling the actors not to be marginalised in the process of democracy.

Endnotes

- 1 Regarding women's interest in politics, our informants also noted important attempts to promote women's participation in politics. Besides struggling for a quota for women in political institutions and increasing women's awareness and capacity, our informants suggested that it was also important to broaden political agendas to be inclusive of women's vital issues.
- 2 One of Demos' thematic researches studies is about the transformation of various kinds of civil activities and social movements into political actions, or their reconnection with political movements, institutions or organisations in the sphere of formal politics in some regions in Indonesia. The results of this study can be read in the report of the "Link Project research"; Priyono, A.E., et.al., (2008) "Kajian tentang Aksi Sipil dan Gerakan Sosial Menjadi Tindakan Politik". While the study on the transformation of socio-political movements, see DEMOS (2007), http://demosindonesia.org/downloads/1199781729_Laporan_Eksekutif_Riset_2007.pdf, or Törnquist (2007), and Törnquist, Kristian Stokke and Neil Webster (eds.) (forthcoming 2009).
- 3 Their active involvement in organised politics takes place in several ways: (1) electoral competition, by competing in local elections, (2) non-electoral methods, by establishing alliances between civil society organisations to strengthen their political power, (3) the employment of formal processes, putting pressure on DPR or executives, (4) informal processes, by lobbying politicians. See the integrated report of Demos' topical researches (2007), *Op.cit.*
- 4 See, for example, the case of POR in West Kalimantan, KP3R in South East Sulawesi and other parties established by some civil society groups, PPR. See Priyono, et al. (forthcoming 2009).
- 5 Identification of the background of alternative actors is based on our informants' assessment of actors with important roles in struggling for more equal power relations and on those who have most influence. Although we had made much effort to minimise the domination of NGO activists in the informants' assessment, it seems impossible to avoid the biases caused by informants' backgrounds as activists.
- 6 The instruments related to political participation in civil society are (1) citizens' participation in extensive independent civil associations; (2) transparency, accountability and democracy within civil associations; (3) all social groups' – including marginalised groups – extensive access to and participation in public life. The instruments related to direct participation are: people's direct access and contact with the public services, government's consultation with the people and direct participation in policy making and the execution of public decisions.
- 7 The options provided to answer the question on the relationship of actors to the instruments of democracy are: to use and promote, to use, to use and abuse, to abuse and to look for other alternatives. The table below only presents the data for the options of 'to use and promote'. In regard to the question of the position of actors towards the instruments of democracy, we provided 'strong' and 'weak' as the options provided to answer the question. The table, however, only presents the data for the 'strong' answer.
- 8 In regard to the improvement of the ability of alternative actors and of the relation of the

- actors with the instruments of democracy, our “Link project” study suggests that pro-democracy actors and socio-political organisations commonly employ five strategies in politics; (1) sustaining their roles as pressure groups, as conducted by INSAN in Kota Baru, South Kalimantan and Forum Warga in Central Java, (2) participating in the legislative process, by urging members of organisation to become parliamentarians at various levels, (3) utilising political parties, (4) establishing alternative parties, such as PPR and Papernas, and (5) attempting to gain power by competing to win executive positions at various levels. See Priyono, et.al. (forthcoming 2009), and DEMOS (2007).
- 9 An exception is the case of some institutions such as POR and Gemawan in West Kalimantan which are the metamorphosis of institutions intended to strengthen their economic base. POR is the sub-organisation of Yayasan Pancur Kasih that developed a Credit Union. For a complete profile of this organisation, see Priyono, et.al., *Op.cit.*.
 - 10 Populism here does not refer to the strategies of the actors to broaden their involvement with the people, but the ways alternative actors employ to obtain direct participation in the political system. Included in these ways are making direct contacts with powerful figures and government institutions as well as claiming to be representing the people. See Törnquist (forthcoming 2009), *Op. cit.*
 - 11 This can be seen by the fact that most pro-democracy actors competing in local elections -to mention one example-failed, as they did not control sufficient sources of power and had not prepared their organisations as a political machine and reliable support base. See, for example, Demos’ study in local elections in Serdang Bedagai, Manggarai and East Belitung districts, see Pradjasto, et.al. (2007) and also DEMOS (2007).
 - 12 See Chapter I. It is unfortunate that we do not have any detailed data on the forms of direct representation related to public executive institutions such as democratic institutions for participatory budgeting.
 - 13 See Törnquist (forthcoming 2009), *Op.cit.*
 - 14 The data was drawn from the assessment by our informants regarding public institutions to which the people address their complaints. We did not identify and classify the people in question, like John Harris (2005 & 2008) did by classifying society into middle and lower class in his research on the participation and representation of the urban poor in India.
 - 15 See, for example Harris (2005), Houtzager, et.al. (2007).
 - 16 In India, particularly in New Delhi, political parties and society figures play important roles as mediums where people may address their complaints – particularly people of the lower classes. The members of the lower classes usually do not have the capacity to directly face the government. On the other hand, the middle class prefers to directly contact the government or the judiciary. Such a direct method is also applied by the people of Sao Paulo, Brazil, but it provides alternatives for the establishment of additional representation institutions such as participatory budgeting, special agencies for health, etc. See Harris (2008).
 - 17 For discussion on the forms of representation and their criticisms, including the discussion on direct participation, see Törnquist (forthcoming 2009).

- 18 Some examples of attempts to link popular organisations and civil society organisations to political activities are shown by the movement Forum of Batang Peasants and Fishers Union (FP2NB) in Batang, Central Java, Consortium for Broadening People Political Participation (KP3R) in Kendari, Muna, and South Konawe, South-East Sulawesi, BP3OPK-Walhi, and other organisations. For further discussion on the attempts to improve popular representation, see Integrated Report of Demos' Topical Researches (2007) and Link project.

Chapter Seven



Crafting Representation?

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Representation is a complex concept. We shall draw on a recent attempt to develop an inclusive framework for understanding the concept of representation on the basis of theory and empirical studies of efforts to counter the demise of popular politics (Törnquist et.al forthcoming). As outlined by Pitkin (1967), representation presupposes a representative, the represented, something that is being represented and a political context. The dynamics are primarily about authorisation and accountability, which presuppose transparency and responsiveness. That which is represented may be substantive, descriptive and/or symbolic.

Substantive representation is when the representative “acts for” the represented, for instance a leader advancing the interests of workers. Descriptive representation is when an actor “stands for” the represented

by being “objectively” similar. For instance, a woman represents women and a resident in a village represents the other villagers. Symbolic representation, finally, is when an actor is perceived by the represented to once again “stand for” them, but now, for instance, in terms of shared culture and identities. However, symbolic representation may also be understood in the wider sense of constructing the demos, the groups and the interests that are being represented and claiming to be a legitimate authority as a representative (Bourdieu and Wacquant 2005, Stokke 2002 and Anderson (1983).

Approaches to Representation

There are two major approaches to representation.¹ The first may be called the chain-of-popular-sovereignty approach. It is typically adhered to by students of political institutions, focusing on formally regulated politics, government and public administration. The second is what will be labelled the direct-democracy approach. This is more common among political sociologists, anthropologists and students of rights and law. They emphasise the importance of informal arrangements and the need for alternative participation through popular movements and lobby groups as well as civic action in for instance neighbourhood groups and associations for self-management.

There are two related tendencies towards deteriorated representation within the chain of popular sovereignty. One is that public matters and resources have been reduced and fragmented under neo-liberalism and globalisation beyond democratic representation. The other tendency is that almost all of the links in the chain itself are tarnished. This is especially with regard to the intermediary representative institutions from civic organisations to political parties. Mass based interest organisations have been radically weakened, most severely those based on class. While public resources and capacities are shrinking, politicians and political parties lose firm and independent popular roots. The privatisation, informalisation, depoliticisation and weakening of the intermediary political institutions generate further distrust in the authority of representatives and their mandates. Representative politics is often looked upon as a particularly dirty business characterised by money and personality oriented politics, non-programmatic organisational machines and crooked politicians. This in turn has generated alternative routes. But the various supplementary forms of democracy – such as taking matters to court and to institutions in civil society for self-financed self-management and direct participation, pressure and informal contacts – are largely detached from the chain of

popular sovereignty. The civic organisations and activists themselves are rarely subject to basic principles of democratic representation, authorisation and accountability. Moreover, communal ethnic and religious organisations as well as families and clans cater to an increasing number of popular worries and needs, typically amongst the weaker sections of the population with insufficient capacities to make use of civil rights. When they do not claim equal civil, political and socio-economic rights for all but specific communal privileges, these organisations and solidarities tend to fragment the demos and to undermine democracy.

While the advantage of the chains-of-popular-sovereignty approach is precision and conceptual consistency in relation to democratic theory, one drawback is that contextual differences, such as those between the exit from organised politics by strong citizens in the North and the marginalisation from organised politics of vulnerable majorities in the South, are often neglected. Another weakness is that practices outside the formally recognised chain tend to be set aside such as attempts at participatory governance and struggles over public affairs that have been privatised or informalised.

Unfortunately, however, the direct-democracy approach does not provide a good alternative but rather focuses on the other or neglected side of the coin. Interestingly, this is done from two directions, one which is more market oriented, supported by for example the World Bank (1997) and in favour of user and consumer participation (rather than citizenship and popular sovereignty); the other is advocated by critics of globalisation like Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000) who argue that the state and power have been so dispersed and localised that there is no decisive unit left to fight and that increasingly many producers are regulating social relations themselves, so that strong parties and representative democracy are unnecessary and even irrelevant.

Both positions support the position of Robert Putnam (1993) and others that the “real” demos develops organically from below among self managing and co-operating citizens (thus developing “social capital”), not in relation to ideologies, institutions and political engagement. Hence, representation becomes redundant since the people act directly through the same contacts and associations that have constituted the people in the first place. Further, almost any “civic” organisation becomes “part of the people itself”. Hence there is no need to analyse, for instance, differences between organisations that relate to “rights-bearing citizens” and people who lack sufficient capacity to promote their own rights. Further, one does not need to discuss the importance of intermediary variables such as politics and ideology. The fact that Scandinavian democracy and welfare

states as well as contemporary participatory budgeting, for instance, have all been politically facilitated and then sustained is conveniently forgotten.

However, many civil society activists are now more anxious than before to legitimate their work in terms of whom they try to represent (Houtzager 2007). Moreover, the new institutions for direct participation such as participatory planning are (just like previous Scandinavian experiences of combining liberal political democracy and interest based representation and cooperation between government and associations) attempts to initiate anew a layer of representation between electoral chains of popular sovereignty and associational life and populism on the other. (C.f. Avritzer 2002, Baiocchi 2005, Esping-Andersen 1985, Berman 2006) Yet, a number of questions remain to be answered such as how to guarantee authority and accountability, and even more difficult, how to identify and agree on what parts of the demos should control what sections of public affairs on the basis of political equality.

Representation: Improving or Just Polishing?

Previous chapters have shown that the situation of political representation in the Indonesian democratic process remains problematic. Informants in their assessments confirmed the poor performance of instruments of representation, which are among the 11 worst instruments of democracy, as seen in Table 7.1. In addition, several instruments of democracy in favour of political representation are related to party performance.

Table 7.1 Eleven lowest ranking instruments of democracy

No	RIGHTS AND INSTITUTIONS ⁽¹⁾	Index 2007
1	Transparency and accountability of the military and the police to elected government and to the public	35
2	<i>Reflection of vital issues and interests among the people by political parties and or candidates</i>	36
3	Government independence from foreign intervention (except UN conventions and applicable international law)	36
4	<i>Membership-based control of parties and responsiveness and accountability of parties and or political candidates to their constituents</i>	38

5	<i>Extensive access to and participation in public life for all social groups – including marginalised groups</i>	38
6	<i>Parties and or candidates ability to form and run government</i>	38
7	The capacity of the government to combat paramilitary groups, hoodlums and organised crime	39
8	<i>Direct participation (People's direct access and contact with the public services, government's consultation with the people and where possible facilitation of direct participation in policy making and the execution of public decisions)</i>	40
9	<i>Independence of political parties and or candidates from money politics and powerful vested interests</i>	40
10	Good corporate governance	40
11	<i>Freedom to form parties on the national or local levels (or teams of independent candidates) that can recruit members and participate in elections.</i>	40

The instruments in italic are those related to representation.

It can be comprehended that this situation resulted from the domination of the political system by powerful actors dominating political parties, interest groups and lobby groups. Meanwhile, alternative actors have focused on direct participation and using populist shortcuts rather than building up democratic representation through organisational politics. Therefore, although the gap between alternative actors and the political system is closing, this does not mean there has been an improvement in the representation situation.

Outside of the data collected and analysed in this 2007 Survey, some signs were identified that reflected attempts by the democrats to improve representation. There have been three prominent groupings. The first group uses institutional or elitist crafting to improve or strengthen democratic institutions such as the parliament, party and election systems. This group includes the efforts by the National Democracy Institute/NDI, the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy/NIMD and International IDEA through party assistance and comparative studies among parties from different countries.

The second group attempts to reform parties both from within and with a top-down approach. Some elements even managed to establish alternative parties. Some activists combined these activities with popular mass organising, by way of populist or alternatives means, like Budiman Sudjatmiko joining the PDI-P. Others are building up alternative parties,

such as Partai Persatuan Pembebasan Nasional (National Liberation United Party/Papernas), and Partai Perserikatan Rakyat (People's Union Party/PPR).

The third group has established direct representative institutions connected to certain organs or commissions in government institutions through, for examples, participatory budgeting or forming political citizens' forums. Included in this group are activists from civil society organisations undertaking self-representation through farmer organisations, labour unions, and political contracts and or dialogue with local government, etc.

It is undoubtedly true that legal reforms are important for improving political parties and the party system. Legal reforms surely have a significant impact, as indicated by the implementation of a multi-party electoral system following the ratification of Law No.2/1999. It was expected that the system would reduce the domination of the old powerful elite, the legacy of the New Order, in political parties and elections as well as in the political system as a whole.

Ironically, the opposite has happened. Parties have started to mushroom and strong actors with capital (access to economic and non-economic resources) have begun to dominate the party 'stock exchange' and adapt to the changes in the system. This is indeed ironic given that formerly, democracy activists strived for a multi-party system and yet their efforts could not be used to build a more meaningful democracy. Why has this happened?

This proves that it is not sufficient to rely only on crafting democratic institutions. There is one important factor that has been neglected in attempts to reform the system. Improving the electoral and the party systems is not strictly a technical matter, such as the number of parties or election mechanisms. Improving the systems would also mean improving the so far unbalanced power relations that exist where certain powerful groups dominate.

We should realise that some institutions and actors have the capacity to use and promote or to avoid and bend the rules and regulations supposedly promoting democracy. As the institutions lack capacity and the people are incapable of using and promoting the instruments of democracy, then the elites dominate the instruments. That is to say that it is important to craft institutions, but far more important to improve the capacity of the institutions and to establish better popular representation.

We should also realise that the "crafting" business will primarily involve parliament and government and the experts consulted, as well as the most resourceful lobbyists, which are dominated by powerful actors.

In some cases, some experts involved in the reform become part of the powerful actors' lobby and give them a certain legitimacy in power. The institutions with the authority to ratify 'the change of the system' also have an interest in the content of the crafting. Therefore, 'drafting' and 'proposing' (law reforms) are clearly insufficient, without other supporting efforts, such as strategies to mobilise important alternative actors and emphasis on power relations as the focus of the reforms, especially to de-monopolise the system and to provide space for more alternative political actors.

The local party policy applied in Aceh can provide valuable lessons on the possibility of organising democratic politics at a local level. The experience of Aceh has not so far generated negative effects such as separatism or devastating ethnic and religious conflicts. On the contrary, the organisation of local democratic politics has supported the peace process and the establishment of a country-wide political community.

Therefore, rather than spending efforts in debating numbers of parties, it is considered that local parties may become one of many alternatives, although further discussion on some related matters remains necessary. In fact, supporters of institutional crafting had not considered this. They act differently, not to mention inconsistently, by lessening, limiting or 'rationalising' the number of eligible political parties through the establishment of strict party requirements and an electoral threshold,² while polishing or fine-tune existing parties.

Limiting the number of parties means hindering the emergence of alternative political power. It is clear that big, powerful parties have the greatest advantage in terms of the placing of limitations on the number of parties. They want to minimise and prevent the emergence of new competitors. The main intention is to establish 'politics of order', a more stable, simple, and less financially demanding type of politics. Surprisingly, this idea is actually supported by some activists and academics embarrassed by the way parties are performing. Their argument is actually confirmed by Transparency International's research that shows people's declining trust in political parties.

Attempts to improve the performance of existing parties—without considering new parties as a form of alternative power—became more prominent when those who believed in the importance of institutional crafting organised training for politicians and political parties. The training aimed to improve the effectiveness of political parties in carrying out their functions. Without undermining the importance of party performance improvement, it is argued that this approach is of a managerial nature and exclusive of attempts to strengthen parties at

a grass roots level. It is true that none of those supporting the idea of institutional crafting supported the domination of the political system by certain figures. Yet they usually did not emphasise the attempts at developing popular control of political parties, rather they only emphasised the elitist methods, such as, delegating the improvement of party performance to actors within the party. In addition, other attempts such as applying a purer form of presidentialism³ through direct elections have not yet been successful in promoting representation.

Direct local elections, since 2005, have not been successful in de-monopolising the elite's domination. Firstly, the current political parties that dominate the system are still important actors who dominate the process of the nomination of candidates; secondly, only certain people—clearly those with influence and access to substantial political and economic resources—are able to become candidates.⁴ Ideally, direct elections should enable more opportunities for the emergence of alternative actors and broaden the opportunities for people's participation.

Thirdly, for individual candidates to be able to nominate themselves they are required to obtain 3% - 6.5% of support from eligible voters to be able to nominate themselves (*Kompas* 6/3/2008).⁵ As an attempt to mitigate party domination of local elections, the decision of the Constitutional Court is not positive. Such a requirement is not sufficiently realistic for most ordinary people and does support the emergence of alternative leaders from below. The current requirement is excessive and the period for mobilisation of signatories is insufficient. Only the already powerful and resourceful can achieve this requirement.

As a result, the system requires much energy and time from the local election committees (KPUD) in order to conduct candidate verification. Other countries who apply a similar system do not set the requirements so high.⁶ Although requirement formulation for individual candidates continues to be developed, it may be concluded that this method is insufficient to promote representation.

Fourthly, direct elections are not accompanied by a clear presentation of candidate programs and interests.⁷ This suggests a practice of shallow politics, which takes a certain form, but is actually vulnerable inside. Direct elections are initially aimed to shorten the distance between candidates, voters and constituents. However, in reality, what has happened has been an intensification of the practices of local patronage politics, as in Makassar and Ternate.⁸

This chapter, however, does not place blame on attempts at institutional crafting. The point is to emphasise that the main duty is

not to polish the party system or reform the electoral system. Rather, it is to provide broader opportunities for, and to improve the capacity of, politically marginalised actors so that they will be able to organise themselves and participate in the political process. Once again, the experience of Aceh can be cited as an example where popular and interest based organisations must come first,⁹ so as to make direct elections an optimal instrument.

Joining, Taking Over and Reforming Parties

Attempts at party reforms, both from joining and establishing alternative political parties, are highlighted by the need to organise politically. Political organisation aims to facilitate issues and interests as well as to establish broader cooperation among diverse social groups. Going beyond the supporters institutional crafting, those in this category have a perspective of changing power relations.

They realise that it is necessary to build a majority power to win elections. Here it was found that activists applied their own individual methods. For example, Budiman Sudjatmiko preferred to join PDI-P, along with other civil associations and social organisations as a ‘diaspora action’.¹⁰ Another example is the experiment by POR Pancur Kasih to take over the PNBK official body at a local level.¹¹ In addition, Papernas attempted to utilise ‘leftist ideology’¹² and to build national (rather than scattered localised) organisations to unite some groups and people, as well as to organise a critical mass. Last but not least, PPR established a party based on an existing social movement – with agriculture as the prime basis of the movement—including several popular oriented NGOs. PPR aimed to facilitate more deeply rooted political participation, where people’s organisations and NGOs can participate in formulating party policies, including nominating their own candidates.

Each experience provides us with lessons from which we can learn. Firstly, all attempts mentioned above failed to prevent political fragmentation, particularly when it came to gaining votes. It often happens that one party’s support base is similar in location with another. What mostly then occurred was threatening their bases.¹³ For democrats conducting diaspora action, most fragmentation happened when other pro-democracy organisations or activists became suspicious of the activists’ motives for joining a political party. They particularly feared party intervention. The party they joined would also become suspicious and consider them to be outsiders.

The experiences of the Philippines and India revealed that the fragmentation among civil society organisations, NGOs, and people’s

organisations resulted in friction and weakness. In the Philippines, fragmentation among the Maoists even turned into violent conflict. In some cases, such fragmentation is unavoidable.

Secondly, there is a tendency for some activists to focus their attention only on their own groups, instead of aiming for broader issues and interests as political parties. For example, Papernas is dominated by PRD activists while PPR's concerns lean towards agrarian issues.¹⁴ In order to survive within a national oriented party system, activists must be able to mobilise support from many social groups, and not just be limited to their own groups who already have a high level of political participation awareness. They have to broaden their constituent basis and include marginal people from outside their group.

Thirdly, the risk of becoming lost or entrapped in elite political culture is a risk commonly encountered by activists conducting diasporic action as they lack sufficient bargaining power. In addition, they often face choices as to whether they owe allegiance to their party or to their original base. To resolve this problem, it is probably necessary to establish clear mechanisms of responsibility between cadres or activists working within dominant actors' parties and their original base or organisations. Of course, this does not apply only to the diasporists, but also to alternative parties. Thus, this matter demonstrates the importance of mature or settled political organisation.

Fourthly, still related to political organisation, the experience of Papernas and PPR has revealed weaknesses in strategies to generate financial support and manage an effective political machine. This is probably the reason why some groups opt for diasporic action. However, those who attempt to take over parties at a local level still face similar obstacles. To make matters worse, they have to deal with intervention from central level party leaders who are dominated by powerful elites. Taking over parties at a local level clearly does not require as much funding as the establishment of a new party. Yet, they still face party funding hurdles in addition to the fact that the political machine they take over is not yet well established.

Fifthly, among the attempts presented previously, there is no blue print or strategy for resolving the problems of representation. The problems are how to combine political work with advocacy activities, institutionalisation of direct participation, drawing party's framework from general principles by considering class based interests and involving women, rather than merely nominating and supporting certain popular figures.

History shows that attempts to produce popular leaders eventually went wrong as was the case of Estrada in the Philippines or as may happen with Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. They are subordinated to strong popular leaders and by their own interests. There are signs that activists are attempting to learn from this lesson. There has been a long tradition in Indonesia – since the war of independence – that local strongmen, including those among radical youth, act as spearheads, as popular leaders with their own followers rather than as leaders of organisations within which members, at least to some extent, can make their leaders accountable according to jointly agreed rules. Interestingly, the few elite communist leaders who attempted to change power relations through a coup in late 1965 were also part of this tradition.¹⁵

Direct Participation:

Cutting down on procedures, but not automatically democratic

Other possible attempts to promote popular representation are the establishment of representative institutions enabling the people to participate directly in government institutions or as part of a government institution, rather than establishing political parties or other political organisations. Such attempts are embodied in forms such as participatory budgeting, political contracts and dialogue. FAKTA and the Urban Poor Consortium (UPC) in Jakarta, as well as ATMA and Forum Warga in Central Java, practice these methods. They do not focus on political organisation but instead facilitate mechanisms or procedures of formal communication between the government and the people on more specific issues.

This method has several advantages. The grassroots have access to direct participation, local spaces are utilised and institutions are open, non-partisan, pluralistic and liberal. Such institutions are also established on the basis of more concrete issues, such as local government performance, issues of corruption, collusion and nepotism. The method for the establishment of such institutions is expected to prevent a distortion of representation and to involve non-party organisations as well. Thus, marginalised people, including women, will become more interested in participation.

These efforts, however, failed to improve the quality of the means of representation in general and specific data on direct participation shows a dismal picture (index is 40). Moreover, there is a lack of interest on how to mobilise and to involve the people. In addition, the efforts also neglect the issue of power relations, as the institutions have been commonly facilitated by ‘top-down’ initiatives, not by people’s participation.¹⁶

As institutions emphasise individual roles, then it is possible that they might be dominated by certain group's or community interests, as was the case for Forum Warga, which is dominated by the NU Moslem community, or Baileo that focuses on traditional communities. But let us not be too eager to consider this as a negative aspect. When institutions are dominated by human rights activists, then issues not related to human rights are neglected. If the majority of the people are Moslem, then there is a risk in which the interests of the non-Moslems are neglected. This also shows that direct representative institutions do not necessarily support pluralism in its ultimate form, that all the people may use the institution, notwithstanding their background and status.

Outside the direct representative institutions mentioned previously, some civil organisations also attempt to channel their aspirations directly, for example through labour unions, peasant organisations or religious communities. Like other direct representative institutions who tend to limit their issues, these organisations are also at risk of isolation from other civil movements.

There is nothing wrong with direct representation of interests, concerned groups or experts, and others, but for a democracy to develop, these direct forms need to be institutionalised to guarantee a clearly defined demos with equal rights, accountability etc. according to the general principles of democracy. Direct forms, as such, have to be combined and must compromise with *universal* popular sovereignty, not just with special groups and interests, all of which call for representation.

Another form of direct representation is direct intervention through political contracts with members of parliament or government. Traditional or religious communities usually apply this method, and commonly demand more specific rights, such as land rights or the enactment of *sharia* law. Recently, these methods have also been used by non-ethnic and non-religious based democratic groups before local elections.

Besides the tendency to struggle on specific issues, the other direct intervention's main weakness is the great dependency on dominant actors, such as certain candidates, politicians or government, rather than on organisations offering political contracts. Therefore, it is possible for one actor to make different political contracts with several people's organisations, regardless of whether they are pro-democratic or not.¹⁷ This implies that both civil society organisations and social organisations do not yet hold a substantial bargaining position, which is coupled with weak institutionalised representation. This makes it extremely difficult to observe the execution of political contracts.

In discussing the various forms of direct representation, it is believed that it is necessary to cluster all attempts and efforts into a broader democratic political framework. Some improvements are clearly necessary to politically facilitate representative institutions. It is not sufficient just to establish a communication system between the people and the government or to limit the scope of social movements at a community level. Representation has a broader agenda, of widely embracing people and their interests, to enable the establishment of a majority political power. By applying the method it is expected that alternative political powers will emerge.

