Linking public action

Kerala's challenges in comparative perspective, in the year of the pandemic

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Abstract

Kerala's struggle against Covid-19, and for socio-economic recovery, has proved decentralisation necessary but also insufficient. The key questions are why stiff challenges occurred in the mid-2020 and what should be done? The essay argues, firstly, that although Kerala suffers less from clientelism and authoritarianism than many other parts of the world, and less from neo-liberal governance than even welfare states like Sweden, it is affected by a universal dilemma of how to unify numerous actors and build links between the local and wider government, economy and popular actions. This brings to mind unresolved challenges during Kerala's celebrated campaigns for decentralisation and participatory development, from the mid-1980s until the early-2000s. More positively however, the article also argues that some of the missing links may now be built in the very implementation of the state wide policies envisioned in the recent local election campaign and five-year budget – to combine, on the one hand, productive and job-creating welfare measures and, on the other, investments in infrastructure, education and value-added production towards inclusive knowledge based development. This is certainly no immediate recipe for how to contain the virus with better-orchestrated measures, but in a longer perspective, the roadmap is supported by positive experiences from elsewhere of forming broad alliances to forge and implement wide welfare policies that foster production. Thirdly, though, the comparative insights indicate also that success calls for democratic partnership governance. This remains a challenge in Kerala.

The problem

Kerala has again testified to the importance of decentralised governance and public action. During the floods in 2018 and 2019, local governments combined state support with their own resources and those of civil society, facilitating, for example, the participation of fisher folks and other volunteers in the rescue work. Similarly, in fighting the Nipah in 2018 and the Corona in 2020, Left Front Health Minister Mrs K.K. Shailaja and her team, backed by Chief Minister Pinarayi Vijayan and Finance Minister T.M. Thomas Isaac among others, could immediately, from January, support and rely on local governments and civil society in containing community transmission and 'flattening the curve'. The measures included

education of the residents, tracking the spread of the viruses and organising local quarantine along with the provisioning of food and welfare, especially for vulnerable sections of the population. (Chathukulam and Tharamangalam 2020; Heller 2020; Isaac and Sadanandan 2020; Menon et al. 2020; Rahul and Ranjith 2020)

From April and May 2020, however, numerous challenges occurred that were difficult to handle locally. We shall return to the details, but the hurdles indicate how the necessary decentralised governance and action is insufficient and in some respect problematic. Comparative insights point to two basic dilemmas. Firstly, the political and economic context. Secondly, whether and how it is possible to link local governance and public action to wider arenas and efforts.

This essay focuses on the links and joint actions, given that they are also crucial to improve the contextual conditions. Most excitingly, after several months of uphill efforts to handle the challenges, the Kerala Left managed by late 2020 to design a way of linking the local and broader efforts. Not so much with regard to the struggle against the Covid-19 as such, but, equally important, when it comes to the social and economic challenges. The new links were initiated within the framework of comprehensive welfare, development and job creation policies – which in turn paved the way for electoral advances. This dynamic support the results from comparative studies, indicating that similar priorities are potentially unifying and transformative. But first the general challenges.

Context matters

Decentralisation and local action do not make sense in all contexts. In Sweden, for example, it is now clear that privatisation (including subcontracting) and New Public Management have undermined impartial and democratic local governance of public welfare. In particular, neo-liberal governance is responsible for the appallingly high death rates in the decentralised care for the elderly in the old age and nurse homes as well as in the ambulating services to the old people who stay in their residences. Unsuitable premises, small stocks of protective equipment and medicine, sloppy routines, understaffing of medical doctors and senior nurses, as well as poor education and precarious work conditions, especially for the low paid assistants, made it impossible to protect the elderly from the extensive community transmission. (Törnquist 2020; Report of the Swedish Corona Commission) Sweden's deterioration in these respects is much sharper than, for example, Norway's and Finland's.

Similarly, as discussed elsewhere in this anthology, decentralised governance and public action suffer often from ethno-nationalism, as in Eastern Europe, religious-nationalism as in the case of *Sangh Parivar* in India, in addition to clientelism, neo-patrimonialism and at times warlordism, like in the Middle East and North Africa. Much the same applies to the processes of decentralisation in Indonesia and the Philippines combined with political bossism. (E.g. Nordholt 2004, Nordholt and van Klinken 2007, Rodan 2018) Usually, top down intervention as in parts of East Asia or in Bonapartist France, is also no solution. The same applies to party dominance, as under the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa and the previous dominance of the Left Front in West Bengal.

Some of all these hurdles are present in Kerala too, but to a lesser extent, as its decentralisation and public action benefit from a comparatively favourable long history of social-religious reform movements and popular based public action for equal citizen rights and land reform. (Tharakan 1998; Törnquist and Harriss 2016a)

The primacy of links

The second and less often talked of general dilemma, however, is as important in Kerala as elsewhere. It relates to the links between the local and wider government, economy and popular actions. Building such links is not easy. Even the authoritarian Chinese Communist party was unable to coordinate development in the scattered people's communes in what Vivienne Shue (1994) called a "cellularised" economy, and therefore conceded to Deng Xiaoping's market reforms, which nourished collusion between politicians-cum-party people and businesspersons. So the key question is whether there are democratic alternatives.

Disintegrated public administration – the case of Sweden

As I have pointed out elsewhere, not even the celebrated Swedish public administration and welfare state have stood tall. (Törnquist 2020) In addition to being undermined by privatisation and New Public Management, especially, as already mentioned, in the case of the care for the elderly (confirmed by the official Swedish Corona Commission 2021), much of the solid although at times rigid state direction, along with partnership governance, has been decentralised to semi-autonomous regions and municipalities with councils elected in conjunction of the general elections. This political and economic devolution may sound fine, but multi-level governance makes is hard for people to find out who is responsible for what, keep politicians and administrators responsible and cast their vote based on sufficient information. Moreover, the central government and state authorities have proved short of

power to address crises such as the pandemic. The constitution does not allow for central direction, even during apparent emergencies (aside from war like situations). Most operational responsibilities are with 21 different regions, which in turn are not always well coordinated, and suffer from poor synchronisation with the municipalities. Hence, it was difficult to decide on and implement quick radical measures to contain the virus, such as testing, tracing and selective lockdowns to reduce the high rate of transmission. When the government and central authority in charge finally insisted on massive testing and tracking, implementation stumbled over confused governance and limited capacities, even though central funds were made available. Similarly, while the care for the elderly is to be handled by the municipalities, the regions remain responsible for the medical care, which they have neglected – and the coordination is bad. To make things worse, the regions and municipalities have their own central confederation, which is not part of public administration, not subject to rules on democratic transparency and impartiality, and often serves as an employer organisation and pressure group.

This is not to argue in favour of central statist commands and complete lockdowns, as have been the practice in many other countries, usually without better results. In fact, Swedish citizens, especially those of some age, have obeyed public recommendations to the same extent as in most European countries that have imposed compulsory measures. The major causes for the Swedish debacle are instead new public management and that poor linkages between the various parts of the public administration have reduced the capacity to decide on and quickly implement preventive measures, provide medical services, protect the elderly, and conduct mass testing and tracking.

Top-down rights agenda with poor links – the case of India

Another important insight may be illustrated with the impressive rights reforms in India during the centre-left Congress governments 2004-2014. (Ruparelia 2013, Harriss 2016, Törnquist 2021) The National Advisory Council under Sonia Gandhi facilitated numerous social activists, concerned scholars and administrators. The reforms included the Right to Information Act, which mandated government agencies to release information about their activities to citizens upon request. The remarkable Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) ruled that adults in every rural household had the right to 100 days of waged-employment from the state. The Recognition of Forest Rights Act gave tribal communities the right to traditionally cultivated land and protected and conserved forests. Another law was

making education for children under 14 free and compulsory and the Food Security Act aimed to provide subsidised food to some two-thirds of the population.

There were certainly several problems. One was that much of the support was targeted, not universal, which reduced the enthusiasm among the growing, aspirational middle classes, for whom there was not much in the programmes. Another was that the rights and welfare measures neglected health and education. Yet another was that the reforms were separated from the liberal economic policies rather than designed to transform them into a welfare-based economic strategy. But the immediately most fundamental hurdles related to implementation. The reforms suffered from the generally poor standard of public administration. The 2011 bill on citizens' right to timely delivery of goods and services, and redressal of their grievances was never enacted, only applied in several states in quite watered down forms. (Chakravarty 2021) Equally serious, the grassroots were rarely organised. As well put by political economist John Harriss (2016), the impressive schemes were more top-down than anchored in the experiences and commitments of the progressive popular movements and organisations. In other words, the linkages with the grassroots were inadequate. Following the Left's poor performance in the 2009 elections, activists and beneficiaries could not do much to improve things. This impotence worsened after the BJP gained power in 2014 and even diluted the right-programmes – largely relying instead on a divisive popular base and semi-private relief through the *Sangh Parivar*.