Institutionalising Nodes for Improved Popular Representation

The basic structural problem of democracy in the global South rests (as Mouzelis pointed out many years ago) with the introduction of liberal democracy ahead of the kind of industrialisation and modernisation that at times gave rise to liberal and constitutional states and pro-democratic farmers and working and middle classes, with related popular and civic organisations and parties and women with special demands. This does not mean that democratisation in the global South is next to impossible and should be sequenced and partially postponed while elites impose development, solid institutions etc. There are important advances in cases such as parts of Brazil, Kerala, and South Africa. Further, the 'early' liberties are to be appreciated. They may reduce the suffering and repression that characterised Europe for hundreds of years and have affected much of the global South under authoritarian and technocratic shortcuts to progress (and still do in for instance China)

What this means is 'only' that while the 'early' liberties are thus crucial advances that must not be undermined, there *are* particular challenges. These are due to (a) the elitist character of the 'early' democratisation in the context of neo-liberal globalisation, weaker states and more space for communal- patronage and network based groups; (b) weak popular representation due to this as well as to previous repression and to the poor capacity of civic and popular organisations to scale up issues, groups and local work and make a difference politically. In short, therefore, there is a need for special measures to promote political equality and popular representation. This is not impossible – but there is a need for a radically altered democratisation by design that is not limited to the basic rules of the game but also focuses on improving their performance, spread and scope/substance and, most importantly, increases the political capacity of the people at large to develop better representation.

In short, this implies the facilitation of popular capacity-building, organisation and representation to compensate for the weak structural preconditions that will enable changes of political power, so that existing deficit democracies become less dominated by the elite and their partners within, on the one hand, business, and, on the other hand, communal-, patronage and network based groups. If not, ordinary people will lose trust in the possibility of making use of limited democracy to generate more substantial democracy as well as rights based sustainable development. It will also be difficult to transform conflicts (including ethnic, religious conflicts and outright civil conflicts in addition to class repression) from battlefields to democratic politics. Further, it will be hard for business and the middle classes to find sufficiently broad allies to foster their agendas without returning to authoritarian/technocratic solutions. Such problems will also be a negative for the North.

A resolute popular oriented design of democracy needs to focus, thus, on improved political equality and popular representation. This in turn will not just grow out of the existing economic and social dynamics and existing movements and civil groups. Rather, it has to be introduced politically, from below as well as from top down.

From below there must be emphasis on improved popular capacities to put vital issues on the public agenda as well as to mobilise, organise and scale up the activities. Basically, this is to foster political equality. The preconditions include civic and political education and training, including on rights and opportunities, where and how to get proper information, how to organise, how to act as representative, what demands to put on representatives and much more. From below there must also be assistance to formulate realistic strategic demands. These need to focus on supporting politicians and mini-platforms for further promotion of political equality and popular representation from top down.

From top down, then, there is a need to introduce *nodes for popular representation*. We know from experiences of countries mentioned above that *democratic* clustering and institutionalisation of opportunities to gain influence and various rewards etc will strengthen *and* focus civic and popular organisations as well as individual civic rights as against the dominance and symbiosis of statist actors, business and communal-, patronage and network based groups. The type, quality and scope of such nodes become crucial. One kind of nodes relates to the opening up of access to information/knowledge etc. A second type of node is the provision (and regulation of) democratic political financing to counter the dominance of the dominant actors and thus promote political

equality. A third relates to the creation of various institutionalised spaces for popular (individual and collective) participation in policy formulation but even more important in various spheres of the executive (e.g. participatory planning, budgeting, various sectoral councils, public commissions) This should also include public efforts to facilitate popular influence in privatised and informalised sectors by way of public regulation. One especially important node relates to the facilitation rights based sustainable growth through pacts between capital and labour.

Yet another priority that relates to all the nodes is the specification of which part of the demos shall control what part of public affairs and how direct popular participation shall be harmonised with representative democracy. A crucial task for the representative democracy is to facilitate and institutionalise (provide rules, regulations and means and avoiding fragmentation) popular participation, uphold universalism and prevent fragmented polycentrism, as well as to govern and regulate governance on levels where popular participation is unviable.

In short, the major priority should be to (a) increase the political capacity of civic and popular organisations and parties to open and use representative democracy to prioritise demands for (b) the fostering *and* democratic government of nodes for more direct popular participation in the control of widely defined public affairs. This in turn would spur (c) more civic and popular engagement and individual rights that are in accordance with the principle of unbroken chains of popular sovereignty.

Basically, this thus is about supporting political equality (including equal capacity to promote and use democracy) and institutionalised nodes for popular representation. As both are basic to the development of democracy, they may be deemed as a joint concern for those who like to go beyond this elitist-oriented democracy. Such concerns would thus be non-partisan in relation to different agendas among those using their political capacity and the channels of representation.

Hence, there is nothing preventing support for the international community for such measures and institutions in the same way as support is there for human rights. Further, it is crucial that civic and popular organisations come together in as broad and concrete alliances as possible (locally and centrally), separating them from the partisan priorities (by various parties and movements) of how to then use the improved means of popular representation.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Although representation remains dismal, Demos' 2007 Survey does provide some optimism about some progress being made in the process of democracy. Several democrats have attempted to: 1) craft rules and regulations; 2) reform parties, and 3) institutionalise direct representation. However, these attempts have not been accompanied by efforts to build the capacity of ordinary people and to develop popular sovereignty. It seems that the constituents have been left behind.

The main weakness of elite crafting lies in its elitist approach tending to place any attempt to generate changes into the hands of the elites, including party elites which are often part of the problem. In addition, this method excludes the perspective of power relations and interests, so that there is a lack of interest in demonopolising the elites. As a result, institutional crafting tends to merely polish the existing system or institutions and increases the capacity of elite-dominated actors rather than increasing the political capacity of the people.

The powerful elites dominate the political system, particularly party politics. In doing so, they lobby and approach various interest groups, and even cooperate with international institutions. Unfortunately, what often is considered a solution is merely fixing the existing democratic institutions, particularly political parties. However, the reality that the institutions have been dominated by the elite, is not yet a matter for concern.

Aside from that, there are still existing party reform weaknesses. The ability of this method to prevent fragmentation among pro-democracy activists is questionable and doubtful. There is no clear chain of mandate between cadres and party activists and their constituents, or between parties and their supporting organisations. Political organisation is not effective, particularly in relation to member recruitment, party financing, base extension and the creation of parties as an effective political machine in the elections. Suffering from these weaknesses, new alternative parties remain unable to compete with the established parties.

Lastly, attempts to institutionalise direct participation are basically flawed. Those who have entered into contracts with the elites tend to take existing power relations for granted. In addition, deliberative process and individual participation have not yet generated clear forms of democracy within the forum.

Although all forms of attempts to promote participation have attained their own achievements, we have to admit that they are not sufficient to resolve the main issues of representation, i.e. how to demonopolise the elites. The promotion of representation will be

fruitful when power relations are changed and when the domination of the powerful elite in the political system is deconstructed. It is also necessary to facilitate democratic popular control with new creativity and innovation to cover the weaknesses of the experiments, or else, democracy will be weakened.

Therefore, Demos recommends some important points based on experiments conducted by pro-democracy actors to promote representation.

- 1) It is important to consider the framework of power relations, that efforts to improve representation must aim to reform power relations presently dominated by elites (elite demonopolisation).
- 2) Constituents should not be left behind, attempts should be made to tie the mandate chain more clearly between activists and cadres and their constituents or base organisations.
- 3) Strategies must be designed to manage self-sufficient financial support and to make a strong political organisation.
- 4) Attempts to embrace and cover the interests of more people, including people outside traditional constituencies is undertaken through formulating more general, broader issues to cover broader social interests. This is particularly in relation to the formulation of an empirical ideology for the establishment of alternative parties.

Endnotes

- 1 The following sections draw particularly closely on Törnquist et.al. (forthcoming), which in turn has its inception in the collective work of Harriss et.al (2004) and inspiration from the public discourse on the Norwegian research programme on power and democracy (c.f. Østerud 2003 and 2007) and the working papers by Stokke (2002), Houtzager et.al (2005) and Castiglione and Warren (2005) in addition to the findings Demos as to if and how the framework and concepts would make sense in reality.
- 2 The new soon to be ratified law suggests strict requirement of party establishment. A party should have regional chapters in 60% of Indonesian provinces, 50% in the district in the province in question, and 25% of the number of sub districts in the district in question. It is hard for alternative parties to fulfill this requirement, as they only have limited funds and facilities.
- 3 Till the presidency of Megawati, the president was elected by the MPR, while Yudhoyono and Kalla were elected through direct elections, so that the president is no longer under the power of parliament, and thus, has stronger independent legitimacy. The parliament cannot impeach the presidents before their period ends. The implementation of the presidential system is expected to create political stability, as part of the spirit of "politics of order" discussed in Chapter 5.
- 4 A simple and clear example is the fact that figures dominating Presidential election and DPD member election in 2004 were usually retired military personnel (Agum Gumelar, Wiranto, SBY) and figures of the New Order (Jusuf Kalla, Hamzah Haz, Siswono Yudohusodho). In addition, 30% of candidates in 2005-2006 local elections consisted of the incumbent local members.
- 5 There are two terms used to describe individual candidates. Firstly, "calon perseorangan" (individual candidate) and second, "calon independen" (independent candidate). The basic difference between the two lies in the perspective. Although both terms refer to candidates not nominated by political parties, individual candidate clearly refers to those from any kind of background while independent candidate clearly refers to candidates with a non-party background. We prefer to use individual candidate, since many criticisms have emerged since the issue of independent candidate became popular and which has led to the question as to whether it would automatically open up the space for alternative actors to get in. The powerful elites might also use the opportunity both at national and local levels. Moreover, the activists struggling for democratisation and the people in general have not been able to improve their capacity to make use of the opportunity.
- 6 In some countries such as Albania, England (London) and Bulgaria, the level of support required for nomination for the city mayoral elections is around 150, 330,

and 550, or one third of the total number of voters. In order to run in gubernatorial elections in the states of Illinois, Alabama, and Missouri in the United States, ones need to gather support from 1 to 5% of total voters, not the total population. In Canada and South Africa, they only require 50-100 voters' signatures in each electoral area. In Aceh, they only require 3% support from the total population in 50% of the levels of the administrative region where the candidates nominate themselves. Source: Data from Cetro's Research and Development.

- 7 Based on our general observation of local elections since mid 2006, we conclude that almost no candidates presented concrete programs in their campaigns. Most of them brought up issue of 'native locals, ethnicity, religion even kinship as a rationale for their election.
- 8 Conflicts in the regions are caused by conflicts in Gubernatorial local elections, in this case, the election of governor and vice governor in South Sulawesi and Northern Maluku. The conflict began with disappointment on the part of the losing candidate. The masses who supported the losing candidate forced both the Central and Local Election Commission to issue the decision they wanted. Yet the problems became further complicated with the involvement of the Supreme Court (Mahkamah Agung) and The Ministry of Internal Affairs. At the time this article was wrtitten, the election conflict in Northern Maluku was not yet settled. The supporting masses went to Jakarta and there is a possibility that this conflict might have to be settled at a presidential level.
- 9 The priority of the organisational process also covers improvements to the quality and representation of the organisations. We do not deny the fact that interest organisations such as labour unions can be trapped in elitism, where the leaders of organisations dominate the process of decision making and personal contacts are more important than membership.
- 10 Diaspora action is conducted by activists studied in Link Project Research. Activists from 98 movements (those who had worked as activists since the 1990s and were actively involved in the anti-Soeharto movement) usually engage in these attempts.
- 11 POR Pancur Kasih in West Kalimantan took over the leadership of its Sekadau chapter.
- 12 What we mean by leftist ideology is the one close to Marxism. Papernas continues the struggle of Popor (Partai Oposisi Rakyat/People's Opposition Party), a new party that was established to counter the stigma of communism levelled at PRD. Yet, Papernas recently faced a similar stigma. Therefore, they established a new party, PPBI (Partai Persatuan Bangsa Indonesia/Indonesian Unity Party) with Dominggus as its leader. Yet neither passed The Ministry of Law and Human Rights verification process.
- 13 For example in *the* Serdang Bedagai local elections there was a conflict over the support base between ORI (the supporters of Sukirman who also conflicted with BITRA, Sukirman's organisation) and PP (the supporters of Purba). Both are organisations well established at a grass roots level. In fact, Chapter 6 shows that the mass power utilised by alternative actors as one of the sources of power is limited. It will worsen

- worse once broken down into several organisations/political parties.
- 14 The fact that PPR is concerned with agrarian issues does not necessarily reveal the party's ideology. On the contrary, they seem to search for it. PPR deliberately make themselves ideologically and organisationally floating to handle the work of coordination, administration and alternative political machine building for CSO, social movement and people's organisations. PPR is particularly supported by people's organisations. Thus, PPR struggles for more specific, local issues. They actually have not yet formulated their broader agenda.
 - 15 As it happened when PKI leaders became subordinate to Soekarno by establishing The Revolution Council (Dewan Revolusi) (Roosa: 2006).
 - 16 It is true that most democratic forms of alternative direct representation have been introduced from above, such as by the mayor's office in Porto Alegre or the State Planning Board in Kerala – but this is the result of long and extensive popular organisation to achieve genuine representative elections and then introduce such measures in a consistent way. It is different in Indonesia where the initiatives come from NGO activists without a popular organisation from below. Ironically, the indication of top-down initiatives is strengthened by undertaking direct representation as a part of deliberative politics proposed by donors such as the Ford Foundation or the World Bank. See also Harris et.al. (2002).
 - 17 As took place in the Jakarta local elections, where UPC and Fakta had political contracts with different candidates.

Chapter Eight



Summary and Conclusion

Demos Team

A Decade of *Reformasi*: The fragility of democracy

Demos' 2007 Survey provides a general picture of Indonesian democratisation during the past decade producing formal and informal regulations and norms supportive of the democratic political system. Democracy has been widely accepted in public life. It has also worked satisfactorily as a national political framework, replacing an authoritarian political system. At this point, the optimistic view is that we have reached the point of no return where democracy will continue to move ahead, little by little, towards progress.

After the dramatic improvements of civil and political rights in the first few years of democratisation, some instruments of democracy related to governance have also improved. The improvement includes the eradication of corruption, government transparency and accountability,

the subordination of government officials before the law, the upholding of the rule of law, and the capacity to combat organised crime. However there remain some problems.

Firstly, there is cynicism about politics when it is understood to be a practice to take over elitist power or merely as a career path to foster vertical mobilisation the political actors to attain more power. Such cynicism is probably related to the powerful elite's domination of politics and that the practice of elitist politics has never been the concern of common people.

Secondly, the option remaining, in spite of some failures, is to continue the process of democratisation. The situation, nevertheless, becomes paradoxical as the powerful elite is going into 'consolidation of oligarchic democracy' mode, a phenomenon marked by the practice of 'politics of order' and the blocking of popular representation within formal democratic structures.

Thirdly, representation remains the most acute problem. No substantial progress has been made on the three dimensions of representation: party based political representation, civil associations and social movement based interest representation, and direct participation. Given this situation, democracy will remain the playground of the oligarchic elites, as long as the agenda of democratisation fails to cover these three dimensions.

Fourthly, threats to fundamental aspects of democracy are indicated by the deterioration of several civil freedoms, such as freedom of religion and freedom of speech and organisation.

Fifthly, the powerful actors are now more integrated into the system of democracy. A party-based political machine and strong economic resources support their manoeuvres. These are the fruit of the nexus of economic and political relations inherited from the previous regime. The capacity of alternative actors is not sufficiently adequate to de-colonise and de-monopolise the existing political system from the grip of oligarchic elites. These actors, relying on dispersed masses and without sufficient economic resources, are fragmented and politically marginalised.

Despite some progress, some of the fundamentals of democracy suffer from a chronic condition. In addition, many of the agendas for the institutionalisation of democracy remain incomplete.

A Rough Road to Political Citizenship: Under the shadow of local communalism?

A nation-wide political framework for democratisation in Indonesia is already in place and functioning. This framework has even succeeded in generating effective solutions for the conflicts in Aceh, so that this region remains an integral part of Indonesia. The nation-wide political framework for democracy can be found in people's self identification with the existence of Indonesia as a community when participating in national elections. This shows that there is a national identity for democratic political communities in Indonesia.

Nonetheless, identity as a member of a religious community and other communal identities has become stronger in the framework of local politics and local conflicts. Sentiments of local communalism, particularly based on ethnic differences coinciding with religious and class differences, are likely to overshadow democratic political work at a local level.

This is the structural reason for the importance of opening up new democratic political spaces within the national political framework at a local level. Once again, learning from the Aceh situation, a national democratic political framework is the only way to resolve local conflicts. What remains a problem is the lack of local political organisations with a democratic, open orientation, working across ethnic, religious and class boundaries. The number of institutions working to channel people's aspirations effectively at a local level is limited. Therefore, there must be a way to promote and open up broader spaces for the emergence of democratic political organisations.

Above all, it is realised that local politics are becoming increasingly important in the aftermath of decentralisation and regional autonomy. Under such circumstances, it is the time to test the democratic political framework at the level of sub-state, with the new setting of 'localisation of politics', which is when politics become something that is globally/locally constructed.

Consolidation of Oligarchic Democracy: Towards a new 'politics of order'?

Instruments of political representation, particularly political parties, are being used more by the powerful actors than by the alternative actors. In addition, the dismal state of political representation is closely related to the colonisation of organised politics by the powerful actors.

To understand this phenomenon, our data provided a bigger picture of the causal factors. Firstly, the instruments of representation are

mostly neglected by pro-democracy actors. Instead of promoting them, these actors prefer to use shortcuts as an alternative. Secondly, although both alternative and powerful actors are at least using the instruments of representation, the latter, in particular, are not good at promoting them.

Thirdly, poor representation is both a product of elite dominance and of a system that is sustaining and even enhancing it as an oligarchic power. It is true that the current powerful elites are not limited to the old centralised oligarchs who have survived the fall of Soeharto. In fact, a substantial part of the broader new elite has emerged from the system of democracy and utilises it to promote its own interests.

Some prominent trends clearly indicate that oligarchic elites are actually preparing to make democracy even more inaccessible to popular participation, so as to serve their own interests. The powerful elites hamper popular participation in the system of representation.

Alternative Actors Trend towards Populist Shortcuts

The alternative actors, regarded as having the potential power to compete with the powerful actors, are also assumed to have better relations with a variety of instruments of democracy. The alternative or pro-democracy actors now have better capacity and are increasingly involved in formal politics. Nevertheless, alternative actors are dependent on the support of dispersed masses and have almost no economic resources. These actors can only communicate their political views among themselves in limited forums.

In spite of such difficulties, the alternative actors have started to realise the importance of working on political agendas, becoming involved in the state domain and transforming their civil activities into politically meaningful ones. In addition, they also see the need to establish a political base among the people. In other words, they do not fully focus on civil activism anymore, but are beginning to realise the importance of becoming involved in politics as the basis of the social movement.

Considering the map of the situation, alternative actors now utilise populist methods, thus neglecting the channels of political representation. They go the populist way by utilising the support of charismatic informal leaders, supported through the system of patronage. Instead of working on agendas to promote representation by establishing broad popular bases for their movement, the alternative actors take shortcuts to put direct pressure on decision-making institutions on behalf of people's needs and interest.

The direct participation methods that they utilise are not based on the promotion of representation on the basis of strong interest

organisations. Relying on mediating contacts and lobbyists, the alternative actors actually employ individual and informal direct participation.

Various attempts at Crafting to Promote Representation: An evaluation

Diverse attempts to promote representation have been made. The first attempt concentrates on improving the performance of political parties and the party system. Efforts have been made to reform political party legislation in order to be more adaptable to the multi-party system. However, the powerful elite is actually using the multiparty system that has been successfully created at an institutional level. This crafting has not brought about any significant change to the pattern of power relations. In other words, the reform of the party system does not significantly contribute to the establishment of an agenda to end the monopoly of the elites and to change the underlying power relations. In addition, local elections are crafted to exclude the importance of efforts to strengthen democratic political organisations at a local level. Local elections will only cause local politics to become filled with anti-democratic forces.

The second attempt is related to joining political parties and reforming them from within or establishing new parties with a new constituent base. The attempts of pro-democracy actors working in CSOs or NGOs or of social movements to join big parties are some examples. However, these actors appear to have failed in bringing about substantial changes to the party they join and, rather, become absorbed deeper into oligarchic mechanisms. Moreover, fragmentation hinders efforts to promote representation by establishing new parties. The effort to establish new parties faces internal problems given the lack of resources and the relative absence of organised popular bases. When the new parties are established, they have to compete for their constituent base. Conflicts break out between the new parties and civil society organisations whose constituent bases are taken over by the new parties.

A third attempt is to promote representation in order to establish representative institutions that enable specific direct participation in government institutions. Different from the other two attempts presented previously, the third is less political, meaning it is not oriented towards political organisation. In other words, this effort attempts to establish non-political representation to struggle for people's specific interests. In many cases, the medium of direct participation is appealing to the lower classes as it accommodates more concrete, open and politically non-partisan issues. Yet, as has been proven in other cases, this medium actually does not employ a clear framework of representation and has the potential to sustain the existing power relations.

We have so far identified some of the problems stemming from a variety of efforts to promote representation. All of these efforts face some common problems in their lack of support from popular organisations, fragmentation within civil society and among pro-democratic organisations and the exclusion of an agenda to change existing power relations.

In brief, no single pathway or combination of them seems to offer a viable solution. The most powerful conclusion is rather that all of them call for a supplementary bloc or public council on an intermediary political level between top level parties and specific groups. Such a democratic political bloc would be firmly organised as a separate body, from the villages to the capital region, by civic associations, movements and individuals.

Joint efforts towards such blocs should be of interest to activists involved in all of the attempts that have been reviewed above to scale up civil and popular work through improved representation in order to make a difference within organised politics. The efforts at self-management and civil and popular interest politics need to combine issues, alliances, communities and workplaces by way of co-operation on a more aggregate level beyond specificities and personalities, without having to subordinate themselves to parties and politicians which tend to be constructions from above by powerful leaders.

Progressive religious, ethnic and customary groups need co-operation with democrats to create more comprehensive agendas where it is possible to relate communal demands to, for instance, equal civil and political rights and environmental protection for the society at large, thus avoiding fragmentation and identity politics. The activists in favour of democratic direct participation in relation to public planning, administration and services need joint political agendas and organisation to put pressure on politicians to introduce such measures. Intellectuals in the fields of media, culture, research and education need exciting and meaningful public spheres to relate to and develop.

Political contracts are unviable without firm and permanent organisation among popular and civic groups to formulate demands, offer powerful support to positive politicians and put hard pressure on defectors. Democrats trying to alter existing parties from within need firm backing from outside. Sectoral political party groups such as those based on trade unions or farmers' organisations must relate to wider efforts and demands. Political machines allowing various popular movements to launch their own political candidates need to consider more people, agendas and priorities. Alternative national ideological parties will

remain marginal without trustworthy relations with much wider sections of the independently co-operating civics and popular movements. Finally, of course, politicians who are prepared to consistently promote the agendas of intermediary political blocs on different levels may well form networks to foster their own co-operation and slowly generate a more representative party. But the latter is not for now, only perhaps in the face of the elections in 2014. At present, Demos and its partners are about to arrange discussions among pro-democrats around the country to facilitate joint work and agendas.

Conclusion

What are the major conclusions about the pioneering attempts by the democracy-oriented groups in Indonesia to come to grips with the two major challenges of (a) combining the work and aspirations of civic and popular movements, and (b) making a difference in organised politics? While not shying away from the contextual factors, we shall close on a note about the common problems and options that may be of wider relevance.

In brief there are four points to be made. Firstly, while the freedoms remain it has become increasingly difficult for independent civic and popular oriented groups to affect public affairs. Much of the public affairs have been depoliticised and left to the technocrats, the market and patronage dominated communities. There is a shortage of institutionalised channels for interest and issue group participation, beyond clientelism and “good contacts”. Even popular representation in formal government is held back by elitist control of party- and electoral systems. Hence, it should be possible to gain broad support for democratic representation through the opening rather than the reduction of the public sphere.

Secondly, the elitist and centralist elements of the traditional Left in Indonesia have been a hindrance as a result of their persistent attempts at “unifying” (but in reality often dividing and disengaging) dispersed groups and movements through competitive top-down leadership. More generally, competing central level elites and the media have tended to set the agendas and frame the debates, thus often distorting issues on the ground. Obviously, the importance of more independent and democratically institutionalised spheres for public discourse need to be re-emphasised, along with non-party dominated politics behind basic agendas.

Thirdly, both of these problems in turn have spurred extra-parliamentary actions, litigation and the participation of special groups and targeted populations in the handling of specific matters of their own concern. There is nothing wrong in this but it is democratically insufficient and comes at the expense of efforts to scale up civic and popular work behind concrete proposals and programmes in relation to both popular representation and direct participation in local governance.

Finally, however, the pioneering attempts in this direction have suffered from poor political facilitation. In addition to political struggle for representation to enable broad participation, the facilitation needs to be firmly in favour of democratic principles of civic and political equality, impartiality and unbroken chains of popular sovereignty. In the Philippines, insufficient priority has been given to broad work for alternative local governance agendas. In Kerala there has been inconsistent Leftist support and lack of organised back up through non-party formations. In Indonesia, civic and movement activists “going political” have not managed to generate basic agendas and organisation in-between specific groups and populist leaders.

Fortunately, these problems point also in the direction of improved roadmaps. The final chapter shall address alternatives and recommendations.

Chapter Nine



The Model of Political Bloc: A Recommendation

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Demos' 2007 Survey shows that democracy has triumphed and now reigns in Indonesia. However, the experience of democratic governance in Indonesia remains very new and still focuses on the procedural level and needs some greater efforts to make democracy meaningful. It is because the former authoritarian government, which ruled for 30 years (1966-1998) and was then replaced by democratically elected civilian government, has affected the political culture of Indonesian society. Democracy itself has empowered civil society, while remaining potentially vulnerable to falling into various forms of conflict that need to be managed politically.

On the one hand, the emergence of undemocratic cultural factors, such as patronage of communal organisations, has privatised

despotism and anarchy that, in turn, has affected the maturation of democracy. On the other hand, the neoliberalism has dominated the economy on the ground and marginalised local economic differences. The state's attention has turned to the market mechanism and, therefore, to the freedom of movement of private capital. Under these circumstances, the state has been weakened by conditions that have resulted in it becoming ineffective in institutionalising democratic governance. However, it is clear that at the procedural level of democracy there are some possibilities for demos to be involved and to make use of it.

The substantive matters of human rights based democracy, such as economic, social, and cultural (ecosoc) rights have not yet demonstrated noticeable changes. The unequal political relationship between demos and the state due to the deficit of popular control, social fragmentation, polycentric governance and the problem of popular representation are factors that might slow down, if not halt, efforts in politicising human rights based democracy in Indonesia. To resolve the crisis, democratic policy making and its implementation needs to be representative through a process of democratisation that follows the principles of political equality and impartiality, authority, accountability, transparency, and responsiveness. This means that the existing economic situation, the role of the state, the position of the people in production and property relations, the division of the people into various classes and strata, the existing political and administrative institutions, all have to be neutral. Democracy, therefore, is a constant movement by the marginalised layers of the population to obtain rights equal to the rest in relation to political power (political equality).