Popular development from below – the case of Kerala

In some contrast, the Kerala activists and concerned scholars had done better already from the mid-1980s. They started with more thoroughly based civil society campaigns such as for literacy, group farming and resource mapping, in cooperation with sympathetic politicians and administrators. This was followed in the mid-1990s by decentralisation and the People's Planning Campaign. Both were to foster change from the bottom up – based on local priorities and governance, within the framework of general instructions from the State Planning Board. Equally important, there was new democratic space for popular action, beyond party-partisan organisations and to reinvent them. (Isaac and Franke 2000; Törnquist 1995 and 2021)

It is true that some corruption was also decentralised in this process, that the institutionalisation of popular participation was delayed, that production was not prioritised on the ground, that the development seminars were closed down after some time, and that the attendance in the *gram sabhas* diminished. Mostly the middle classes stayed away, including

unemployed educated youth, as there was little for them in the targeted benefits. Finally, from the 2000 local and 2001 state assembly elections, political leaders and parties hijacked the process, and the focus on negotiated local unity based on welfare and development priorities was undermined.

In-spite of this, not everything was lost. Until today, much of the state's planning budget remain for local development and there are functioning village, block and district governments. The state as well as people can relate to them. There are also myriads of local issue and interest associations and some of the popular action has survived, especially the women's *kudumbashree* labour groups with 4,5 million members in about 300.000 neighbourhood groups. (Heller et al. 2007; Isaac 2014; Rajesh 2020; Törnquist 2021; Martin 2021) As noted in the beginning of the essay, Kerala's struggle against the floods as well as the Nipah and Corona viruses proves how crucial the new decentralised governance, local popular space and public action really are. To contain Covid-19, local health authorities and civil society joined hands for several months by informing citizens of how to avoid the virus, tracking infection, arranging local quarantine, providing food and welfare and initiating economic self-help projects. This was remarkably successful – and based on equal civil rights and democracy. (Chathukulam and Tharamangalam 2020; Heller 2020; Isaac and Sadanandan 2020; Menon et al. 2020; Rahul and Ranjith 2020) Leaders and activists acquired world fame. (E.g. Spinney 2020)

However, while the rights activists in New Delhi (2004-2014) who started from above and prioritised broad reforms suffered from insufficient implementation through the local governments and base among the grassroots, the Kerala campaigners (1980-2000) who started from below and benefitted from solid grounds never managed to fully to link their local foundations and actions with wider programmes. The latter deficiency became obvious again by April and May 2020 during the struggle against the Covid-19 – when local action proved insufficient. (Chathukulam and Tharamangalam 2020; Törnquist 2020) Most obviously, there was a need by then for broad state-level welfare schemes to guarantee people's livelihood and support production. Further, local action could not handle the increasing conflicts with the central government of how to control the health status of the huge numbers of migrants returning home. There had to be wide joint measures, beyond the communities, to fight the increasing community transmission of the virus and handle the extensive travel in face of the *Onam* harvest festival. Recommendations on social distancing and mobility to contain Covid-19 were overstepped which in some cases called for police intervention. Meanwhile,

moreover, local elections were on the horizon, so it was hard for politicians to insist on strict discipline; and party partisan priorities and lack of unifying overall policy priorities disrupted joint local action against the pandemic. On the state level, the handling of sensitive individual health data was politicised and issues beyond the urgent common challenges were blown up in media, such as a gold smuggling case involving a secretary of the Chief Minister. (E.g. R. Krishnakumar 2020a, 2020b, 2020c) By early 2021, community transmission in Kerala was among the highest in the country. (Maya 2021) In short, the initial local containment of the pandemic had not been followed up with sufficient state-wide measures and coordination.

Unresolved hurdles

As already indicated, these dynamics brought to mind crucial unresolved problems during the bottom-up struggle for popular development, from the late 1980s until the early 2000s. (Törnquist 2021, for general analysis) One is that even though there are now many more local development oriented associations and action groups that address various grievances (Velayudhan 2020), their prime rationale is still not to link with groups and issues in other local settings; and when they try it is difficult. The major partial exception is the *kudumbashree* groups. Meanwhile, the synergies with the 'old' organisations and movements related to production and work, such as unions and farmers organisations remain poor. Historically they used to provide the much needed linkages, but have for decades been subordinated to the priorities of political parties and lost their focus on popular development and universal welfare.

Similarly, the original focus on issues that can be addressed and resolved locally still makes it hard to consider the linkages with the 'outside world', including broader markets, modern economic development, the extensive labour migration and remittances. Similarly, there is no formula for comprehensive planning including both public and private assets, resources and investments. The ideological priority of the grassroots oriented activists was to shape and expand 'non-capitalist' spheres of popular development, maybe as a step towards people's communes. But building local alternatives was difficult to combine with struggles to tame and alter the wider frameworks where capitalism remained dominant. And while there was a general model for relating central and local planning, this was mainly about general principles and the primacy of local needs and resource mobilisation. This was fine in many ways, but it remained unclear how the local priorities would fit into a broad transformative reform programme, if any, that could link actors, sectors and multiple levels of governance.

New roadmaps?

In theory, some of the missing links may certainly be constructed by centralist and high-handed means. This seems to have been important in the most successful cases of containing Covid-19. It is true that the efficient actions in East Asia were rarely by force. Nor were they in the form of complete lockdowns, as frequently attempted in Europe. These were only applied where contagion went 'out of control'. The successful countries relied instead on experiences and infrastructure from the previous containment of SARS. The main methods were early, speedy and continuous mass testing and contact tracing, along with the common instructions about physical distancing, extreme hygiene and quarantine. However, efficient implementation in these respects seems to have called for centralised apparatuses with undisputed authority to collect personal data and information of networks to trace people and instruct them on how to behave. (An 2020; Kheng 2020; Sundrum 2021)

Are there more liberal and democratic ways of coordinating resources and actors? Kerala managed through local public action, until it had to be coordinated and supplemented on a wider scale. Generally in the Global South, and increasingly often elsewhere too, such as in the United States, impartial democratic governance is rare. The efficiency and trust in the usual links between state and society – through the public administration and the judiciary, political parties and leaders, related organisations, media and networks – is limited.

One useful historical insight is the rise and character of the equal citizenship rights in Scandinavia. (Harriss and Törnquist 2016; Sandvik 2016; Svensson 2016; Trägårdh 2007) This did not only rest with the relative independence of propertied farmers and their role in pre-democratic local governance, along with the church, gentry and bourgeois. From the rapid industrialisation in the second part of the 19th century and onwards, when the local format proved inadequate in the provisioning of relief to the increasingly many impoverished labourers, and when popular self-help was also insufficient, there had to be universal welfare state programmes. Still, the labour movement in particular did not want to reinvigorate the 'bourgeois state apparatuses', run by authoritative bureaucrats. So a system of partnership was negotiated with regard to policy development and implementation. This was based on democratic representation of the concerned organisations among employers, labourers and professionals, along with impartial administrators and independent experts. And it was combined with a system of public committees (often inclusive of the same partners) to prepare government proposals and wide consultations on the same. For half a decade, this partnership governance generated vibrant and stable links between state and society, central

and local – and coordination of actors. As a complement to the liberal parliamentary democracy.

The Scandinavian partnership model may still be a source of inspiration, but obviously it cannot serve as a blueprint. For one, it rested with high state capacity, strong democratic, national organisations and favourable governments – all of which being endangered spaces in the Global South, even in Kerala. In fact, these preconditions have been undermined in Scandinavia too, especially in Sweden, from inside by 'iron triangles' and weakened popular movements, from outside by neo-liberalism. (Therborn 2018, Törnquist 2021)

Yet, there are also signs of openings. In the comparative research that I have been involved in, they relate primarily to struggles for broad reforms in favour of welfare based development. (Törnquist and Harriss 2016b; Törnquist 2021)

The Kerala twist

Let us return to Kerala in the mid-2020 and onwards, when there were good reasons to be concerned about the problems of scaling up the initially successful local public action to contain Covid-19. (E.g. Krishnakumar 2020a, 2020b, 2020c, Chathukulam and Tharamangalam 2020, Törnquist 2020) The problem was not only administrative and organisational links and coordination in the very containment of the virus, especially the rising community transmission and the need for large scale testing and tracing. In particular, it was also about increasingly many people without employment and livelihood, adding to the already high rate of unemployment, especially among educated youth. Meanwhile the hostile right wing nationalist government in New Delhi made every effort to reduce the capacity of the Kerala government. And the upcoming local elections in December meant that all kinds of mistakes and different priorities were blown up – from cases of corruption among leftist leaders and a scam involving a principal secretary of the Chief Minister, to increasing party politicisation of popular and civic organisations at the local level.