In the Indonesian context of democracy, citizens are deliberately encouraged to accept the existing economic relations, and to reducing the question of political liberation to that of the participation of the individual or 'social layers' in the legal process of the formation of the state. The practice of democracy in Indonesia has so far been to legitimise the class rule of the capitalist class, which is by nature above the people.


Mechanically, the existing parliamentary system is an indirect mechanism for indirect participation of the people. But, in fact, it is not the people, but rather individuals representing them who actually participate both in legislative assemblies and government. These representatives are not duty bound to reflect the wishes of their electorates on various issues. They cast their own votes and express their own views in parliaments, legislative assemblies, and so on. In other words, people elect them,

not as their representatives and spokespersons, but as their substitutes in running the government. The election process means, therefore, the procedure of legitimising the government, and not that of the people's participation in politics. It is rather the establishment of a government, which originates from the people in a formal sense.

Elections here function to secure the position of the ruling class by which every five years they get this stamp of approval and go about their own business. In this opinion poll, the voters are involved, not as people with certain aspirations who are still alive in the period between the two elections and therefore have views and things to say, but merely as insignificant countable units (votes). In the next five years when they can again channel their 'insignificant' votes into the ballot box, nobody asks them anything or listens to what they have to say, nor do they have access to power, or to solving their ecosoc problem, or the capacity to do anything about the laws that the so-called legislative body pass about their lives. They may, of course, protest in this interval (as happened in labour strikes against the four ministers' bill in late October and early November 2008), provided that their protest does not spoil the ruling class game and disrupt the ordinary state of affairs of the society or become a serious nuisance for the capitalist class politician and the capitalist class businessman.

To solve the problem above we need to think about an alternative sociopolitical pact that functions in developing political linkages, scaling up the capacity of the people to represent their views politically and to make use of democracy to make their votes become significant. A political bloc, as seen from the model below, perhaps is one of the alternatives that may enable the existing sociopolitical fragmentation to build popular control.

Figure 9.1. A Model of Political Bloc



A political bloc as seen from the model above is a socio-political sphere where civil society, popular organisations and organised politics are engaged to make use of democracy in order to be more meaningful. This alternative political institution enables civil society organisations to represent their aspirations. Meanwhile, organised politics can make use of this political bloc to get across the views, aspirations, interest and the needs of demos for a political agenda and program.

This engagement will facilitate previously floating democrats to be more connected to people by anchoring them into the political bloc. This bloc will open up access for the people to increase their capacity in channeling their issues, to scale up linkages and organisations and to transform sectarian conflicts, commonly found in fragmented civil society, into more political forms of action. A political bloc in this political constellation may function as popular control and make people's votes significant because they have access to intervene in public affair especially in order to realise their ecosoc rights.

The political bloc as a sociopolitical sphere not only widens the legal and formal base of demos power but also encourages cultural democracy that will guide their political action and governmentality. It functions as a sphere for political engagement of increasingly broader sections of society in power and personal freedom, which in turn empowers the individual to intervene in public affairs through popular control and political equality. The political bloc emphasises the process of democratic institutionalisation that will function as an authority to enhance the material and spiritual needs of human beings so that they are able to enjoy the possibility of making free choices in the realm of political and civil rights. Hence, we recommend the establishment of democratic political blocs.

What is a Democratic Political Bloc (DPB)?

The DPB is a democratically institutionalised non-party political alliance that functions on an intermediary level in-between, on the one hand, networks, movements and organisations that focus on specific issues and interests, and on the other hand, political parties and candidates that focus on aggregated general policies and their implementation and run in elections.

The DPB is a joint organisation of people's organisations, social movements, NGOs and individual figures (who for good reasons are not members of any of the affiliated organisations) in the village, district,

and province and at the centre. The organisation must be permanent in character to enhance the democratic character and bargaining power of the bloc as compared to the rather inefficient political contracts that have been tried so far.

Committed politicians and candidates should also be members of the DPB but they do not represent their parties. With regard to DPB they must instead be loyal to the aims and means of the bloc. Political parties in turn may be supportive of the bloc but they are not members. All this is to guarantee the party-political independence of the DPB. The bloc may support candidates and parties based on its own minimum programme and criteria. As long as a politician/party follows the platform and agenda of the bloc, she/he/it is eligible to get the support of the DPB, including in election campaigns.

The DPB is facilitated by task forces from above but built from below. The task forces from above (on various levels) should consist of individual and collective initiators that are committed to the idea of the DPB. It is necessary to have facilitating task forces of ideologically committed persons (and organisations like Demos and perhaps Walhi's political group), as most other organisations will find it difficult to give priority to the bloc, given the logic of organisational self-interest etc., specific programmes, competition etc.

The DPB is then built from below, from the village, subdistrict (*kecamatan*), district/municipality (*kabupaten/kota*) and provincial level. Ideally there is a DPB at each level where there are public elections. The blocs may be formed by different organisations and movements on each of these levels. In addition, representatives from the blocs on the village level are then also sent to the blocs on the kecamatan level; and from kecamatan to the kabupaten, and from the kabupaten to the province-level. This is to guarantee co-ordination, despite the fact that member-organisations of DPB may not be present on all the levels where the DPBs must be present. The central level bloc, however, is only made up of representatives from the lower levels, in order not to be dominated by Jakarta figures. Hence, the bloc-building combines a unitary and federative structure.

The DPB is an organisation where decision-making is based as far as possible on the principles of deliberative democracy, i.e. on the primacy of arguments that are rooted in best possible knowledge through studies and research. However, when unity can not be reached and decisions must be made, this should be done on the basis of qualified majorities, e.g.

2/3 of the votes. In making such decisions, different members must have proportional numbers of votes, e.g. from one to ten, where individual members have one vote and the large organisations have ten. (The details of what constitutes small and larger organisations would be specified for each level, from the village to the provincial level and is also dependent on the size of the population in each unit.) This is to inhibit personality-oriented politics as well as organisational fragmentation. It should make more sense to unite than to split. On the other hand, one should not go to the extreme of counting the number of members.

The DPB is a joint organisation where compulsory membership fees and additional donations are also contributed according to organisational strength. Further, the arranging of cultural events (such as concerts, festivals and sporting activities) is particularly important to create a common and wider identity and to mobilise funds. This self-financing must be sufficient to cover basic operational costs in order to sustain the independence of the bloc. Additional funding by national and international donors (which is quite possible due to the non-party partisan character of the bloc) should rather focus on the research-based education, training, monitoring, media and cultural work within or in relation to the bloc.

An additional source of funding may be from the DPB providing cost-priced services to candidates who follow the platform and agenda of the DPB. This is for activities that simply cannot be carried out by way of voluntary labour only. Such services may include surveys, education and training including for electoral campaigning and election monitoring. This is to provide the DPB-related candidates with a transparent and accountable alternative to commercialised political machines; an alternative that also enables DPB activists to obtain routine income rather than only being able to work voluntarily in their leisure time while the candidates pay well for separate extra services on the market.

In contrast to most of the political contracts so far attempted, the DPB is not based on unity behind a popular figure or party, but behind an independently institutionalised mini-platform of demands for rights and public policies as well as demands on non-public institutions such as companies, business organisations, militias and religious or ethnic groups. The mini-platform thus accommodates and aggregates the most vital concerns of the democracy movement and that are important to the people at large.

This aggregation is not in line with what is common in conventional alliances and coalitions, i.e. a combination of various demands from a number of organisations. Rather the DPB is based on the principle that any advocate for a specific demand must be able to convince others that this demand is also important for people at large, including for the success of the other groups' demands. This is because the DPB aims at public practices and policies that should be rooted in human rights and democracy and 'good for ordinary people at large', irrespective of organisational affiliation, religion, ethnicity etc. Partisanship is necessary to foster DPBs with this orientation, but must not adversely affect its work and the implementation of its policies. The aim is hegemony for a popular, human (including social and economic) rights- and democracy based community. Theoretically this comes close to Habermas' distinction between private and specific on the one hand and public on the other. It is also along the lines of for instance Gramsci and the old Scandinavian ideas of civil and democratic based 'people's home' as opposed to the idea of both fascist and separate class or ethnic and religious based communities as a basis for the society at large.

The reasons for why a special demand is important for all (rather than only for some) are thus the point of departure for the common policies. For instance, it is easy to argue that most women's rights are important for all since it is a precondition for gender equality, but the common policy should thus be formulated in terms of gender equality, not as 'special demands'. Similarly, since only some demands for land reforms may be compatible with the rights of agricultural workers, only those that meet the needs of all interest groups should become the common policy, and the individual group demands that are not commonly agreed to should not be included. Special demands will have to be promoted by the separate founding organisations outside the political bloc.

The DPB platform is explicitly and by principle pro-democratic. This includes a whole range of aspects, from the way to handle civil wars, conflicts between capital and labour, or who should take care of the children or clean the house back home. However, the minimum agenda does not focus on general statements in favor of all the intrinsic means of a meaningful democracy that are defined by the framework of Demos (including rules and regulations as well as people's political capacity) – but on the most important concrete policies to promote them

in various settings. For instance, the minimum agenda may include specific demands for:

- Local independent, public commissions (such as the National Commission of Human Rights) that are responsible for the reviewing and monitoring of human rights, social and economic rights, gender equality, sustainable development, democratic representation and good governance,
- The facilitation of local institutions for participatory control of public services such as health and education as well as participatory planning and budgeting,
- Specific political reforms for better representation,
- The promotion of a number of neglected issues that women in particular tend to be interested in but are also vital to others,
- The facilitation of social pacts between labour and capital for basic social- and economic rights (including for informal labourers and farmers) in exchange for growth oriented economic development.

The DPB negotiates institutionalised and quite specific political contracts with various independent candidates or members of parties that are prepared to promote the mini-platform and agendas in different ways and in the context of various wider frameworks and ideologies. These candidates are invited to be members of the DPB. Similar contracts may also be negotiated with political parties, but the parties are not represented in the DPB.

DPB's political contracts differ from most of those that have been tried within the democracy movement so far. DPB's political contracts are politically institutionalised in the sense that DPB is an independent and permanent organisation that is able to monitor the performance of the candidates and parties and keep them accountable not just before but also after elections. Partner candidates and parties who do not honour the contracts are abandoned publicly and lose the support of the DPB. Since the DPB is both a permanent organisation and a service provider that is crucial to the political partners, these partners may find it impossible to ignore the DPB's bargaining power. Furthermore, parties and political leaders who try to capture / colonise / dominate and affect various peoples' organisations, social movements, NGOs (collectively or by way of party members who act on the basis of party instructions) are also denounced.

The DPB thus does not itself run in elections or appoint its own candidates but supports politicians and parties working for the mini-platform and agenda. The DPB also engages in non-partisan co-operation with the political executive and administration, such as taking part in participatory planning and budgeting and various sectoral councils such as for public health, educations, human rights etc.

The Democratic Political Bloc as An Experiment to Promote Popular Representation

There are several problems underlying the emergence of new ideas to form Democratic Political Bloc:

1. The currently ratified package of political laws, particularly the Law on Political Parties and the Law on General Elections, once again, reveals efforts by the parliamentary political elites to hinder the establishment of new parties by establishing discriminative, unreasonable requirements. The new laws on political parties and elections make it almost impossible to build local political parties and increasingly difficult to build alternative 'national' political parties. Hence there is a need to form an institutionalised bloc to struggle both for more democratic regulations and for influencing supportive candidates and parties from outside. Similarly, a well organised political bloc is the only way in which the restrictive regulations for registration of independent candidates to be eligible to run in direct local elections can be overcome and turned into an effective political campaign.
2. The efforts to bridge various movements and NGOs 'from below' on the basis of their existing priorities and work have usually proved unsuccessful. The special histories, personalities, priorities and established practices in each organisation are quite different and impossible to overcome on this level. (A recent case is that of trying to promote bloc-based contracts with candidates in the gubernatorial elections in Jakarta on the primary basis of specific work among the urban poor.)
3. The efforts to build alliances between various groups and people by drawing on communal solidarities such as those based on religion, ethnicity, clan and adat law only tend to be pro-democratic when promoting universal civil rights (such as human-, social- economic- and environmental rights) rather

than communal rights. Communal solidarities do not serve as a fruitful basis for civic unity as they tend to undermine the fundamental principle of political equality among the citizens at large by actively or passively excluding those who are not part of special communal solidarities. Communal rights may however apply to some other sectors such as with regard to environmental protection, collective right to certain land, protection of specific cultures etc.

4. The efforts to build political organisations on the basis of sectoral interests such as among workers or farmers fighting for land neglect too many of the additional issues and interests that are at stake in political work and elections.
5. The efforts to bridge various movements and NGO's behind party-political programmes based on multi-sectoral interests and solidarities have not yet found a means to include a range of other issues and interests. Meanwhile they generate resistance among those who do not wish to relate to any political party, or are just out for exchanging support to an exciting party in return for special favours.
6. The efforts to unite various groups and concerns behind popular individual independent or party-supported candidates or charismatic figures tend to subordinate the coalitions to the figure or party (and at worst lead to political clientelism). This is at the expense of the development of coherent and sustainable organisations that can select and keep political representatives accountable in a democratic way, thus sustaining political equality and impartial public services. Populism and clientelism is no solution.
7. The previous efforts at political contracts have been insufficient because the popular parties to the contract have not been permanently organised and strong enough to put up a political fight in the case where the political candidate(s) do not honour the agreement, both before and after elections.
8. The efforts to rather promote co-operation and unity 'from above' on the basis of a theoretically and ideologically consistent perspective and programme have also been unsuccessful. Many groups resist this as an attempt to dominate them, and others are divided. Hence these efforts tend to create another layer of divisions within the broad democracy oriented movement

which have proved devastating in countries such as India and the Philippines.

9. The efforts to bypass 'rotten' politicians by promoting direct links between various groups and movements on the one hand and 'the executive' on the other (including by way of 'participatory budgeting') neglect the need for political facilitation of such linkages through altering the relations of power as well as political representation on the basis of broader perspectives and aggregated issues and interests. 'Participatory populism' is no substitute for democratic political representation.
10. There is a need for alternative political movements to include women and their interests, since both have proved particularly difficult to accommodate within political parties.
11. There is a need to find ways of engaging politically the many individuals (such a civil servants) and organisations (such as NGOs) who can not or do not wish to engage in party-partisan politics.

The Democratic Political Bloc aims to promote alternative representation, based on popular interest.

The Democratic Political Bloc as a Solution to the Fragmentation of the Pro Democracy Movement.

A democratic political bloc is not the only solution to our fragile process of democratisation. However, it aims to solve one of the crucial problems of democratisation, i.e. the fragmentation of the pro-democracy movement.

With a democratic political bloc, we will be able to gather energy to consolidate and coordinate the fragmented pro-democracy movement. The fragmentation is not only caused by different focuses but also by the lack of strong links between movements in different places.

A democratic political bloc also serves as a bridge for reformist actors in organised politics to link with actors working in social movements and civil organisations. The bloc are formed by various individuals, NGOs, peoples' organisations and social movements who want to influence various elections on the basis of their priorities (mini-agendas) rather than being 'mobilised' behind the agenda of a candidate or a party.

The bloc is initiated by a number of groups and individuals who want to promote sectoral interests such as land reform or labour rights on the political level and then realise that they have to broaden their concerns in order to stand a chance in getting sympathetic candidates and parties elected. Similarly, the bloc is initiated by a number of groups and individuals who want to promote:

- participatory planning and budgeting, and/or
- anti-corruption measures,
- sustainable development,
- human rights and conflict resolution.

Nonetheless, it must be realised that this calls for political facilitation and thus the need to form broader alliances.

Despite the great challenges, the opportunity to build a broad social basis for the movement to promote popular representation does exist. The opportunity provides the basis for broad social support from several elements among the people with a high interest in politics but with a very critical outlook towards actual political practices, that is, elitist political practices.

In such a situation, it is necessary that we map the social sectors that are already 'politicised', and classify them according to three forms of representation: political, interest, and civic representation. The sectors of new political masses in-waiting need a strong, solid, open, inclusive and participatory organisational method.

Agendas of the Democratic Political Bloc

There are four inherent agendas involved in the establishment of a Democratic Political Bloc. Firstly, democratic political blocs aim to protect human rights based on democratisation – including equal civil and political rights and forms of more democratic political representation – against an elitist scenario which aims to establish politics of order through the consolidation of its oligarchic democracy. Secondly, democratic political blocs aim to promote participatory local government, including participatory budgeting and participatory sustainable planning. Thirdly, democratic political blocs aim to promote women's participation and include women's perspectives and issues in political matters. Fourthly,

the establishment of a democratic political bloc also serves as a concrete step towards the demonopolisation of the system of representation and closed-door parties.

The DPBs aim to create a system of popular representation – as an alternative to the elitist representation currently practiced.

- (i) To scale up the possibility to build local parties from below, from a local context.
- (ii) To open up broader possibilities for social (movement) based interest representation.
- (iii) To open up broader participation for women and accommodate women's perspectives in politics.
- (iv) To promote social, economic and political rights.
- (v) To promote social pacts to guarantee the fulfillment of rights to employment, social security, environmental protection and economic development.

The Institutionalisation of a Democratic Political Bloc at National and Local Level

A democratic political bloc can be established both at national and local levels. If nationally it is based on universal themes, ideas and principles, then locally it is implemented on the basis of a universal vision.

A local democratic political bloc is an authentic response to the problems of democracy at a local level. Therefore, the bloc's themes, issues and strategies must provide a contextual solution to local problems.

The establishment of a local political bloc does not only concentrate on promoting party-based political representation despite the urgency and the strategic nature of the arena. The promotion of non-party based representation to promote issues and interests, as well as civic participation is also an important agenda item.

Finally, it is important to map the road for each experiment with a national and local democratic political bloc. The road map is important to determine when the establishment of the bloc should begin or when it should end, the situation within which the bloc is to be established, the bloc agenda and the bloc structure.

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DATA TABULATION



NATIONAL SURVEY PROBLEMS AND OPTIONS ON DEMOCRATISATION IN INDONESIA 2007

**CATEGORY:
GENERAL DATA (ALL INFORMANTS)**

A. PROFILE OF INFORMANTS

Table A.1. Proportion of informants according to province

NO	PROVINCE	PROPORTION (%)
A	REGION: SUMATERA	29
1	Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam	2
2	North Sumatra	3
3	Riau	1
4	Riau Islands	2
5	West Sumatra	3
6	Jambi	3
7	Bengkulu	4
8	South Sumatra	4
9	Bangka Belitung	3
10	Lampung	3
B	REGION: JAWA AND BALI	21
11	Banten	3
12	West Jawa	3
13	DKI Jakarta	4
14	Central Jawa	3
15	DI Yogyakarta	3
16	East Jawa	3
17	Bali	2
C	REGION: KALIMANTAN	12
18	West Kalimantan	3
19	Central Kalimantan	2
20	East Kalimantan	4
21	South Kalimantan	3
D	REGION: SULAWESI	19
22	Gorontalo	3
23	North Sulawesi	4
24	Central Sulawesi	3
25	West Sulawesi	2
26	Southeast Sulawesi	4
27	South Sulawesi	3

E	REGION: EASTERN INDONESIA	19
28	West Nusa Tenggara	3
29	East Nusa Tenggara	3
30	Maluku	3
31	North Maluku	3
32	Papua	3
33	West Irian Jaya	4
TOTAL (A+B+C+D+E)		100

Percentage based on number of informants, N=903.

Table A.2. Proportion of informants according to frontline

NO	FRONTLINES	PROPORTION (%)
1	The struggle of peasants, agricultural labourers and fisher folks for their social, economic and other rights (Land rights)	9
2	The struggle of labour for better working conditions and standard of living (Labour movement)	7
3	The struggle for the social, economic and other rights of the urban poor (Urban poor)	5
4	The promotion of human rights (Human rights)	8
5	The struggle against corruption in favour of 'good governance' (Anti-corruption)	8
6	Democratisation of the political parties and the party system (Reform parties)	9
7	The promotion of pluralism, religious and ethnic reconciliation and conflict resolution (Pluralism)	8
8	The improvement and democratisation of education (Education)	8
9	The promotion of professionalism as part of 'good governance' in public and private sectors (Professionalism)	7
10	The promotion of freedom, independence and quality of media (Media)	9
11	The promotion of gender equality and feminist perspectives (Gender equality)	10
12	The improvement of alternative representation at the local level (Local representation)	7
13	The promotion of sustainable development (Sustainable development)	7
	TOTAL	100

Percentage based on number of informants, N=903.

Table A.3. Proportion of informants according to gender

NO	GENDER	PROPORTION (%)
1	Female	23
2	Male	77
TOTAL		100

Percentage based on number of informants, N=903.

Tabel A.4. Proportion of informants according to age

NO	AGE GROUPS	PROPORTION (%)
1	25 yo. or younger	3
2	26-35 yo.	35
3	36-45 yo.	37
4	46 yo. or older	23
5	No data	2
TOTAL		100

Percentage based on number of informants, N=903.

Table A.5. Proportion of informants according to level of education

NO	LEVEL OF EDUCATION	PROPORTION (%)
1	Elementary	2
2	Middle	18
3	University	59
4	Post graduate	19
5	No data	2
TOTAL		100

Percentage based on number of informants, N=903.

Tabel A.6. Proportion of informants according to occupation

NO	OCCUPATION	PROPORTION (%)
1	NGO	31
2	Academe	11
3	Politician	6
4	Bureaucracy and local government	4
5	Auxiliary state bodies	2
6	Business	8
7	Professional	30
8	Religious and ethnic leader	1
9	Non career (housewives, retired persons, etc)	2
10	No answer	4
TOTAL		100

Percentage based on number of informants, N=903.

Tabel A.7. Proportion of informants according to religion

NO	RELIGION	PROPORTION (%)
1	Islam	74
2	Hindu	2
3	Budha	1
4	Protestan	14
5	Chatolic	8
TOTAL		100

Percentage based on number of informants, N=903.

Tabel A.8. Context of information that informants refer to

NO	CONTEXT	PROPORTION (%)
1	Province/Local	83
2	National/issue-area	17
		100

Percentage based on number of informants, N=903.

Table A.9. Proportion of informants according to province and frontline

NO	PROVINCE	FRONTLINES												TOTAL	
		LAND RIGHTS	LABOUR MOVT	URBAN POOR	HUMAN RIGHTS	ANTI-CORRUPTION	REFORM PARTIES	PLURALISM	EDUCATION	PROFESSIONALISM	MEDIA	GENDER EQUALITY	LOCAL REP.		SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
1	Aceh Darussalam	1	0	0	1	2	3	2	2	2	0	4	1	1	19
2	North Sumatra	3	6	2	3	1	1	2	2	1	1	3	1	2	28
3	Riau	1	2	0	0	0	3	1	0	1	2	1	0	0	11
4	Riau Islands	1	1	2	2	2	2	1	2	3	2	2	1	0	21
5	West Sumatra	3	2	2	3	2	2	2	3	2	3	3	3	1	31
6	Jambi	3	3	1	5	2	2	0	3	1	2	1	4	2	29
7	Bengkulu	4	1	3	4	4	4	2	3	2	3	4	2	4	40
8	South Sumatra	3	4	2	2	3	3	4	1	3	2	3	1	3	34
9	Bangka Belitung	3	0	1	0	5	0	3	2	1	3	4	1	0	23
10	Lampung	3	2	2	4	4	3	1	0	1	2	3	2	1	28
11	Banten	1	2	4	2	3	2	2	3	1	2	4	2	2	30
12	West Java	6	9	0	1	2	3	0	1	0	2	1	2	0	27
13	DKI Jakarta	2	4	3	5	4	6	2	4	1	4	2	1	2	40
14	Central Jawa	4	1	2	2	1	3	2	2	3	2	2	1	3	28
15	DI Yogyakarta	3	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	1	3	1	3	24
16	East Jawa	3	1	3	2	3	1	3	1	2	2	1	1	2	25
17	West Kalimantan	3	0	1	1	1	3	4	2	0	2	4	4	2	27
18	Central Kalimantan	2	0	0	1	1	2	1	1	0	3	3	2	3	19
19	East Kalimantan	3	3	2	2	3	3	3	2	2	3	2	3	3	34
20	South Kalimantan	2	1	2	2	2	3	2	3	1	3	4	2	3	30

(continued)

Table A.9. Proportion of informants according to province and frontline

NO	PROVINCE	FRONTLINES												TOTAL	
		LAND RIGHTS	LABOUR MOVT	URBAN POOR	HUMAN RIGHTS	ANTI-CORRUPTION	REFORM PARTIES	PLURALISM	EDUCATION	PROFESSIONALISM	MEDIA	GENDER EQUALITY	LOCAL REP.		SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
21	Gorontalo	3	0	0	2	2	3	3	2	1	2	3	2	2	25
22	North Sulawesi	2	3	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	4	3	3	2	35
23	Central Sulawesi	3	2	2	3	2	3	2	2	3	1	3	2	2	30
24	West Sulawesi	2	0	0	1	2	3	3	0	2	3	3	1	1	21
25	Southeast Sulawesi	3	0	2	3	3	3	2	4	3	4	3	3	3	36
26	South Sulawesi	2	1	1	1	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	4	1	25
27	Bali	0	1	0	4	2	0	3	2	2	3	2	1	0	20
28	West Nusa Tenggara	4	3	0	0	4	1	0	1	2	2	3	3	1	24
29	East Nusa Tenggara	3	0	1	2	2	2	3	2	1	1	2	3	1	23
30	Maluku	1	0	0	3	0	4	4	3	2	6	3	2	2	30
31	North Maluku	3	3	2	2	1	1	2	4	3	3	1	3	2	30
32	Papua	1	0	1	3	2	1	1	0	3	3	2	2	5	24
33	West Irian Jaya	2	3	0	4	2	2	3	4	4	2	3	1	2	32
TOTAL		77	83	59	45	73	74	79	70	68	59	80	87	65	61
9%		7%	5%	8%	8%	9%	8%	8%	7%	9%	10%	7%	7%	100%	

B. ATTITUDES TO POLITICS*Table B.1. People's understanding on politics*

Q17. In your experience, how do people understand politics?		
NO	UNDERSTANDING ON POLITICS	PROPORTION (%)
1	Struggle for power	54
2	Popular control of public affairs	14
3	Something taken care of by the elites/public figures	12
4	Elitist manipulation	17
5	Kind of job/career; as social dedication	1
6	No answer	2
TOTAL		100

Percentage based on number of informants, N=903.

Table B.2. People's interest towards in politics

Q18. How interested are people in politics?		
NO	PEOPLE'S INTEREST TOWARDS IN POLITICS	PROPORTION (%)
1	Highly interested	14
2	Interested	46
3	Not interested	40
TOTAL		100

Percentage based on number of informants, N=903.