However, the dynamics were altered. The main reason seems to have been the effort of the Left Democratic Front (LDF) to prioritise the combination of state financed and coordinated welfare, and job-generating production reforms, with local contributions and implementation; plus to include liberal allies, and trust in candidates with good records from joint social and development work. (For example, 70% of the seats reserved for women in the local bodies are reported to have been won by *Kudumbashree* members. (Martin 2021)) This response to the multiple crisis of health, livelihood and development did not solve the very Corona problem,

but it addressed people's social and economic problems by connecting various parts of the central and local public governance, and it obviously caught the imagination of numerous activists and the wider electorate. The outcome was a compelling electoral victory in-spite of all the hardship, and the harsh critique from New Delhi as well as the local opposition. The Left sustained it remarkable results from 2015 (with a clear majority of the *grama* and block *panchayats*, even 11 of the 14 district *panchayats*, still less than half the number of municipalities but crucial advances in the major cities). (E.g. Krishnakumar 2020d, Kerala Bureau (2020); Wikipedia 2020; Philip 2020)

Equally important, the politically successful combination of, on the one hand, welfare and inclusive development policies, and, on the other, state level direction and local contributions, paved the way the drafting of a similarly even more visionary long term budget; backed up by the State Planning Board and vigorously presented by Finance Minister T.M. Thomas Isaac in a three hour long speech in the parliament. This may serve as a basis for a manifesto for the May 2021 Assembly Elections in terms of what Isaac calls "a new edition to the Kerala Model". (The Hindu 15.01.21) As compared with the efforts at local priorities, self-help and resource mobilisation in the 1990s, the new reforms focus on supplementing local public action with, for example, electronic platforms for temporary jobs, and combining it with major state-driven investments in infrastructure, education and training, along with private investments in value-added production. To thus bet on the educated youth and promote internationally competitive and environmentally sustainable 'knowledge based development'. (Anand et al. 2021, News Click 15.01.21) Beyond the reliance on remittances from migrant labourers in unsustainable oil based Gulf economies.

Comparative encouragements – and worries

Promisingly, the Kerala opening reminds of those in other contexts. Even in parts of the Global South such as in Indonesia, with weaker and more fragmented civic and popular organisations, it proved possible for a decade to build broad local and national alliances of unions, informal labour groups as well as CSOs and politicians behind comprehensive welfare and development reforms. The best example is probably the successful campaign for the national public health reform in the early 2010s. (Djani et al. 2017; Törnquist 2021)

Yet, there are also worrying lessons from the Indonesian and international developments. (Törnquist 2021) One is that there need to be a chain of transformative reform programmes. In Indonesia, the leading actors and related think tanks did not prepare a follow up reform. So

the broad alliance and transformative process came to a halt. Another stumbling block is that paradigmatic models call for adaptation in other settings. Among others, the social democratic growth strategy from Scandinavia, also adopted by the International Labour Organisation, presupposes good capacity to create new jobs when old disappear as a result of social pacts to combine improved productivity with better conditions for the labourers who keep their jobs. Consequently, the model is less fruitful in countries with huge numbers of informal labour and unemployment, tragically illustrated by South Africa. In these contexts there must also be forceful supplementary policies to generate more, decent and important jobs. (Nattrass and Seekings 2019) Encouragingly, this seems be a priority in the new Kerala plans. (Anand et al. 2021, News Click 15.01.21)

The other major worry, however, applies to Kerala too. This is that there must be inclusive negotiations with all major partners that are affected, to design, finance and implement welfare based development reforms; including employers as well as unions – plus organisations among informal labour and professionals. In addition, the policies need to be comprehensive rather than separate. Talks about minimum wages, for example, are harder if one cannot also consider employment conditions, job creation and welfare programmes.