Table B.3. Women's interest in politics

Q19. How interested are women in politics?		
NO	WOMEN'S INTEREST TOWARDS IN POLITICS	PROPORTION (%)
1	Highly interested	7
2	Interested	42
3	Not interested	50
4	No answer	1
TOTAL		100

Percentage based on number of informants, N=903.

Table B.4. Informants' assessment on what should at first hand be done to encourage women participation in politics

Q20. According to you, what should at first hand be done to encourage the participation of women in politics?		
NO	WAYS TO ENCOURAGE WOMEN PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS	PROPORTION (%)
1	Fight for women quota in legislative and executive institutions	10
2	Increase women's political awareness and capacity	61
3	Support women to gain positions in political institutions	7
4	Expand the political agenda so that it includes more issues	21
5	Against patriarchy	1
TOTAL		100

Percentage based on number of informants, N=903.

Table B.5. Informant's assessment on the most appropriate channel to be used to engage in political process

Q21. If one is interested in politics, which channel do you think is the most appropriate to be used at first hand?		
NO	CHANNEL TO BE USED TO ENGAGE IN POLITICAL PROCESS	PROPORTION (%)
1	Join a big national political party	31
2	Join a small political party that is eligible to run in elections	15
3	Establish a new locally rooted political party	13
4	Congregate a non-party political block	37
5	Active in political discourse/mapping	3
6	No answer	1
TOTAL		100

Percentage based on number of informants, N=903.

Tabel B.6. The most effective method to increase people's political capacity and participation

Q22. Which method do you think is most effective to increase people's political capacity and participation?		
NO	METHODS TO INCREASE POLITICAL CAPACITY AND PARTICIPATION	PROPORTION (%)
1	Increasing people's political awareness	58
2	Improving the education of political cadres	19
3	Reforming and consolidating existing political parties	5
4	Promoting politically oriented campaigns and making public statements and speeches	3
5	Mobilising the masses	2
6	Building democratic and mass-based organisations and new political parties	12
7	No answer	1
TOTAL		100

Percentage based on number of informants, N=903.

c. THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE 'PEOPLE'/DEMOS

Table C.1. Informants' assessment of people's identity in 2004 general election

Q23. In the 2004 general elections of legislators, how did people at first hand identify themselves?		
NO	IDENTITY	PROPORTION (%)
1	As a resident of Indonesia in general	35
2	As residents of their city/municipality/province	12
3	As residents of their village and hamlet (dusun)	7
4	As members of their ethnic community	8
5	As members of their religious community	5
6	As members/supporters of 'their' political party	24
7	As members of their social class	8
TOTAL		100

Percentage based on number of informants, N=903.

Table C.2. Informants' assessment of people's identity in Pilkada

Q24. In regional election(s) (pilkada), how did people at first hand identify themselves?		
NO	IDENTITY	PROPORTION (%)
1	As residents of their city/municipality/province	40
2	As residents of their village and hamlet (dusun)	11
3	As members of their ethnic community	23
4	As members of their religious community	4
5	As members/supporters of 'their' political party	13
6	As members of their social class	7
7	Others	2
8	No answer	1
TOTAL		100

Percentage based on number of informants, N=903.

Table C.3. Informants' assessment of people's identity in situation of conflict caused by social, economy and political tension

Q25. How do people identify themselves when they face situation of conflict caused by social, economy and political tension?		
NO	IDENTITY	PROPORTION (%)
1	As residents of their city/municipality/province	12
2	As residents of their village and hamlet (dusun)	12
3	As members of their ethnic community	36
4	As a member of their religious community	12
5	As members of their social class	23
6	As members of their political party/ideology	1
7	Others	0
8	No answer	4
TOTAL		100

Percentage based on number of informants, N=903.

Table C.4. Informants' assessment of people's identity in responding to issues of administrative division of provinces or regencies

Q26. In responding to issues of administrative division of provinces or regencies, how do people at first hand identify themselves?		
NO	IDENTITY	PROPORTION (%)
1	As residents of their city/municipality/province	37
2	As residents of their village and hamlet (dusun)	30
3	As members of their ethnic community	26
4	As members of their religious community	1
5	Interest oriented	3
6	Others	1
7	No answer	3
TOTAL		100

Percentage based on number of informants, N=903.

D. THE QUALITY OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY

Table D.1. Informants' assessment on relation of formal rules and regulations to intrinsic instruments to promote democracy

Q27. Existence: In your assessment, do there exist formal rules and regulations within your regional context that are meant to support the following issues? Q28. Performance: In your assessment, do the existing formal rules and regulations that are applied within your regional context generally tend to be supportive enough or not very supportive in relation to the following issues? Q29. Spread: In your assessment, do the formal rules and regulations apply effectively throughout your regional context, or the geographical contexts your issue area, Q30. Substance: In your assessment, are the formal rules and regulations substantive by really addressing all aspects that you deem to be part of public life?													
NO	INSTRUMENTS TO PROMOTE THE FOLLOWING INTRINSIC MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	QUALITY OF FORMAL RULES AND REGULATION											
		EXISTENCE			PERFORMANCE			SPREAD			SUBSTANCE		
		No	Yes	N/a	Supportive enough	Not very supportive	N/a	No	Yes	N/a	No	Yes	N/a
		% of informants			% of informants			% of informants			% of informants		
1	Citizenship (Equal state-citizenship: The rights of minorities, migrants and refugees, Reconciliation of horizontal conflicts)	33	59	8	77	21	2	70	29	1	72	26	2
2	Government support of international law and UN human rights	27	67	6	85	15	0	69	31	0	69	30	1
3	Subordination of the government and public officials to the rule of law	33	60	7	78	21	1	56	43	1	61	38	1
4	The equality before the law (Equal and secure access to justice; The integrity and independence of the judiciary)	33	61	6	80	20	0	57	43	0	61	38	1
5	Freedom from physical violence and the fear of it	32	62	6	82	18	0	56	43	1	58	40	2
6	Freedom of speech, assembly and organisation	19	78	3	84	15	1	39	60	1	47	51	2
7	Freedom to carry out trade union activity	24	72	4	80	19	1	51	48	1	58	40	2
8	Freedom of religion, belief, language and culture	19	77	4	87	12	1	30	69	1	37	61	2
9	Gender equality and emancipation	27	67	6	84	15	1	58	41	1	64	34	2
10	The rights of children	23	72	5	88	11	1	60	40	0	57	42	1
11	The right to employment, social security and other basic needs	32	60	8	78	22	0	60	40	0	64	35	1

Q27. Existence: In your assessment, do there exist formal rules and regulations within your regional context that are meant to support the following issues?

Q28. Performance: In your assessment, do the existing formal rules and regulations that are applied within your regional context generally tend to be supportive enough or not very supportive in relation to the following issues?

Q29. Spread: In your assessment, do the formal rules and regulations apply effectively throughout your regional context, or the geographical contexts of your issue area,

Q30. Substance: In your assessment, are the formal rules and regulations substantive by really addressing all aspects that you deem to be part of public life?

12	The right to basic education, including citizen's rights and duties	19	78	3	86	14	0	43	57	0	51	48	1
13	Good corporate governance	37	55	8	79	20	1	68	31	1	66	32	2
14	Free and fair general elections (free and fair general elections at central, regional and local level; free and fair separate elections of e.g. governors, mayors and village heads)	16	81	3	85	14	1	29	70	1	44	54	2
15	Freedom to form parties on the national or local level (or teams of independent candidates) that can recruit members, and participate in elections	43	46	11	75	24	1	53	46	1	58	41	2
16	Reflection of vital issues and interests among people by political parties and or candidates.	51	36	13	77	22	0	56	43	2	58	41	1
17	Abstention from abusing religious or ethnic sentiments, symbols and doctrines by political parties and or candidates.	39	52	9	79	20	1	49	50	1	54	44	2
18	Independence of money politics and powerful vested interests by political parties and or candidates.	40	52	8	70	30	0	50	49	1	58	40	2
19	Membership-based control of parties, and responsiveness and accountability of parties and or political candidates to their constituencies	48	37	15	79	21	0	54	45	1	60	40	0
20	Parties and or candidates ability to form and run government	49	38	13	78	21	1	51	48	1	57	41	2
21	Democratic decentralisation of government of all matters that do not need to be handled on central levels.	39	52	9	72	26	1	47	50	3	61	37	2
22	The transparency and accountability of elected government, the executive(bureaucracies), at all levels	40	50	10	78	21	1	52	47	1	58	41	1

Table D.2. Informants' assessment on relation of informal arrangements to intrinsic instruments to promote democracy

	INSTRUMENTS TO PROMOTE THE FOLLOWING INTRINSIC MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	QUALITY OF INFORMAL ARRANGEMENTS									
		PERFORMANCE			SPREAD			SUBSTANCE			
		Supportive enough	Not very supportive	No answer	No	Yes	No answer	No	Yes	No answer	
		% of informants			% of informants			% of informants			
		65	33	2	49	49	2	62	36	2	
1	Citizenship (Equal state-citizenship; The rights of minorities, migrants and refugees, Reconciliation of horizontal conflicts)										
2	Government support of international law and UN human rights	65	31	4	57	39	4	63	33	4	
3	Subordination of the government and public officials to the rule of law	58	38	4	50	45	4	55	40	5	
4	The equality before the law (Equal and secure access to justice; The integrity and independence of the judiciary)	57	40	3	53	44	3	56	40	4	
5	Freedom from physical violence and the fear of it	65	31	4	49	47	4	55	40	5	
6	Freedom of speech, assembly and organisation	71	26	3	38	59	3	48	49	3	
7	Freedom to carry out trade union activity	68	29	3	49	47	4	57	39	4	
8	Freedom of religion, belief; language and culture	76	21	3	30	67	3	37	60	3	
9	Gender equality and emancipation	46	51	3	49	48	3	60	37	3	
10	The rights of children	66	31	3	47	50	3	55	42	3	
11	The right to employment, social security and other basic needs	67	30	3	51	46	3	56	41	3	
12	The right to basic education, including citizen's rights and duties	73	23	3	40	57	3	49	48	3	
13	Good corporate governance	57	39	4	60	36	4	62	33	5	

<p>Q31. Performance: In your assessment, do the existing informal arrangements applied in your regional context generally tend to support or hamper the following issues?</p> <p>Q32. Spread: In your assessment, do the informal arrangements apply effectively throughout your regional context or the geographical contexts of your issue area?</p> <p>Q33. Substance: In your assessment, are the informal arrangements substantive by really addressing all aspects that you deem to be part of public life?</p>											
NO	INSTRUMENTS TO PROMOTE THE FOLLOWING INTRINSIC MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	QUALITY OF INFORMAL ARRANGEMENTS									
		PERFORMANCE			SPREAD			SUBSTANCE			% of informants
		Supportive enough	Not very supportive	No answer	No	Yes	No answer	No	Yes	No answer	
		% of informants			% of informants			% of informants			
14	Free and fair general elections (Free and fair general elections at central, regional and local level; Free and fair separate elections of e.g. governors, mayors and village heads)	70	25	5	36	59	5	44	51		5
15	Freedom to form parties on the national or local level (or teams of independent candidates) that can recruit members, and participate in elections	63	32	5	56	40	4	61	34		5
16	Reflection of vital issues and interests among people by political parties and or candidates.	56	40	4	55	41	4	58	37		5
17	Abstention from abusing religious or ethnic sentiments, symbols and doctrines by political parties and or candidates.	61	37	2	48	49	3	55	42		3
18	Independence of money politics and powerful vested interests by political parties and or candidates.	53	44	3	50	47	3	55	41		4
19	Membership-based control of parties, and responsiveness and accountability of parties and or political candidates to their constituencies	56	40	4	56	40	4	60	36		4
20	Parties and or candidates ability to form and run government	60	36	4	57	39	4	59	37		4
21	Democratic decentralisation of government of all matters that do not need to be handled on central levels.	62	34	4	50	46	4	56	40		4
22	The transparency and accountability of elected government, the executive,(bureaucracy),at all levels	60	36	4	49	47	4	54	42		4
23	The transparency and accountability of the military and police to elected government and the public	54	41	5	54	41	5	57	38		5
24	The capacity of the government to combat paramilitary groups, hoodlums and organised crime	58	38	4	50	46	4	55	41		4

25	Government independence from foreign intervention (except UN conventions and applicable international law)	60	36	4	59	38	3	59	37	4
26	Government's independence from strong interest groups and capacity to eliminate corruption and abuse of power	64	33	3	48	48	4	53	44	3
27	Freedom of the press, art and academic world	75	21	4	41	55	4	51	45	4
28	Public access to and the reflection of different views within media, art and the academic world	71	26	3	52	45	3	56	40	4
29	Citizens' participation in extensive independent civil associations	78	19	3	45	51	4	52	44	4
30	Transparency, accountability and democracy within civil organisations	74	23	3	51	45	4	57	39	4
31	All social groups' - including marginalised groups - extensive access to and participation in public life	64	32	3	56	40	4	61	35	4
32	Direct participation (People's direct access and contact with the public services and government's consultation of people and when possible facilitation of direct participation in policy making and the execution of public decisions)	67	30	3	56	41	3	58	39	3

Percentage based on number of informants, N=903.

Tabel D.3. Index of democracy instruments

No	CODE	RIGHTS AND INSTITUTIONS	2003/04		2007	
			INDEX	RANK	INDEX	RANK
1	8	Freedom of religion, belief; language and culture	74	1	66	1
2	14	Free and fair general elections (Free and fair general elections at central, regional and local level; Free and fair separate elections of e.g. governors, mayors and village heads)	63	4	64	2
3	6	Freedom of speech, assembly and organisation	74	2	60	3
4	12	The right to basic education, including citizen's rights and duties	37	13	59	4
5	27	Freedom of the press, art and academic world	60	6	59	5
6	29	Citizens' participation in extensive independent civil associations	62	5	54	6
7	10	The rights of children	27	18	53	7
8	7	Freedom to carry out trade union activity	57	8	51	8
9	30	Transparency, accountability and democracy within civil organisations	42	11	48	9
10	5	Freedom from physical violence and the fear of it	28	16	47	10
11	28	Public access to and the reflection of different views within media, art and the academic world	57	7	47	11
12	2	Government support of international law and UN human rights	27	17	46	12
13	9	Gender equality and emancipation	47	9	46	13
14	11	The right to employment, social security and other basic needs	22	26	45	14
15	3	Subordination of the government and public officials to the rule of law	16	32	45	15
16	4	The equality before the law (Equal and secure access to justice; The integrity and independence of the judiciary)	18	30	44	16
17	17	Abstention from abusing religious or ethnic sentiments, symbols and doctrines by political parties and or candidates.	38	12	44	17
18	22	The transparency and accountability of elected government, the executive, (bureaucracies), at all levels	23	24	43	18

19	26	Government's independence from strong interest groups and capacity to eliminate corruption and abuse of power	18	31	43	19
20	21	Democratic decentralisation of government of all matters that do not need to be handled on central levels.	33	14	43	20
21	1	Citizenship (Equal state-citizenship; The rights of minorities, migrants and refugees, Reconciliation of horizontal conflicts)	32	15	42	21
22	15	Freedom to form parties on the national or local level (or teams of independent candidates) that can recruit members, and participate in elections	71	3	40	22
23	13	Good corporate governance	21	27	40	23
24	18	Independence of money politics and powerful vested interests by political parties and or candidates	20	29	40	24
25	32	Direct participation (People's direct access and contact with the public services and government's consultation of people and when possible facilitation of direct participation in policy making and the execution of public decisions)	25	19	40	25
26	24	The capacity of the government to combat paramilitary groups, hoodlums and organised crime	20	28	39	26
27	20	Parties and or candidates ability to form and run government	24	21	38	27
28	31	All social groups' - including marginalised groups - extensive access to and participation in public life	46	10	38	28
29	19	Membership-based control of parties, and responsiveness and accountability of parties and or political candidates to their constituencies	23	25	38	29
30	25	Government independence from foreign intervention (except UN conventions and applicable international law)	24	20	36	30
31	16	Reflection of vital issues and interests among people by political parties and or candidates	24	22	36	31
32	23	The transparency and accountability of the military and police to elected government and the public	23	23	35	32
Average index			37		46	

Index scale 0 (worst)-100 (best)

E. THE MAIN ACTORS' POLITICAL WILL AND CAPACITY

Table E.1. Composition of main actors

Q34, Q35. Based on your knowledge and experience, which individual or collective actors are currently most powerful and have most important influence in the political process?*

NO	MAIN ACTORS' BACKGROUND	POWERFUL ACTORS		ALTERNATIVE ACTORS	
		F	%	F	%
1	Government/ Bureaucracy	885	46	135	8
2	Police and military	102	5	18	1
3	Parliament (central+local)	157	8	109	7
4	Political parties	278	14	234	14
5	Religious or ethnic groups	144	7	211	13
6	Academicians, the judiciary/law firms, media	106	5	284	17
7	NGOs	57	3	431	26
8	Non class based mass organisations	11	1	16	1
9	Class based mass organisations	12	1	74	4
10	Business	114	6	64	4
11	Adat councils etc.	22	1	45	3
12	Semi-state or state-auxiliary bodies	18	1	35	2
13	Underworld and militia	39	2	2	0
TOTAL		1945	100	1658	100

*Informants were asked to identify up to maximum 3 powerful actors and 3 alternative actors. Percentage based on number of each category of main actors.

Table E.2. Main actors' relation to democratic instruments

Q36. The actors' relation to the means of democracy: How does each of the actors that you have specified relate to the various formal as well as informal rules and regulations?										
NO	CATEGORY OF RULES AND REGULATIONS	POWERFUL ACTORS (N=1945)			ALTERNATIVE ACTORS (N=1658)			% of alternative actors		
		USE AND PROMOTE	USE	USE AND MANIPULATE	AVOID OR OPT FOR ALTERNATIVE	USE AND PROMOTE	USE			
		% of powerful actors								
1	Equal citizenship	44	31	19	6	77	17	3		3
2	International law and UN HR instruments	31	40	13	16	65	29	2		4
3	Rule of law & justice	32	35	23	10	67	25	4		4
4	Civil and political rights	39	34	18	9	72	22	3		3
5	Economic and social rights	36	35	19	10	68	26	3		3
6	Free and fair elections	35	36	23	6	64	28	4		4
7	Good representation	28	39	22	11	58	31	4		7
8	Democratic and accountable government	31	33	25	11	63	29	3		5
9	Freedom of media, press and academic freedoms	35	39	18	8	67	27	3		3
10	Additional civil political participation	30	40	18	12	65	29	3		3
11	Direct participation	33	36	18	13	64	29	3		4
AVERAGE		34	36	20	10	66	27	3		4

Percentage based on number of each category of main actors.

Table E.3. Main actors' position to democratic instruments

Q37. The actors' position (strong/weak) in relation to the means of democracy: Is each of the actors that you have specified in a strong or weak position to influence the various formal as well as informal rules and regulations?

NO	CATEGORY OF RULES AND REGULATIONS	POWERFUL ACTORS (N=1945)			ALTERNATIVE ACTORS (N=1658)		
		STRONG	WEAK	NO DATA	STRONG	WEAK	NO DATA
		% of powerful actors			% of alternative actors		
1	Equal citizenship	73	27	0	72	28	0
2	International law and UN HR instruments	45	55	0	57	43	0
3	Rule of law & justice	59	41	0	68	32	0
4	Civil and political rights	66	34	0	76	24	0
5	Economic and social rights	64	36	0	67	33	0
6	Free and fair elections	63	37	0	67	33	0
7	Good representation	58	42	0	64	36	0
8	Democratic and accountable government	56	44	0	61	39	0
9	Freedom of media, press and academic freedoms	63	35	0	73	27	0
10	Additional civil political participation	60	40	0	73	27	0
11	Direct participation	63	36	0	71	29	0
AVERAGE		61	39	0	68	32	0

Percentage based on number of each category of main actors

Table E.4. Main actors' political terrain

Q38. The actors' presence within politics: In what spheres of the political landscape is each of the actors primarily active?*

NO	SPHERES OF THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE	POWERFUL ACTORS	ALTERNATIVE ACTORS
		PERCENT OF RESPONSES	
1	Business and industry	12	6
2	Small business	1	3
3	Self-managed non-profit units	2	5
4	Lobby groups	9	21
5	Interest organisations	14	28
6	Political parties	21	14
7	Elected government	17	9
8	The bureaucracy	19	9
9	The judiciary	3	5
10	Military and police	3	2
TOTAL		100	100

*Informants were asked to identify 2 most important spheres. Percentage based on responses.

Table E.5. Main actors' sources of power

Q39. The actors' sources of power: In your assessment, what are the main actors' sources of power?*

NO	SOURCES OF POWER	POWERFUL ACTORS	ALTERNATIVE ACTORS
		(% of responses)	(% of responses)
1	Economic resources	25	10
2	Mass power/Political/ Military coercion	33	21
3	Social strength and favourable contacts	28	32
4	Knowledge, information	13	37
TOTAL RESPONSES		100	100

*Informants were asked to identify two most sources of powers. Percentage based on responses.

Table E.6. The most frequent methods used by main actors to transform their sources of power

Q40. The actors' way of legitimating their powers: How does each of the actors legitimate its sources of power to gain political authority and thus influence and control the political process and dynamics in your regional context?			
NO	WAYS OF LEGITIMATING POWERS	POWERFUL ACTORS	ALTERNATIVE ACTORS
		% of responses	% of responses
1	By providing discursive activities within the public sphere through seminars, discussion, hearings	11	23
2	By providing contacts and dialogue with politicians and administrators at various levels	17	14
3	By providing and building networks and co-ordination for joint activity	7	16
4	By creating contacts and partnership with influential figures and experts	13	12
5	By being able to demonstrate collective and mass-based strength	5	7
6	By generating economic self-sufficiency, self-help activities, co-operatives, etc.	2	3
7	By gaining legitimacy through DPR, DPRD, the judicial system and/or the formal executive organs the state	12	4
8	By making use of various means of forceful official authority, coercion, demonstration of power and force as well as the generation of fear	7	1
9	By using state and government budgets other resources and regulations to the benefit of pro-market policies and various actors on the market	8	1
10	By providing patronage in various forms (including favourable treatment, loans, aid and charity) to for instance social groups, communities, civil society organisations (including NGOs) as well as to businessmen, relatives and other individuals	5	3

11	By organising support within communities	6	11
12	By gaining a popular mandate or getting elected	6	3
13	By influencing public opinion via mass media	0	0
TOTAL REPOSESES		100	100

**Informants were asked to identify two most sources of powers. Percentage based on responses.*

Table E.7. The most frequent type of issues and interests fought for by main actors

Q41. The actors' interests, issues, platforms and policies: What interests and issues brought together into platforms and policies do the actors try to promote or resist – and how would you characterise these interests, issues and/ or policies?									
NO	CONTENT OF INTERESTS, ISSUES, PLATFORMS AND/OR POLICIES	POWERFUL ACTORS				ALTERNATIVE AVTORS			
		RESPONSE	TYPE OF ISSUES/INTERESTS/POLICIES			RESPONSE	TYPE OF ISSUES/INTERESTS/POLICIES		
			SPECIFIC ISSUES OR INTERESTS	THE COMBINATION OF SEVERAL ISSUES/ INTERESTS	GENERAL CONCEPTS OR IDEAS		SPECIFIC ISSUES OR INTERESTS	THE COMBINATION OF SEVERAL ISSUES/ INTERESTS	GENERAL CONCEPTS OR IDEAS
1	Public services, basic needs, social security	10%	26%	46%	28%	7%	34%	33%	33%
2	Religious and ethnic values, morality, conflict and conflict reconciliation	11%	28%	46%	26%	12%	41%	29%	30%
3	Democracy and civil-political rights	10%	28%	40%	32%	20%	28%	35%	37%
4	Economic development oriented	31%	22%	48%	30%	17%	32%	35%	33%
5	Sustainable development, environment	3%	35%	45%	20%	4%	39%	41%	20%
6	Good governance, anti-corruption, rule of law	13%	27%	46%	27%	15%	25%	42%	32%
7	Human rights	3%	19%	40%	41%	11%	34%	38%	28%
8	Nationalism, integration, national security	6%	29%	40%	31%	2%	36%	31%	33%
9	Decentralisation and local autonomy	10%	27%	45%	28%	5%	39%	46%	16%
10	Gender issues	1%	61%	21%	18%	7%	56%	28%	16%
TOTAL RESPONSES		100%	26%	45%	29%	100%	34%	36%	30%

Table E.8. The actor's method of communication

Q42. The actor's method of communication: How do the actors typically communicate the issues and interests that they fight for?

NO	METHOD OF COMMUNICATION	POWERFUL ACTORS	ALTERNATIVE ACTORS
		% of responses	% of responses
1	Writing books and articles	6	18
2	Performing in the media	29	19
3	Attending and giving speeches in public seminars/ meetings	19	23
4	Through personal contacts and networks	19	17
5	Through organisations and their meetings and contacts	26	22
6	Coercive ways	0	0
TOTAL RESPONSES		100	100

*Informants were asked to identify two most methods. Percentage based on responses.

Table E.9. The actors' mobilisation and organisation of people

Q43. The actors' mobilisation and organisation of people: How do the actors typically try to mobilise and organise popular support for the issues that you have identified in the previous question (no 42)?*

NO	WAY TO MOBILISE AND ORGANISE PEOPLE	POWERFUL ACTORS	ALTERNATIVE ACTORS
		% of responses	% of responses
1	Popular and charismatic leaders	29	21
2	Clientelism	28	9
3	Alternative patronage	10	20
4	Networks between independent actors	22	34
5	Integration from below of popular organisations into more general organisations	11	16
TOTAL RESPONSES		100	100

*Informants were asked to identify two most methods. Percentage based on responses.

Table E.10. The actors' organising

Q44. The actors' organising: What are the actor's main organisational methods?			
NO	ORGANISATIONAL METHODS	POWERFUL ACTORS	ALTERNATIVE ACTORS
		% of responses	% of responses
1	Descriptive	12	11
2	Ethnicity, religion, family, etc.	22	17
3	Origin and residence (son of the soil identity)	8	5
4	Hierarchical connecting levels	22	9
5	Sector, profession	13	12
6	Visions, ideas, interests	15	36
7	Personal network	7	11
TOTAL RESPONSES		100	100

*Informants were asked to identify two most methods. Percentage based on responses.

Table E.11. The actors' alliances

Q45. The actors' alliances: With whom do the actors typically build alliances or networks in their effort to influence or control the political process? *			
NO	BACKGROUND OF INDIVIDUAL ALLIANCES	POWERFUL ACTORS	ALTERNATIVE ACTORS
		% of responses	% of responses
1	Government/Bureaucracy	20	12
2	Police and military	4	1
3	Parliament (central and local)	8	4
4	Political parties	20	14
5	Religious or ethnic groups	10	9
6	Academicians, the judiciary /law firms, media	9	17
7	NGOs	7	22
8	Non class based mass organisations	3	3
9	Class based mass organisations	2	7
10	Business	10	4
11	Adat councils etc.	3	4
12	Semi-state or state-auxiliary bodies	1	3
13	Underworld and militia	3	0
TOTAL RESPONSES		100	100

**This table only cover individual alliances of the actors. Percentages based on responses*

Table E.12. The powerful actors' political parties/organisations

Q46. What major political parties are the actors primarily related to? (If an actor is not primarily related to a party, indicate the other kind of political organisation that the actor is at first hand related to.)			
NO	POLITICAL PARTIES/ ORGANISATIONS	POWERFUL ACTORS (%)	ALTERNATIVE ACTORS (%)
1	Partai Golkar	40	16
2	PDIP	17	10
3	Partai Hanura, PPRN	0	1
4	Partai Demokrat	7	2
5	Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS)	3	6
6	Major Islamic-based parties (PAN, PPP, PKB)	12	13
7	Small parties	6	6
8	Alternative parties (PPR, PRD, Papernas)	1	6
9	NGOs (incl. Media)	3	21
10	Adat council/groups, ethnic-based groups	2	3
11	Business	1	1
12	Mass organisations	8	15

Percentages based on responses.

Table E.13. The financing of the political parties and organisations

Q47. What are the main ways in which these parties or other political organisations (that were specified in question 46) finance their activities?											
No	SOURCES OF POLITICAL FINANCE		POWERFUL ACTORS				ALTERNATIVE ACTORS				
			METHODS USED BY THE ACTORS' POLITICAL ORGANISATIONS			TOTAL RESPONSES	METHODS USED BY THE ACTORS' POLITICAL ORGANISATIONS			TOTAL RESPONSES	
			Voluntary labour	Funds	Equipment etc		Voluntary labour	Funds	Equip-ment etc		
1	Official support from the government (E.g. official party-support)	% of responses	4	92	4	24	4	89	7	15	
2	Support from democracy-donors (E.g. for improved organisation & education)	% of responses	10	81	9	6	5	90	5	13	
3	Contributions from own activities, co-operatives or businesses	% of responses	12	83	5	6	12	82	7	5	
4	Contributions from own functionar-ies / cadres	% of responses	39	58	3	14	43	55	2	11	
5	Contributions from own individual members	% of responses	39	56	4	7	44	51	4	11	
6	Contributions from own individual sympathisers	% of responses	55	40	5	8	54	40	6	12	
7	Contributions from affiliated or related organisations (E.g. supportive ISMs or popular organisations)	% of responses	70	27	3	4	56	36	8	12	
8	Contributions from sponsors within media, culture and academe	% of responses	41	41	19	3	45	39	16	6	
9	Contributions from sponsors within business	% of responses	5	92	2	17	8	90	2	8	
10	Contributions from sponsors within the military and police	% of responses	43	40	17	3	36	50	14	1	
11	Contributions from candidates in vari-ous elections	% of responses	9	88	3	5	19	75	6	3	
12	Contributions from the candidates' relatives and friends	% of responses	28	68	4	4	37	52	11	4	
	TOTAL		22	73	5	100	30	64	6	100	

Table E.14. The powerful actors' strategies in the political system and related forms of representation

Q48. The actors' strategies in the political system and related forms of representation: To what governance-institutions do the most important actors turn to at first hand? (You may identify at the most two such institutions!) Then, how do the most important actors reach and affect the governance institutions? Direct and/ or by what mediating institutions? (You may identify at the most three ways!)															
NO	GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS		DIRECT	MEDIATING INSTITUTIONS										Total	
				NGOs	People's organisation	Experts, incl media	Popular figures	Patrons and fixers	Communal groups	Neighbour-hood groups	Political parties	Politically oriented interest organisations	Lobby/pressure groups		
1	The judiciary (incl the police)	% of responses	35	6	3	12	3	4	2	1	13	7	13	8	
2	The political executive – (the government)	% of responses	36	3	4	9	4	4	2	1	16	10	11	34	
3	The legislative (e.g. DPRD)	% of responses	35	4	4	9	4	4	2	1	18	10	11	26	
4	The bureaucracy	% of responses	37	3	3	10	4	4	2	1	16	10	10	15	
5	The military	% of responses	35	2	3	8	5	7	2	1	15	10	12	3	
6	Auxiliary bodies and institution for sub-contracted public governance	% of responses	29	6	5	12	6	4	4	2	12	9	10	4	
	Institutions for self-management (e.g. cooperative)	% of responses	34	6	8	10	7	5	3	2	10	8	7	3	
8	Institutions for private management (e.g. the market, the family)	% of responses	30	3	5	8	6	5	3	2	14	11	12	5	
	TOTAL	% of responses	35	4	4	9	4	4	2	1	16	10	11	100	

Q48. The actors' strategies in the political system and related forms of representation:
To what governance-institutions do the most important actors turn to at first hand? (You may identify at the most two such institutions!)
Then, how do the most important actors reach and affect the governance institutions? Direct and/or by what mediating institutions? (You may identify at the most three ways!)

Table E.15. The alternative actors' strategies in the political system and related forms of representation

Q48. The actors' strategies in the political system and related forms of representation: To what governance-institutions do the most important actors turn to at first hand? (You may identify at the most two such institutions!)															
Then, how do the most important actors reach and affect the governance institutions? Direct and/or by what mediating institutions? (You may identify at the most three ways!)															
NO	GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS	DIRECT	MEDIATING INSTITUTIONS										Total		
			NGOs	People's organisation	Experts, incl media	Popular figures	Patrons and fixers	Communal groups	Neighbourhood groups	Political parties	Politically oriented interest organisations	Lobby/pressure groups			
1	The judiciary (incl the police)	% of responses	27	18	8	16	3	3	2	1	4	3	13	10	
2	The political executive - (the government)	% of responses	28	13	9	14	4	4	3	1	8	5	11	28	
3	The legislative (e.g. DPRD)	% of responses	28	14	10	13	3	3	3	1	9	5	11	28	
4	The bureaucracy	% of responses	30	9	8	13	5	5	4	3	8	6	9	7	
5	The military	% of responses	31	11	6	8	3	4	5	2	9	10	11	1	
6	Auxiliary bodies and institution for sub-contracted public governance	% of responses	28	17	9	12	5	4	5	2	5	3	10	10	
7	Institutions for self-management (e.g. cooperative)	% of responses	29	14	10	11	5	5	5	2	5	4	10	10	
8	Institutions for private management (e.g. the market, the family)	% of responses	28	12	9	11	6	6	5	3	7	5	8	7	
TOTAL		% of responses	28	14	9	13	4	4	3	2	7	5	11	100	

Q48. The actors' strategies in the political system and related forms of representation:

To what governance-institutions do the most important actors turn to at first hand? (You may identify at the most two such institutions!)

Then, how do the most important actors reach and affect the governance institutions? Direct and/or by what mediating institutions? (You may identify at the most three ways!)

Table E.16. *Public representation*

Q49. Based on your knowledge and experience, to what institutions do the ordinary people address their complaints and demands regarding public affairs?					
Note: Only pick the three most important alternatives, and rank them [1] and [2] and [3] based on priority.					
NO	DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS	% of RESPONSES	RANK 1	RANK 2	RANK 3
			% within rows		
1	To media; To specific issue- and pressure/ lobby groups	31	34	36	30
2	To self-management-NGOs; To informal leaders	28	45	31	25
3	Directly to elected executives on various levels; Directly to the bureaucrats various levels; Directly to the law enforcement institutions	16	23	31	47
4	To political parties; Directly to elected politicians in legislative bodies on various levels	14	20	42	39
5	To semi-government institutions	6	15	26	59
6	To interest-based popular organisations	5	27	36	36
TOTAL RESPONSES (f)		2653	889	884	880

DATA TABULATION



NATIONAL SURVEY PROBLEMS AND OPTIONS ON DEMOCRATISATION IN INDONESIA 2007

**CATEGORY:
REGION BASE**



A. PROFILE OF INFORMANTS

Tabel A.1. Gender proportion of informants in different regions

GENDER		REGION					
		SUMATERA	JAWA	KALIMAN-TAN	SULAWESI	BALI+NTB+NTT	MALUKU+PAPUA
1	Male	196	141	89	125	52	88
		74%	81%	81%	73%	78%	76%
2	Female	68	33	21	47	15	28
		26%	19%	19%	27%	22%	24%
Total		264	174	110	172	67	116
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Tabel A.2. Age proportion of informants in different regions

AGE GROUP		REGION					
		SUMATERA	JAWA	KALIMAN-TAN	SULAWESI	BALI+NTB+NTT	MALUKU+PAPUA
1	25 yo. or younger	8	1	3	7	1	6
		3%	1%	3%	4%	2%	5%
2	26-35 yo.	103	64	44	66	11	27
		39%	37%	40%	38%	16%	23%
3	36-45 yo.	93	66	38	67	26	46
		35%	38%	35%	39%	39%	40%
4	46 yo. or older	56	37	23	28	26	37
		21%	21%	21%	16%	39%	32%
5	Unknown	4	5	2	4	3	0
		2%	3%	2%	2%	5%	0%
Total		264	173	110	172	67	116
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Tabel A.3. Proportion of informants according to level of education

EDUCATION		REGION					
		SUMATERA	JAWA	KALIMAN-TAN	SULAWESI	BALI+NTB+NTT	MALUKU+PAPUA
1	No answer	7	0	1	4	4	2
		3%	0%	1%	2%	6%	2%
2	Elementary	5	3	1	4	3	3
		2%	2%	1%	2%	5%	3%
3	Middle	52	29	23	33	8	23
		20%	17%	21%	19%	12%	20%
4	University	156	99	67	96	42	70
		59%	57%	61%	56%	63%	60%
5	Post graduate	44	43	18	35	10	18
		17%	25%	16%	20%	15%	16%
Total		264	174	110	172	67	116
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Tabel A.4. Proportion of informants according to occupation

JOB		REGION					
		SUMATERA	JAWA	KALIMAN-TAN	SULAWESI	BALI+NTB+NTT	MALUKU+PAPUA
1	NGO	77	63	44	52	22	25
		29%	36%	40%	30%	33%	22%
2	Academe	29	22	11	22	6	13
		11%	13%	10%	13%	9%	11%
3	Politician	18	9	6	11	2	9
		7%	5%	6%	6%	3%	8%
4	Bureaucracy and local government	9	1	3	14	2	10
		3%	1%	3%	8%	3%	9%
5	Auxiliary state bodies	10	1	2	4	0	4
		4%	1%	2%	2%	0%	3%
6	Business	28	12	3	12	2	11
		11%	7%	3%	7%	3%	10%
7	Professional	79	58	36	40	23	38
		30%	33%	33%	23%	34%	33%
8	Religious and ethnic leader	0	2	1	3	3	1
		0%	1%	1%	2%	5%	1%
9	Non career	4	1	3	2	4	1
		2%	1%	3%	1%	6%	1%
10	No answer	10	5	1	12	3	4
		4%	3%	1%	7%	5%	3%
Total		264	174	110	172	67	116
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Tabel A.5. Proportion of informants according to religion

RELIGION		REGION					
		SUMATERA	JAWA	KALIMAN-TAN	SULAWESI	BALI+NTB+NTT	MALUKU+PAPUA
1	No answer	0	2	0	0	0	0
		0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%
2	Islam	237	138	81	143	25	49
		90%	79%	74%	83%	37%	42%
3	Hindu	0	0	2	0	15	0
		0%	0%	2%	0%	22%	0%
4	Budha	4	1	1	0	0	0
		2%	1%	1%	0%	0%	0%
5	Protestan	16	10	12	23	18	52
		6%	6%	11%	13%	27%	45%
6	Chatolic	6	23	14	4	8	15
		2%	13%	13%	2%	12%	13%
7	Konghucu	1	0	0	1	0	0
		0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%
8	Others	0	0	0	1	1	0
		0%	0%	0%	1%	2%	0%
Total		264	174	110	172	67	116
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Tabel A.6. Context of information that informants refer to

THE CONTEXT		REGION					
		SUMATERA	JAWA	KALIMAN-TAN	SULAWESI	BALI+NTB+NTT	MALUKU+PAPUA
1	Province	233	108	98	145	61	109
		88%	62%	89%	84%	91%	94%
2	National/ issue-area	31	66	12	27	6	7
		12%	38%	11%	16%	9%	6%
Total		264	174	110	172	67	116
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table A.7. Proportion of informants from each frontline in different regions

FRONTLINE		REGION					
		SUMATERA	JAWA	KALIMAN-TAN	SULAWESI	BALI+NTB+NTT	MALUKU+PAPUA
1	The struggle of peasants, agricultural labourers and fisher	25	19	10	15	7	7
		10%	11%	9%	9%	10%	6%
2	The struggle of labour	21	18	4	6	4	6
		8%	10%	4%	4%	6%	5%
3	The struggle for the social, economic and other rights of th	15	14	5	7	1	3
		6%	8%	5%	4%	2%	3%
4	The promotion of human rights	24	13	6	12	6	12
		9%	8%	6%	7%	9%	10%
5	The struggle against corruption in favour of 'good governanc	25	15	7	14	8	5
		10%	9%	6%	8%	12%	4%
6	Democratisa-tion of the political parties and the party syste	23	17	11	17	3	8
		9%	10%	10%	10%	5%	7%
7	The promotion of pluralism, religious and ethnic reconciliat	18	11	10	15	6	10
		7%	6%	9%	9%	9%	9%
8	The improve-ment and democ-ratisation of education	18	13	8	13	5	11
		7%	8%	7%	8%	8%	10%
9	The promotion of profes-sionalism as part of 'good governance	17	8	3	14	5	12
		6%	5%	3%	8%	8%	10%
10	The promotion of freedom, independence and quality of media	20	13	11	16	6	14
		8%	8%	10%	9%	9%	12%
11	The promotion of gender equality and feminist per-spectives	28	13	13	17	7	9
		11%	8%	12%	10%	10%	8%

12	The improvement of alternative representation at the local l	16	8	11	15	7	8
		6%	5%	10%	9%	10%	7%
13	The promotion of sustainable development	14	12	11	11	2	11
		5%	7%	10%	6%	3%	10%
Total		264	174	110	172	67	116
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

B. ATTITUDES TO POLITICS

Table B.1. People's understanding on politics according to informants from different regions

HOW DO PEOPLE UNDERSTAND POLITICS?		REGION					
		SUMATERA	JAWA	KALIMAN-TAN	SULAWESI	BALI+NTB+NTT	MALUKU+PAPUA
1	Struggle for power	142	99	64	97	36	51
		54%	57%	58%	56%	54%	44%
2	Popular control of public affairs	30	18	15	27	8	26
		11%	10%	14%	16%	12%	22%
3	Something taken care of by the elites/ public figures	34	18	19	12	10	12
		13%	10%	17%	7%	15%	10%
4	Elitist manipu-lation	53	33	10	32	11	19
		20%	19%	9%	19%	16%	16%
5	Kind of job/ career	3	0	0	1	1	1
		1%	0%	0%	1%	2%	1%
6	As social dedication	0	0	0	0	1	3
		0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	3%
7	No answer	2	4	2	3	0	4
		1%	2%	2%	2%	0%	3%
Total		264	174	110	172	67	116
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table B.2. People's interest towards in politics according to informants from different regions

HOW INTERESTED ARE PEOPLE IN POLITICS?		REGION					
		SUMATERA	JAWA	KALIMAN- TAN	SULAWESI	BALI+ NTB+NTT	MALUKU+ PAPUA
1	Highly inter- ested	36	22	3	21	9	32
		14%	13%	3%	12%	13%	28%
2	Interested	122	53	57	105	28	53
		46%	31%	52%	61%	42%	46%
3	Not interested	105	98	50	46	30	31
		40%	56%	46%	27%	45%	27%
4	No answer	1	1	0	0	0	0
		0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Total		264	174	110	172	67	116
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table B.3. Women's interest in politics according to informants from different regions

HOW INTERESTED ARE WOMEN IN POLITICS?		REGION					
		SUMATERA	JAWA	KALIMAN-TAN	SULAWESI	BALI+NTB+NTT	MALUKU+PAPUA
1	Highly interested	16	13	2	11	5	10
		6%	8%	2%	6%	8%	9%
2	Interested	107	57	40	89	25	65
		41%	33%	36%	52%	37%	56%
3	Not interested	134	102	68	72	37	40
		51%	59%	62%	42%	55%	35%
4	No answer	6	2	0	0	0	1
		2%	1%	0%	0%	0%	1%
Total		263	174	110	172	67	116
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table B.4. What should at first hand be done to encourage women participation in politics according to informants from different regions

WHAT SHOULD AT FIRST HAND BE DONE TO ENCOURAGE THE PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN IN POLITICS?		REGION					
		SUMATERA	JAWA	KALIMAN-TAN	SULAWESI	BALI+NTB+NTT	MALUKU+PAPUA
1	Fight for women quota in legislative and executive instituti	23	9	9	18	12	16
		9%	5%	8%	11%	18%	14%
2	Increase women’s political awareness and capacity	160	100	65	107	36	79
		61%	58%	59%	62%	54%	68%
3	Support women to gain positions in political institu-tions	21	7	11	15	6	4
		8%	4%	10%	9%	9%	3%
4	Expand the politi-cal agenda so that it includes more issues	60	53	24	31	9	15
		23%	31%	22%	18%	13%	13%
5	Against patriarchy	0	3	1	0	3	2
		0%	2%	1%	0%	5%	2%
6	No answer	0	2	0	1	1	0
		0%	1%	0%	1%	2%	0%
Total		264	174	110	172	67	116
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table B.5. The most appropriate channel to be used to engage in political process according to informants from different regions

IF ONE IS INTERESTED IN POLITICS, WHICH CHANNEL DO YOU THINK IS THE MOST APPROPRIATE TO BE USED AT FIRST HAND?		REGION					
		SUMATERA	JAWA	KALIMANTAN	SULAWESI	BALI+NTB+NTT	MALUKU+PAPUA
1	Join a big national political party	78	50	40	59	20	37
		30%	29%	36%	34%	30%	32%
2	Join a small political party that is eligible to run in elec	33	9	16	27	13	31
		13%	5%	15%	16%	19%	27%
3	Establish a new locally rooted political party	47	22	13	21	4	12
		18%	13%	12%	12%	6%	10%
4	Congregate a non-party political block	98	85	37	59	30	27
		37%	49%	34%	34%	45%	23%
5	Active in political discourse/mapping	5	7	2	3	0	8
		2%	4%	2%	2%	0%	7%
6	No answer	1	1	2	3	0	1
		0%	1%	2%	2%	0%	1%
Total		264	174	110	172	67	116
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Tabel B.6. The most effective method to increase people's political capacity and participation according to informants from different regions

WHICH METHOD DO YOU THINK IS MOST EFFECTIVE TO INCREASE PEOPLE'S POLITICAL CAPACITY AND PARTICIPATION?		REGION					
		SUMA-TERA	JAWA	KALIMAN-TAN	SULAWESI	BALI+ NTB+NTT	MALUKU+ PAPUA
1	Increasing people's political awareness	136	88	63	119	38	77
		52%	51%	57%	69%	57%	66%
2	Improving the education of political cadres	55	40	20	26	11	16
		21%	23%	18%	15%	16%	14%
3	Reforming and consolidating existing political parties	10	13	6	5	3	11
		4%	8%	6%	3%	5%	10%
4	Promoting politically oriented campaigns and making public s	8	5	5	5	1	3
		3%	3%	5%	3%	2%	3%
5	Mobilising the masses	4	3	4	1	3	1
		2%	2%	4%	1%	5%	1%
6	Building democratic and mass-based organisations and new pol	50	20	12	14	10	7
		19%	12%	11%	8%	15%	6%
7	No answer	1	5	0	2	1	1
		0%	3%	0%	1%	2%	1%
Total		264	174	110	172	67	116
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

C. THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE DEMOS

Table C.1. People's identity in 2004 general election according to informants from different regions

IN THE 2004 GENERAL ELECTIONS OF LEGISLATORS, HOW DID PEOPLE AT FIRST HAND IDENTIFY THEMSELVES?		REGION					
		SUMATERA	JAWA	KALIMANTAN	SULAWESI	BALI+NTB+NTT	MALUKU+PAPUA
1	As a resident of Indonesia in general	109	61	38	51	19	39
		41%	35%	35%	30%	28%	34%
2	As residents of their city/ municipality/ province	40	8	9	29	9	11
		15%	5%	8%	17%	13%	10%
3	As residents of their village and hamlet (dusun)	17	14	7	18	4	7
		6%	8%	6%	11%	6%	6%
4	As members of their ethnic community	18	7	13	16	10	10
		7%	4%	12%	9%	15%	9%
5	As members of their religious community	8	12	10	6	4	7
		3%	7%	9%	4%	6%	6%
6	As members/ supporters of 'their' political party	50	48	25	40	16	38
		19%	28%	23%	23%	24%	33%
7	As members of their social class	22	23	8	12	5	4
		8%	13%	7%	7%	8%	3%
8	No answer	0	1	0	0	0	0
		0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Total		264	174	110	172	67	116
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table C.2. People's identity in pilkada according to informants from different regions

IN REGIONAL ELECTION(S) (PILKADA), HOW DID PEOPLE AT FIRST HAND IDENTIFY THEMSELVES?		REGION					
		SUMATERA	JAWA	KALIMANTAN	SU-LAWESI	BALI+ NTB +NTT	MALUKU+ PAPUA
1	As residents of their city/ municipality/ province	114	84	36	70	19	42
		43%	48%	33%	41%	28%	36%
2	As residents of their village and hamlet (dusun)	38	16	9	19	8	8
		14%	9%	8%	11%	12%	7%
3	As members of their ethnic community	51	13	33	43	28	36
		19%	8%	30%	25%	42%	31%
4	As members of their religious community	9	9	9	6	4	2
		3%	5%	8%	4%	6%	2%
5	As members/ supporters of 'their' political party	29	26	13	25	2	19
		11%	15%	12%	15%	3%	16%
6	As members of their social class	21	19	7	7	4	5
		8%	11%	6%	4%	6%	4%
7	As Indonesian citizens	2	5	2	1	2	3
		1%	3%	2%	1%	3%	3%
8	No answer	0	2	1	1	0	1
		0%	1%	1%	1%	0%	1%
Total		264	174	110	172	67	116
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table C.3. Informants' assessment of people's identity in situation of conflict caused by social, economy and political tension

HOW DO PEOPLE IDENTIFY THEMSELVES WHEN THEY FACE SITUATION OF CONFLICT CAUSED BY SOCIAL, ECONOMY AND POLITICAL TENSION?		REGION					
		SUMATERA	JAWA	KALIMANTAN	SU-LAWESI	BALI+NTB+NTT	MALUKU+PAPUA
1	As residents of their city/ municipality/ province	35	13	6	29	8	13
		13%	8%	6%	17%	12%	11%
2	As residents of their village and hamlet (dusun)	38	24	8	18	11	10
		14%	14%	7%	11%	16%	9%
3	As members of their ethnic community	89	35	60	63	23	53
		34%	20%	55%	37%	34%	46%
4	As a member of their religious community	14	27	9	27	14	21
		5%	16%	8%	16%	21%	18%
5	As members of their social class	78	57	24	29	6	15
		30%	33%	22%	17%	9%	13%
6	As members of their political party/ideology	1	3	0	2	0	0
		0%	2%	0%	1%	0%	0%
7	as Indonesian citizens	0	1	0	0	0	0
		0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%
8	No answer	8	12	3	4	5	4
		3%	7%	3%	2%	8%	3%
Total		264	174	110	172	67	116
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table C.4. Informants' assessment of people's identity in responding to issues of administrative division of provinces or regencies

IN RESPONDING TO ISSUES OF ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION OF PROVINCES OR REGENCIES, HOW DO PEOPLE AT FIRST HAND IDENTIFY THEMSELVES?		REGION					
		SUMATERA	JAWA	KALIMANTAN	SULAWESI	BALI+NTB+NTT	MALUKU+PAPUA
1	As residents of their city/ municipality/ province	89	69	35	75	17	46
		34%	40%	32%	44%	25%	40%
2	As residents of their village and hamlet (dusun)	87	47	47	40	25	23
		33%	27%	43%	23%	37%	20%
3	As members of their ethnic community	73	36	21	46	18	44
		28%	21%	19%	27%	27%	38%
4	As members of their religious community	4	2	1	1	1	0
		2%	1%	1%	1%	2%	0%
5	As Indonesian citizens	0	5	0	2	0	0
		0%	3%	0%	1%	0%	0%
6	interest oriented	3	4	4	5	5	2
		1%	2%	4%	3%	8%	2%
7	No answer	8	8	2	3	1	1
		3%	5%	2%	2%	2%	1%
Total		264	174	110	172	67	116
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

D. THE QUALITY OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY

Tabel D.1. Comparison index of democracy instruments between regions

NO	RIGHTS AND INSTITUTIONS	SUMATERA	JAWA	KALIMANTAN	SULAWESI	BALI+NTT+NTB	MALUKU+PAPUA
1	Citizenship (Equal state-citizenship; The rights of minorities, migrants and refugees, Reconciliation of horizontal conflicts)	44	50	38	36	37	41
2	Government support of international law and UN human rights	47	51	45	40	43	42
3	Subordination of the government and public officials to the rule of law	44	52	50	43	33	38
4	The equality before the law (Equal and secure access to justice; The integrity and independence of the judiciary)	45	54	41	37	38	43
5	Freedom from physical violence and the fear of it	51	54	46	37	40	47
6	Freedom of speech, assembly and organisation	64	66	60	50	56	62
7	Freedom to carry out trade union activity	57	57	48	41	47	52
8	Freedom of religion, belief; language and culture	67	67	64	57	64	73
9	Gender equality and emancipation	48	53	44	39	43	45
10	The rights of children	56	58	51	46	59	47
11	The right to employment, social security and other basic needs	44	50	45	37	42	53
12	The right to basic education, including citizen's rights and duties	61	66	59	50	61	59
13	Good corporate governance	39	46	44	32	33	39
14	Free and fair general elections (Free and fair general elections at central, regional and local level; Free and fair separate elections of e.g. governors, mayors and village heads)	66	72	63	58	66	57
15	Freedom to form parties on the national or local level (or teams of independent candidates) that can recruit members, and participate in elections	41	49	33	33	47	38
16	Reflection of vital issues and interests among people by political parties and or candidates	38	39	34	31	29	39
17	Abstention from abusing religious or ethnic sentiments, symbols and doctrines by political parties and or candidates.	44	51	39	33	33	40