This did not happen in Indonesia. (Törnquist 2021) There was no framework to negotiate general agreements on wage levels, employment conditions and welfare measures. And there was poor representation of the parties concerned, especially from among unions and organisations of informal labourers. The unfortunate substitute was leftist and rightist populism, and transactional deals, followed by confrontations and losses for the progressives in particular.

Kerala might

In Kerala, the struggle for decentralised public action and development was guided by the State Planning Board, which provided instructions about consultations and broad agreements on local priorities. There were less focus on comprehensive policies and planning. Beyond public investments, it was difficult to also consider private assets and resources, as well as the economy outside the local settings and co-ordination of local popular action in wider arenas. Fortunately, some of this may now be addressed in the context of the state-wide welfare and economic reforms that are indicated in the five year budget plan. In other words, the crucial links between local and wider government, economy and popular actions may be built in the very process of designing and implementing the reform programmes. But the remaining

challenge is to also create a format for partnership governance of the comprehensive reform programmes. How shall all concerned partners participate and contribute. There is no forceful developmental state at hand, as once in South Korea. Are there democratic alternatives?

One dilemma, then, is the scattered and party-partisan character of interest and issue organisations at the side of labour as well as capital, reducing the feasibility of the Scandinavian model. Another challenge is how to improve the welfare and education system, so that they become more supportive of production, and transformative at that. Yet another hurdle is the unavoidable negotiations on finance and investments. This is particularly sensitive in view of the West Bengali Left's concessions to big capital and subsequent demise. In addition, Kerala has no currency of its own, limited rights to tax and borrow, and is constrained by an unfriendly central government. (Cf. Oommen 2021) Innovative solutions are necessary in these respects, involving partnerships between public and private actors. As widely admitted under the pandemic around the world, it is absolutely necessary to stimulate crisis ridden economies with promising potentials, even by debt-financing, as long as it does not cause high inflation and when priority is given to 'self-liquidating' social and economic investments.

But the deals and social pacts need to be democratically anchored – among people in general as well as entrepreneurs. Including, in the case of Kerala, to weather the predictable storms from New Delhi. In my understanding, these issues of governance have been given very little attention as compared to the economic and educational priorities, most recently at the State Planning Board's impressive international congress "Kerala looks ahead" (2021). Given the progressives' previous emphasis on democratic participation, it would be a contradiction of sorts, and a possible source of instability, if the necessary negotiations and agreements were to rest with individuals within the government, leading party and expert committees.

Conclusion

The struggle against Covid-19, and for fair socio-economic recovery, illustrate, again, that decentralised governance and public action are necessary but also insufficient. Partly this is because of the prevalence of clientelistic, authoritarian or neo-liberal governance in many contexts, including in the previously celebrated Swedish welfare system. Yet, even in Kerala the strong elements of democratic and participatory local government and public action, which helped containing the pandemic for several months, were not enough. There was also a second and universal dilemma – how to unify numerous actors and build links between the

local and wider government, economy and popular actions, without resorting to centrist and authoritarian means. These challenges remained unresolved since the implementation during the 1990s of democratic participatory governance and planning.

Paradigmatic models of democratic partnership governance such as from Scandinavia are still useful as sources of inspiration but cannot be copied, given insufficient requirements such as high state capacity and strong unified national organisations among the parties concerned. But while short of sufficiently solid organisations, one may instead commence (and strengthen such organisations as well as impartial and efficient administration) on the basis of policies and alliances to foster comprehensive reforms. There are positive experiences from the Global South of forming broad alliances for the development and implementation of welfare reforms, like the universal public health reform in Indonesia. A similar opening may be the priorities of the Kerala progressives in face of the late-2020 local elections, and in the subsequent long-term budget. The envisioned reform programme combines, on the one hand, state provisioning of welfare, and job-generating reforms, and, on the other, investments in education and training, infrastructure and value-added production – in cooperation with local governments and civil society as well as private entrepreneurs, towards inclusive and sustainable knowledge based development. Thus, there is a potential to build the necessary links between local and wider government, economy and the concerned partners – in the very process of designing and implementing a comprehensive reform programme. Yet, the remaining challenge is to also shape a democratic format for partnership governance of the programmes so that all concerned partners can participate and contribute, including in matters of finance.

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