18	Independence of money politics and powerful vested interests by political parties and or candidates	40	46	43	32	32	41
19	Membership-based control of parties, and responsiveness and accountability of parties and or political candidates to their constituencies	38	39	42	28	30	44
20	Parties and or candidates ability to form and run government	37	40	41	31	33	43
21	Democratic decentralisation of government of all matters that do not need to be handled on central levels.	43	49	44	37	34	41
22	The transparency and accountability of elected government, the executive,(bureaucracies), at all levels	42	51	43	40	32	42
23	The transparency and accountability of the military and police to elected government and the public	37	36	36	25	29	39
24	The capacity of the government to combat paramilitary groups, hoodlums and organised crime	43	42	38	31	30	38
25	Government independence from foreign intervention (except UN conventions and applicable international law)	34	46	35	29	27	44
26	Government's independence from strong interest groups and capacity to eliminate corruption and abuse of power	43	49	49	39	37	40
27	Freedom of the press, art and academic world	64	69	56	48	57	54
28	Public access to and the reflection of different views within media, art and the academic world	51	54	43	36	40	49
29	Citizens' participation in extensive independent civil associations	57	63	52	46	38	53
30	Transparency, accountability and democracy within civil organisations	49	55	42	41	43	53
31	All social groups' - including marginalised groups - extensive access to and participation in public life	38	47	36	33	29	38
32	Direct participation (People's direct access and contact with the public services and government's consultation of people and when possible facilitation of direct participation in policy making and the execution of public decisions)	37	48	43	34	30	38
AVERAGE INDEX		47	52	45	38	40	46

Index scale 0 (worst)-100 (best)

E. THE MAIN ACTORS' POLITICAL WILL AND CAPACITY

Table E.1. Powerful actors according to informants in different regions

POWERFUL ACTORS		REGION					
		SUMATERA	JAWA	KALIMANTAN	SULAWESI	BALI+ NTB+NTT	MALUKU+ PAPUA
1	Government/ Bureaucracy	279	156	91	167	58	134
		52%	40%	36%	48%	40%	49%
2	Police and military	31	32	6	10	4	19
		6%	8%	2%	3%	3%	7%
3	Parliament (central+local)	35	19	20	39	20	24
		7%	5%	8%	11%	14%	9%
4	Political parties	72	51	53	54	20	28
		13%	13%	21%	15%	14%	10%
5	Religious or ethnic groups	28	46	14	26	10	20
		5%	12%	6%	7%	7%	7%
6	Academicians, the judiciary/ law firms, media	22	16	11	30	13	14
		4%	4%	4%	9%	9%	5%
7	NGOs	7	4	11	16	10	9
		1%	1%	4%	5%	7%	3%
8	Non class based mass organisations	5	3	0	1	1	1
		1%	1%	0%	0%	1%	0%
9	Class based mass organisa- tions	3	4	2	1	1	1
		1%	1%	1%	0%	1%	0%
10	Business	35	36	29	5	5	4
		7%	9%	12%	1%	3%	2%
11	Adat councils etc.	4	1	0	0	2	15
		1%	0%	0%	0%	1%	6%
12	Semi-state or state-auxiliary bodies	3	8	2	1	0	4
		1%	2%	1%	0%	0%	2%
13	Underworld and militia	14	13	11	0	1	0
		3%	3%	4%	0%	1%	0%
Total 100%		538	389	250	350	145	273
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	

Table E.2. Alternative actors according to informants in different regions

ALTERNATIVE ACTORS		REGION					
		SUMATERA	JAWA	KALIMAN-TAN	SULAWESI	BALI+NTB+NTT	MALUKU+PAPUA
1	Government/ Bureaucracy	26	19	21	32	8	29
		6%	5%	10%	11%	6%	15%
2	Police and military	3	4	1	7	1	2
		1%	1%	1%	3%	1%	1%
3	Parliament (central+local)	48	4	10	32	3	12
		10%	1%	5%	11%	2%	6%
4	Political parties	70	60	31	40	10	23
		15%	16%	14%	14%	8%	12%
5	Religious or ethnic groups	47	63	22	25	25	29
		10%	17%	10%	9%	20%	15%
6	Academicians, the judiciary/law firms, media	65	65	48	47	22	37
		14%	18%	22%	17%	17%	19%
7	NGOs	127	86	62	77	45	34
		27%	24%	28%	27%	35%	17%
8	Non class based mass organisa- tions	5	5	1	2	2	1
		1%	1%	1%	1%	2%	1%
9	Class based mass organisations	28	28	3	8	6	1
		6%	8%	1%	3%	5%	1%
10	Business	21	17	8	9	3	6
		5%	5%	4%	3%	2%	3%
11	Adat councils etc.	10	8	7	2	0	18
		2%	2%	3%	1%	0%	9%
12	Semi-state or state-auxiliary bodies	14	6	4	4	2	5
		3%	2%	2%	1%	2%	3%
13	Underworld and militia	0	1	1	0	0	0
		0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%
Total		464	366	219	285	127	197
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table E.3. Main actors' relation to democratic instruments

NO	CATEGORY OF RULES AND REGULATIONS	WHAT ACTORS DO?	SUMATRA		JAWA		KALIMANTAN		SULAWESI		BALI, NTB, NTT		MALUKU, PAPUA	
			Powerful	Alternative	Powerful	Alternative	Powerful	Alternative	Powerful	Alternative	Powerful	Alternative	Powerful	Alternative
1	<i>Equal citizenship</i>	Use and promote	39	78	35	78	44	69	49	74	36	84	61	81
		Use	31	17	31	15	31	24	33	18	39	14	26	18
		Use and manipulate	21	4	27	3	22	3	14	3	15	2	11	1
		Avoid or opt for alter-natives	9	2	7	4	3	3	4	4	10	0	2	1
2	<i>International law and UN HR instruments</i>	Use and promote	24	64	23	67	37	64	36	66	28	75	47	60
		Use	45	29	39	26	30	27	43	30	40	22	38	36
		Use and manipulate	13	2	19	2	15	2	11	2	16	2	6	2
		Avoid or opt for alter-natives	19	6	18	5	18	7	10	2	16	2	9	3
3	<i>Rule of law & justice</i>	Use and promote	28	68	28	72	32	57	39	65	29	78	41	62
		Use	35	22	30	21	34	36	40	29	36	18	37	30
		Use and manipulate	24	5	31	3	26	3	14	2	24	2	18	6
		Avoid or opt for alter-natives	13	5	12	4	7	3	8	4	11	2	5	3
4	<i>Civil and political rights</i>	Use and promote	33	74	32	71	40	67	47	73	38	81	51	70
		Use	37	19	29	23	36	27	35	23	38	17	31	24
		Use and manipulate	19	4	25	3	18	2	12	2	17	1	14	5
		Avoid or opt for alter-natives	11	4	14	3	6	3	6	2	8	1	4	1

NO	CATEGORY OF RULES AND REGULATIONS	WHAT AC-TORS DO?	SUMATRA		JAWA		KALIMANTAN		SULAWESI		BALI, NTB, NTT		MALUKU, PAPUA	
			Powerful	Alternative	Powerful	Alternative	Powerful	Alternative	Powerful	Alternative	Powerful	Alternative	Powerful	Alternative
5	<i>Economic and social rights</i>	Use and pro-mote	30	65	26	66	37	65	44	68	32	77	51	73
		Use	37	27	34	27	35	29	35	28	43	18	30	24
		Use and ma-nipulate	21	3	26	5	20	2	12	1	18	2	12	2
		Avoid or opt for alternatives	12	6	13	2	9	4	9	3	7	3	7	2
6	<i>Free and fair elections</i>	Use and pro-mote	29	66	32	61	35	57	45	67	35	69	44	64
		Use	40	27	33	29	38	35	34	26	35	21	32	29
		Use and ma-nipulate	25	3	29	4	26	7	17	3	25	4	18	6
		Avoid or opt for alternatives	7	4	7	7	2	1	4	4	6	7	7	2
7	<i>Good representation</i>	Use and pro-mote	25	62	26	56	26	53	36	61	23	62	35	55
		Use	42	30	34	31	34	35	40	31	38	25	41	36
		Use and ma-nipulate	21	4	27	4	30	5	12	2	30	4	16	6
		Avoid or opt for alternatives	13	5	13	9	10	7	12	7	10	9	8	4
8	<i>Democratic and accountable government</i>	Use and pro-mote	25	65	28	61	27	59	43	64	27	73	40	59
		Use	35	26	31	28	36	35	33	29	32	22	33	35
		Use and ma-nipulate	26	3	30	5	31	3	16	4	31	2	18	3
		Avoid or opt for alternatives	14	7	11	6	7	2	9	3	10	2	9	4

NO	CATEGORY OF RULES AND REGULATIONS	WHAT AC-TORS DO?	SUMATRA		JAWA		KALIMANTAN		SULAWESI		BALL, NTB, NTT		MALUKU, PAPUA	
			Powerful	Alternative	Powerful	Alternative	Powerful	Alternative	Powerful	Alternative	Powerful	Alternative	Powerful	Alternative
9	<i>Freedom of media, press and academic freedoms</i>	Use and pro-mote	31	68	30	63	38	69	41	67	34	73	43	68
		Use	40	26	36	29	33	24	42	28	36	24	41	26
		Use and ma-nipulate	20	4	23	3	22	4	12	2	21	2	12	3
		Avoid or opt for alternatives	9	2	12	5	8	3	5	2	9	1	4	3
10	<i>Additional civil political participation</i>	Use and pro-mote	24	62	25	64	30	65	39	66	31	77	39	62
		Use	42	31	36	27	41	31	42	29	37	20	41	35
		Use and ma-nipulate	18	3	24	4	20	2	12	2	19	3	12	2
		Avoid or opt for alternatives	15	5	14	5	10	2	7	3	13	0	9	2
11	<i>Direct participation</i>	Use and pro-mote	25	63	28	66	32	55	45	67	32	73	42	61
		Use	38	31	35	23	35	40	34	30	34	20	34	28
		Use and ma-nipulate	22	2	23	4	23	1	11	2	18	4	12	6
		Avoid or opt for alternatives	15	4	14	7	11	3	10	1	16	4	12	5

Table E.4. Main actors' political terrain according to informants in different regions

Q38. The actors' presence within politics: In what spheres of the political landscape is each of the actors primarily active?					
NO	SPHERES OF THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE	POWERFUL ACTORS		ALTERNATIVE ACTORS	
		RESPONSE	PERCENT	RESPONSE	PERCENT
1	Business and industry				
	Sumatera	148	14%	51	6%
	Jawa	104	15%	42	7%
	Kalimantan	75	16%	26	7%
	Sulawesi	58	9%	25	5%
	Bali, NTB, NTT	20	7%	10	5%
	Maluku, North Maluku, Papua, West Papua	38	7%	16	4%
2	Small business				
	Sumatera	23	2%	20	2%
	Jawa	5	1%	14	2%
	Kalimantan	8	2%	18	5%
	Sulawesi	12	2%	13	2%
	Bali, NTB, NTT	2	1%	1	0%
	Maluku, North Maluku, Papua, West Papua	6	1%	12	3%
3	Self-managed non-profit units				
	Sumatera	12	1%	48	6%
	Jawa	7	1%	36	6%
	Kalimantan	8	2%	14	4%
	Sulawesi	13	2%	18	3%
	Bali, NTB, NTT	1	0%	11	5%
	Maluku, North Maluku, Papua, West Papua	17	3%	13	3%
4	Lobby groups				
	Sumatera	90	9%	164	20%
	Jawa	70	10%	136	22%
	Kalimantan	42	9%	70	19%
	Sulawesi	72	11%	104	20%
	Bali, NTB, NTT	19	7%	56	26%
	Maluku, North Maluku, Papua, West Papua	39	7%	72	19%

5	Interest organisations				
	Sumatera	140	14%	233	29%
	Jawa	94	13%	198	32%
	Kalimantan	56	12%	109	29%
	Sulawesi	88	13%	132	25%
	Bali, NTB, NTT	38	14%	54	25%
	Maluku, North Maluku, Papua, West Papua	79	15%	84	22%
6	Political parties				
	Sumatera	201	20%	125	15%
	Jawa	129	18%	82	13%
	Kalimantan	114	24%	50	13%
	Sulawesi	171	25%	82	16%
	Bali, NTB, NTT	58	22%	22	10%
	Maluku, North Maluku, Papua, West Papua	110	21%	51	14%
7	Elected government				
	Sumatera	155	15%	79	10%
	Jawa	128	18%	27	4%
	Kalimantan	74	16%	27	7%
	Sulawesi	106	16%	60	11%
	Bali, NTB, NTT	65	24%	22	10%
	Maluku, North Maluku, Papua, West Papua	97	18%	46	12%
8	The bureaucracy				
	Sumatera	195	19%	58	7%
	Jawa	122	17%	44	7%
	Kalimantan	72	15%	43	11%
	Sulawesi	134	20%	60	11%
	Bali, NTB, NTT	45	17%	18	8%
	Maluku, North Maluku, Papua, West Papua	114	22%	41	11%

NO	SPHERES OF THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE	POWERFUL ACTORS		ALTERNATIVE ACTORS	
		RESPONSE	PERCENT	RESPONSE	PERCENT
9	The judiciary				
	Sumatera	26	3%	26	3%
	Jawa	20	3%	31	5%
	Kalimantan	10	2%	17	5%
	Sulawesi	13	2%	18	3%
	Bali, NTB, NTT	16	6%	14	7%
	Maluku, North Maluku, Papua, West Papua	15	3%	32	9%
10	Military and police				
	Sumatera	39	4%	11	1%
	Jawa	38	5%	11	2%
	Kalimantan	9	2%	1	0%
	Sulawesi	14	2%	12	2%
	Bali, NTB, NTT	5	2%	5	2%
	Maluku, North Maluku, Papua, West Papua	14	3%	9	2%

Table E.5. Main actors' sources of power according to informants in different regions

Q39. The actors' sources of power: In your assessment, what are the main actors' sources of power?					
NO	SOURCES OF POWER	POWERFUL ACTORS		ALTERNATIVE ACTORS	
		RESPONSE	PERCENT	RESPONSE	PERCENT
1	Economic resources				
	Sumatera	271	27%	84	11%
	Jawa	182	26%	70	11%
	Kalimantan	118	26%	39	11%
	Sulawesi	148	22%	53	10%
	Bali, NTB, NTT	52	20%	13	6%
	Maluku, North Maluku, Papua, West Papua	127	24%	44	12%
2	Mass power/Political/ Military coercion				
	Sumatera	358	36%	191	24%
	Jawa	243	35%	119	19%
	Kalimantan	132	30%	75	20%
	Sulawesi	207	31%	112	22%
	Bali, NTB, NTT	89	35%	55	26%
	Maluku, North Maluku, Papua, West Papua	165	31%	67	18%
3	Social strength and favourable contacts				
	Sumatera	255	26%	245	31%
	Jawa	198	28%	189	31%
	Kalimantan	138	31%	108	30%
	Sulawesi	202	31%	177	35%
	Bali, NTB, NTT	77	30%	58	27%
	Maluku, North Maluku, Papua, West Papua	149	28%	137	36%
4	Knowledge, information				
	Sumatera	114	11%	275	35%
	Jawa	78	11%	241	39%
	Kalimantan	58	13%	144	39%
	Sulawesi	102	15%	166	33%
	Bali, NTB, NTT	37	15%	89	41%
	Maluku, North Maluku, Papua, West Papua	87	16%	128	34%

Table E.6. *The most frequent methods used by powerful actors to transform their sources of power*

METHODS USED BY POWERFUL ACTORS TO TRANSFORM THEIR SOURCES OF POWER		REGION					
		SUMATERA	JAWA	KALIMAN- TAN	SULAWESI	BALI+ NTB+NTT	MALUKU+ PAPUA
1	By providing discursive activities within the public sphere through seminars, discussion, hearings	147	97	78	136	42	115
		10%	9%	11%	14%	11%	15%
2	By providing contacts and dialogue with politicians and administrators at various levels	243	180	131	187	53	136
		16%	16%	19%	19%	13%	18%
3	By providing and building networks and co-ordination for joint activity	84	56	46	76	35	66
		6%	5%	7%	8%	9%	9%
4	By creating contacts and partnership with influential figures and experts	184	154	98	113	42	105
		12%	14%	14%	11%	11%	14%
5	By being able to demonstrate collective and mass-based strength	78	62	36	49	20	37
		5%	6%	5%	5%	5%	5%
6	By generating economic self-sufficiency, self-help activities, co-operatives, etc.	29	20	12	24	8	23
		2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	3%
7	By gaining legitimacy through DPR, DPRD, the judicial system and/or the formal executive organs the state	213	138	70	116	54	84
		14%	13%	10%	12%	14%	11%
8	By making use of various means of forceful official authority, coercion, demonstration of power and force as well as the generation of fear	131	105	44	54	23	42
		9%	10%	6%	5%	6%	6%
9	By using state and government budgets other resources and regulations to the benefit of pro-market policies and various actors on the market	157	105	61	67	35	35
		11%	10%	9%	7%	9%	5%

10	By providing patronage in various forms (including favourable treatment, loans, aid and charity) to for instance social groups, communities, civil society organisations (including NGOs) as well as to businessmen, relatives and other individuals	77	51	36	43	31	30
		5%	5%	5%	4%	8%	4%
11	By organising support within communities	60	71	46	64	28	54
		4%	7%	7%	6%	7%	7%
12	By gaining a popular mandate or getting elected	83	58	28	74	25	39
		6%	5%	4%	7%	6%	5%
	Total	1486	1097	686	1003	396	766
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table E.7. *The most frequent methods used by powerful actors to transform their sources of power*

	METHODS USED BY ALTERNATIVE ACTORS TO TRANSFORM THEIR SOURCES OF POWER	REGION					
		SUMATERA	JAWA	KALIMANTAN	SULAWESI	BALI+NTB+NTT	MALUKU+PAPUA
1	By providing discursive activities within the public sphere through seminars, discussion, hearings	278	224	132	183	89	131
		22%	23%	23%	23%	27%	23%
2	By providing contacts and dialogue with politicians and administrators at various levels	165	146	68	119	41	81
		13%	15%	12%	15%	12%	14%
3	By providing and building networks and co-ordination for joint activity	209	151	81	116	73	97
		17%	15%	14%	14%	22%	17%
4	By creating contacts and partnership with influential figures and experts	138	141	63	97	37	72
		11%	14%	11%	12%	11%	13%
5	By being able to demonstrate collective and mass-based strength	108	81	38	61	24	22
		9%	8%	7%	8%	7%	4%
6	By generating economic self-sufficiency / self-help activities, co-operatives, etc.	32	31	29	27	13	26
		3%	3%	5%	3%	4%	5%
7	By gaining legitimacy through DPR, DPRD, the judicial system and/or the formal executive organs the state	54	31	25	37	13	30
		4%	3%	4%	5%	4%	5%
8	By making use of various means of forceful official authority, coercion, demonstration of power and force as well as the generation of fear	13	10	11	8	5	8
		1%	1%	2%	1%	2%	1%
9	By using state and government budgets other resources and regulations to the benefit of pre-market policies and various actors on the market	13	13	8	6	1	9
		1%	1%	1%	1%	0%	2%

10	By providing patronage in various forms (including favourable treatment, loans, aid and charity) to for instance social groups, communities, civil society organisations (including NGOs) as well as to businessmen, relatives and other individuals	36	37	30	26	2	22
		3%	4%	5%	3%	1%	4%
11	By organising support within communities	143	104	64	98	32	59
		12%	11%	11%	12%	10%	10%
12	By gaining a popular mandate or getting elected	59	25	16	29	6	14
		5%	3%	3%	4%	2%	3%
	Total	1248	994	565	807	336	571
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	

Table E.8. *The powerful actor's method of communication*

METHOD OF COMMUNICATION		REGION					
		Sumatera	Jawa	Kaliman- tan	Sulawesi	Bali+ NTB+NTT	Maluku+ Papua
1	Writing books and articles	56	42	39	56	8	35
		6%	6%	8%	8%	3%	7%
2	Performing in the media	332	204	130	171	75	160
		32%	28%	28%	25%	29%	30%
3	Attending and giving speeches in public seminars/ meetings	171	119	77	151	58	124
		17%	16%	17%	22%	23%	23%
4	Through personal contacts and networks	205	165	86	129	42	86
		20%	23%	18%	19%	16%	16%
5	Through organisations and their meetings and contacts	261	202	135	167	74	126
		25%	28%	29%	25%	29%	24%
Total		1026	734	467	674	257	531
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	

Table E.9. The alternative actor's method of communication

METHOD OF COMMUNICATION		REGION					
		Sumatera	Jawa	Kaliman-tan	Sulawesi	Bali+ NTB+NTT	Maluku+ Papua
1	Writing books and articles	162	160	68	89	40	57
		18%	23%	16%	16%	17%	15%
2	Performing in the media	174	130	84	103	47	78
		20%	19%	20%	18%	19%	20%
3	Attending and giving speeches in public seminars/ meetings	204	153	106	125	66	96
		23%	22%	26%	22%	27%	25%
4	Through personal contacts and networks	151	119	71	115	39	65
		17%	17%	17%	21%	16%	17%
5	Through organisations and their meetings and contacts	202	136	85	130	50	94
		23%	20%	21%	23%	21%	24%
Total		893	698	414	562	242	390
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table E.9. The actors' mobilisation and organisation of people according to informants from different regions

Q43. The actors' mobilisation and organisation of people: How do the actors typically try to mobilise and organise popular support for the issues that you have identified in the previous question (no 42)?					
No	Way to mobilise and organise people	Powerful actors		Alternative actors	
		Response	Percent	Response	Percent
1	Popular and charismatic leaders	967	30	594	21
	Sumatera	261	28%	154	20%
	Jawa	155	25%	142	23%
	Kalimantan	124	31%	76	21%
	Sulawesi	189	31%	103	20%
	Bali, NTB, NTT	85	33%	49	22%
	Maluku, North Maluku, Papua, West Papua	165	32%	89	23%
2	Clientilism	902	28	246	9
	Sumatera	293	32%	65	8%
	Jawa	218	35%	47	8%
	Kalimantan	122	30%	36	10%
	Sulawesi	145	24%	43	8%
	Bali, NTB, NTT	68	27%	18	8%
	Maluku, North Maluku, Papua, West Papua	86	17%	36	9%
3	Alternative patronage	335	10	560	20
	Sumatera	98	11%	179	23%
	Jawa	70	11%	104	17%
	Kalimantan	21	5%	70	19%
	Sulawesi	66	11%	107	21%
	Bali, NTB, NTT	31	12%	52	23%
	Maluku, North Maluku, Papua, West Papua	55	11%	67	18%
4	Networks between independent actors	718	22	979	35
	Sumatera	184	20%	252	32%
	Jawa	126	20%	238	38%
	Kalimantan	104	26%	127	35%
	Sulawesi	144	24%	183	36%

	Bali, NTB, NTT	46	18%	68	30%
	Maluku. North Maluku, Papua, West Papua	121	24%	133	35%
5	Integration from below of popular organisations into more general organisations	350	11	429	15
	Sumatera	94	10%	136	17%
	Jawa	49	8%	93	15%
	Kalimantan	32	8%	51	14%
	Sulawesi	65	11%	74	15%
	Bali, NTB, NTT	26	10%	38	17%
	Maluku. North Maluku, Papua, West Papua	81	16%	55	14%

Table E.10. The powerful actors' organising according to informants from different regions

ORGANISATIONAL METHODS		REGION					
		SUMATERA	JAWA	KALIMAN-TAN	SULAWESI	BALI+NTB+NTT	MALUKU+PAPUA
1	Descriptive	115	47	54	84	13	58
		14%	8%	14%	15%	6%	13%
2	Ethnicity, religion, family, etc.	183	126	91	116	48	111
		22%	21%	24%	21%	23%	24%
3	Origin and residence (son of the soil identity)	67	32	25	45	16	51
		8%	5%	7%	8%	8%	11%
4	Hierarchical connecting levels	164	158	58	114	63	114
		20%	26%	15%	21%	30%	25%
5	Sector, profession	114	103	63	67	15	44
		14%	17%	17%	12%	7%	10%
6	Visions, ideas, interests	124	97	58	86	43	61
		15%	16%	15%	16%	21%	13%
7	Personal network	68	52	29	36	9	20
		8%	9%	8%	7%	4%	4%
Total		835	615	378	548	207	459
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table E.11. The alternative actors' organising according to informants from different regions

ORGANISATIONAL METHODS		REGION					
		SUMATERA	JAWA	KALIMAN-TAN	SULAWESI	BALI+NTB+NTT	MALUKU+PAPUA
1	Descriptive	83	37	29	51	12	46
		13%	7%	10%	12%	7%	14%
2	Ethnicity, religion, family, etc.	78	95	67	65	30	75
		12%	18%	23%	16%	17%	23%
3	Origin and residence (son of the soil identity)	32	17	8	27	8	17
		5%	3%	3%	7%	5%	5%
4	Hierarchical connecting levels	50	50	16	41	9	48
		8%	9%	6%	10%	5%	15%
5	Sector, profession	72	77	38	43	19	29
		11%	14%	13%	11%	11%	9%
6	Visions, ideas, interests	245	211	99	133	74	89
		38%	39%	35%	32%	43%	27%
7	Personal network	79	55	30	50	21	21
		12%	10%	11%	12%	12%	7%
Total		639	542	287	410	173	325
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table E.11. *The powerful actors' alliances*

BACKGROUND OF INDIVIDUAL ALLIANCES		REGION					
		SUMATERA	JAWA	KALIMAN-TAN	SULAWESI	BALI+NTB+NTT	MALUKU+PAPUA
1	Government/ Bureaucracy	160	126	70	111	47	106
		20%	22%	19%	18%	21%	23%
2	Police and military	32	34	7	14	4	18
		4%	6%	2%	2%	2%	4%
3	Parliament (cen- tral and local)	48	18	27	71	23	44
		6%	3%	7%	12%	10%	9%
4	Political parties	170	118	75	135	31	78
		22%	21%	21%	22%	14%	17%
5	Religious or ethnic groups	71	63	35	41	46	44
		9%	11%	10%	7%	20%	9%
6	Academicians, the judiciary/law firms, media	59	47	36	75	21	35
		8%	8%	10%	12%	9%	7%
7	NGOs	53	22	20	59	24	21
		7%	4%	6%	10%	11%	5%
8	Non class based mass organisa- tions	25	8	6	25	2	25
		3%	1%	2%	4%	1%	5%
9	Class based mass organisations	15	15	11	20	0	10
		2%	3%	3%	3%	0%	2%
10	Business	90	89	49	42	6	35
		12%	16%	13%	7%	3%	7%
11	Adat councils etc.	21	8	8	6	9	41
		3%	1%	2%	1%	4%	9%
12	Semi-state or state-auxiliary bodies	8	2	3	11	4	7
		1%	0%	1%	2%	2%	2%
13	Underworld and militia	32	17	18	6	8	7
		4%	3%	5%	1%	4%	2%

Table E.12. *The alternative actors' alliances*

BACKGROUND OF INDIVIDUAL ALLIANCES		REGION					
		SUMATERA	JAWA	KALIMAN-TAN	SULAWESI	BALI+NTB+NTT	MALUKU+PAPUA
1	Government/Bureaucracy	70	50	34	63	25	43
		11%	10%	13%	13%	13%	14%
2	Police and military	10	9	2	5	0	6
		2%	2%	1%	1%	0%	2%
3	Parliament (central and local)	26	14	6	26	14	16
		4%	3%	2%	6%	7%	5%
4	Political parties	85	78	32	82	18	26
		14%	16%	12%	17%	10%	9%
5	Religious or ethnic groups	27	69	21	29	35	37
		4%	14%	8%	6%	19%	12%
6	Academicians, the judiciary/law firms, media	120	90	43	63	32	54
		19%	18%	16%	13%	17%	18%
7	NGOs	125	83	95	121	47	43
		20%	17%	35%	26%	25%	14%
8	Non class based mass organisations	22	8	2	13	3	14
		4%	2%	1%	3%	2%	5%
9	Class based mass organisations	63	42	11	26	2	10
		10%	9%	4%	6%	1%	3%
10	Business	26	32	9	21	3	9
		4%	7%	3%	4%	2%	3%
11	Adat councils etc.	17	4	10	11	5	37
		3%	1%	4%	2%	3%	12%
12	Semi-state or state-auxiliary bodies	27	11	5	14	3	11
		4%	2%	2%	3%	2%	4%
13	Underworld and militia	3	1	2	1	1	0
		1%	0%	1%	0%	1%	0%

Table E.12. The powerful actors' political parties/organisations

POLITICAL PARTIES/ORGANISATIONS (Powerful Actors)		REGION					
		Sumatera	Jawa	Kalimantan	Sulawesi	Bali+ NTB+NTT	Maluku+ Papua
1	Golkar	162	155	76	143	72	90
		35%	43%	34%	43%	55%	37%
2	PDIP	74	50	42	35	13	78
		16%	14%	19%	11%	10%	32%
3	Hanura, PPRN	1	4	1	2	0	0
		0%	1%	0%	1%	0%	0%
4	Demokrat	46	42	6	14	4	12
		10%	12%	3%	4%	3%	5%
5	PKS	26	14	1	11	1	6
		6%	4%	0%	3%	1%	3%
6	Major Islamic-based	62	45	47	51	8	6
		13%	12%	21%	16%	6%	3%
7	Small parties	25	7	15	31	13	17
		5%	2%	7%	9%	10%	7%
8	Alternative parties	10	0	0	2	0	1
		2%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%
9	NGOs	8	7	12	8	10	8
		2%	2%	5%	2%	8%	3%
10	Adat council/groups,	5	5	5	4	3	8
		1%	1%	2%	1%	2%	3%
11	Media	1	0	0	0	0	0
		0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
12	Business	8	6	1	4	2	0
		2%	2%	0%	1%	2%	0%
13	Mass organisations	39	30	18	25	5	17
		8%	8%	8%	8%	4%	7%
Total 100%		467	365	224	330	131	243
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	

Table E.13. The alternative actors' political parties/organisations

POLITICAL PARTIES/ORGANISATIONS (Alternative Actors)		REGION					
		Sumatera	Jawa	Kalimantan	Sulawesi	Bali+ NTB+NTT	Maluku+ Papua
1	Golkar	50	37	32	39	8	46
		14%	12%	18%	16%	8%	33%
2	PDIP	28	36	15	31	12	16
		8%	12%	8%	13%	13%	11%
3	Hanura, PPRN	0	0	3	4	1	0
		0%	0%	2%	2%	1%	0%
4	Demokrat	16	2	3	5	0	5
		4%	1%	2%	2%	0%	4%
5	PKS	32	20	10	12	0	2
		9%	7%	6%	5%	0%	1%
6	Major Islamic-based	34	65	22	42	9	6
		9%	21%	12%	17%	10%	4%
7	Small parties	24	5	14	17	7	12
		7%	2%	8%	7%	7%	9%
8	Alternative parties	45	9	3	18	1	0
		12%	3%	2%	7%	1%	0%
9	NGOs	76	64	42	30	28	27
		21%	21%	23%	12%	30%	19%
10	Adat council/groups,	4	5	5	8	0	14
		1%	2%	3%	3%	0%	10%
11	Media	3	3	5	0	2	1
		1%	1%	3%	0%	2%	1%
12	Business	7	1	2	8	1	0
		2%	0%	1%	3%	1%	0%
13	Mass organisations	47	57	24	33	26	12
		13%	19%	13%	13%	27%	9%
Total 100%		366	304	180	247	95	141
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	



QUESTIONNAIRE



National Re-survey Problems and Options of Democracy in Indonesia 2007-2008

(The final version of the questionnaire was in Indonesian)

NB! That a separate list of non-biased examples (that were well known around the country) were attached to each of the questions. Contextual local examples were also developed in the training sessions with the local interview-assistants.

No. Questionnaire:

I

II

III

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I. Code of Region

[01] = Nanggroe Aceh Darusalam
[02] = Sumatra Utara
[03] = Riau
[04] = Kepulauan Riau
[05] = Sumatra Barat
[06] = Jambi
[07] = Bengkulu
[08] = Sumatra Selatan
[09] = Bangka Belitung
[10] = Lampung
[11] = Banten

[12] = Jawa Barat
[13] = DKI Jakarta
[14] = Jawa Tengah
[15] = DI Yogyakarta
[16] = Jawa Timur
[17] = Kalimantan Barat
[18] = Kalimantan Tengah
[19] = Kalimantan Timur
[20] = Kalimantan Selatan
[21] = Gorontalo
[22] = Sulawesi Utara

[23] = Sulawesi Tengah
[24] = Sulawesi Barat
[25] = Sulawesi Tenggara
[26] = Sulawesi Selatan
[27] = Bali
[28] = Nusa Tenggara Barat
[29] = Nusa Tenggara Timur
[30] = Maluku
[31] = Maluku Utara
[32] = Papua
[33] = Irian Jaya Barat

II. Code of issue areas, i.e the frontline of democratic work along which the informant is active

[1] = The struggle of peasants, agricultural labourers and fisher folks for their social, economic and other rights
[2] = The struggle of labour for better working conditions and standard of living
[3] = The struggle for the social, economic and other rights of the urban poor.
[4] = The promotion of human rights
[5] = The struggle against corruption in favour of 'good governance'
[6] = Democratisation of the political parties and the party system
[7] = The promotion of pluralism, religious and ethnic

reconciliation and conflict resolution.

[8] = The improvement and democratisation of education
[9] = The promotion of professionalism as part of 'good governance' in public and private sectors.
[10] = The promotion of freedom, independence and quality of media
[11] = The promotion of gender equality and feminist perspectives
[12] = The improvement of alternative representation at the local level
[13] = The promotion of sustainable development

III. Number of informant

From [01] to [...] for informant in each province

Time of Interview:

I. From..... to

II. From..... to

III. From..... to

A. THE INFORMANT

1. Full Name :
2. Nick Name :
3. Sex : Female/ Male
4. Place of Birth :
5. Age : years old
6. Religion/Belief :
7. Ethnicity :
8. Home Address :
.....
9. City/Province & pin code:
10. Highest education :
11. Profession :
12. In what city/town/village is your major work place(s):
13. Telephone/Mobile :
14. E-mail :
15. Organisational activity related to issues of democracy:

<u>Name of Organisation</u>	<u>Major location of activity Village/City/Municipality/Province</u>	<u>Type of Organisation</u>	<u>Main Issue of the Organisation</u>	<u>Informant's Position in the organisation</u>
a.	a.	a.	a.	a.
b.	b.	b.	b.	b.
c.	c.	c.	c.	c.

WHAT DOES YOUR ASSESSMENT REFER TO?

Please select whether *all* your answers relate to the context of your province or the national situation within the framework of your issue-area.

You have to opt for one and hold on to it all through the questionnaire!

16. Province []
National/issue-area []

B. ATTITUDES TO POLITICS

Note: In questions no. 17-22, please pick only one of the available options.

17. In your experience, **how do people understand politics?**

- a. ☐ Struggle for power
- b. ☐ Popular control of public affairs
- c. ☐ Something taken care of by the elites/public figures
- d. ☐ Elitist manipulation
- e. ☐ Others (please mention!).....

18. **How interested are people** in politics?

- a. ☐ Highly interested (being politically conscious and actively involved in political activity)
- b. ☐ Interested (follow the political debate and events)
- c. ☐ Not interested (floating/passive)

19. **How interested are women** in politics?

- a. ☐ Highly interested (being politically conscious and actively involved in political activity)
- b. ☐ Interested (follow the political debate and events)
- c. ☐ Not interested (floating/passive)

20. According to you, what should at first hand be done to encourage the **participation of women** in politics?

- a. ☐ Fight for women quota in legislative and executive institutions
- b. ☐ Increase women's political awareness and capacity
- c. ☐ Support women to gain positions in political institutions
- d. ☐ Expand the political agenda so that it includes more issues that are vital to women
- e. ☐ Others (please mention!).....

21. If one is interested in politics, which **channel** do you think is the most appropriate to be used at first hand?

- a. ☐ Join a big national political party
- b. ☐ Join a small political party that is eligible to run in elections
- c. ☐ Establish a new locally rooted political party
- d. ☐ Congregate a non-party political block
- e. ☐ Others (please mention!).....

22. Which method do you think is most effective to **increase people's political capacity and participation?**

- a. ☐ Increasing people's political awareness
- b. ☐ Improving the education of political cadres
- c. ☐ Reforming and consolidating existing political parties
- d. ☐ Promoting politically oriented campaigns and making public statements and speeches
- e. ☐ Mobilising the masses
- f. ☐ Building democratic and mass-based organisations and new political parties
- g. ☐ Others (please mention!)

C. POLITICS AND IDENTITY

The aim of democracy is popular control of public affairs on the basis of political equality. So how is the 'people' (demos) defined in the real world, by people themselves?

*Note: In questions no. 23-26, please pick only **one** of the available options.*

23. In the 2004 general elections of legislators, how did people at first hand identify themselves?

- a. ☐ As a resident of Indonesia in general
- b. ☐ As residents of their city/municipality/province
- c. ☐ As residents of their village and hamlet (*dusun*)
- d. ☐ As members of their ethnic community
- e. ☐ As members of their religious community
- f. ☐ As members/supporters of 'their' political party
- g. ☐ As members of their social class (e.g. working class, farmers, middle class, the class of businessmen)
- h. ☐ Others, (*please mention!*)

24. In regional election(s) (*pilkada*), how did people at first hand identify themselves?

- a. ☐ As residents of their city/municipality/province
- b. ☐ As residents of their village and hamlet (*dusun*)
- c. ☐ As members of their ethnic community
- d. ☐ As members of their religious community
- e. ☐ As members/supporters of 'their' political party
- f. ☐ As members of their social class (e.g. working class, farmers, middle class, the class of businessmen)
- g. ☐ Others, (*please mention!*)

25. How do people identify themselves when they face situation of conflict caused by social, economy and political tension?

- a. ☐ As residents of their city/municipality/province
- b. ☐ As residents of their village and hamlet (*dusun*)
- c. ☐ As members of their ethnic community
- d. ☐ As a member of their religious community
- e. ☐ As members of their social class (e.g. working class, farmers, middle class, the class of businessmen)
- f. ☐ Others, (*please mention!*)

26. In responding to issues of administrative division of provinces or regencies, how do people at first hand identify themselves?

- a. ☐ As residents of their city/municipality/province
- b. ☐ As residents of their village and hamlet (*dusun*)
- c. ☐ As members of their ethnic community
- d. ☐ As members of their religious community
- e. ☐ Others, (*please mention!*)

D. THE QUALITY OF THE RULES & REGULATIONS TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY

It is generally accepted that there is a need for a number of means to promote the aim of democracy (i.e. popular control of public affairs based on political equality). These means or dimensions of democracy are listed below. For these means to be good enough to generate a meaningful democracy there must be a number of promotional rules and regulations. A meaningful democracy requires thus, that the quality of these rules and regulations is reasonably high. This may be assessed by considering performance and scope. By performance we mean the efficiency of the rules and regulations. By scope we mean (a) geographic spread and (b) substance in terms of addressing all aspects that people deem to be part of public life.

The questions of this part (no. 27-33) cover these two basic dimensions of the general standard of the rules and regulations that are meant to promote democracy in your regional context: (a) their existence (b) their performance and (c) their geographic as well as substantive scope. Further, the rules and regulations are both formal (legally sanctioned) and informal (customs, traditions, norms, values, conventions).

*Note: For the questions no. 27-33, please pick **one of the available options**. (See table in the next pages!)*

27. Existence: In your assessment, do there exist **formal rules and regulations** within your regional context that are meant to support the following issues?
28. Performance: In your assessment, do the existing **formal rules and regulations** that are applied within your regional context generally tend to be supportive enough or not very supportive in relation to the following issues?
29. Spread: In your assessment, do the **formal rules and regulations** apply effectively throughout your regional context, or the geographical contexts your issue area,
30. Substance: In your assessment, are the **formal rules and regulations** substantive by really addressing all aspects that you deem to be part of public life?
31. Performance: In your assessment, do the existing **informal arrangements** applied in your regional context generally tend to support or hamper the following issues?
32. Spread: In your assessment, do the **informal arrangements** apply effectively throughout your regional context or the geographical contexts of your issue area?
33. Substance: In your assessment, are the **informal arrangements** substantive by really addressing all aspects that you deem to be part of public life?

No	INSTRUMENTS TO PROMOTE THE FOLLOWING INTRINSIC MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	QUALITY OF FORMAL RULES AND REGULATION				QUALITY OF INFORMAL ARRANGEMENTS			
		No. 27 If the informant's answer is 'no' go directly to question no 31	No. 28 Performance: Supportive enough?	No. 29 Spread: Broadly applied?	No. 30 Substance: Substantive?	No. 31 Performance: Supportive or hampering?	No. 32 Spread: Broadly applied?	No. 33 Substance: Substantive?	
		Existence : Rules and regulations exist?	Performance: Supportive enough?	Spread: Broadly applied?	Substance: Substantive?	Performance: Supportive or hampering?	Spread: Broadly applied?	Substance: Substantive?	
1.	Citizenship (Equal state-citizenship: The rights of minorities, migrants and refugees; Reconciliation of horizontal conflicts)	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Supportive enough <input type="checkbox"/> Not very supportive	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Tend to support <input type="checkbox"/> Tend to hamper	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
2.	Government support of international law and UN human rights	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Supportive enough <input type="checkbox"/> Not very supportive	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Tend to support <input type="checkbox"/> Tend to hamper	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
3.	Subordination of the government and public officials to the rule of law	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Supportive enough <input type="checkbox"/> Not very supportive	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Tend to support <input type="checkbox"/> Tend to hamper	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
4.	The equality before the law (Equal and secure access to justice; The integrity and independence of the judiciary)	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Supportive enough <input type="checkbox"/> Not very supportive	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Tend to support <input type="checkbox"/> Tend to hamper	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
5.	Freedom from physical violence and the fear of it	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Supportive enough <input type="checkbox"/> Not very supportive	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Tend to support <input type="checkbox"/> Tend to hamper	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
6.	Freedom of speech, assembly and organisation	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Supportive enough <input type="checkbox"/> Not very supportive	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Tend to support <input type="checkbox"/> Tend to hamper	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
7.	Freedom to carry out trade union activity	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Supportive enough <input type="checkbox"/> Not very supportive	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Tend to support <input type="checkbox"/> Tend to hamper	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
8.	Freedom of religion, belief, language and culture	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Supportive enough <input type="checkbox"/> Not very supportive	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Tend to support <input type="checkbox"/> Tend to hamper	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
9.	Gender equality and emancipation	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Supportive enough <input type="checkbox"/> Not very supportive	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Tend to support <input type="checkbox"/> Tend to hamper	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
10.	The rights of children	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Supportive enough <input type="checkbox"/> Not very supportive	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Tend to support <input type="checkbox"/> Tend to hamper	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
11.	The right to employment, social security and other basic needs	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Supportive enough <input type="checkbox"/> Not very supportive	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Tend to support <input type="checkbox"/> Tend to hamper	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
12.	The right to basic education, including citizen's rights and duties	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Supportive enough <input type="checkbox"/> Not very supportive	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Tend to support <input type="checkbox"/> Tend to hamper	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
13.	Good corporate governance	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Supportive enough <input type="checkbox"/> Not very supportive	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Tend to support <input type="checkbox"/> Tend to hamper	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
14.	Free and fair general elections (Free and fair general elections at central, regional and local levels; Free and fair elections of e.g. governors, mayors and village heads)	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Supportive enough <input type="checkbox"/> Not very supportive	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Tend to support <input type="checkbox"/> Tend to hamper	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	

No	INSTRUMENTS TO PROMOTE THE FOLLOWING INTRINSIC MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	QUALITY OF FORMAL RULES AND REGULATION				QUALITY OF INFORMAL ARRANGEMENTS			
		No.27	No.28	No.29	No.30	No.31	No.32	No.33	Substance: Substantive?
		If the informant's answer is 'no', go directly to the question no 31	Performance Supportive enough	Spread: Broadly applied?	Substance: Substantive?	Performance Supportive or hampering?	Spread: Broadly applied?		
		Existence of Rules and regulations exist?							
		<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Supportive enough <input type="checkbox"/> Not very supportive	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Tend to support <input type="checkbox"/> Tend to hamper	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
15.	Freedom to form parties on the national or local level (or teams of independent candidates) that can recruit members, and participate in elections	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Supportive enough <input type="checkbox"/> Not very supportive	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Tend to support <input type="checkbox"/> Tend to hamper	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
16.	Reflection of vital issues and interests among people by political parties and or candidates.	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Supportive enough <input type="checkbox"/> Not very supportive	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Tend to support <input type="checkbox"/> Tend to hamper	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
17.	Absterion from abusing religious or ethnic sentiments, symbols and doctrines by political parties and or candidates.	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Supportive enough <input type="checkbox"/> Not very supportive	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Tend to support <input type="checkbox"/> Tend to hamper	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
18.	Independence of money politics and powerful vested interests by political parties and or candidates.	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Supportive enough <input type="checkbox"/> Not very supportive	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Tend to support <input type="checkbox"/> Tend to hamper	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
19.	Membership-based control of parties and responsiveness and accountability of parties and political candidates to their constituencies	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Supportive enough <input type="checkbox"/> Not very supportive	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Tend to support <input type="checkbox"/> Tend to hamper	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
20.	Parties and candidates ability to form and run government	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Supportive enough <input type="checkbox"/> Not very supportive	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Tend to support <input type="checkbox"/> Tend to hamper	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
21.	Democratic decentralisation of government of all matters that do not need to be handled on central levels.	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Supportive enough <input type="checkbox"/> Not very supportive	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Tend to support <input type="checkbox"/> Tend to hamper	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
22.	The transparency and accountability of elected government, the executive (bureaucracies), at all levels	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Supportive enough <input type="checkbox"/> Not very supportive	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Tend to support <input type="checkbox"/> Tend to hamper	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No

No	INSTRUMENTS TO PROMOTE THE FOLLOWING INSTRUMENTS BY MEANS OF DEMOCRACY	QUALITY OF FORMAL RULES AND REGULATION				QUALITY OF INFORMAL ARRANGEMENTS			
		No. 27	No. 28	No. 29	No. 30	No. 31	No. 32	No. 33	
		If the instrument's answer is 'no', go directly to the question no 31	Performance: Supportive enough	Spread: Broadly applied?	Substance: Substantive?	Performance: Supportive or hampering?	Spread: Broadly applied?	Substance: Substantive?	
23.	The transparency and accountability of the military and police to elected government and the public	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Supportive enough <input type="checkbox"/> Not very supportive	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Tend to support <input type="checkbox"/> Tend to hamper	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
24.	The capacity of the government to combat paramilitary groups, hoodlums and organised crime	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Supportive enough <input type="checkbox"/> Not very supportive	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Tend to support <input type="checkbox"/> Tend to hamper	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
25.	Government independence from foreign intervention (except UN conventions and applicable international law)	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Supportive enough <input type="checkbox"/> Not very supportive	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Tend to support <input type="checkbox"/> Tend to hamper	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
26.	Government's independence from strong interest groups and capacity to eliminate corruption and abuse of power	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Supportive enough <input type="checkbox"/> Not very supportive	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Tend to support <input type="checkbox"/> Tend to hamper	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
27.	Freedom of the press, art and academic world	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Supportive enough <input type="checkbox"/> Not very supportive	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Tend to support <input type="checkbox"/> Tend to hamper	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
28.	Public access to and the reflection of different views within media, art and the academic world	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Supportive enough <input type="checkbox"/> Not very supportive	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Tend to support <input type="checkbox"/> Tend to hamper	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
29.	Citizens' participation in extensive independent civil associations	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Supportive enough <input type="checkbox"/> Not very supportive	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Tend to support <input type="checkbox"/> Tend to hamper	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
30.	Transparency, accountability and democracy within civil organisations	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Supportive enough <input type="checkbox"/> Not very supportive	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Tend to support <input type="checkbox"/> Tend to hamper	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
31.	Pressure groups - including marginalised groups - effective access to and participation in public life	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Supportive enough <input type="checkbox"/> Not very supportive	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Tend to support <input type="checkbox"/> Tend to hamper	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
32.	Direct participation (People's direct access and contact with the public services and government's consultation of people and when possible facilitation of direct participation in policy making and the execution of public decisions)	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Supportive enough <input type="checkbox"/> Not very supportive	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Tend to support <input type="checkbox"/> Tend to hamper	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	

E. THE MAIN ACTORS' POLITICAL WILL AND CAPACITY

Democracy is not just made up by the rules and regulations about the intrinsic means of democracy. It is also essential that people have the will and capacity to promote and use these instruments. Let us first identify the most important powerful and alternative actors.

34. Based on your knowledge and experience, which individual or collective actors are currently most powerful and have most important influence in the political process?

*Note: Please specify the **three most powerful actors**. Please give the name of each actor and categorise its at the most three most important backgrounds in order of importance, 1- 3.*

NO	27. POWERFUL ACTORS	
1	<p>Name:</p> <p>Background:</p> <p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Government/Bureaucracy</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Police and military</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Parliament (central+local)</p> <p>d. <input type="checkbox"/> Political parties</p> <p>e. <input type="checkbox"/> Religious or ethnic groups</p> <p>f. <input type="checkbox"/> Academicians, the judiciary/law firms, media</p> <p>g. <input type="checkbox"/> NGOs</p> <p>h. <input type="checkbox"/> Non class based mass organisations (Eg. Palang Merah Indonesia, Perkumpulan Keluarga Berencana Indonesia)</p>	<p>i. <input type="checkbox"/> Class based mass organisations (E.g. Trade unions/Peasants/Fishermen associations)</p> <p>j. <input type="checkbox"/> Business</p> <p>k. <input type="checkbox"/> Adat councils etc.</p> <p>l. <input type="checkbox"/> Semi-state or state-auxiliary bodies (E.g. KPU/D, Kommas HAM, etc.)</p> <p>m. <input type="checkbox"/> Underworld and militia</p> <p>n. <input type="checkbox"/> Others (please mention!)</p> <p>.....</p>
2	<p>Name:</p> <p>Background:</p> <p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Government/Bureaucracy</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Police and military</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Parliament (central+local)</p> <p>d. <input type="checkbox"/> Political parties</p> <p>e. <input type="checkbox"/> Religious or ethnic groups</p> <p>f. <input type="checkbox"/> Academe, the judiciary/law firms, media</p> <p>g. <input type="checkbox"/> NGOs</p> <p>h. <input type="checkbox"/> Non class based mass organisations (Eg. Palang Merah Indonesia, Perkumpulan Keluarga Berencana Indonesia)</p>	<p>i. <input type="checkbox"/> Class based mass organisations (E.g. Trade unions/Peasants/Fishermen associations)</p> <p>j. <input type="checkbox"/> Business</p> <p>k. <input type="checkbox"/> Adat councils etc.</p> <p>l. <input type="checkbox"/> Semi-state or state-auxiliary bodies (E.g. KPU/D, Kommas HAM, etc.)</p> <p>m. <input type="checkbox"/> Underworld and militia</p> <p>n. <input type="checkbox"/> Others (please mention!)</p> <p>.....</p>
3	<p>Name:</p> <p>Background:</p> <p>a. <input type="checkbox"/> Government/Bureaucracy</p> <p>b. <input type="checkbox"/> Police and military</p> <p>c. <input type="checkbox"/> Parliament (central+local)</p> <p>d. <input type="checkbox"/> Political parties</p> <p>e. <input type="checkbox"/> Religious or ethnic groups</p> <p>f. <input type="checkbox"/> Academe, the judiciary/law firms, media</p> <p>g. <input type="checkbox"/> NGOs</p> <p>h. <input type="checkbox"/> Non class based mass organisations (Eg. Palang Merah Indonesia, Perkumpulan Keluarga Berencana Indonesia)</p>	<p>13. <input type="checkbox"/> Class based mass organisations (E.g. Trade unions/Peasants/Fishermen associations)</p> <p>14. <input type="checkbox"/> Business</p> <p>15. <input type="checkbox"/> Adat councils etc.</p> <p>16. <input type="checkbox"/> Semi-state or state-auxiliary bodies (E.g. KPU/D, Kommas HAM, etc.)</p> <p>17. <input type="checkbox"/> Underworld and militia</p> <p>18. <input type="checkbox"/> Others (please mention!)</p> <p>.....</p>

35 Based on your knowledge and experience, which are the most important individual and collective actors who fight for a more equal division of power, for instance within the different issue-areas from which informants are recruited to this survey?

Note: Please specify the three most important alternative actors. Please give the name of each actor and categorise its at the most three most important backgrounds in order of importance, 1- 3.

NO	28. ALTERNATIVE ACTORS	
4	Name: Background: a. [] Government/Bureaucracy b. [] Police and military c. [] Parliament (central+local) d. [] Political parties e. [] Religious or ethnic groups f. [] Academe, the judiciary/law firms, media g. [] NGOs h. [] Non class based mass organisations (Eg. Palang Merah Indonesia, Perkumpulan Keluarga Berencana Indonesia)	i. [] Class based mass organisations (E.g. Trade unions/Peasants/Fishermen associations) j. [] Business k. [] Adat councils etc. l. [] Semi-state or state-auxiliary bodies (E.g. KPU/D, Komnas HAM, etc.) m. [] Underworld and militia n. [] Others (please mention!)
5	Name: Background: a. [] Government/Bureaucracy b. [] Police and military c. [] Parliament (central+local) d. [] Political parties e. [] Religious or ethnic groups f. [] Academe, the judiciary/law firms, media g. [] NGOs h. [] Non class based mass organisations (Eg. Palang Merah Indonesia, Perkumpulan Keluarga Berencana Indonesia)	i. [] Class based mass organisations (E.g. Trade unions/Peasants/Fishermen associations) j. [] Business k. [] Adat councils etc. l. [] Semi-state or state-auxiliary bodies (E.g. KPU/D, Komnas HAM, etc.) m. [] Underworld and militia n. [] Others (please mention!)
6	Name: Background: a. [] Government/Bureaucracy b. [] Police and military c. [] Parliament (central+local) d. [] Political parties e. [] Religious or ethnic groups f. [] Academe, the judiciary/law firms, media g. [] NGOs h. [] Non class based mass organisations (Eg. Palang Merah Indonesia, Perkumpulan Keluarga Berencana Indonesia)	i. [] Class based mass organisations (E.g. trade unions/Peasants/Fishermen associations) j. [] Business k. [] Adat councils etc. l. [] Semi-state or state-auxiliary bodies (E.g. KPU/D, Komnas HAM, etc.) m. [] Underworld and militia n. [] Others (please mention!)

36. It's basic to a democracy that the major actors are willing to apply it.

The actors' relation to the means of democracy: How does each of the actors that you have specified relate to the various formal as well as informal rules and regulations?

Note: Please mark only **one** alternative for each actor with [X] in a proper column.

- [1] Use and promote the rules and regulation
 [2] Use the rules and regulation
 [3] Use and manipulate the rules and regulation
 [4] Avoid or opt for alternatives

R/I category	Powerful actors			Alternative actors		
	Actor 1	Actor 2	Actor 3	Actor 4	Actor 5	Actor 6
1. Equal citizenship	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]
2. International law and UN HR instruments	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]
3. Rule of law & justice	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]
4. Civil and political rights (Freedom from violence and fear; freedom of speech, assembly, organisation, trade union activity, religion, belief, language and culture, and gender equality)	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]
5. Economic and social rights (The right of children, employment, social security and other basic needs, basic education, including citizen's rights and duties, and good corporate governance)	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]
6. Free and fair elections	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]
7. Good representation (Freedom and rights of parties and candidates; and their reflection of vital issues and interests, abstention from abusing ethnicity and religion, independence of money politics and powerful vested interests, membership based control, responsiveness and accountability to constituents, and ability to form an run government.)	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]
8. Democratic and accountable government (Appropriate decentralisation, transparency and accountability, capacity to fight militias, organised crime etc., independence from strong interest groups, capacity to fight corruption, independence of foreign intervention.)	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]
9. Freedom of media, press and academic freedoms (Freedoms, public access and the reflection of different views.)	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]

R/I category	Powerful actors			Alternative actors		
	Actor 1	Actor 2	Actor 3	Actor 4	Actor 5	Actor 6
10. Additional civil political participation (Participation and democratic character of civil society, <i>and</i> all social groups' access to participation in public life.)	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]
11. Direct participation (People's direct contact with public services, government's consultation and when possible the provision of direct democracy)	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]	[1] [2] [3] [4]

37. The actors' position (strong/weak) in relation to the means of democracy: Is each of the actors that you have specified in a strong or weak position to influence the various formal as well as informal rules and regulations?

Note: Please mark only one alternative for each actor with [X] in a proper column.

R/I category	Powerful actors			Alternative actors		
	Actor 1	Actor 2	Actor 3	Actor 4	Actor 5	Actor 6
1. Equal citizenship	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak
2. International law and UN HR instruments	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak
3. Rule of law & justice	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak
4. Civil and political rights (Freedom <i>from</i> violence and fear; freedom <i>of</i> speech, assembly, organisation, trade union activity, religion, belief, language and culture, <i>and</i> gender equality)	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak
5. Economic and social rights (The right of children, employment, social security and other basic needs, basic education, including citizen's rights and duties, <i>and</i> good corporate governance)	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak
6. Free and fair elections	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak
7. Good representation (Freedom and rights of parties and candidates; <i>and</i> their reflection of vital issues and interests, abstention from abusing ethnicity and religion, independence of money politics and powerful vested interests, membership based control, responsiveness <i>and</i> accountability to constituents, <i>and</i> ability to form an run	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak

R/I category	Powerful actors			Alternative actors		
	Actor 1	Actor 2	Actor 3	Actor 4	Actor 5	Actor 6
government.)						
8.Democratic and accountable government (Appropriate decentralisation, transparency and accountability, capacity to fight militias, organised crime etc., independence from strong interest groups, capacity to fight corruption, independence of foreign intervention.)	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak
9.Freedom of media, press and academic freedoms (Freedoms, public access and the reflection of different views.)	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak
10.Additional civil political participation (Participation and democratic character of civil society, and all social groups' access to participation in public life.)	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak
11.Direct participation (People's direct contact with public services, government's consultation and when possible the provision of direct democracy	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak	[1] Strong [2] Weak

38. It is also intrinsic to a meaningful democracy that the actors are not repressed, marginalised or uninterested but actively present in the major parts of the political terrain.

The actors' presence within politics: In what spheres of the political landscape is each of the actors primarily active?

Note: Please mark at the most two alternatives for each actor with [X] in the proper columns.

The Actors	SPHERES OF THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE									
	Business and industry	Small business	Self-managed non-profit units	Lobby groups	Interest organisations	Political parties	Elected government	The bureaucracy	The judiciary	Military and police
1	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
2	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
3	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
4	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
5	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
6	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]

NB! That within business and industry, for instance, an actor may not be a businessman but rather a worker who is active in his/her workplace; and within elected government, for another example, an actor need not be an elected politician but may also be an activist trying to influence the politicians.

39. Within this political landscape, a favourable power structure is not intrinsic for a meaningful democracy, but the conditions set the limits.

The actors' sources of power: In your assessment, what are the main actors' sources of power?

Note: Please mark at the most two alternatives for each actor with [X] in the proper columns.

The actors	Economic resources (e.g. capital, money, own-business, and labour, including the ability to block production)	Mass power/Political/ Military coercion (e.g. access to efficient organisations, ability to mobilise people, institutions of violence)	Social strength and favourable contacts (e.g. patronage, networks, family connections)	Knowledge, information (e.g. education knowledge of culture and religion , access to media, think tanks)
1	[]	[]	[]	[]
2	[]	[]	[]	[]
3	[]	[]	[]	[]
4	[]	[]	[]	[]
5	[]	[]	[]	[]
6	[]	[]	[]	[]

40. It is also not clear that a certain way of legitimating power is a necessary element of a meaningful democracy, but knowledge of the predominant ways in which 'raw' powers are transformed into authority and legitimacy is crucial when we wish to explain the problems and options of democracy.

The actors' way of legitimating their powers: How does each of the actors legitimate its sources of power to gain political authority and thus influence and control the political process and dynamics in your regional context?

Note: Please mark the answers with [X] in the proper columns. If there is any other ways, please explain briefly and clearly. Use separate sheet if necessary. Indicate at the most **three** alternatives for each actor!

Ways	Powerful actors			Alternative actors		
	1	2	3	4	5	6
a. By providing discursive activities within the public sphere through seminars, discussion, hearings	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
b. By providing contacts and dialogue with politicians and administrators at various levels	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
c. By providing and building networks and co-ordination for joint activity	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
d. By creating contacts and partnership with influential figures and experts	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
e. By being able to demonstrate collective and mass-based strength	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
f. By generating economic self-sufficiency, self-help activities, co-operatives, etc.	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
g. By gaining legitimacy through DPR, DPRD, the judicial system and/or the formal executive organs the state	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
h. By making use of various means of forceful official authority, coercion, demonstration of power and force as well as the generation of fear	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
i. By using state and government budgets other resources and regulations to the benefit of pro-market policies and various actors on the market	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
j. By providing patronage in various forms (including favourable treatment, loans, aid and charity) to for instance social groups, communities, civil society organisations (including NGOs) as well as to businessmen, relatives and other individuals	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
k. By organising support within communities	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
l. By gaining a popular mandate or getting elected	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
m. Others (please write down the detail below this table)	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]

Others: (actor 1 2 3 4 5 6)

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

41. Given these power conditions, it is intrinsic to a meaningful democracy, however, that people are able to turn those of their problems and concerns which they do not deem to be private into public political matters, i.e. to politicise the issues and interests. Both the content and character of these matters are thus crucial.

The actors' interests, issues, platforms and policies: What interests and issues brought together into platforms and policies do the actors try to promote or resist – and how would you characterise these interests, issues and/or policies?

Note to the interviewer: Write down briefly the informants' statements, and pick **one** of the available categorisations by marking [X] in the next column.

The actors	Content of interests, issues, platforms and/or policies	Type of issues/interests/policies [N] <i>Pick one for each actor!</i>
1		Specific issues or interests []
		The combination of several issues/interests []
		General concepts or ideas []
2		Specific issues or interests []
		The combination of several issues/interests []
		General concepts or ideas []
3		Specific issues or interests []
		The combination of several issues/interests []
		General concepts or ideas []
4		Specific issues or interests []
		The combination of several issues/interests []
		General concepts or ideas []
5		Specific issues or interests []
		The combination of several issues/interests []
		General concepts or ideas []
6		Specific issues or interests []
		The combination of several issues/interests []
		General concepts or ideas []

42. A vital related aspect is the capacity to communicate the issues, interests and policies.

The actor's method of communication: How do the actors typically communicate the issues and interests that they fight for?

Note: Please select at the most **two** predominant methods of communication for each actor.

NO	Method of communication	Powerful actors			Alternative actors		
		1	2	3	4	5	6
1	Writing books and articles	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
2	Performing in the media (radio, TV, internet, cultural performance)	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
3	Attending and giving speeches in public seminars/ meetings	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
4	Through personal contacts and networks	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
5.	Through organisations and their meetings and contacts	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
6	Others (please mention)	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]

Others:

.....
.....
.....

43. It is similarly intrinsic to a meaningful democracy that people are able to act collectively. This in turn calls for a capacity to include people into politics, primarily by way of mobilisation and organisation—i.e. to politicise the people,

The actors' mobilisation and organisation of people: How do the actors typically try to mobilise and organise popular support for the issues that you have identified in the previous question (no 42)?

Note: Please mark at the most **two** alternatives for each actor with [X] in the proper columns.

The actors	Popular and charismatic leaders	Clientilism (More or less authoritarian patron-client relations)	Alternative patronage (A powerful actor help people resist existing patrons)	Networks between independent actors	Integration from below of popular organisations into more general organisations
Actor 1	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
Actor 2	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
Actor 3	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
Actor 4	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
Actor 5	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
Actor 6	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]

44.. A related aspect of the inclusion of people into politics is the ability to organise collective political participation in a reasonably efficient way.

The actors' organising: What are the actor's main organisational methods?

Note: Select at the most two of the following methods for each actor and specify what people, groups and organisations that are applying the method that you have in mind.

No	Organisational method	Powerful actors		Alternative actors		
		1	2	3	4	5
A	Descriptive Connecting people from the same sex or age category (e.g. women, youth)	[] What people/group/organisation apply the method?	[] What people/group/organisation apply the method?	[] What people/group/organisation apply the method?	[] What people/group/organisation apply the method?	[] What people/group/organisation apply the method?
	
B	Ethnicity, religion, family, etc. Connecting people from the same religious or ethnic community or clan	[] What people/group/organisation apply the method?	[] What people/group/organisation apply the method?	[] What people/group/organisation apply the method?	[] What people/group/organisation apply the method?	[] What people/group/organisation apply the method?
	
C	Origin and residence (son of the soil identity) Connecting people from the same part of the province (<i>kabupaten</i> , neighborhood, <i>desa</i> , <i>desa</i> , <i>kecamatan</i>)	[] What people/group/organisation apply the method?	[] What people/group/organisation apply the method?	[] What people/group/organisation apply the method?	[] What people/group/organisation apply the method?	[] What people/group/organisation apply the method?
	
D	Hierarchical connecting levels Connecting people in different levels of government administration or central and local parts of organisation	[] What people/group/organisation apply the method?	[] What people/group/organisation apply the method?	[] What people/group/organisation apply the method?	[] What people/group/organisation apply the method?	[] What people/group/organisation apply the method?
	
E	Sector, profession Connecting people in a certain sector of business, workplace, profession	[] What people/group/organisation apply the method?	[] What people/group/organisation apply the method?	[] What people/group/organisation apply the method?	[] What people/group/organisation apply the method?	[] What people/group/organisation apply the method?
	
F	Visions, ideas, interests Connecting people with similar visions, ideas, and/or interests (e.g. anti	[] What people/group/organisation apply the method?	[] What people/group/organisation apply the method?	[] What people/group/organisation apply the method?	[] What people/group/organisation apply the method?	[] What people/group/organisation apply the method?
	

	corruption, human rights, environment, political ideology)	method?	method?	method?	method?	method?	method?
G	Personal network Connecting people with personal networks	[]	[]	What people/group/ organisation apply the method?	What people/group/ organisation apply the method?	What people/group/ organisation apply the method?	What people/group/ organisation apply the method?
I	Others (please mention!)	[]	[]	What people/group/ organisation apply the method?	What people/group/ organisation apply the method?	What people/group/ organisation apply the method?	What people/group/ organisation apply the method?

45. *In addition, reasonably efficient mobilisation and organisation call for alliances.*

Note: Write at the most **three** organisations and **three** individuals that each actor tends to enter into alliances with and then specify the background of the individual partners. For the possible character background of the individual partners, see the list below!

The actors	Alliance with organisations	Alliance with individuals	
		Name	Background (a) – (n) (see list below!)
Actor 1	1.	1.	1. [.....]
	2.	2.	2. [.....]
	3.	3.	3. [.....]
Actor 2	1.	1.	1. [.....]
	2.	2.	2. [.....]
	3.	3.	3. [.....]
Actor 3	1.	1.	1. [.....]
	2.	2.	2. [.....]
	3.	3.	3. [.....]

Actor 4	1.	1.	1.
	2.	2.	2.
	3.	3.	3.
Actor 5	1.	1.	1.
	2.	2.	2.
	3.	3.	3.
Actor 6	1.	1.	1.
	2.	2.	2.
	3.	3.	3.

Background OF INDIVIDUAL ALLIANCES:

- (a) Government/ Bureauacracy
- (b)Police and military
- (c) Parliament (central+local)
- (d) Political parties
- (e) Religious or ethnic groups
- (f) Academe, the judiciary/ law firms, media
- (g) NGOs
- (h) Non class based mass organisations (Eg. Palang Merah Indonesia, Perkumpulan Keluarga Berencana Indonesia)
- (i) Class based mass organisations (E.g. trade unions/Peasants/ Fishermen associations)
- (j) Business
- (k) Adat councils etc.
- (l) Semi-state or state-auxiliary bodies (E.g. KPU/D, Komnas HAM, etc.)
- (m) Underworld and militia
- (n) Others (please mention!)

Given that politicisation of issues and interests through policies and platforms as well as politicisation of people by way of mobilisation and organisation are necessary aspects of democracy, this calls for resources. To assess this we must first know what major parties or organisations that are related to the actors. Thereafter we can ask how the parties and organisations are financed.

46 **The actors' political parties/organisations:** What major political parties are the actors primarily related to? (If an actor is not primarily related to a party, indicate the other kind of political organisation that the actor is at first hand related to.)
Please specify!

Note: Please give only *one* political party/organisation for each actor.

Main Actors	Political Party (or political organisation)
Actor 1	
Actor 2	
Actor 3	
Actor 4	
Actor 5	
Actor 6	

47. The financing of the political parties and organisations: What are the main ways in which these parties or other political organisations (that were specified in question 46) finance their activities?

Note:

(1) Before you answer this question, please fill in your answer to the previous question on the first row in the table below!

(2) Please select at the most three predominant sources of political finance for each actor; then select one method related to each of these sources.

MAJOR SOURCES AND METHODS OF POLITICAL FINANCE		METHODS USED BY THE ACTORS/ POLITICAL ORGANISATIONS																				
		POLITICAL PARTY/ ORGANISATION OF ACTOR 1 (according to your answer to question 46)			POLITICAL PARTY/ ORGANISATION OF ACTOR 2 (according to your answer to question 46)			POLITICAL PARTY/ ORGANISATION OF ACTOR 3 (according to your answer to question 46)			POLITICAL PARTY/ ORGANISATION OF ACTOR 4 (according to your answer to question 46)			POLITICAL PARTY/ ORGANISATION OF ACTOR 5 (according to your answer to question 46)			POLITICAL PARTY/ ORGANISATION OF ACTOR 6 (according to your answer to question 46)					
NO	SOURCES	Funds	Equipment t etc	Voluntary labour	Funds	Equipment t etc	Voluntary labour	Funds	Equipment t etc	Voluntary labour	Funds	Equipment t etc	Voluntary labour	Funds	Equipment t etc	Voluntary labour	Funds	Equipment t etc	Voluntary labour	Funds	Equipment t etc	Voluntary labour
A	Official support from the government (E.g. official party-support)																					
B	Support from democracy-donors (E.g. for improved organisation & education)																					
C	Contributions from own activities, co-operatives or businesses																					
D	Contributions from own functionaries/ cadres																					
E	Contributions from own individual members																					
F	Contributions from own individual sympathisers																					

[illegible]

48. Finally among the intrinsic aspects of a meaningful democracy, people who are supposed to control public affairs on the basis of political equality must be able to manoeuvre within the political system and develop means of representation.


Certain institutions in a society are mainly for governance of matters that people have in common. We call them governance institutions. Some of the governance institutions are for private management, such as the market or the family. Other institutions are for joint self-management, such as co-operatives or self-help organisations. Yet others are state-auxiliary bodies like Komnas HAM and institutions for sub-contracted public governance – for instance joint government and civic ventures like public services leased out to a private bus company, private security guards, or private doctors and hospitals. Finally are the major institutions for public political governance, the judicial (e.g. the district court and the police), the political executive (e.g. the bupati), the legislative (e.g. the DPRD) and the public administration (the bureaucracy and the military).

Some actors may prefer to turn directly to the governance institutions, for instance because they participate in these institutions or by calling on a politician or visiting the bureaucrat in charge of a certain matter. However, there are also many institutions to represent and help people to reach and affect the instruments of governance. We call them mediating institutions. Some institutions are 'informal' – for instance patrons, communal (ethnic and religious) organisations, and neighbourhood groups. Others are in civil society (i.e. they are organised by citizens who can make use of their rights) – for instance NGO's, people's organisations, and experts, including media and academicians. Yet others are political societies, for instance parties, interest organisations and lobby and pressure groups.

The actors' strategies in the political system and related forms of representation:¹

1. To what governance-institutions do the most important actors turn to at first hand?
*Note: Please identify at the most **two** such institutions!*
2. How do the most important actors reach and affect the governance institutions? Direct and/or by what mediating institutions?
*Note: Please identify at the most **three** such ways!*

¹ In the figure one must not exclude the various institutional arrangements for direct or indirect representation that may be immediately attached to each of the governance institutions. In the present figure, it is only the legislative which is included. This makes it difficult to consider various forms of more direct participatory democracy. Further, it should also be specified more clearly what the direct relation implies in cases where people vote in so-called direct local elections. It may be that some informants deem this to be a case of direct linkage to the politicians in the governance institutions in spite of the fact that they are at least so far elected via the political parties.



The actors' strategies in the political system and related forms of representation: To what governance-institutions do the most important actors turn to at first hand? *Then*, how do the most important actors reach and affect the governance institutions? Direct and/or by what mediating institutions?

*Note: The informant is asked to point out **two** institutions/parties that most frequently used by each actor. Then, the informant should describe at the most **three** ways on how the actors come to the institutions/parties*

Actor 1 (powerful actor)

GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS		Direct	←----- MEDIATING INSTITUTIONS -----→									
		DIRECT	NGOs	People's organisation	Experts, incl media	Popular figures	Patrons and fixers	Communal groups	Neighbourhood groups	Political parties	Politically oriented interest organisations	Lobby/pressure groups
a. The judiciary (incl the police)	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
b. The political executive – (the government)	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
c. The legislative (e.g. DPRD)	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
d. The bureaucracy	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
e. The military	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
f. Auxiliary Bodies and Institution for Sub-contracted public governance	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
g. Institutions for self-management (e.g. cooperative)	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
h. Institutions for private management (e.g. the market, the family)	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]

The actors' strategies in the political system and related forms of representation: To what governance-institutions do the most important actors turn to at first hand? *Then*, how do the most important actors reach and affect the governance institutions? Direct and/or by what mediating institutions?

Note: The informant is asked to point out **two** institutions/parties that most frequently used by each actor. Then, the informant should describe at the most **three** ways on how the actors come to the institutions/parties

Actor 2 (powerful actor)

GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS		Direct	-----<----- MEDIATING INSTITUTIONS ----->-----									
		DIRECT	NGOs	People's organisation	Experts, incl media	Popular figures	Patrons and fixers	Communal groups	Neighbourhood groups	Political parties	Politically oriented interest organisations	Lobby/pressure groups
i. The judiciary (incl the police)	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
j. The political executive - (the government)	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
k. The legislative (e.g. DPRD)	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
l. The bureaucracy	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
m. The military	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
n. Auxiliary Bodies and Institution for Sub-contracted public governance	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
o. Institutions for self-management (e.g. cooperative)	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
p. Institutions for private management (e.g. the market, the family)	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]

The actors' strategies in the political system and related forms of representation: To what governance-institutions do the most important actors turn to at first hand? *Then*, how do the most important actors reach and affect the governance institutions? Direct and/or by what mediating institutions?

Note: The informant is asked to point out **two** institutions/parties that most frequently used by each actor. Then, the informant should describe at the most **three** ways on how the actors come to the institutions/parties

Actor 3 (powerful actor)

GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS		Direct	←----- MEDIATING INSTITUTIONS -----→										
		DIRECT	NGOs	People's organisation	Experts, incl media	Popular figures	Patrons and fixers	Communal groups	Neighbourhood groups	Political parties	Politically oriented interest organisations	Lobby/ pressure groups	
q. The judiciary (incl the police)	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	
r. The political executive – (the government)	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	
s. The legislative (e.g. DPRD)	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	
t. The bureaucracy	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	
u. The military	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	
v. Auxiliary Bodies and Institution for Sub-contracted public governance	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	
w. Institutions for self-management (e.g. cooperative)	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	
x. Institutions for private management (e.g. the market, the family)	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	

The actors' strategies in the political system and related forms of representation: To what governance-institutions do the most important actors turn to at first hand? *Then*, how do the most important actors reach and affect the governance institutions? Direct and/or by what mediating institutions?

Note: The informant is asked to point out **two** institutions/parties that most frequently used by each actor. Then, the informant should describe at the most **three** ways on how the actors come to the institutions/parties

Actor 4 (alternative actor)

GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS		Direct	←----- MEDIATING INSTITUTIONS -----→									
		DIRECT	NGOs	People's organisation	Experts, incl media	Popular figures	Patrons and fixers	Communal groups	Neighbourhood groups	Political parties	Politically oriented interest organisations	Lobby/pressure groups
y. The judiciary (incl the police)	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
z. The political executive - (the government)	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
aa. The legislative (e.g. DPRD)	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
bb.The bureaucracy	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
cc. The military	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
dd. Auxiliary Bodies and Institution for Sub-contracted public governance	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
ee. Institutions for self-management (e.g. cooperative)	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
ff. Institutions for private management (e.g. the market, the family)	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]

The actors' strategies in the political system and related forms of representation: To what governance-institutions do the most important actors turn to at first hand? *Then*, how do the most important actors reach and affect the governance institutions? Direct and/or by what mediating institutions?

Note: The informant is asked to point out **two** institutions/parties that most frequently used by each actor. Then, the informant should describe at the most **three** ways on how the actors come to the institutions/parties

Actor 5 (alternative actor)

GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS		Direct	<----- MEDIATING INSTITUTIONS ----->									
		DIRECT	NGOs	People's organisation	Experts, incl media	Popular figures	Patrons and fixers	Communal groups	Neighbourhood groups	Political parties	Politically oriented interest organisations	Lobby/ pressure groups
gg. The judiciary (incl the police)	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
hh. The political executive - (the government)	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
ii. The legislative (e.g. DPRD)	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
jj. The bureaucracy	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
kk. The military	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
ll. Auxiliary Bodies and Institution for Sub-contracted public governance	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
mm. Institutions for self-management (e.g. cooperative)	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
nn. Institutions for private management (e.g. the market, the family)	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]

The actors' strategies in the political system and related forms of representation: To what governance-institutions do the most important actors turn to at first hand? *Then*, how do the most important actors reach and affect the governance institutions? Direct and/or by what mediating institutions?

Note: The informant is asked to point out **two** institutions/parties that most frequently used by each actor. Then, the informant should describe at the most **three** ways on how the actors come to the institutions/parties

Actor 6 (alternative actor)

GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS		Direct	<----- MEDIATING INSTITUTIONS ----->									
		DIRECT	NGOs	People's organisation	Experts, incl media	Popular figures	Patrons and faces	Communal groups	Neighbourhood groups	Political parties	Politically oriented interest organisations	Lobby/ pressure groups
oo. The judiciary (incl the police)	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
pp. The political executive – (the government)	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
qq. The legislative (e.g. DPRD)	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
rr. The bureaucracy	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
ss. The military	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
tt. Auxilliary Bodies and Institution for Sub-contracted public governance	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
uu. Institutions for self-management (e.g. cooperative)	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
vv. Institutions for private management (e.g. the market, the family)	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]

49 *It is not only collective actors but also people themselves (individuals or small groups of individuals) that need to navigate the political system and seek forms of representation.*

To what more or less democratic institutions do individuals' or small groups of individuals go with their problems?: Based on your knowledge and experience, to what institutions do the ordinary people address their complaints and demands regarding public affairs?

*Note: Please just pick the **three** most important alternatives, and **rank them** according to their importance by writing 1, 2, 3, in the table below.*

- a. [] To media
- b. [] To self-management-NGOs (e.g. neighbourhood groups, community groups, ethnic and religious groups, co-operatives)
- c. [] To specific issue- and pressure/lobby groups (e.g. human rights, anti-corruption or environmental groups – in addition to study/research-groups)
- d. [] To interest-based popular organisations (e.g. trade unions, farmers' associations)
- e. [] To political parties
- f. [] Directly to elected politicians in legislative bodies on various levels
- g. [] Directly to elected executives on various levels
- h. [] Directly to the bureaucrats various levels
- i. [] Directly to the law enforcement institutions (the police, the military, the judiciary)
- j. [] To semi-government institutions such as Komnas HAM, KPK, KPU, KPUD, Ombudsman, etc.
- k. [] To informal leaders (patrons, communal leaders, religious- or ethnic organisations)
- l. [] Others. *Please specify!*.....

- END -

Thank you for contributing to this collective effort to try to improve the pro-democracy work through better knowledge of the problems and options!

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